International Handbook of Urban Policy, Volume 1
Contentious Global Issues

Edited by

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Preface

When I was initially approached to compile a volume that could serve as an international handbook on urban policy the number of deserving themes soon exceeded the realistic limits of one volume. This is therefore the first of what is expected to become a series of volumes. Generally, themes were chosen for their relevancy in the global urban policy arena. In books of this nature, editors are tempted to find contributors whose views broadly correspond or if there are differences, do not deviate too far from one another. In this volume the approach was the complete opposite. Some of the themes selected for the book have attracted a great deal of debate over the years and in those respects, prospective contributors were purposely targeted for their known differences of opinion on those matters, hence the subtitle: ‘Contentious Global Issues’. In such cases authors were asked not to shy away from controversy. The purpose of the approach was twofold: to provoke healthy debate for the sake of putting on record arguments that are often wished away by opponents on both sides of current divides, and second, to cover themes that would be of interest to a wide readership and would do justice to an international handbook of urban policy.

The volume is divided into five parts. The introduction and concluding chapters form the first and last parts of the book. The second part deals with urban morphology and structural issues. Urban sprawl versus urban densification, location in economic space and urban restructuring are the three main issues being addressed here. The question whether market-driven urbanization or enforced urban densification holds the most benefits for society over the longer term has attracted enormous attention from the academic community over the past two decades and still does. Closely tied to this theme is that of the disappearing urban–rural divide in parts of the developed and developing worlds. Both are politically loaded issues. Main arguments for and against the two forms of urban development are offered on both sides of the debate in this book. What impact globalization had on the redistribution of economic activities and what knock-on effects these patterns had on the economic transformation in former communist countries are the other two issues looked at in this part of the book.

Social and economic inequality in urban areas has always been a contentious issue. The third part of the book deals with these and other related social topics. As politically loaded concepts, urban poverty and the unequal distribution of wealth are looked at from different angles in this volume. In one chapter social exclusion is looked at from a European perspective. In others, the mobility of people, socially and in terms of their redistribution internationally, is being looked at. Migration is becoming an increasingly sensitive political issue worldwide, and the patterns of crime, terrorism and the fear of violence that are sometimes linked to it are regarded as very important factors, shaping people’s perceptions about urban living today. It is these factors that give ‘place’ a special meaning in today’s urban space.

The fourth part of the book covers a variety of urban policy issues focusing on urban sustainability. The issues that are covered range from spatial and organizational integration of urban management, to infrastructure, to environmental management issues.
Some of the most prominent researchers in each of the fields covered in this volume were approached to contribute – a list from which the editor is obviously excluded! To do justice to the idea of an international handbook, authors were asked not to write exclusively for the advanced student but to provide enough basic material to enable the novice to connect the dots in the various fields. It is hoped that, collectively, the chapters of this volume, as well as those that will follow, will provide some new insight into the width of the range of issues that impact urban policy today – insight that may open up new areas of research in the future.

Based on the selection of themes and the way in which the contributors handled the material the book should be of interest to the layman, but in particular to scholars in the fields of social science, economics, geography, regional studies and planning.

I want to thank the chapter authors and co-authors for their dedication as well as the professional way in which the staff of the Edward Elgar Publishing Company handled the production process. A final word of appreciation goes to Philip Geyer, Hestelle Stoppel and Saakirah Jeeva who assisted with the initial grammar and computer editing of the book.

Manie Geyer
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PART ONE

POLICY APPROACHES
1 Approaches to urban policymaking: a framework

B.J.L. Berry

Prologue
The world reached a milestone in 2006 when the United Nations formally acknowledged that more than three billion people, half the global population, lived in urban areas. Yet another burst of technological innovation is not only producing greater transnational global interdependence and extraordinary immediacy of interchange, it is both propelling and is propelled by unparalleled flows of capital and labour. Capital moves with lightning speed to take advantage of earnings opportunities, promoting both seedbeds of innovation and the relocation of routinized activities to low-wage areas. Movements of people are channelled from rural to urban areas within the least developed countries, transnationally towards the major urban centres of the most developed nations, and within developed nations, where there is no longer any discernible urban–rural divide, from traditional urban cores into former small-town and rural peripheries.¹

Global interdependence and the new scale of city-systems raise fundamental questions about the role of national urban policy. It has been said that policy without implementation is hallucination (to which the extensive discursive urban policy literature bears witness). For there to be effective implementation there must be closure between means and ends. Increased global interdependence means that the possibility of achieving such closure at the national level has vanished, and what is left for any distinctively ‘urban’ policy are the traditional place-based domains of public service delivery and city and regional planning, especially land use regulation and design. As more parts of the globe become completely urbanized every national policy becomes a national urban policy because there are few spaces left that are not part of multiple urban systems.

This was already apparent a quarter-century ago in the United States when a committee of the National Academy of Sciences, on which I served, wrote that:

Urban policy resists precise definition. Historically, it has been considered (among other things) a component of subnational regional policy; a euphemism for much of domestic social policy; an umbrella term describing policies designed to deal with places; and as programs specifically addressed to the physical, fiscal, and social afflictions of central cities. The National Urban Policy Act of 1970 suggest(ed) that urban policy should encompass almost every aspect of domestic policy. Each of the . . . three [subsequent] administrations . . . defined urban policy differently, within the terms of that law. The Nixon Administration argued that urban growth policy should be a part of overall national growth policy, but the Carter Administration, responding to 1977 amendments to the law, confined its attention to . . . distressed central cities. (Committee on National Urban Policy, 1982, p. 1)

Not anticipating the speed with which spatial reorganization of the United States was to occur, we went on to say:

While this debate over definitions is intriguing, it tends to be somewhat circular . . . [T]here has been no consensus about the outcomes desired of urban policy. The policy history of the past
several years suggests that it may be more useful to think of urban policy as a search for an overall positive net effect by public policy on the economic, social, and physical conditions of urban settlements [italics added]. Labeling a policy as urban is not as important as understanding the consequences of a range of policies for urban conditions and attempting to reconcile those intended and unintended effects with the central aims of the policies so as to have a positive net effect. National urban policy is not a specific collection of actions so much as it is one strategic perspective on public policy [italics added]. (Committee on National Urban Policy, 1982, pp. 1–2)

The notion of a strategic perspective is still an important one, but it leaves open the question of what now is an urban settlement in a world that is urbanized in the more traditional senses of the term. The postmodernists may well be correct: the nineteenth-century dichotomy between the urban and the rural, between stateways and folkways, has long passed; what has replaced it is amorphous and pliable, given only to a temporary pattern that changes as quickly as it is perceived – to switch metaphors in a manner to which the postmodernists would object, a complex system that can and does change rapidly and in unexpected ways. The question then is whether policies can be implemented that will nudge change towards desirable ends.

The crisis of agency
All societies are engaged in such nudging – in continuous efforts to realize the values that are lodged within their cultures. These efforts may include attempts to achieve the goals acknowledged within the culture to be desirable; to link society, economy and polity into a coordinated mainstream; to deal with deviations from accepted standards by devising regulatory mechanisms; and to develop means of coping with externally generated change. The primary mechanism is that of the political agency of the state. This can take two forms, the state functioning either as the central actor imposing a presumed collective will, or as the guarantor of the aggregate outcomes of individual choices. The first, the domain of the corporatist state, carries with it the dangers of rigid regimentation and arbitrariness. The second, the world of the free enterprise system, is often beset by the challenges of change and the unintended consequence. It is no surprise that radical theorists point to what they call a crisis of agency: global interdependence reduces the possibility of the means–ends closure necessary for social engineering and biases the playing field towards the complex open system, which implies a pressure towards the American policymaking model and to change and greater uncertainty (Bull, 2005; 2006).

The American policymaking model
To understand the American urban policymaking model it is necessary to understand the underlying cultural predispositions. The underlying belief in American society is that individuals should be free to pursue whatever activities they please, to live and work where they will and to spend their incomes as they see fit, because locked into the personality of each American at an early age is the drive to succeed, and the expectation that this is to be achieved by their own efforts. Solutions to both individual and collective needs will be found, according to this belief, in the private sector, where the free interaction of buyers and sellers determines the appropriate levels of production and consumption at mutually agreed-upon prices, and results in efficient resource allocation. Market processes are expected to provide new jobs, rising real incomes, better housing, improved quality of life and opportunities for self-enhancement, provided there is adequate mobility of labour
and capital to be able to respond to changing opportunities, tastes and resource availabilities.

If the American mainstream is essentially private, driven by the individual efforts of millions of Americans, integrated and regulated by market mechanisms, and able to adjust because of the flexibility provided by mobile capital and labour, what then is the role of the state? Throughout American history, Hegel's two contending views have been debated. The classically mainstream view is that government should intervene only to protect liberty and to establish the necessary conditions for the full development of individual talents by regulating relations between individuals and by administering public goods (such as common defence), limiting governmental intervention to those matters whose effect on others is so direct and substantial that they should be regulated by democratically elected governments. The contending view is that public officials should attempt to achieve a greater good by requiring individuals to conform to more centralized dictates, and by social engineering of outcomes that the marketplace would not normally deliver.

In the United States the pendulum has swung back and forth between these positions. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, Roosevelt's New Deal brought massive growth of government accompanied by increased regulation, aggressive social engineering via centrally directed public investments, and included an expanding array of redistributive programmes in which progressively more private wants were redefined as publicly guaranteed entitlements. American government thus went far beyond its role as a facilitator, supportive of a political economy based upon free enterprise and democratic pluralism, and, following the European model, became increasingly corporatist in orientation and operation, progressively more intrusive into and directive of the lives of individual Americans as attempts (culminating in Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programmes) were made to create an American welfare state.

This was countered in the 1980s by the Reagan Administration, committed to reasserting the roles, rights and responsibilities of individual Americans and reversing the drift to socialism, producing a new consensus about the essential role of the state, namely:

1. to assure certain public goods, such as common defence and foreign policy;
2. to ensure proper functioning of the economic mainstream by ensuring that contractual obligations between individuals are met, that information is freely available to buyers and sellers and that undue concentrations of economic power that would result in higher prices, fewer services and less participation in the economy than if competition prevailed are prevented;
3. to promote growth by facilitating the resource mobility that is essential if flexible adjustments to change are to take place, by removing barriers that prevent participation in the mainstream and result in underutilization of resources (examples: barriers of language, inadequate education, isolated subculture and poor health) and by setting limits to market fluctuations and cushioning their consequences;
4. to maintain minimum levels of service to those population groups unable through no fault of their own to participate effectively in the mainstream;
5. to ameliorate adverse side-effects of development when the full social costs are not reflected in market prices, as in the case of the long-term health effects of environmental pollution.
As this latter view of the role of the American state took hold, three separate paths were debated in the nation’s search for a national urban policy. The first involved the effort to achieve coherence with respect to principles and objectives. Such coherence was embodied within the three overarching objectives of the Reagan Administration: reducing the federal presence by returning decision responsibilities and tax sources to the states and localities; restoring the national economy to a trajectory of sustained real growth; and curbing inflation by reducing federal deficits. The second was more corporatist, imported from Western Europe, and centred on the proposition that the federal government should play a strongly prescriptive role in influencing the distribution of population across the landscape. The third was that of adaptation – the idea that the proper role of government at all levels should be to find ways of generating the variety that is essential to successful response to change.

Coherence and adaptability emerged as the defining characteristics of national urban policy. Prescription was rejected as inconsistent with mainstream beliefs, part of the New Deal mindset that was being left behind. Coherence was guaranteed by commitment to the basic values that underlie the American way of life:

- that responsibility for economic and social welfare is divided between the private and public sectors;
- that private choices power the mainstream;
- that the role of the public sector is to support mainstream growth, regulate away undesirable deviations and enable those outside the mainstream or left behind in backwaters to seek out the currents of growth.

Adaptability emerged from the content of these activities:

- changing the incentives that power the mainstream to nudge the flow in the directions of innovative new growth;
- smoothing the mobility of capital and labour to speed readjustments to increase overall efficiency and growth;
- regulating to keep the mainstream on track;
- encouraging local initiatives to increase the number and variety of responses to changes in the social and economic environment;
- and finding ways to bring by-passed or underutilized resources into full and productive use and simultaneously increase national welfare.

Very few of these activities (with the exception of fiscal measures to shift incentives) were necessarily federal: the national urban policy thus was to be composed of a variety of private and public ventures at a variety of scales, local, state and federal. There was to be an essential devolution of many functions to lower levels of the federal system. There were to be increases in local and private initiatives and partnerships. And above all, there was to be the lifting of the heavy hand of central control to let local initiatives take root and to encourage individuals to experiment, take risks and perhaps to flourish.

The outcome has been an amalgam of three types of policy, mainstream, regulatory and ameliorative. Mainstream policies have worked to support growth, to create opportunity, and to make economic and geographic mobility pervasive throughout society. They are
therefore concerned with such things as the flows of capital and labour from one economic sector or region to another, and with the creation of new capital and more productive labour. In a society with high levels of technical skills, this implies promotion of research, development and innovation on the one hand, and education and professional development on the other, to keep the frontiers of new growth healthy. Such activities may be national, regional or local. At the national level they include tax policies that shift relative prices and create incentives for capital to flow into faster growth sectors and to support research and development into tomorrow’s technologies while at the state and local levels there has been greater concern for training and education.

Regulatory policies have continued to be designed to keep growth and development within politically acceptable bounds. At the national level, antitrust, international trade, and transportation regulations have been designed to foster competition. Environmental regulations have sought to prevent negative externalities that can impair the health of affected populations and the efficiency of the mainstream. At the local level, land use regulation remains the principal tool by which growth is channelled to desirable locations and unsafe or unhealthy development is prevented.

To complete the troika, there also have been ameliorative policies designed to address the problems of people and places left behind by the shifting frontiers of growth, and those afflicted by negative externalities. As in nature, the economic mainstream tends to leave backwaters in its course, areas where the current is not so swift, population subgroups separated from the mainstream when new currents rechannel the flow, and those negatively affected by some of the by-products that are carried. Those who do not share fully in the system through no fault of their own may become a drag on it, but at the same time are a product of it and become its responsibility. The areas that are left behind do not grow, and may even decline and develop dysfunctional lifestyles. Ameliorative policies attempt to combat such dysfunctions by providing mobility and by directly combating social pathologies. Of particular concern as the mainstream has moved to higher levels of technology and demanded more sophisticated human resources is whether an underclass is being perpetuated that is unable to participate in the mainstream. This underclass is primarily concentrated in the central cities.

It bears re-emphasizing that each of these types of policy falls short of the social engineering favoured by central planners. Some are the domain of the judiciary rather than the legislative or administrative branches of government. Few are the exclusive domain of the federal level and none point directly and explicitly to anything that might be termed a national urban policy. When mainstream growth has been of primary concern, urban policy has been viewed as a facet of overall growth policy. When redistribution to support places and social groups that have been left behind has been of greater concern, urban policy has been equated with programmes narrowly targeted on declining central cities. In both instances, national concerns have been overlaid on a substratum of state economic development programmes and local urban planning concerned with attracting tax base, regulating land use and encouraging innovative design.

A range of variants
The American policymaking model lies at one end of a spectrum of approaches to urban policymaking and planning. In a previous work I thought I could discern several divergent paths in twentieth-century urbanization that resulted from these different approaches
to policymaking and different roles of the state, and I offered a fourfold taxonomy. I quote:

The most common is simply ameliorative problem-solving – the natural tendency to do nothing until problems arise or undesirable dysfunctions are perceived to exist in sufficient amounts to demand corrective or ameliorative action. Such ‘reactive’ or ‘curative’ planning proceeds by studying ‘problems’, setting standards for acceptable levels of tolerance of the dysfunctions, and devising means for scaling the problems back down to acceptable proportions. The focus is upon present problems, which implies continually reacting to processes that have already worked themselves out in the past; in a processual sense, then, such planning is past-oriented. And the implied goal is the preservation of the ‘mainstream’ values of the past by smoothing out the problems that arise along the way.

A second style of planning is allocative trend-modifying. This is the future-oriented version of reactive problem-solving. Present trends are projected into the future and likely problems are forecast. The planning procedure involves devising regulatory mechanisms to modify the trends in ways that preserve existing values into the future, while avoiding the predicted future problems. Such is Keynesian economic planning, highway building designed to accommodate predicted future travel demands, or Master Planning using the public counterpoint of zoning ordinances and building regulations.

The third planning style is exploitive opportunity-seeking. Analysis is performed not to identify future problems, but to seek out new growth opportunities. The actions that follow pursue those opportunities most favourably ranked in terms of returns arrayed against feasibility and risk. Such is the entrepreneurial world of corporate planning, the real-estate developer, the industrialist, the private risk-taker – and also of the public entrepreneur acting at the behest of private interests, or the national leader concerned with exercising developmental leadership, as when Atatürk built Ankara . . . It is in this latter context . . . [that] the concept of strategy planning was developed.

Finally, the fourth mode of planning involves explicitly normative goal-orientation. Goals are set, based upon images of the desired future, and policies are designed and plans implemented to guide the system towards the goals, or to change the existing system if it cannot achieve the goals. This style of planning involves the cybernetic world of the systems analyst, and is only possible when a society can achieve closure of means and ends; i.e. acquire sufficient control and coercive power to ensure that inputs will produce desired outputs.

The four different planning styles have significantly different long-range results, ranging from haphazard modifications of the future produced by reactive problem-solving, through gentle modification of trends by regulatory procedures to enhance existing values, to significant unbalancing changes introduced by entrepreneurial profit-seeking, to creation of a desired future specified ex ante. Clearly, in any country there is bound to be some mixture of all styles present, but equally, predominant value systems so determine the preferred policy-making and planning style that significantly different processes assume key roles in determining the future in different societies. (Berry, 1973, pp. 178–9)

Any treatise on urban policy must recognize that these different modes of intervention persist and are associated with different policy preferences across societies and cultures. But the typology was developed almost four decades ago and much has affected the ability to choose. With the collapse of communism and the overthrow of other totalitarian regimes, the ability to achieve sufficient means–ends closure to permit centralized goal-oriented planning has waned, with the fourth mode giving way to the third as new oligopolistic regimes emerge in which there are close partnerships between central government and the big businesses that have replaced state enterprises. There is tension, too, surrounding the allocative mode as the rigidities of the corporatist model constrain adaptation to change in welfare states, and as globalization limits means–ends closure.
The twentieth-century ideal of national urban policy thus has been thrust aside by the pace of change and by new patterns of interdependence, and to the extent that there is urban policy that is likely to secure some modicum of means–ends closure it is local, and both topic- and place-specific, with great variety in the objects for which policies are developed and the nature of the policies themselves.

The purpose of the chapters that follow is to cast light on this new variety and on its causes and consequences, with the hope of identifying the principal issues that need to be resolved in the attempt to shape policymaking in the much-changed world of the twenty-first century, and the principal channels by which policies are proposed and implemented to affect urban space and the residents of the world’s urban systems.

Notes
1. Berry (1993) and Chapters 2, 3, 7 and 12 in this volume.
2. This opposition is laid out in Hegel’s (1952) theory of the state.

References
Introduction

Many current urban policy discussions focus on concerns over ‘urban sprawl’. The term is usually left undefined except by way of contrasts with abstractions such as ‘orderly’, ‘well planned’ or ‘compact development’. But cities are complex organizations, still largely driven more by market forces than by the expansion of regulations. Urbanization has been key to the evolution from subsistence levels, especially but not limited to the last century (DeLong, 1999).

How do cities contribute? Two simple questions suggest a quick answer. Are there more positive or more negative externalities in the modern economy? That question is easily answered by posing another question. Why are there cities? Locators compete for sites and site owners compete for locators. Competition extends among and across cities. Cities succeed and prosper as long as they are attractive places to live and work – and innovate (Jacobs, 1961; Hall, 1998). However, spatial concentration is also costly. Yet these costs are acceptable as long as location at any site confers marginal benefits greater than marginal costs.

The urban sprawl critique is problematic because, as we will show, it ignores how and why cities exist, function and prosper. There has been a mound of research on the case for and against sprawl. Rather than repeat this discussion, this chapter will approach the issue from a more philosophical perspective by contrasting the principles of markets and consumer sovereignty with those of interventionism and even social engineering as represented by viewpoints such as expressed in the Charter of the Congress of New Urbanism.

What do we know?

General principles

The fundamental principles of economics form the basis of our discussion. Resources are scarce and their highest and best use poses a difficult challenge. This is a dynamic problem because circumstances quickly and invariably change. Market exchange in a context of clear and credible property rights has been shown (theoretically and empirically) to be the best remedy. It respects and incorporates the many trade-offs that buyers and sellers continuously evaluate and re-evaluate. There is what Von Hayek (1967) called order without design.

But governments that create the environment for property rights can also restrict them. They typically do so in the name of redistribution or limiting external diseconomies. Yet these actions are inevitably politicized and often fail. Market participants, on the other hand, are rewarded when they discover ways to reduce transactions costs and/or expand property rights. In so doing they expand the ambit of the exchange economy and contribute
to increasing prosperity. Globalization and the many ways in which we routinely transact over the Internet are only the latest of many examples.

Economic growth has also been shown to be the most powerful anti-poverty device. We also know that people treat each other better when economies grow and prosper (Friedman, 2005). Also, growth is good for the environment, as suggested by the environmental Kuznets curve (Kahn, 2006).

**General principles and cities**

Economic freedom and prosperity reinforce each other in a virtuous cycle (Bhalla, 1994; Hanson, 2000). But when we add cities as a third pole in the creation of the wealth, several important points emerge. First, urbanization and increasing prosperity have gone hand in hand for centuries. This is because cities take form in such a way that the economies of agglomeration dominate the associated congestion costs. The question of whether there are more positive or more negative externalities in the world is neatly answered by the question, why are there cities? Realized external costs are minimized and realized external benefits are maximized. The idea of agglomeration economies is broad enough to include settings that facilitate inventiveness and successful entrepreneurship. Cities are characterized as ‘engines of growth’ because they are likely to be the congenial hosts to entrepreneurial activity. And this is a dynamic concept because, as tastes and technologies evolve, new urban forms are in demand, including the modern decentralized ones. Spatial order without design occurs.

Second, cities almost everywhere have been decentralizing for as long as we have records. In the latter half of the twentieth century, upwards of 90 per cent of the developed countries’ large metro areas’ growth was in their suburbs. The reasons are not hard to understand. Transportation and communications costs keep falling. This expands the range of location choices and allows greater space consumption. As incomes rise, there is greater demand for space and it is facilitated by the cited evolution. This means that metropolitan regions are actually the engines of growth. We are now in the ‘Age of the Great Dispersal’ (Brooks, 2004), and the cities and their hinterlands are inseparable economic units (Rappoport, 2005).

Third, capital and labour are increasingly mobile, causing cities to compete. Cities do so successfully to the extent that they can offer attractive and competitive urban forms with access to specialized sets of buyers and sellers that may be unique to each locator. Without an amenable urban structure, land and transportation costs rise, limiting further attraction and growth. Flexible and open land markets are essential.

Fourth, national economies also compete, and we have already mentioned that successful metropolitan areas are seen as their engines of growth because they can be congenial hosts to entrepreneurial activity. Solow’s (1956) Nobel Prize-winning growth equation has prompted considerable work by economists attempting to shed light on his unexplained growth residual. Better specifications of human capital and capital services (including public infrastructure) have been proposed. The nature of cities, where most economic activity now occurs, is surely an important facilitator of growth and success. The trouble is that analysts have been unable to develop simple measures of efficient urban forms. Neoclassical urban economists have, instead, applied themselves to analysing optimal urban sizes but efficient urban forms, including the capacity to realize them as circumstances require, matter much more. Efficient urban scale denotes a static idea and
is essentially useless in growth discussions, while the idea of adaptive urban form is helpful because it is dynamic.

Fifth, central planning does not work. The international performance record is clear and supports the Von Mises (1933)–Von Hayek (1935) view that central planning is impossible. Economies are too complex. They succeed insofar as local knowledge is the basis of decentralized decision-making. This decision-making involves considerable foresight and planning – and underlies society’s ability to provide for the future. In a competitive setting with clear property rights, private action and economic freedom are essential to progress and prosperity. The role of political leaders should be restricted to guaranteeing economic freedom. However, the development process in US cities is politicized.

Sixth, market participants have incentives to internalize externalities. It is profitable to expand the scope of the exchange economy. This is why entrepreneurs search for ways to lower transactions costs and to clarify property rights. Where any remaining external costs are dealt with by central planners, there is the risk of politicization, rendering the benefits uncertain.

Seventh, and implicit in the previous six, everyone plans, not simply those who claim the title ‘planner’. Everyone is engaged in multi-period calculations, and markets mediate the plans of large numbers of individuals. The plans of entrepreneurs have a unique status because they are specialized in the important work of innovation and discovery. When it comes to cities and urban land, the prime entrepreneurs are developers and we expect them to discover the highest and best uses of sites for the simple reason that this is how they perform well. They cultivate and have access to specialized local knowledge, which no city planner can be expected to have. When developing more than just one parcel, it is also in the developer’s interests to arrange land uses efficiently, in ways that result in potential external benefits being realized and potential external costs being avoided or minimized. When engaged in these projects, developers also have an incentive to discover how common areas and facilities (and associated common area management rules) augment nearby land values. Because these activities have benefits over a defined spatial ambit, their benefits are capitalized in land values. There are then price signals and market exchange instead of market failure. Over the past 30 years, approximately 55 million Americans have moved into private communities (Nelson, 2005). Research shows that they will pay a premium for governance by a homeowners’ association (Agan and Tabarrok, 2005). Nevertheless, inefficient policies can thrive in democracies. Public choice economists highlight the fact that interest groups emerge to expropriate resources. Median voter analysis suggests that ‘homevoter cities’ often enact land use policies that are inefficient (Fischel, 2001).

**Does the congress of new urbanism offer policy guidelines?**

There are many critics and criticisms of urban sprawl. Perhaps the most articulate and widely cited single statement of the position is the Charter of the Congress of the New Urbanism (http://www.cnu.org/charter), summarized below. The CNU charter, to its credit, does not evoke the most extreme of the anti-sprawl criticisms (that it is the cause of obesity, stress, high blood pressure [there is even a book and a website titled Sprawl Kills], poverty, unemployment, racism, sexism, etc.). Nevertheless, reflecting on the CNU Charter’s 27 principles is a useful expository device to discuss issues on which there is
substantial research and an almost endless variety of opinions. First, let us quote part of its preamble.

The Congress for the New Urbanism views disinvestment in central cities, the spread of placeless sprawl, increasing separation by race and income, environmental deterioration, loss of agricultural lands and wilderness, and the erosion of society’s built heritage as one interrelated community-building challenge . . . We advocate the restructuring of public policy and development practices to support the following principles: neighbourhoods should be diverse in use and population; communities should be designed for the pedestrian and transit as well as the car; cities and towns should be shaped by physically defined and universally accessible public spaces and community institutions; urban places should be framed by architecture and landscape design that celebrate local history, climate, ecology, and building practice.

The preamble suggests a degree of spatial determinism associated with undue optimism about the power of spatial policies and social engineering. This approach conflicts with the economic principles discussed above. The 27 principles of the CNU platform elaborate the arguments at three spatial levels: the region, the neighbourhood and the block and its buildings. A brief summary is given below.

At the regional level, metropolitan regions are made up of multiple centres, and the metropolitan region is the ‘fundamental economic unit, but is located in an agrarian landscape’. In consequence, infill development is preferable to peripheral expansion, which eats up farmland.

At the neighbourhood and district level, a jobs–housing balance in mixed use neighbourhoods is preferable to bedroom suburbs. Attention should be given to equity considerations, including the promotion of affordable housing. Transportation alternatives (such as transit, cycling and pedestrianization) should be encouraged to reduce dependence on the automobile. Metropolitan revenue sharing is also an important goal. Neighbourhoods and districts should be linked by corridors (especially transit corridors), although they should also be compact, mixed use and pedestrian-friendly.

Housing diversity (by type and price) can contribute to neighbourhood diversity. Architecture and design codes can play an important role. The provision of open space is critical. A balance needs to be struck between safety and accessibility. Civic buildings play an important role in promoting community identity. Resource-efficient heating and cooling methods should be used. Historic preservation is a key societal goal.

Much of the rest of this chapter is commentary on some of the CNU’s Charter principles in light of the arguments expressed earlier in the chapter.

Many of the world’s great cities (Paris, London, New York, Prague, San Francisco, Budapest, Vienna, St Petersburg and many others) grew up along waterways and then straddled them in response to successful growth. Cities grow when they find spatial arrangements by which agglomeration economies dominate associated congestion costs. This is how and why they become engines of regional and national growth.

Metropolitan areas do have multiple centres; in general, the larger the metro, the more centres. However, Lee (2006) reports that for the largest US metros in 2000, about 78 per cent of job opportunities are dispersed outside identifiable job centres; the traditional downtowns account for an average of 7 per cent of the jobs while secondary centres account for 15 per cent. Workers outside the subcentres had, on average, the shortest (one-way auto) commutes (27.2 minutes); the longest commutes were experienced by the
downtown workers (37.1 minutes), while those working in subcentres reported an average commute of 28.5 minutes. Stronger agglomeration economies in centres generate high productivity that creates the high salaries that compensate for the longer commutes, but centres also have many low-wage service workers who do not reap these benefits.

The idea of the metropolitan region as a ‘fundamental economic unit’ agrees with our view. Inter-governmental cooperation is widely practised because it is productive, especially with respect to regional facilities (airports, sewer plants, drainage projects etc.). It only becomes problematic when it becomes enshrined as a regional super-government that limits competition between local governments. Charles Tiebout described this type of competition as a market mechanism that creates a ‘quasi-market’ for local public goods (Tiebout, 1956).

Land markets are irreplaceable as a means for allocating scarce sites (locations) to their highest and best uses. This is a dynamic process, responsive to changing economic conditions. No one can predict with certainty how cities should look or evolve. An open-ended process is required for local knowledge (at any time and place) to coalesce as signals that make it possible for hospitable environments to form (Ikeda, 1997; Pennington, 2002).

Farmland at the urban edge eventually has its highest and best use in some urban land use. There is no shortage of farmland or farm products in developed countries; most are coping with crop surpluses rather than shortages. Problems arise when residents at the city’s edge use their political influence to zone nearby undeveloped land as urban growth boundaries. This usually deprives the owners of nearby farmland of property rights and also limits housing supply.

The idea of imposing a geometrically neat urban edge may appeal to some but it ignores land markets. The cover of Robert Bruegmann’s recent book on sprawl (2006) shows a satellite image of the ‘Flemish Triangle’, including much of northwestern Belgium (including Ghent and Antwerp and their suburbs). It is not atypical. No one looking at such images can be clear about where town and country meet.

There will always be infill opportunities to be seized by opportunistic developers when growing communities near the metropolitan edge become mature enough to require local commercial or industrial facilities that had previously been unprofitable. Blurred urban edges permit an economically efficient timing of sequential development.

Organization occurs all the time but, perhaps, not of the type that CNU planners favour. Employers and employees have always managed to find each other. The terms of their engagement have many attributes, including where the work takes place. Demand and supply of labour are the consequences of many trade-off evaluations, made by both employers and employees. Most employees make more complex residential choices than simply minimizing the journey to work. One of the most unproductive ventures by urban economists has been the measurement of ‘wasteful commuting’, for example, commutes that are more than the minimum. The ‘jobs–housing balance’ idea is naive insofar as there are myriad variations of jobs, skills and residential choices. No planner can hope to balance them somehow within some defined spatial confines.

We live in a world of complex trade-offs. Joseph Schumpeter famously noted that most economic progress involves ‘gales of creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942). Very few cities can survive as large-scale museums and most of the ones that do are the old central districts of old world cities, and even these usually have large suburbs around them. Most
cities have a future primarily because they are open to change and adaptation. Spatial flexibility makes for hospitable environments for entrepreneurial activity.

Housing affordability problems are primarily because of supply constraints, often imposed by planners (Quigley and Raphael, 2005). Other authors have evoked the concept of the ‘welfare city’, where welfare-dependent populations receive minimal incomes to maintain old and durable housing (Glaeser et al., 2005). However, people of all incomes have much better prospects where open-endedness facilitates entrepreneurial success.

As people around the world enter the middle class, they almost always aspire to own a car. Income predicts both auto and home ownership. Most people like the automobile because it offers personal mobility and faster door-to-door travel times. They view collective mobility (public transit) as an inferior good. As metropolitan origins and destinations become more dispersed, transit becomes even more inferior. Transit commuting in the United States was little more than 12 per cent in 1960 and then fell more or less steadily, dropping to 4.7 per cent in 2000. This decline occurred while governments at all levels were providing hundreds of billions of dollars of subsidies. Also, as more women enter the labour force and there are more two-worker households, people increasingly link errands to work trips. Chained trips, especially if they involve shopping, are impractical if done on foot or by bicycle (Lee et al., 2006).

Competition is beneficial. City managers left to themselves often develop cooperative agreements when needed and jurisdictions (counties and cities) create special districts when required. They coordinate but still compete. The mantra that ‘regional problems require regional governments’ ignores all this and suggests a cartel. If competition were to be wholly abandoned in the name of ‘cooperation’, a key element of checks and balances to limit politicians’ power would be sacrificed.

A large part of the privatization of municipal services has been the move to private communities. A parallel movement has been into small cities, often referred to as ‘homevoter cities’ (Fischel, 2001). In either case, governance becomes focused on the maintenance of residential land values. These activities encourage citizen interest because neighbourhood quality is correctly viewed as a collective good.

Von Hayek asserted (1935), and events demonstrated, that top-down planning is impossible to implement successfully. Assertions of one-size-fits-all planning principles ignore this important point. The economy, including its spatial organization, is complex.

Conventional transit and taxis in US cities are government-sponsored monopolies. These interests have stood in the way of more affordable and more user-friendly transit innovations. Transit vouchers for the poor and the elderly, for example, redeemable with any bonded provider, could result in more attractive options. In practice, vanpools and jitneys (share taxis) are typically opposed to the point of being driven underground by the established and protected providers. For reasons already elaborated, very few people use transit. It is, therefore, unlikely that transit stations can be poles of development. There is almost no good example of successful transit-oriented development (TOD) projects in the United States. Roads and parking should be properly priced, in light of the opportunity costs of the space taken at the particular time and place (Shoup, 2005; Roth, 2006; Richardson and Bae, forthcoming).

In a profit-and-loss system, not all housing types are feasible in all areas. Interpreting local market conditions are activities best left to the specialists, private developers. It is inconceivable that this difficult task could be better done via a political process.
Similarly, the nature, size, location and density of centres and subcentres are best left to the market. Developers, left to their own devices, will create centres for the simple reason that most people are attracted to opportunities to interact with others. They also have a keen interest in creating centres that are most likely to be successful at any particular site.

Where do the design codes come from? Top-down planning suffers from two well-known fatal problems. Top-down planners do not have as much local knowledge as bottom-up planners (primarily the entrepreneurs). Also, top-down planning is likely to be politicized.

The use of ‘should’, which permeates the CNU principles, is not helpful in the absence of consideration of opportunity costs.

Many social spaces are privately owned and operated. The Starbucks idea (in fact, an import from abroad) is that many people are ready to pay premium prices for coffee if they can enjoy it in a social space that provides private but shared use spaces. It is likely that many social interactions occur in Starbucks-type places and private shopping malls, often referred to as lifestyle centres. Being privately provided, they are much more likely to cater to local tastes and preferences. Both architects and developers can be counted on to cater to local tastes and circumstances. However, they do so in the context of competition; development is a very decentralized field, with literally hundreds of thousands of independent firms. Their first priority is to gain the favourable attention of their clients. Most designers follow the precept of local innovation. But the blanket insistence on employing home-grown anything evokes the well-known costs of autarchy. Literature and commentary to fill whole libraries have been developed since the time of David Ricardo to show that we are better off by specializing and being open to the import of cheaper and/or better imports. Local designers can learn from practice here, there and everywhere.

Many people seek gated communities for reasons of privacy and security. The very rich have always done so, but many others who can afford such barriers now seek them. The privatization of security is a response to the failings of conventional law enforcement (see Chapter 10 in this book). Consumers and their suppliers can be counted on to trade off security and safety and accessibility and openness. They do so in response to specific circumstances in ways that are much more complex than the simple CNU admonitions.

Recent research suggests that suburbanites have a richer community life than others (Brueckner and Largey, 2006). Also, travel surveys show that central city and suburban residents in the United States engage in very similar social trip-making (Gordon and Richardson, 2000)

CNU pleads for ‘resource-efficiency’. While it does reflect what markets are supposed to achieve, we prefer to drop the adjective. We know that ‘energy-efficiency’ and many other similar terms are problematic. All resources are scarce. We rely on markets to reveal opportunity costs and trade-off opportunities. This is how we economize on all resources. Despite the increasingly frequent pleas for alternative energy sources, windmills, for example, remain a very expensive way to generate kilowatt hours.

Conclusions
The CNU recommendations appeal to top-down planner/designers and leave little room for consumer sovereignty. We live in a complex world where the tastes and wants of a highly diverse population must be accommodated. Top-down planner/designers have no
idea how to do this. Also, not everyone shares the designer tastes of the CNU. Some people may be content to live with simpler design standards in pursuit of some other of life’s pleasures. Most of the CNU recommendations are subject to the criticism that they believe in a world of minimal, if not zero, trade-offs. This is a dubious luxury in a world of scarcity. The exchange economy organizes a complexity that nothing can replace. Resources are channelled to where they satisfy a large variety of tastes. There is considerable order without design and this profound truth has never been grasped by the CNU members.

There are many ‘smart growth’ plans in several states and multiple jurisdictions that try to incorporate many of the ‘new urbanist’ concepts referred to in this chapter and elsewhere. These plans have been in vogue for almost two decades in the United States but there is little evidence that they have had much impact. The built environment is highly durable and the settlement pattern would be slow to change even if smart growth principles had unanimous support among planners, developers and households. Most newer developments tend to be more attractive and better designed, but this is primarily the result of increased wealth. Suburbanization has melded into exurbanization and the dominance of the auto continues (Berube et al., 2006). People are voting with their feet (and their wallets) and letting it be known that most of them still favour places and settings that may not meet the CNU guidelines (although housing in New Urbanist communities earns a premium; Eppli and Tu, 1999; Song and Knaap, 2003). Tastes may be slowly changing towards more compactness (Nelson and Dickens, 2006, argue that the ageing of the population will over the next 20 years create a demand for a different type of housing) but, if so, the market will respond to it.

Note

1. For a good and impartial summary of arguments for and against sprawl and anti-sprawl see Boarnet and Crane (2001).

References

3 Defining ‘urban’: the disappearing urban–rural divide

A.G. Champion

Introduction

For those concerned with urban policy, it is axiomatic that there should be an understanding of, and indeed agreement about, what the ‘urban’ refers to and, equally, what urban policy is not designed for. The traditional approach takes this dichotomous form using a place-based classification, with separate policy packages being developed for the urban and the rural parts of national territories. Yet, even in the early days of land use planning, it was recognized that there was no clear divide between the two, as, for instance, in the successive Town and Country Planning Acts in Britain from 1947. Indeed, a major goal of such measures around the world appears to have been the reversal of the ‘blurring’ tendency, with particular attention being given to curbing urban sprawl. On the other hand, even where building controls have achieved some success in maintaining an urban–rural contrast in physical terms, many of the other distinctions between urban and rural areas have continued to fade.

This chapter has two main objectives: first, to describe and account for the ‘blurring’ process that is leading to the disappearance of the urban–rural divide and, second, to discuss what this means for the development and implementation of policies that are specifically urban in design and coverage. It begins by briefly setting the context for the disappearance of the divide, focusing on the ‘urban transition’ and the associated erosion of the ‘rural’. Then it reviews the evidence on the ways in which the dichotomy has been progressively eroded on the ground. We look both at the increasing penetration of urban characteristics and behaviour down national settlement hierarchies and at the lateral extension of individual urban places and their zones of influence. The chapter then examines the several driving forces behind these changes, providing a basis for going on to discuss the implications for policy. A key issue raised in the final section is the question of compatibility between attempts at reinforcing the urban–rural distinction and policies designed to enhance the symbiosis of city and countryside. Also addressed is the value of a single general-purpose definition of the urban in the context of the increasing variety of policy interventions.

The context of urban transition

Taking a long-term perspective, it should be no surprise that the urban–rural divide is becoming less clear and losing its original significance. All the statistics on urbanization, such as the report *World Urbanization Prospects* released biennially by the UN (see Zlotnik, 2004, for a summary account), indicate that the population of the world is rapidly changing from one that is primarily rural to one that is primarily urban, with the halfway point being projected to be passed in 2007. This is just one of a series of transitions though which societies have been moving over more than two centuries since the
onset of the Industrial Revolution, as has been portrayed most generally in the ‘stages of development’ model (Rostow, 1960), but also developed in the models of the ‘demographic transition’ (Thompson, 1929; Notestein, 1945) and the ‘mobility transition’ (Zelinsky, 1971).

The concept of ‘urban transition’ (Gibbs, 1963) denotes the process of transformation from mostly rural settlement systems made up of numerous and scattered hamlets and villages that are relatively homogeneous in their size and functions to almost entirely urban systems composed of a much more differentiated set of elements (see also Friedmann and Wulff, 1976; Pumain, 2004). On this basis, eventually the ‘rural’ – at least, in the form that it is conventionally recognized – will indeed disappear completely, as reflected in Hoggart’s (1990) suggestion of ‘let’s do away with rural’. If this is the case, then the primary focus of settlement portrayal shifts to the classification of the urban-system elements that would, in practice, no longer need to be considered a distinctive group called ‘urban’.

On the other hand, following the challenge to the developmentalist paradigm by Taylor (1989) among others, there are those who believe that some form of ‘rurality’ will always exist (see, for instance, Brown and Cromartie, 2004; Halfacree, 2004). Even if this does not turn out to be the case, more immediately there remains the challenge of making sense of the composition of the rapidly evolving urban part of the settlement system, so as to provide a firmer basis for statistical tabulation, settlement analysis and policymaking (Frey and Zimmer, 2001). In the words of Cohen (2003, pp. 48–9), ‘the traditional distinction between urban and rural areas has become insufficient for many purposes and an enormous challenge for the social sciences is to come up with a classification system that adequately represents present day spatial realities’. The task now, therefore, is to provide the evidence base on the extent to which urban–rural distinctions are fading and to try to link this tendency to the way in which human settlement patterns are evolving.

The fading of traditional urban–rural distinctions

The traditional distinction between urban and rural parts of national territories is based on the assumption that there are important contrasts between them in the characteristics of their residents and in their demographic and other processes and that these map on to each other in a completely conformable way. As summarized by Champion and Hugo (2004, p. 8, Table 1.2), the urban areas are the parts where agricultural and other primary occupations are less important, where education levels and provision are higher and where accessibility to services and information is also greater. Meanwhile, rural areas are characterized by the higher levels of fertility and mortality and tend to be the more homogeneous in ethnic composition, the more conservative in political outlook and the more resistant to change. In Wirth’s (1938) classic statement on ‘urbanism as a way of life’, these features were shown to be reducible to three basic indicators of size, density and heterogeneity. These stereotypical differences have been drawn upon extensively to provide the basis of the rules adopted by national statistical agencies for identifying urban areas, with the most commonly used criteria being population size, population density, administrative status, proportion of the labour force engaged in non-agricultural work and the presence of particular services or activities (UN, 2003, p. 107; Champion, 2004).

Right from the outset of this sort of definitional work, however, it is clear that the concept of a ‘simple’ urban–rural dichotomy was, in fact, extremely elusive. Even in the
early days of urbanization, there developed a variety of settlement sizes ranging from hamlets through to large cities, as outlined by Pumain (2004). This was rationalized in the form of ‘central place theory’ by Christaller (1933) in relation to a landscape that was still based primarily on agriculture. Subsequently, Zipf’s (1949) ‘rank-size rule’, which hypothesized a ‘normal’ situation where the size of a settlement could be determined by dividing the population of the system’s largest centre by the settlement’s size ranking in the system, helped to further emphasize that there was a ‘continuum’ of settlement sizes from largest to smallest, rather than some precise cut-off between an urban place and a rural one. Over the years, a great deal of evidence has demonstrated the existence of a settlement-size gradient in the degree of ‘urban-ness’, including the ‘density-size rule’ of how the population density of individual settlements has traditionally declined with their size (Best et al., 1974) and the correlation between settlement size and measures relating to fertility, mortality and health care provision that still appears to exist in the developing world (National Research Council, 2003). With such a nuanced relationship between the two ends of the spectrum, it has proved extremely difficult to justify the choice of any specific point at which to distinguish an urban settlement from a rural one.

The challenge posed by the ‘continuum’ nature of differences across the settlement system has been aggravated by the fading of these differences over time or, expressed in the terms just mentioned, by the settlement-size gradient becoming shallower. Again, various lines of evidence can be presented. Best et al.’s (1974) work on changing population densities in Britain identified a ‘pivotal’ level towards which the densities of settlements’ built-up areas were regressing, with the traditionally higher densities of large cities reducing and the lower densities of smaller towns and villages rising. Similarly, the monitoring of rank-size graphs has revealed some tendency for the flattening of these relationships over time (see, for instance, Hall and Hay, 1980, for Western Europe). This partly reflects a shifting of the fastest rates of population growth down the settlement hierarchy away from the largest cities towards medium-sized and smaller ones. Indeed, the term ‘counterurbanization’ was coined by Berry (1976) in response to the rural population turnaround observed in the United States in the early 1970s and has come to refer to the reversal of the traditional positive relationship between size and growth, such that the smallest settlements were now experiencing the highest rate of internal migration gain, with the largest registering the highest rate of net out-migration (Fielding, 1982; Champion, 1989).

Distinctions have also been fading in most of the other respects mentioned above. What have conventionally been considered rural areas have seen a reduction in the share of their labour force employed in farming and other primary sector activities and a parallel rise in the proportion working in manufacturing. This is particularly common in the more developed parts of the world, but not exclusively so: for instance, Zhu (2004) describes the considerable impact that ‘town and village enterprises’ have recently been having on the economic structure of the more rural parts of Fujian province, China. In most countries, such changes have gone hand in hand with the diffusion of ‘urban’ amenities down the settlement hierarchy and into the more rural regions, with the improvement of transport links and communications, the introduction of piped water supply, mains sewerage and street lighting, and the increasing provision of education and health care services. They have also been accompanied by the diversification of the labour force in terms of occupations and skills, to the extent that – according to Hoggart (1990, p. 245) – ‘rural and...
urban places will often belong to the same population’ in terms of characteristics and attitudes. In demographic terms, too, the general picture in the more developed world, at least, is the virtual elimination of the traditionally higher levels of fertility and mortality in the countryside compared with the city.

Clearly, all these changes are acting as witness to the overall transformation of society from one that has conventionally been considered predominantly rural to one that is predominantly urban, raising the question as to whether there is anything left that can be used to distinguish between parts of national territory in a way that is meaningful in theoretical and policy-relevant terms. In their review of the nature of rurality in post-industrial society, Brown and Cromartie (2004) assess the validity and diagnostic power of four broad dimensions of rurality: ecological, economic, institutional and socio-cultural. It is primarily the first of these that still appears to have a role in differentiating the components of national settlement systems, with the vestigial distinctions on the other dimensions largely deriving from that. Most obvious under the ‘ecological’ heading is richness in natural resources. The others – population size, population density and situation in the settlement system – parallel the argument of Coombes and Raybould (2001) that the remaining differences between modern urban and rural areas are reducible to just three dimensions: the size of settlements, the intensity or concentration of settlements and the accessibility of settlements to services and other facilities.

At the same time, Coombes and Raybould (2001) emphasize that these three dimensions are not substitutable one for another, but display non-conformable geographies and – in policy terms – relate to different sets of issues and instruments. Coombes (2004, p. 309) reinforces his point about the multi-dimensional nature of settlement systems by stressing that ‘these different dimensions will produce different rankings from rural to urban’. On this basis, however, it would seem most logical to abandon these two descriptors altogether and, instead, talk in terms of a larger or smaller settlement, a more concentrated or dispersed distribution of settlements, and a settlement with higher or lower degree of accessibility. The summing of indicators of these three dimensions to produce a single index of rurality or urbanity, while satisfying an apparently continuing desire for discrete zones for urban and rural policy development, would result in a hybrid classification that would likely obfuscate more than clarify and not be fully fit for any single purpose.

Defining ‘urban’

Urban evolution and the delineation of ‘settlements’

All the discussion in the previous section assumes that we know what constitutes the individual ‘settlements’ that are being classified or ranked in terms of urban/rural or some other traditionally related dimension. Yet the task of putting a line round a ‘place’ where people live is just as large a challenge as deciding whether the resulting grouping of dwellings is urban or rural and forms a second way in which the urban–rural divide is disappearing. In the days when most residents went about their daily tasks on foot, it was common for buildings to cluster around a central core and thus for there to be a pretty sharp physical distinction between the built-up area and the surrounding fields or forest, often reinforced by a defensive wall or some symbolic separation. With the growth of centres into larger cities and the development of new forms of transportation, among other things (see the next section), it has become much harder to identify the outer edge of a settlement or indeed, in a more heavily settled district, to locate the dividing line where one settlement ends and another begins.
This aspect of urban evolution has generated a voluminous literature (as reflected, for example, in Champion and Hugo, 2004): there is scope here only for key points and a few examples. What we are dealing with here has conventionally gone under the label of ‘suburbanization’ (Champion, 2001a; 2003), though as we shall see this fails to capture all the new forms of urban development that have appeared in recent decades. The term ‘suburb’ carries connotations of something less than ‘urbs’, the city: as defined by Johnston (1981, p. 331), ‘usually residential or dormitory in character, being dependent on the city for occupational, shopping and recreational facilities’. Suburbanization is by no means a new phenomenon, with its origins traceable in the building of large homes on the outskirts of the burgeoning centres of industry and commerce in the early nineteenth century. Since then, the process has surged ahead, such that by the second half of the twentieth century, suburban living had become the modal pattern in many countries; for instance, by 1970, the United States’ metropolitan suburbs were accommodating nearly 38 per cent of the national population, compared with 31 per cent each for central cities and non-metropolitan areas (Beauregard, 2006).

Over time, however, the nature of suburbanization has altered considerably. Probably the most significant, long-term change has been the vast increase in the geographical scale of the process. Once experienced chiefly in the form of the lateral spreading of contiguous development outwards from the urban core, suburbanization has since come to involve decentralization over a much broader commuting field. The term ‘urban sprawl’ denotes, from an essentially critical stance, the apparently haphazard pattern of rural-to-urban land conversion that results from this process, with development leapfrogging to locations that, at least initially, are physically separate from the city’s continuously built-up area (see Chapter 12 in this book). A whole variety of terms have been coined to describe this deeper penetration of city-generated development into the surrounding countryside, including ‘exurban’, ‘periurban’ and ‘rurban’, with the territory beyond the continuously built-up area being seen as ‘urban–rural fringe’ or, more dynamically, as a ‘transition zone’. The first of these terms dates back to Spectorsky’s 1955 book on ‘the exurbanites’ but, according to Berube et al. (2006), has been experiencing a new lease of life in the United States, with the terms exurbs, exurban and exurbia appearing in its newspapers four times as often in 2005 than ten years before and with an explosion in the analysis of these development patterns since the early studies of Lamb (1983) and Nelson (1992).

Another major change has been the progressive disappearance of the ‘sub’ element of the suburbanization process or, in the words of Birch (1975, p. 25), a transformation ‘from suburb to urban place’. What was once very largely residential in nature, with just the most basic of local consumer services, has been followed since the 1950s by the decentralization of industrial, commercial and retail activities and, more recently, also by the growth of office and high-tech sectors. While the latter has been portrayed as the ‘third wave’ of suburbanization (Cervero, 1989) and the ‘new suburbanization’ (Stanback, 1991), other commentaries have been more redolent of a complete revolution in the form of the city, with ‘suburban downtowns’ (Hartshorn and Muller, 1986) and ‘edge cities’ (Garreau, 1991) challenging the traditional core and threatening to turn the metropolitan area inside out. Indeed, using US Census data on employment by industry, Lee, Seo and Webster (2006, p. 2541) confirm that ‘the suburbs have caught up with the core in terms of their economic diversity’. In response, Frey (2004, pp. 73–81) suggests that an ‘extended suburban typology’ is now necessary to reflect these changes and allow us still
to pick up the key socio-demographic contrasts within urban areas (including age, household type, race-ethnicity and income) that the simple central-city/suburb dichotomy no longer achieves. This classification differentiates between six broad ‘community types’: major city, inner employment centre, outer employment centre, inner residential suburb, outer residential suburb and low density areas (see also Frey and Speare, 1995).

These two trends are mutually reinforcing, in that the growth of suburban centres allows a wider residential spreading for those people whose commuting and other trips can now be oriented to these outer centres rather than to the main city core (Nelson and Sanchez, 1997). In its turn, this has led to the recognition that urban areas are evolving from essentially monocentric cities into polycentric urban regions (PUR). In fact, the latter is rather a loose concept, referring to a range of situations differentiated by spatial scale, degree of interaction between centres and type of origin (Champion, 2001b). For example, Clark and Kuijpers-Linde (1994) contrast the situation where there is a high degree of interdependence between many growing subcentres and a region containing a number of long-established cities that have their own primary market areas but are merging physically and becoming more intertwined in their daily interactions. The former is most commonly found in the New World context, with the classic example of Los Angeles (Berry and Kim, 1993; Gordon and Richardson, 1996a; Anas, Arnott and Small, 1998), while the latter is best exemplified by the Dutch Randstad and other examples of the European ‘polynucleated metropolitan region’ (Dieleman and Musterd, 1992; Dieleman and Faludi, 1998; Kloostermann and Musterd, 2001).

This recognition of evolving PURs is, however, just one stage in a much longer process that can be dated back to the emergence of ‘conurbations’, signifying separate centres that were growing together into a single urban concentration (Geddes, 1915). On the other hand, this process has taken on a much greater scale in more recent decades, as first observed by Gottmann (1961) in his treatment of the north-eastern seaboard of the United States as ‘Megalopolis’: a region where there were such intense interactions between the component cities that it seemed to be behaving like a single entity. Moreover, it is not just in developed countries that this type of settlement form has been observed. In Asian countries such as Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, for instance, Ginsburg, Koppel and McGee (1991, p. 27) have identified ‘extended metropolitan regions’ as a ‘new spatial paradigm’. As portrayed graphically by Robinson (1995, pp. 97–8) for the case of Bangkok:

The bulk of the decentralization has been occurring in the form of ‘ribbon development’ along the three major transport corridors leading out of the urban core . . . It has involved conversion of paddy lands; encroachment on agricultural land; and leapfrogging types of development in the fringe areas, leaving large tracts of unused land in between.

As underlined by Jones (2004, p. 126):

The change in settlement patterns in the zones of rapid change surrounding major metropolitan areas in Asia is often very ‘messy’, with a haphazard mix of land uses: cultivated fields, roads, houses, workshops, factories, small shops, unused land cleared for development, and waste land strewn with wrecked cars or used for temporary storage.

Whether in the developing countries or more developed world, therefore, it is becoming increasingly difficult to put a line around the edge of a settlement and, given the latest
trends in polynuclear patterns of development, sometimes even to be able to identify the centres to be treated as the cores of the settlements. Indeed, in the US context, there is now talk of things going ‘beyond polycentricity’ (Gordon and Richardson, 1996a). Already studies have shown how scattered the distribution of non-residential land uses, especially employment, can be. For instance, according to Gordon and Richardson (1996b), under one-fifth of the jobs in the Los Angeles region are in its main centres, both city and suburban. Similarly, Wadell and Shukla (1993) pointed out that jobs in the ‘Dallas–Fort Worth Metroplex’ are to be found in a ‘myriad minor clusters’ as well as in a variety of concentrations and corridors, prompting them to portray the evolving urban landscape as ‘multinodal, multiaxial and multiformal’ (p. 15). In similar vein, Lang (2003) claims that the prevailing pattern is now the ‘edgeless city’, featuring sprawling office development that does not have the density or cohesiveness of edge cities but now accounts for the bulk of the office space found outside the central business district (CBD). According to Teaford (2006, p. 241), ‘The multi-centered metropolis [is] seemingly as passé as its single-centered ancestor’: the metropolitan revolution is over and we are now witnessing the rise of post-urban America. Clearly, this adds up to a huge challenge for those who still wish to identify individual settlements and then go on to classify them as urban or rural.

The drivers of the centrifugal tendencies
The blurring of urban–rural distinctions described in the previous two sections has come about primarily as a result of penetration of urban influences into traditionally rural domains. This tendency has taken place at two conceptually different scales, one relating to the diffusion of urban people and characteristics down the settlement hierarchy and the other to the outward extension of cities into their surrounding countryside. While sometimes distinguished in terms such as (settlement-system-wide) ‘deconcentration’ as opposed to (metropolitan or urban) ‘decentralization’, these two sets of centrifugal processes can be seen to be operating side by side at more local scales, as the ‘wave’ of urban development moves out of the core cities into hinterlands traditionally characterized by smaller settlements. Moreover, it is now recognized that there is a fair degree of communality between the two processes in the types of residential population involved and the factors that are believed to be driving them. This is certainly the case to the extent that both involve people leaving the largest cities, where the term ‘counterurbanite’ has been applied both to people moving into a more rural setting locally or heading to a smaller city or more rural region some considerable distance away. Here, therefore, we review the factors relating to both at the same time, merely highlighting where one applies more to one than the other. Additionally, we will refer to ways in which the blurring trend has been reinforced by the diminution of the ‘urbanness’ of the largest centres, as when an element of the countryside has come to town.

Perhaps the most obvious single driver, or at least facilitator, of the centrifugal tendency is the way in which key aspects of city life have been brought to traditionally rural areas. It was mentioned earlier that one of the features of the blurring between urban and rural is the fact that the basic ‘urban’ amenities like piped water supply, mains sewerage and electric power are almost universally available to houses in the more developed world. Even if they are not supplied from a wider grid, technology allows these amenities to be provided for the smallest settlement or even for the individual residence through pumps,
Septic tanks and generators. Given that very few of the newcomers to more rural locations appear to be seeking a complete return to traditional ‘rurality’ and to a pre-industrial lifestyle, the availability of these facilities in small settlements is an essential precondition for the urban exodus towards these places. It is also reflected in the way in which quite complete urban environments now have to be provided to retain or attract the more skilled labour that is now often required for mining, forestry and even farming activities in more remote areas.

Allied to this is the improvement in transport and communications. Modern life requires access to a much wider range of services than was previously the case. Although some of these have been internalized within the home (through, for instance, washing machines replacing the need for laundry services and in-house entertainment substituting for visits to theatre and cinema), only limited use has so far been made of telecommunications to gain access remotely to a whole set of vital services such as schooling and health care. Even ‘teleworking’ has not penetrated substantially into areas from which residents are not able to make fairly regular visits to larger centres. Good transport linkages with such centres have therefore been vital in the opening up of more peripheral areas for new urban development and associated city-derived population growth. At the same time, as mentioned above and is very well documented, the great flexibility allowed by the private car, combined with vast road building programmes, has provided the other primary facilitator not just of suburban sprawl but also of the evolution of the ‘edgeless city’.

On the other hand, the existence of such passive factors would hold no significance for the location of population growth if there was no desire to live in these types of areas, so now we need to turn our attention to the factors that are actively driving the urban exodus. In migration analysis, it is conventional to distinguish between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, but in this particular context most of the drivers constitute the relativeness in people’s residential preferences that identify living in one type of environment as being preferable to life in another. On this basis, people move from the core of a city to the suburbs or from the suburbs to further afield because this will help them both escape the more negative features of city life and at the same time benefit from the more agreeable aspects of life in a more rural setting. Perhaps the only way of assessing the relative importance of rural attraction and urban repulsion is in terms of the types of people moving and the distances moved.

The evidence on sprawl tends to support the importance of the negative features of urban life. In nineteenth-century Britain, for instance, the main drivers were the threats posed to people’s well-being by disease, smoke and squalor, with the new housing being built only as far away as was necessary to avoid these and with the wealthier opting for the windward side of the sources of pollution. Economic considerations have also played an important role both then and more recently, owing to the generally higher price commanded by land and housing in locations closer to the core of the classic monocentric city, as reflected in the land-rent gradient. Around Paris, for instance, it is the less wealthy (‘employees and workers’) that have had to move the furthest from the city core in their quest for more spacious and comfortable accommodation, whereas the ‘executives and intermediary professions fare better in procuring a residence close to places of work’ (Guérois and Pumain, 2002, p. 69). In his seminal work on people who had moved deep into the English countryside and become urbs in rure, Pahl (1966) identified the reluctant Londonward commuter as one of the principal categories of people interviewed.
Similarly, in their analysis of American exurban populations, Berube et al. (2006) found the search for modestly priced and sized homes to be a key factor, with ‘affordable exurbs’ being the most common type of exurban neighbourhood, while the ‘favored-quarter exurbs’ that featured more upscale homes were in the minority overall and were especially thin on the ground in the faster-growth and more pressurized metropolitan regions. This largely confirms the finding of Nelson and Sanchez (1997) that, while there was little else to distinguish exurbanites from suburbanites, the former contained a larger representation of households with middle incomes and families at the main child-rearing stage as opposed to smaller families at the early and late stages of the life cycle.

In general, however, the majority of people moving from metropolitan cores to the suburbs and beyond are drawn from the wealthier segments of society, with the least well-off being trapped in older, cheaper parts of the core or in subsidized housing schemes. This tendency has manifested itself in greater social spatial polarization and the growth of low-income and often low-demand neighbourhoods, particularly in the United States but also in other New World countries and Britain, and more recently also in Continental Europe and the developing world. In India, for instance, Dupont (2004) has shown how on the outskirts of Delhi, often well beyond the perimeter of its urban agglomeration, private developers have implemented large-scale housing schemes targeted at well-to-do residents looking for a better quality of life than the city can provide.

This tendency is probably most highly developed in Britain, and more specifically England, where the ‘lure’ of the countryside is seen as a major driving force behind the exodus from urban areas. Studies of the reasons for urban–rural migration there consistently quote the importance of both the physical and the social qualities of life in the countryside (for example, Halfacree, 1994; see also the review by Champion et al., 1998). According to Murdoch (1997), country life holds two main attractions for these people, allowing them to live in something resembling a natural setting and holding the potential for participating in real communities – possibly a rarely attained ‘idyll’ but one that is much sought-after nonetheless, with successive surveys since the 1930s revealing that up to 72 per cent of the population would prefer to live in the countryside.

Besides the evidence provided by studies of residential preferences and migrants’ motivations, there are at least three further sets of factors that have promoted centrifugal shifts of population: changes in the distribution of jobs, changes in demographic regimes and changes in urban capacity. As well as the dispersion of jobs across the polycentric urban region mentioned above, economic restructuring has been an even more powerful motor in the wider counterurbanization process, as the manufacturing basis of earlier city growth has contracted and new growth sectors have emerged, often located in other regions and their smaller but often rapidly-growing settlements (see, for instance, Frey, 1987, on the United States and Turok and Edge, 1999, on the United Kingdom). This partial redrawing of national space economies has gone hand in hand with population deconcentration down the urban hierarchy, with the one building on the other in cumulative fashion. New growth industries, often with a large complement of more skilled staff, have attracted to them the types of people who have formed the majority segment of the counterurbanites – in the words of Perry, Dean and Brown (1986), the ‘middle-aged, middle-class and middle-brow’ plus their growing-up children – while, in their turn, these new arrivals have increased the demand for services and enriched the labour pool, both helping to generate new opportunities for business.
Just as with the economy, the demographic regime of many countries, especially in the
developed world, is now very different from that of 30–40 years ago, with a ‘second demo-
graphic transition’ (van de Kaa, 1987) involving several features that can be linked to con-
tinuing residential decentralization. As elaborated by Champion (2001b), longer life
expectancy and markedly lower fertility has led to a rising proportion of the elderly in the
population, these being pioneers of the counterurbanization process owing to not needing
to live close to metropolitan jobs and indeed preferring to seek out areas combining
cheaper housing and a more attractive environment. The shift in people’s lifestyles from
more altruistic attitudes towards more individualistic and self-gratifying behaviour, com-
bined with the growth of self-employment and telecommunications, has prompted many
people of working age to follow their parents’ generation, often trading in higher salaries
for a superior quality of life. This shift in attitudes is also associated with the growth in
the proportion of one-person households, fuelled by rising levels of relationship break-
down as well as a desire to live alone. Separately, the strong growth in two-earner, and
especially two-career, households has led some people to select ‘intermediate’ locations
for their homes, so as to be able to access a wider range of jobs across the increasingly
polycentric labour markets. Higher levels of international immigration and the resultant
growth of ethnic minority populations have made the metropolitan ‘gateway’ cities less
attractive to the indigenous population through greater competition for housing and jobs,
if not more directly leading to a conflict-based ‘white flight’.

These developments are also associated with a fall in the residential capacity of urban
areas beyond that associated with employment decline and neighbourhood abandonment.
The smaller families resulting from lower fertility have combined with the growth in
numbers of one-person households to produce a substantial lowering of average house-
hold size, meaning that people have become spread more thinly across the existing housing
stock (Champion, 2001b). Rising wealth and aspirations have placed a premium on larger
houses with more space within their curtilage, while the rise in car ownership has meant
that larger areas have had to be set aside for parking, not just in housing areas but at all
the main destinations of journey-making, including trips to work, shop and play.
Government-led slum clearance and urban renewal over the decades has generally involved
rebuilding at lower densities and efforts at ‘greening’ the city, so as to reduce congestion
and pollution and to provide ‘rural lungs’ and recreational space (see next section).

Government policies have also played a less direct part in promoting population decen-
tralization and deconcentration, as can be identified from among the 17 explanations for
counterurbanization listed by Champion (1989, p. 236) from a review of nine national
case studies. Besides the already-mentioned improvements in highways, communications
technology and public-sector service provision in the countryside, these included the avail-
ability of subsidies for rural activities and services, which helped to offset the cost penal-
ties of living in less accessible locations; the growth of employment in the public sector,
which was generally less urban-focused than private sector services; and the growth of
state pensions and other portable welfare benefits, which helped to encourage the retired
and unemployed to move to lower-cost smaller towns and rural areas. In addition, the
nationwide promotion of home ownership through subsidies like tax relief on mortgage
interest payments encouraged the outward push of development at the edge of the city.

At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that none of these broad groups of
drivers is merely a one-way process, with each also having centripetal elements that
would seem to have been growing stronger. The economic restructuring in which de-industrialization featured so strongly also involved the growth of the 'quaternary' sector (Gottmann, 1970), including finance and business services and now better known as the knowledge-based and creative industries, for which the larger cities – and especially the so-called ‘world cities’ – are especially advantaged owing to their large skilled populations and extensive networking functions. The demographic trends towards delayed marriage and independent living by young adults, helped by increasing participation in higher education and the strong labour demand for young professionals, has swelled the movement of school leavers to the larger cities and their more central areas. Third, both private and public sectors have identified these trends as opportunities for countering the falling population capacity of the existing housing stock by building smaller units and converting existing housing into apartments and starter homes. Finally, governments have been reducing the subsidies that helped to stimulate urban expansion, partly through the general ‘rolling back’ of the welfare state since the 1980s but also because of switching to policies of urban regeneration. The latter forms the central issue addressed in the next section, which documents how policymakers have tried to tackle the phenomenon of the ‘expanding’ or ‘sprawling’ city.

Challenges for policymakers

These centrifugal tendencies and their drivers pose two main challenges for the formulation and implementation of policy. First, to the extent that the resulting sprawl is seen as undesirable – not ‘smart’ in current US parlance – and needs to be checked or at least made more orderly, there is the need for policy interventions designed to achieve this. Second, there needs to be a clear understanding both of what constitutes the most appropriate form of settlement that constitutes the ultimate goal of such intervention and also, given that normally, planning policies are territorially based, a resolution of the conceptual and definitional issues related to this. Which areas need to be targeted for particular policy measures, and what is the most suitable geographical framework for devising and administering the measures?

Looking at the challenge of stemming the tide of urban sprawl, the policy options can perhaps be most neatly classified into two groups; first, ways of intensifying the use of land that has already been converted from rural activities (nowadays commonly termed ‘brownfield land’) and, second, the best approach to be taken towards accommodating urban expansion across still rural territory (or ‘greenfield land’).

The planned intensification of already urbanized space is the more recent of the two. In fact, it is virtually the opposite of what the earliest government interventions into city growth were designed to achieve, these having been introduced to improve public health standards in the nineteenth-century industrial city by limiting building densities and providing parks as well as water supply and sanitation infrastructure. That approach was reinforced by the ‘garden city’ movement that had such a strong influence on suburban development in the first half of the twentieth century and formed the underlying rationale for the re-planning of British cities after the Second World War, with Britain’s New Town idea being aimed at reducing population densities in cities like London and Glasgow. With the subsequent hollowing-out of city populations by a combination of decentralization and de-industrialization, however, the emphasis has switched completely around: the watch words are now ‘re-urbanization’, ‘urban renaissance’ and ‘urban consolidation’.
The strategies being adopted to achieve urban intensification are able to harness and attempt to reinforce the growth of city-loving elements mentioned at the end of the previous section, though they face substantial obstacles in achieving a broader-based urban revival. There is a particular focus on the promotion of city-centre living among the increasing number of university-educated young adults who are in great demand from the growing business-services and information-economy sectors and appear to want to postpone family rearing while still enjoying pseudo-student lifestyles. More difficult, however, is the challenge of holding onto these people when they decide to have children, as these continue to be the main drivers of the residential decentralization process. This large group has traditionally tended to shun the areas of housing abandonment and the so-called ‘problem neighbourhoods’, not least because the latter do not represent good bets in terms of capital appreciation in housing values but also because of the often poor quality of the surrounding environments in terms of schools, safety and physical appearance. Many of these negative characteristics of the wider locality are not overcome merely by the building of individual ‘gated communities’, while there is considerable suspicion about the redevelopment of larger vacant and derelict sites in the form of ‘mixed communities’. Until now, the most successful approach to retaining and attracting better-off families has been through increasing the housing stock of the older suburbs by building apartment blocks and higher-density housing on the sites of demolished mansions and by infilling on spare green sites and back gardens. Yet this ‘urbanization of the suburbs’ can provoke strong reactions from existing residents, while what is now labelled ‘town cramming’ in the United Kingdom threatens to remove some of the features – like a sense of spaciousness and relative quiet on the local roads – that have formed the conventional appeal of these areas (Troy, 1996).

As regards the best approach to be taken towards the development pressures that cannot be accommodated within the existing ‘urban frame’, a variety of models offer alternatives to unrestrained urban sprawl, all emphasizing higher densities but differing in the location and scale of the individual sites. The principal decision is between building out from the edge of the existing agglomeration and allowing new development to take place only on the far side of a protected ‘green belt’ or, perhaps more accurately, it is about the balance to be struck between these two. The ‘green belt’ approach has formed the mainstay of over half a century of planning for urban growth in the United Kingdom, though there have been many notable examples of green-belt ‘nibbling’ and – more recently under the dual pressure of countryside protection interests and environmental sustainability issues – a partial endorsement of the ‘compact city’ notion of attaching new development to the existing infrastructure at the edge of cities that has so far seen its fullest application in the Netherlands. As regards choosing the pattern of development beyond the green belt, the main options can be grouped under three headings: completely new settlements, key village extensions and multiple village extensions. Fuller descriptions of these options can be found in Breheny, Gent and Lock (1993), who go on to assess how they rate in economic, social and environmental terms both between each other and by comparison with the urban-infill and urban-extension alternatives.

At the same time, it is now widely recognized that decisions about the most appropriate form that this physical development should take, need to be informed by notions of how the wider settlement system is, or should be, evolving. This was not always the case; for instance, in the 1940s’ planning for Greater London, it was assumed – indeed, it was
the planning philosophy – that the New Towns should be self-contained, with people living and working within them and with all the services needed by their residents being provided locally. Yet, even within 30 years, it was recognized that these were merely a few urban nodes among the many making up the embryonic English ‘Megalopolis’, supplying commuters to central London and in their turn drawing in workers from surrounding villages (Hall et al., 1973; Champion et al., 1978). Planning interventions relating to just one part of such a wider region will have repercussions for many of its other parts, so policy decisions need to be made on this basis.

The question, therefore, turns to what best constitutes this wider geographical framework for planning decisions. As suggested above by the use of terms like ‘metropolitan area’ and ‘Megalopolis’, the literature is replete with examples of attempts to come to terms with the new forms of urbanization. The most fundamental step is to move away from defining cities in purely physical terms such as denoted by the term ‘urban agglomeration’: this is problematic even in the situation of free-market sprawl, where the challenge of the ‘edgeless city’ is hardly addressed by identifying some form of ‘urban–rural fringe’, but it is totally indefensible in a situation where development restrictions have pushed the city’s suburbs to leapfrog to the far side of a protected zone. To understand the dynamics of the city, it is necessary that its definition should embrace the same whole functioning entity that was the city of old within its defensive walls. The most common approach to this task is on the basis of identifying the extent of a city’s primary commuting field and treating this as a ‘labour market area’, though there is a case that other forms of interaction besides journeys to work should be used to depict possibly more extensive ‘daily urban systems’, ‘functional urban regions’ and ‘city regions’ that cover the city’s main recreational zone as well as the outlying areas that depend on the main core for higher-level services. Many countries around the world have gone down this route, as is evident from the chapters in this book as well as the case studies to be found in multinational compilations like Geyer (2002) and Champion and Hugo (2004). Even the United Kingdom, where for so long, governments rejected the notion of functionally defined planning areas and left such regionalization exercises to the academic community (Champion, 2002), has just recently begun to consider the ‘city region’ as a suitable vehicle for policy development (ODPM, 2003).

Finally, even within these wider frameworks, there remains the issue of whether any useful purpose is served by continuing to try to distinguish between the urban and the rural. On the one hand, many of the planning interventions designed to counter urban sprawl seem to be premised on the notion that it is best for the two to be kept as separate as possible, at least in physical terms. In the United Kingdom, urban containment and rural protection have gone hand in hand during well over half a century of ‘town and country planning’, with the aim of reducing the length of the so-called ‘urban fence’ that separates them and minimizing the degree to which they would interpenetrate. Within the last few years, this dichotomous approach has been reinforced by the promulgation of separate urban and rural policy frameworks, with the official dividing line being built-up areas containing 10,000 residents. Even the United Kingdom’s adoption of the ‘city region’ notion is designed primarily to ensure that, within such a functional region, as much as possible of all the new building should be channelled into the core urban area and the rural landscape be kept as free as possible from both residential and business development (ODPM, 2003).
By contrast, policy development at the European Union level, taking place within the primary lens of polycentric development, has increasingly been emphasizing the positive aspects of the urban/rural interface, such that growth tendencies emanating from the city can be harnessed to aid the process of rural regeneration (ESPD, 1999; see also Hoggart, 2005). Also important at this broader level is the recognition that neither urban areas nor rural areas are the same across the whole of national or supranational territory, but vary according to the wider context. A good example of this diversity is provided by the sixfold classification of European ‘settlement types’ described by Pumain (2004, pp. 242–5), these comprising: regions dominated by a large metropolis; polycentric regions with high urban and rural densities; polycentric regions with high urban densities and low rural ones; rural areas under metropolitan influence; rural areas with small and medium-sized cities; and remote rural areas. Such a classification takes into account not only the remaining key dimensions that once distinguished urban from rural in a conformable way, namely settlement size, density and accessibility to services, but also considers additional information about the type of trajectory of the individual settlement relative to its context in the wider settlement system. Interestingly, however, it still retains notions of urban and rural in terms of the building blocks for these types of settlement area, suggesting that it is still necessary to keep them in place even while planning to reduce the differences between the two, just as would be the case where aiming to reduce between-area variations in wealth and deprivation. Despite the completion of the urban transition in many countries and notwithstanding all the difficulties of distinguishing urban from rural both conceptually and on the ground, it does not seem possible to ‘do away with rural’ just yet.

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Introduction

Although some are questioning globalization’s existence or relevancy (Douglas and Wind, 1987; Beinart, 1997), most regard it as a growing force in the development of economies all over the world. Certainly, no one can today deny globalization’s effect on the industrial landscape of the world with any measure of conviction. It is visible and it is real. But globalization is not a recent phenomenon, it has always been there. Only its effects were not as visible and overwhelming as it has become in recent years. In fact, for a long time its effect was almost undetectable, infiltrating our economic environment quietly, systematically and incrementally. Only when one really thought about it would one realize what affect it had on one’s life. This was until the personal computer and communication satellites came. Then, everything changed. Cyberspace exploded. It changed our perceptions about geographic space. It infected our personal lives and invaded our economic space, made it more defined, purposeful, efficient, faster, bigger, and above all, more visible. As Batty (1993, p. 615) said: it is ‘layered on top of, within and between the fabric of traditional geographic space’.

Initially some thought that globalization would cause the collapse of geographic space, that economically speaking, it would flatten the world and shrink space to such an extent that friction of distance would eventually become an insignificant locational factor (Graham, 1998). Tools such as the computer, the Internet and the cell phone, it was believed, would reduce the need for face-to-face interaction. But none of this happened exactly in the way that we anticipated it. Electronic interaction became easier, sure, its volume increasing manifold, audibly and visually, but so did the need for more products and face-to-face contacts. And although geography has become insignificant in a wide range of economic activities occurring in the digital realm, distance has remained a limiting factor in most other respects. One might be able to do window shopping in cyberspace, inspect the qualities of features and purchase products on the Internet, but the actual delivery of most products still occurs in real time and space, an environment in which the friction of distance remains a significant factor. Given the impact globalization had on the structure and location of industries that are producing the products that are purchased on the Internet, their location locally is still subject to the locational forces outlined in ‘traditional’ location theory.

For this reason we are going to take a short but interesting walk down memory lane. This is not simply done for fun – although it gives great pleasure to dust off some of the concepts that have threatened to disappear under the cloud of dust stirred up by the new and exciting global economics made possible by the digital revolution. No, it is done for a specific reason. While practitioners may argue that there is not much use in remembering the ‘old’ ideas generated in the fields of locational economics and regional science,
long before the new global economic era visibly took hold, others warn not to discard the old handbooks on location theory too soon because most of them are still as useful today as they were years ago when the theories were formulated (Polèse and Champagne, 1999). However, to help the young researcher connecting the dots in the field of location economics, great care will be taken not wander along paths that are not likely to lead us to destinations that will either refresh our memory or help us understand current spatial economic processes in the context of tried and tested theory. A brief outline will be given of relevant aspects of location theory that have evolved over time, before moving on to the more recent global impact of the IT sector on global spatial economics.

In the discussion of spatial competition at various levels of spatial aggregation the reader will become aware of the potential underlying tension between what is and what is desirable in location in economic space – the tension between (the durable aspects of) space and time. Once a business location has been decided upon, many actions that follow reinforce the permanency of that location. Undoing our endeavours of the past is normally very cumbersome, time-consuming and costly. The location of villages, towns and cities in urban systems has been predetermined by our forefathers and mothers. We now have to ‘pay the price’ for the locational decisions that were made by them years ago, just as our descendants will one day have to ‘pay’ for the decisions we make. To illustrate the point, it is interesting to imagine what would happen to our world if, in one instant, it were possible to detach our towns and cities, houses, schools, factories and other businesses from their current locations. One thing is certain, our world would look very different from how it used to look and, I am sure, at the end, would look very different from how we though it would. Why? Because, as Pred (1967) amply demonstrated, our understanding of the forces that shape our economic landscape is not complete and what is worst, most of us do not even make an effort to use the knowledge that is available on relevant locational forces before deciding where to locate our businesses.

**Location in economic space**

*Inside cities*

Although the same fundamental forces determine profitable location decisions in micro- and macroeconomic space, the outcome of those forces differ significantly at different levels of spatial aggregation. In urban areas, land has two fundamental values: its original, inherent or ‘intrinsic’ value and its acquired, speculative or ‘extrinsic’ value (Hurd, 1924). According to Hurd, land value is dependent on economic output, output dependent on location, location on convenience and convenience on proximity, so, land value is ultimately dependent on proximity.

Because we are dealing here with microeconomic (urban) space, real distances travelled are usually not long. However, locations of land uses in urban space are usually largely influenced by friction of distance because economic distances, measured in time, are high in such areas (Scott, 1982). Agglomeration economies are one of the important outcomes of this phenomenon. Traditionally, agglomeration economies have been seen to manifest in three forms: scale economies, localization and urbanization economies (Ohlin, 1933; Hoover, 1937; Isard, 1956). By reorganizing different elements of the concept into agglomeration economies of scale, scope and complexity, internally and externally to the firm, the concept can have different meanings when applied in
microeconomic (intra-urban) and macroeconomic (supra-urban) space as Parr (2002a; 2002b) demonstrated. Linking cost-based to contact-based agglomeration economies (Karlvqvist and Lundqvist, 1972; Goddard, 1973) in micro space it becomes clear that (at least certain) birds of a feather in business tend to flock together within the city structure (Scott, 1982). This especially applies to smaller businesses that (1) individually struggle to cover overheads, (2) do not provide a complete service and therefore (3) do not make a large enough target to attract sufficient numbers of clients to survive economically on their own. By clustering together with enough other similar businesses they become visible enough to make a more worthwhile target to a dispersed market within the city. This phenomenon can be seen in the formal and informal sectors in cities all over the world, from Portobello Road in London, to Mexico City central, to Boat Street, Singapore, to Greenmarket Square in Cape Town. But corporate businesses, which individually do make a visible target, also tend to do this. Wall Street, the Financial District of Singapore, Hong Kong and the South Kensington–Knightsbridge area in London are examples of this. Elsewhere, industrial districts are formed containing enterprises that display strong industrial and technological links such as Silicon Valley or Toyota City, or commercial clusters are formed in shopping centres along the urban edge (Fujita and Tomoya, 2005). Why do even large businesses tend to cluster together? Because their threshold levels are very high, but also because they want to portray the same image and share the same clientele base. Keeping contact is therefore important to them.

Writing about attraction forces in microeconomic space Köhl (1850) said that if construction above land and underground were as easy as building horizontally on land, cities would have had a spherical shape. Why is this observation significant enough to be mentioned? Because that is what actually happens and can be seen in certain parts of cities all over the world. Some likeness of the three-dimensional city (Hoch, 1969) is found in the central business districts and other nodes in cities where, due to location economic pressure, land scarcity made it so valuable that its commercial value exceeds the high construction costs of high-rise buildings and underground construction. That is where one sees some resemblance between Köhl’s imaginary cupola and real-life urban nodes (Figure 4.1). Through the working of economic centripetal forces, economic concentration causes compaction of land uses in the city centre at first, causing it to develop three-dimensionally, first in a mono-nodal urban structure and later on in a multi-nodal structure.

Over time, city centres start running out of space. Centrifugal forces, some driven by agglomeration diseconomies (Richardson, 1980), others by deglomeration advantages in decentralized locations deeper into suburban areas, eventually cause the city to morphologically acquire a multi-nodal structure. While centripetal and centrifugal economic forces acting on nodes and axes in the city battle each other for supremacy in space, the city often takes on a star-shaped form (Hurd, 1924; Hawley, 1950). These centripetal and centrifugal forces are either centrally directed towards nodes, or laterally towards communication axes linking the nodes. They are in constant competition with one another, the one always trying to dominate the other. Together they morphologically shape the city. In the process, cities evolve into expansive, continuous built-up areas with the central city and other suburban nodes appearing as visible bulging protrusions of high-rise development on the city’s horizon (Figure 4.1).
During the nineteenth and early parts of the twentieth century, the contact zones between business and residential areas in cities often showed signs of urban decay (Burgess, 1925). Conditions in these parts of the cities became so desperate that something had to be done. People’s need to live in environmentally acceptable conditions led to a residential revolution. This revolution, linked to the suburban drive in the United States, subsequently set the scene for large-scale urban expansion. What started out as suburbanization (some of them turning into ‘boomburbs’) soon turned into polycentricity, edge cities (Garreau, 1992; Gordon and Richardson, 1996) and exurbanization (Nelson, 1992). Explaining it in the language of the migration specialist, population concentration (or urbanization) forces dominated during the initial phases of urban development. As deconcentration forces started setting in and suburban growth increased, counter-migration streams started to become visible as part of a process of differential urbanization (Geyer and Kontuly, 1993; Geyer, 1996; Pacione, 2005). During this time, some people still migrated towards the city centre, but others started to migrate in an opposite direction in a wave-like fashion, initially mostly to suburban areas but later also to satellite centres close by (Gordon, 1979). In essence it is this drive outward that enabled residential land uses to compete with business for land in the urban environment.

It can therefore be said that competitive spatial economic influences not only strongly determine the location of businesses but also the location of residential types. According to Haig (1926) every business has an ideal or best location in the city, a principle that potentially applies to every land use in the city. Economically speaking the best location is determined by rent, which is determined by the position of the land use relative to other land uses in the city. Based on Von Thünen’s (Horvath, 1969) view on the effect of
transport costs on the distribution of agricultural land uses, Alonso (1964) used his bid
rent curve concept to show how the location of residential land uses are potentially influ-
enced by their location relative to a central location in the city. When in competition for
land, residential land uses are usually displaced by business land uses. But it has been ade-
quately demonstrated that residential units are perfectly able to compete with other busi-
nesses for space in city centres if enough of them are stacked on top of each other. How-
ever, lower density residential land uses (compared with high-rise) have also shown
their ability to compete successfully for space in denser parts of cities against other tradi-
tionally more competitive urban land uses such as commerce, industry and services. This
is done through the deliberate commodification of residential land uses. Place values such
as safety, good environmental qualities, quality housing, community values and similar-
ity of lifestyles are typical marketing elements that are used to turn normal community
housing into commodity housing. Most of the gated residential areas fall into this cate-
gory and are the direct or indirect result of growing rates of crime and violence in cities
(see Chapter 9).

The national scale
To be able to understand what factors have been playing a role in the redistribution of eco-
nomic activities globally, one needs to look briefly backwards to see where we came from.
Looking at the meso and macro scales an extensive body of theory exists that helps one
understand how people’s decisions about the location of economic activities have
impacted on urban systems as a whole. Christaller (1933) and Lösch (1954) demonstrated
how potential advantages of scale and agglomeration economics can be created by the
clustering of businesses (central places) at certain locations for the provision of goods and
services to a dispersed market. In their central place theory Christaller (1933) and
Lösch (1954) focused on the supply and demand side respectively. ‘Locational constants’ –
locations displaying exceptional economic attributes (Richardson, 1973) – are usually
responsible for the establishment of ‘non-central’ places. Philbrick (1957) distinguished
between bipolar and parallel business relationships in a core-peripheral spatial framework
to explain how a hierarchy of urban centres evolves, ranging in reach from the most local
to the global level.

How transportation costs determine the type, character and location of land uses in the
service areas around cities (i.e., in continuous economic space) is something Von Thünen
examined. In his critical review of Von Thünen’s theory, Sinclair (1967) indicated what
could be expected to happen to Von Thünen’s distribution of land uses around the urban
defense when fast urban growth causes speculative land values to soar.

Coming closer to the main focus of this chapter, location theory has greatly increased
our understanding of why certain cities grow economically more vigorously than others.
One category of theory focuses on friction of distance as the most important consideration
in the decision to find the best location for an industry. One of the most prominent loca-
tion theorists in the least cost category is Weber ([1909] 1929) who studied the impact of
production factors, the market and agglomeration economies on the location of industries.
In his work he showed how the location of production factors such as accessible sources
of material and cheap labour, as well as a punctiform market and agglomeration savings
determine the least cost location of a production plant in economic space. Several other
scholars commented on the applicability of his arguments. Palander (Smith, 1971) showed
how, under linear transport cost conditions, the likelihood of the location of lowest transportation costs would change when long haul gets cross-subsidized by short distance transportation. Through Palander’s diagrammatic explanation of how differences in production costs and transportation costs would affect the location of economic activities, the same could be used to show why certain cities, which according to the central place theory should have become higher order centres, failed to grow economically.

The main principle that determines the least cost location of industries is that of the law of cost substitution. In his critique of Weber’s location model, Predöhl (1928) explained industrial location in production and cost substitution terms. Zooming in on cost factors he showed how (1) different groups of cost factors, (2) individual cost factors in a particular group of cost factors and (3) different cost elements in an individual cost factor would substitute one another as the production process moved from one location to another (Isard, 1956). Hoover (1948) considered complex production substitution as a cost-saving option. According to him, if various products are produced by an industry (or one product line is considered amongst several by a producer), it is possible for a firm to become more profitable by producing more of certain products that can be sold more profitably than others. According to Moses (1958), another contributor in the substitution field, there is no single optimum location in reality. Optimum locations vary according to levels of output.

The most important weakness in the least cost approach was its assumption of perfect competition and spatially constant demand, because if demand fluctuates, the least cost location may not necessarily yield the highest profits. Two of the difficulties that had to be overcome were, on the one hand, how to achieve equilibrium in a market that had both punctiform and spatially distributed features, and on the other hand, how to address the issue of imperfect competition. Fetter (1924), Robinson (1934), Smithies (1941), Hoover (1948), Lösch (1954), Greenhut (1956) and Isard (1956) were a few of many who contributed in this field.

More important for our discussion in this chapter, though, is the issue of agglomeration economies (Parr, 2002a; 2002b). Ohlin (1933) and Hoover (1936), followed by Isard (1956), revisited earlier versions (Marshall, [1890] 1920; Weber, [1909] 1929) of the concept. According to them the spatial elements and types of agglomeration economies in industrial location had not been sufficiently distinguished at the time. In contrast to Weber’s ([1909] 1929) generalized views on agglomeration economics in continuous economic space they differentiated between three different elements of agglomeration economies: scale, localization and urbanization economies in a network context. Nourse (1968) subsequently linked transfer savings, the net result of juxtapositioning to Ohlin and Isard’s latter three. The focus now clearly moved away from finding best locations in continuous economic space to the modelling of transport networks – arcs and vertices. The latter are connecting points of arcs that represent markets or nodes in economic space (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004).

In a wider geographical context, agglomeration economies are also related to the idea of large, high intensity business agglomerations, a phenomenon that was sometimes referred to as ‘business (usually industrial) complexes’ or ‘growth poles’ (Perroux, 1955; Boudeville, 1967; Hermansen, 1972). Although a technical distinction was sometimes drawn between the two, a business complex may generally be described as a cluster of businesses displaying exceptional nodal qualities in economic space at the meso and
macro geographical scale. As an extraordinary node in economic space it is often associated with an economic core area. It generates large amounts of economic activities by means of (1) the extraordinary large number of businesses that are clustered there, (2) the large number of business linkages between the firms located in the core and (3) between firms in the core and others located elsewhere. Some of these linkages can be characterized as upstream, others downstream, and others yet, lateral (Scott, 1983). Some of these linkages are production-oriented, some service-oriented and some marketing-oriented (Todd, 1974).

The growth pole derives its impetus or energy from its combined focus on a single or small range of dynamic economic sectors and the interrelatedness of the businesses that make up the composition of the pole. It is believed that a dominant or key industry is the pole’s raison d’être and (initially) serves as both its driving force and main source of attraction (Perroux, 1955; Darwent, 1969). The types of businesses that are dominant in the pole determine its sectoral focus and serve as the focus or nucleus of the node and at the same time typecast it. The linkages between it and other businesses it does business with form the glue that holds the pole together. A growth pole is usually visualized as an industrial complex, but depending on its size could also be a city, a metropolis, even an industrialized region (Lasuén, 1972) and its influence can be felt regionally and nationally, often also internationally. More often than not such areas of outstanding economic development form parts of core areas and those that remain behind, peripheries (Friedmann, 1966).

Business linkages generate business traffic, some in cyber space, others through air, water, rail and road transportation networks – hence the importance of arcs and vertices in economic space. A growing number of linkages occur in cyberspace, but otherwise the bulk of them are still occurring by means of air, water, road and rail transport. While the friction of distance has been overcome in linkages in cyberspace, all other forms of linkages are still very much (and in most instances increasingly so) influenced by it. The amount of business traffic that is generated along communication networks inside and between economic core areas as a result of business linkages make the notion of the development axis or corridor still a very relevant concept. A corridor develops when significant amounts of business traffic are generated along the communication infrastructure connecting two or more economic nodes (Pottier, 1963; Geyer, 1989). The amount of business that is generated between the nodes creates potential for additional economic development along the axis connecting the centres and its vitality is (1) directly related to the number, size and vitality of the nodes connected by it and (2) inversely related to the distance between the nodes (Friedmann, 1966). In fact, it is the amount of business generated along the axis that turns a communication axis into a development axis or corridor.

There are two theories that one can use to build a clear mental picture of how the issues that were discussed above fit together in an all-inclusive spatial construct: one was put forward by Weber ([1909] 1929), the other by Perroux (1950a). Expanding on Weber’s ([1909] 1929) initial vision of layers of activities impacting on industrial location, a diagrammatic model can be built covering the full range of human activities that determine the distribution of economic activities as they unfold in economic space over time (Figure 4.2).

The bottom layer consists of agricultural and rural economic activities that bring about a dispersed market as visioned by Von Thünen (Grotewald, 1957; Peet, 1966). It is this layer that provides the demand (hinterlands) for goods and services that
is necessary for the initial settlement of central places and it is the same continued
demand in those hinterlands that helps sustain them economically henceforth
(Christaller, 1933; Lösch, 1954). Moving one layer up we find natural resources located in
particular locations that result in the location of extracting industries – the locations
where non-central places developed. In this sense the first layer plays a dominant role in
the location of central places and the second layer in the establishment of non-central
places. The third layer consists of manufacturing industries, the kinds that were often
focused upon in the location theory referred to above. Overall they obtain much of their
materials necessary for production from activities in the second layer and by locating
there they helped building the economies of the non-central places. It is these activities
(in the second and third layers) that were responsible for most of the earlier forms of
growth poles in Western Europe, the United States and at numerous locations in erst-
while colonial areas. But not all industries in the second layer are responsible for non-
central place building. Some industries of the second layer also obtain their inputs from
the agricultural sector. By locating at higher order central places that serve as collecting
points for products coming from the agricultural sector, they also serve to bolster the
economies of central places.
Together the central and non-central places that came about as a result of the first and
second layer activities make up the majority of all the towns and cities in the world. The
remainder (usually a minority) are towns and cities that came about as a result of activities
in the other layers such as administration, recreation, culture, etc. The only towns and
cities whose origin cannot be directly linked to a particular activity in a layer are those


Figure 4.2 A diagrammatic representation of layers of human activities in social and
economic space
who came into being as a result of interaction between layers – that is, transportation. The many port cities in the world are testament to this. Together, the nine layers of economic activities and the activities between them complete the market scene: (1) the farming community forming a punctuated but dispersed market and (2) the towns and cities – in which an assortment of activities from the second to ninth layer may occur – a punctuated but agglomerated market.

Normally, however, the upper (third to ninth) layers only play an urban building role in cities but they may become so dominant that the original reason for the location of the town or city at that location is completely obscured. This can cause a complete economic transformation of urban systems as was witnessed in cities in the developed West. As time moved on, the global economic landscape was gradually reshaped from an agricultural to a Fordist to a post-Fordist economic society. In the process activities in the upper layers have become relatively more important as providers of employment compared with the lower levels. The first layer to suffer was the agricultural layer. As people left rural areas for jobs in the cities, rural central places started struggling to survive. This was indicative of the Fordist period when the industrial sector in First World countries expanded. Since then the commercial and service sectors have grown in prominence, to such an extent that financial and computer-related commercial and service nodes have taken centre-stage in the global business arena. During this period many Fordist businesses started cascading away from First World locations to quality locations in the developing world and in the process caused cities that previously heavily relied on Fordist business to start struggling to survive.

Perroux’s (1950a) views on economic dominance helped us to visualize further the evolvement of Weber’s ([1909] 1929) layers of economic activities over time. In his discussion of dominance in the economic realm Perroux (1950a) saw four misinterpretations of economic space: that of the ‘small nation’, that of ‘economic inclusion’, that of a nation ‘without space’ and that of the ‘natural’ bounding of economic space. According to him economic space might be influenced by geographical space but ultimately cannot be contained by it. From one perspective, according to him, economic space can be seen as ‘defined by a plan’. In another, it can be viewed as a ‘field of forces’ that are reacting to economic decision-making processes. In the third it could be regarded as a distribution of ‘homogeneous objects’ or relationships.

If these views were to be looked at from a slightly different angle than initially intended by Perroux, one could say that each of his perspectives of economic space gives one a view of economic activities at different levels of spatial aggregation. At the lowest (micro) level, an economic activity (a specific business such as a brick works, for instance) may perhaps be well planned but cannot always be clearly delimited on a plan. This applies to almost all individual businesses. One might be able to show the position of the different components of a business on a city map, but many elements of the business have a reach far beyond what could be shown on the street layout of the city map. Looking at the position of the components on the plan only is therefore highly constrictive. However, if one were to keep one’s eyes fixed on the business components on the city map, but zooming out, almost like someone taking off in a space shuttle, a clearer picture emerges. What initially seemed impossible to discern clearly on a plan, now comes increasingly clearer into focus. Business elements that previously may have looked spatially incoherent and complex are now slowly imploding into what could eventually be shown as a dot on the map, while the
outward reach of the business activities (i.e., its market area) emerges more and more clearly as a discernable field of forces stretching out around it. As one travels further into space, an even bigger, more complete picture emerges. The business that appeared to be a dot on the map with its wider surrounding field of forces, now appears to be one of many of the same kind of business in economic space. If the particular type of business under investigation is spatially competitive in a region, its field of forces (market area) will meet up with the market areas of the same kind of business elsewhere in the region. The service areas of the businesses, all of them tightly packed in the region, will end up looking like the cells of a living organ when looked at under a microscope, all of them tightly packed together, each individual cell (business) consisting of a nucleus (the buildings of the business that contain the decision-makers) surrounded by cell plasma (the firm’s market area), and locked in by its cell membrane (the outer limit of its market area). If one were to go one step further and turn this picture through 90 degrees, to afford a sectional view of it, it would represent one of many kinds of economic activities that are to be found on each of the layers of human activities described in the human activities model above.

To link this picture with the evolution of urban systems in national space over time, the following features seem generally to apply (Geyer and Kontuly, 1993):

[Once an urban system has come into being, it] first goes through a primate city phase, in which a large proportion of economic development and large numbers of migrants are attracted to one or a few primary centers (Richardson, 1973; 1980). Second, as the national urban system expands and matures, new urban centers are added to the lower ranks while many of those that already exist develop and move up through the ranks. In this process, economic development gets dispersed, while the urban system becomes more spatially integrated (Friedmann, 1966 and Richardson, 1973). Third, such expanding national urban systems develop various strata of territorially organized subsystems, from the macro-level through the regional and subregional levels to the local or micro-levels (Friedmann, 1972 and Bourne, 1975). Fourth, the sequence of tendencies observed in the development of urban systems, first toward concentration and then toward deconcentration and dispersion, is not limited to systems at the national level, but can also manifest itself at each of the lower levels of territorially organized subsystems because the same spatial forces operate at both the national and subnational levels. Fifth, in [an economically integrated] urban environment, the odds normally favor the development of secondary centers closer to primary centers (Richardson, 1977; 1980; Gordon, 1979; van den Berg et al., 1982; Richter, 1985), unless an outlying center is located in an area with exceptional locational attributes.

With these few observations of how urban systems come about and the way in which they subsequently spatially and economically evolve through industrial development we are now going to look at how they are affected by globalization.

The global scale

Divisions of labour  As was said in the beginning, traces of the impact of globalization are to be found everywhere, when you enter a shop, or your house, when you switch on your television, your radio or computer, everywhere. It has affected the way we live our lives, the way we see the world and the way the world sees us, the way governments operate and the way business is conducted. Economically speaking global business has been localized. With the click of a button the privacy of a company thousands of kilometres away can be invaded through the Internet, and wherever one goes, Coca Cola, McDonald's and
Kentucky Fried Chicken are offered as local products. The same credit card can be used to draw cash or make a sale virtually everywhere on earth. The most outstanding feature of globalization is the ease with which goods and information can cross international borders and how integrated the economies of the world have become (Allen and Thompson, 1997; Cyr, 2001).

The 1970s can in many respects be regarded as the watershed decade of transformation, from the older, slower pace of the largely pre-computerized world economy to what has subsequently become a superfast, computerized global economy. Up until the 1970s the leaders in manufacturing, most of them Fordist, used to be mainly concentrated in the core regions of the First World. Up until then the Third World (as it was known at the time) remained firmly dependent on the First World – a condition that was confirmed by the former providing non-essential materials to the latter. Essentially this was the first global division of labour. But signs that the tide was beginning to turn were already visible by the second half of the 1960s. Although worker unions always posed a potential threat to the economic viability of the industrial sector, socialist-oriented uprisings in France radically changed the political mood in the country. It caused a ripple effect that was soon visible in the rest of Western Europe, North America and beyond. The stranglehold that worker unions had on businesses, especially labour-intensive industries, would eventually change the economic geography of the world. Pressure on profitability caused businesses to look for alternative production structures, especially the Fordist sector. Mechanization was one option. The other was to move or outsource labour-intensive components to regions of the world where labour was not only cheaper but also more productive. The reaction to this would eventually lead to what later became known as post-industrialism and, according to some in the developing world, neo-colonialism. In the process a gradual change in the international division of labour occurred. Labour-intensive production processes shifted from the high-labour-cost areas in North America and Western Europe to lower-labour-cost areas in the developed world, especially Central Asia and the Pacific Rim (Sassen, 1991), a change that eventually would affect the economic geography of the entire world. This change represented the second global division of labour. Similar spatial economic considerations apply here to those that were considered in Weber’s ([1909] 1929) theory – if savings in production costs and profitability justify it production processes will move. Only this time, it applies to the global rather than the local scale.

The tendency in international trade to move production processes to areas where conditions are most favourable for production has, since the 1990s, been leading to a change in the international division of labour once again. A new third international division of labour is being forged in which labour-intensive production processes are being increasingly moved from high-labour-cost core areas to the closest low-wage countries with quality labour and good infrastructure (Froebel et al., 1980; O’Loughlin, 1989; Lipietz, 1997). In the process, new global economic alliances are being forged (Geyer, 2006). In both of the latter phases of industrial restructuring, neo-liberalism has played an important part.

A distinction can be drawn between what could be called an exogenous and an endogenous process of change in the last two international divisions of labour. The exogenous process of industrial restructuring occurred through vertical disintegration, detachment and relocation. The other was a more subtle process of endogenous differentiation through
changes in command and production functions coupled with strategic outsourcing. The former process occurred through the deliberate relocation of (especially Fordist) elements of businesses from areas where the costs of land, labour, infrastructure and environmental externalities were high to areas where they were low (Glass and Saggi, 2001). The latter occurred through strategic restructuring and outsourcing. Production patterns changed globally. Specialist manufacturing in older industrialized countries was replaced by an integrating global production system in which labour-intensive production moved to developing countries. Newly industrializing countries saw the potential benefits of these trends and were particularly welcoming. They consequently benefited hugely by this while Africa and parts of South America started lagging behind (Geyer and van der Merwe, 2006).

However, the effects that foreign direct investment (FDI) have on the global economic landscape should be put into proper perspective. Although FDI has always played an important role in industrial restructuring and is widely seen as one way to circumvent trade barriers, most FDI is still being channelled to industrialized countries (Koechlin, 1995; Allen and Thompson, 1997; Cyr, 2001). This is largely due to the fact that the latter have retained their multinational command functions and high-value services, many of them feeding large city growth (Sassen, 1997a). Trade conditions, supported by the interplay of centrifugal and centripetal forces in trade-offs between various forms of increasing returns and different types of mobility costs (Krugman, 1991a; 1991b), generally favour the widening of economic core-peripheral differentials globally. To make the point, Fujita and Mori (2005) showed that NAFTA yielded 35 per cent, the EU (15 countries) 25 per cent and East Asia 23 per cent (in total, 83 per cent) of the world’s GDP in 2000 compared with 27 per cent for NAFTA, 29 per cent for the EU and 14 per cent for East Asia respectively (70 per cent in total) in 1980.

To be able to understand which factors are playing an important role in the latest trends in global economic flows one needs to look closely at concepts such as outsourcing and modular industrialization.

**Flexibility in business relocation** The concept of outsourcing is not something new. Through the ages, people and institutions have relied on others to assist them in what they, themselves, could not do to produce what was needed to survive. In the process upstream, downstream and lateral linkages became standard practice in economic relationships. However, in recent decades the scale and complexity of these linkages (many of them leading to outsourcing) grew in volume, significance and reach (Sassen, 1997b). The business environment has been changing significantly. As global competition and the rate of technological diffusion and innovation increased, the location of raw materials and cheap labour started playing a less important role in comparative advantages while innovation began playing a more important role (Krieger Mytelka, 1993). New retailer–supplier relationships (system-level competition that replaced the traditional competition between individual firms) evolved, reducing profit margins and blurring the distinction between retailers and manufacturers (Adams, 2002).

According to Jones (2000), international trade has been growing relative to national incomes. Intermediate goods are becoming a more important part of international trade and vertically integrated production processes are becoming increasingly fragmented. This is caused by reductions in transportation costs and costs in information dissemination, resulting in the outsourcing of fragments of production processes to countries that
have comparative advantages in such fragments. In the process the absolute advantages that certain countries previously had in complete areas of production are now being reduced.

Traditional forms of vertical and horizontal integration or conglomeration, to gain efficiency, are also changing. While traditional forms of industrial conglomeration ensured command over supply chains, provided economies of scale, ensured better exploitation of the market and control over market forces, lower transaction costs are making them increasingly uncompetitive. As a result, the focus in manufacturing in the 1990s has slowly been shifting from processing of material and assembly to the selling of ideas (McCarthy and Anagnostou, 2004). Entrepreneurs increasingly see outsourcing as the opposite of vertical integration – a way of improving the competitive advantage of firms and achieving the same results as vertical integration, but without its structural and managerial drawbacks. In fact, vertical integration in many respects is now fast becoming a last resort rather than an obvious option (Vining and Globerman, 1999). This has changed the configuration of businesses. They are now becoming geographically more fragmented but at the same time functionally more integrated, blurring traditional sectoral and geographical boundaries.

Multinationals buy in specialized inputs rather than producing them themselves. Services, especially advanced corporate services are growing in cities. Even when headquarter functions move out of large cities, services tend to remain there. Both contribute to, and even boost city employment. Growth of services and conditions necessary for production of advanced corporate services are turning cities into key production sites, once again. This is something they have lost in the post-Fordist period. Production processes in advanced corporate services that focus on speed, efficiency, complexity and multiplicity benefit from central locations. Together they are creating new forces of agglomeration (Sassen, 1997b).

Global competition tends to shorten the life-cycle of products. To be able to sustain a competitive edge companies need continuously to acquire new capacities. Innovation is not enough, however. Manufacturing and marketing capabilities that are stronger than before are now required to survive. The possibility of reverse engineering has made traditional forms of legal protection of innovation largely ineffective (Kotabe and Murray, 2004). Because outsourcing has a strategic, operational, political, innovative and structural motivation (McCarthy and Anagnostou, 2004), it has become an important instrument for companies to sustain their competitive advantage. Producing in-house, or reverting to the outsourcing of parts or whole products to low-wage countries has been an important part of this practice now for some time.

The decision to outsource is more often than not based on the distinction between core and complementary skills within companies. Although the outsourcing of complementary skills has become a well-established practice (Cowan and Brubaker, 2000), firms are now increasingly willing to consider also the outsourcing of (some) core skills for strategic reasons – a tendency that challenges conventional thinking about vertical integration (Vining and Globerman, 1999; Baden-Fuller et al., 2000). Whether complementary or (some) core skills are outsourced, the decision to handle an activity within a company, or to outsource it, normally hinges on three factors: the company’s strategic vulnerability, its current capacity to execute a specific function and its potential to obtain a competitive advantage (Nellore and Söderquist, 2000).
A synthesis

Location theory and urban development

In this chapter we have now looked at two issues: how theory explains location of businesses in micro-, meso- and macroeconomic space, and how the business landscape has changed globally in recent years. In this final section two questions need to be answered. What are the generic issues that revolve around location theory and urban development processes and more specifically, how has globalization affected urban systems across the size spectrum?

To find out how globalization has affected urban systems from the global right down to the local level one will first have to look at how it has affected population migration patterns. During the 1970s, two transitions began to occur at the same time in parts of the developed world, the one a demographic transition, the other an industrial transition. Soon the people living in those countries realized that the two transitions were undermining one another. When developed countries started entering the demographic transition phase for the first time in the early 1970s they soon realized what potential consequences it held for their economies. One was the potential ‘losses’ in the availability of labour due to decreasing birth rates. The obvious policy reaction to that was to regard international labour migration as a way of compensating for these effective ‘losses’. But at the same time the same countries moved from Fordism to post-Fordism. In the process, North America and Western Europe started losing job opportunities in the Fordist sector. Over a period of three decades immigration gradually became a growing political concern amongst large segments of the populations of those countries – amongst the socialist-oriented because of the threat that growing numbers of immigrants pose to the blue-collar employment market and amongst the conservatives because of the potential cultural threat they pose.

However, internally continuing differential urbanization trends were observed in developed and developing countries. On the whole, proportionally more younger people, low-income groups, minorities and immigrants concentrated in larger cities, which they regarded as social and economic ‘escalators’. At the same time more of the older people and higher-income groups (those that have financially ‘arrived’) tended to deconcentrate, effectively forming counter-migration streams. Some moved to decentralized locations inside cities, others (exurbanites) to smaller satellite cities in the vicinity while substantial numbers tended to move over longer distances from older industrialized metropolitan areas to more rural locations or environmentally more friendly areas (Geyer, 1996).

At the micro level these population redistribution patterns also impact on urban morphology. The point was made earlier on that market forces tend to cause cities to evolve spatially over time. Initially cities have a mono-nodal structure. During this stage, city centres are still alive with activities of all kinds because that is the only logical place where people can go to for shopping and urban-oriented entertainment. As time goes on, cities keep on expanding, their city centres and adjoining areas accruing negative externalities all the time. As a result of mounting commuting time and costs to reach city centres suburban nodes emerged. Some remained small but some grew into what has now become known as edge cities. In certain cases some of the latter have grown so large that combined they are trouncing city centres, turning the economic structures of large cities inside out. In certain cases cities effectively become doughnut cities, that is, edge cities
becoming the new city outer cores while the traditional central city areas lose economic momentum.

As the central parts of the cities start to age with urban decay setting in in many areas, and the suburban areas gain in economic vitality, traffic patterns also tend to change. Traffic flows that were originally central-oriented now increasingly start turning into lateral flows between suburban centres. The tendency of businesses to follow the market drives multi-centricity. Can this trend be reversed as some idealists tend to think? Probably not. Just as market forces largely determine the distribution of businesses and have turned even low-density residential properties in choice residential locations into commodity housing, any step taken to turn the clock back is likely not to succeed. The reason for this is simply because it will negatively affect the urban economies. Factors such as least cost locations, low profit margins, agglomeration economies, multi-purpose shopping trips and uneven market distributions have forced many traditional kinds of businesses to cluster together, initially in city centres, then in suburban centres and shopping malls. By doing this small businesses that would have been unable to attract enough clientele to survive economically on their own are now able to combine forces with many other similar businesses in a suburban centre or shopping mall to attract much larger numbers of potential customers than would have been possible otherwise. Traditional locational economic principles still largely determine the micro location of these businesses. Striving for post-modern urban ideals but ignoring something as basic as the market threshold of businesses (Christaller, 1933) are likely to do more harm than good.

However, many businesses have gained market accessibility through information technology. This, you can see when you open your e-mail. Countless businesses – industrial, commercial and services – have become more visible and are able to access their target market worldwide without having to be located where it can be seen by motorists. They all lie hidden just below the surface of the Internet. Enter it, and millions of business options of the kind you are interested in lie waiting, ready to be accessed. These businesses have managed to invade all kinds of urban areas – residential, industrial and commercial – without changing its basic character. Why? Because they have largely become silent and invisible and have overcome the friction of distance. In cases where they have entered the homes of people in neighbourhoods, integration of land uses has indeed occurred. But these businesses do not alter the outward appearance of neighbourhoods. Neither are they subject to the traditional forces of agglomeration and externalities. This is part of what is regarded as the pentanary sector – the intellectual economic sector that focuses on the minds of people (Geyer, 2002c).

**Impact on urban systems**

Globalization also had a marked effect on the way local governments do their business. Towns and cities are now widening their focus from the national to the international urban system. They are now seeking new working relationships with towns and cities facing similar problems in other parts of the world. They are increasingly becoming involved in direct bilateral relationships with authorities in other countries, something that used to be largely the domain of higher levels of government. They use all the abilities, expertise and advantages they possess to attract business from international investors. Towns and cities develop their own websites on the Internet, advertising their social, economic, strategic and locational advantages to the national and international
society at large. As a result, national boundaries are being blurred while a new global system of cities is emerging. Privatization and deregulation are key elements of the global local economy. Governments are moving away from narrow security issues to financial and economic concerns. Privatization not only means a shift in the property regime, but also a shift in governmental functions from the public sector to the private sector (Sassen, 1997b). World cities fulfil an important role as apexes and centres of spatial ordering within this urban system. They are classified as such because of the intensity of their economic interaction worldwide. They serve as hubs of international finance and business, corporate and communication services, as well as carriers of mass information and culture.

The notion put forth over the past decade or so that world cities are single identifiable nodes and that only New York, London and Tokyo are truly world cities is no longer a defendable position. A much larger number of cities than only those few enjoy world city status. They attract migrants and generate economic flows on a global scale and are connected to similar cities elsewhere in the world.

Since the e-revolution took hold, people have become spatially more connected than they used to be. A much larger percentage of people now have access to the open system of economic and information flows than before (Geyer, 2002b). A paradigm shift is needed from the idea of a hierarchy of world cities to the idea of a wider global city network. The flows of capital, people, information and commodities between these connected world cities create a global network in which more than only a few cities can assume world city status (Taylor et al., 2002). A new empirical agenda has been established through which a new relational database is being generated (Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor, 2000). It is an initiative that follows Castells’ (1996) idea of space of flows and focuses on the relationships between and the connectedness of cities that make up the current global network society.

It should be stressed, however, that the widening of the world city concept does not mean that every large city in the world with significant IT capability has now suddenly become a world city. Far from it. What it means is that the somewhat elusive idea of the overarching connectedness of the citizens of the global network society has been enhanced by the exploding computer hard and software industry in recent years. Through their technologically advanced businesses and their IT-practising inhabitants, more cities in the developed and developing world are now globally connected than ever before.

However, information technology has not made the concept of the resistance of geographical space obsolete (Graham, 1998; 1999). On the contrary, experience has taught us that, despite the wonderful new information technology that is available today, eye-to-eye contact is still an indispensable requirement for a business to be successful, even in the world’s sophisticated corporate economic environment (Geyer, 2002a). This fact has been proven by the concentration of headquarter functions of large business corporations in certain locations in the world, resulting in the concept of global urban cores, that is, groups of cities that contain large numbers of multinational headquarters that are closely knitted together within clearly defined geographical areas of the developed world (Geyer, 2006).

However, vast numbers of less advanced people and organizations in the developed and developing world still do not have the ability to plug readily into this globalized information and communication layer. These people and organizations are not yet able to escape
the friction of distance to the degree that the network society is able to do. For them (and
frankly also for a large part of Castells’ ‘global network society’), Mumford’s (1961) view
that human life ‘swings between two poles: movement and settlement’, has remained as
relevant as ever.

Core regions as gravity centres
Using the global urban system as a point of departure, several generalizations can be
made regarding its form and function:

First, the world cities and large urbanized regions in their immediate vicinity have
become spatially integrated to such an extent that they can be regarded as outstanding
gravitational fields or core areas attracting business and tapping into markets and
resources globally. Agglomeration forces favouring apexes in these areas gave Krugman
(1991b) grounds for his view of the evolving new economic geography. Several global
core areas can be identified offhand. In North East America, New York serves as an
apex within the north-eastern seaboard. Around this inner core area lies an outer core
area, stretching roughly from Washington in the south, to Chicago in the west and
Montreal in the north. Similarly, London serves as an apex within an inner core area in
Western Europe, stretching from Paris in the south to Frankfurt in the East and
Amsterdam in the north. This inner core is surrounded by a massive outer core area,
stretching roughly from Lyon and Milan in the south, to Vienna and Berlin in the east,
to Stockholm and Oslo in the north, and Manchester and Liverpool in the west.
Although there are more core areas, these examples serve to illustrate how global apexes
and their surrounding urban areas constitute highly integrated urban networks at the
highest level of aggregation.

From an international development perspective, the global core regions are not the only
areas advantaged significantly by international economic forces of cumulative causation.
Also, lesser cores such as Hong Kong, the Johannesburg–Pretoria area, Sao Paulo and
Singapore present similar advantages to multinational corporations, albeit at lower levels
of intensity and scale than the global cores. In fact, sub-continental cores in the develop-
ing world often provide agglomeration advantages far outstripping those of vast areas
around them. The locational advantage offered by these cores cause many influential
multinationals, international financial institutions and international agencies to locate
their regional headquarters there. This creates opportunities similar to those offered to
prospective skilled and unskilled international migrants in the world cores. In a global
context, subcontinental cores could be regarded as standalone intermediate-sized cores.
Expanding on Friedmann (1972) and Philbrick’s (1957) visions of how urban systems
evolve, spatially organized urban (sub)systems can be identified at the global, continen-
tal, subcontinental, national, subnational and local levels.

Many subcontinental cores are located in the developing world. Although parts of the
developing world are increasingly lagging behind economically (Geyer, 2006) the focus in
terms of human resource potential is slowly shifting from the developed world towards
quality destinations in the developing world. Serving as gateways to large tracts of eco-
nomically less developed territory in the developing world, certain strategically well-
located urban agglomerations are already becoming important subcontinental and even
continental cores attracting large amounts of foreign direct investment and scores of
international migrants across the board annually.
Notes
1. Due to the thematic overlap, this chapter drew (heavily in parts) from Geyer (1989; 2002a; 2002b; 2002c and 2006).
2. The characterization of location decision-making as ‘profitable’ in this sentence is quite deliberate since a sizable body of literature exists showing that non-profitable location decisions such as for public facilities, for instance, are based on quite different premises (DeVerteuil, 2000), a range of factors that fall well outside the scope of this chapter.
3. Von Thünen provided a theoretical explanation of how such a dispersed market is formed around a town or city over time (see, for instance, Grotewald, 1957; Peet, 1966).
4. Originally Perroux (1955) saw a growth pole as an economic node or protrusion in abstract economic space, which, in the minds of some, made the concept almost impossible to apply in practice (Blaug, 1964; Darwent, 1969; Hermansen, 1972; Lasuén, 1972). A growth centre on the other hand was regarded as a cluster of industries in geographic space (Boudeville, 1967). Such a cluster forms part of a city that not only offers central place functions to a dispersed community but is also a centre that has an abundance of entrepreneurs.
5. Richardson (1973) regards them as part of what he calls ‘locational constants’.
6. Each (commercial) farm forms a nodal region in micro scale. The farmhouse represents the ‘headquarters’ and the remainder of the farm the functional area.
7. Together the nine layers of economic activities complete the market scene: the farming community forming a dispersed market and the towns and cities – in which an assortment of activities from the second to ninth layer may occur – a punctuated market.
8. The concept of comparative advantage has been regarded as a cornerstone in international trade theory since Ricardo (Jones, 1980; 2000).
9. A firm has a competitive advantage when it follows a strategy that its competitors are not following or cannot follow.
10. This can be done through exploitation, generation or collaboration. Exploitative innovation (often referred to as the ‘demonstration effect’ in economics) is the most common and oldest form of innovation. It normally requires less input from the benefactor. Collaborative innovation is when innovative partners work together to create an innovation. It is a more positive form of innovation and often leads to generative innovation, an improvement of a current product or idea (Archibugi and Iammarino, 1999).
11. There is a perception that increased reliance on outsourcing may lead to a decline in innovation overall and in control over the quality of end-products, but studies have shown that outsourcing may improve a firm’s ability to innovate (Gilley et al., 2004).
12. As a result, volumes of outsourcing are soaring. In 1998 outsourcing was estimated at $100 billion globally and by 2003, five years later, it stood at $150 billion (Assmann and Punter, 2003). In 1999, 34 per cent of world trade was intra-firm (Kotabe and Murray, 2004), but in 2000 approximately 40 per cent of hi-tech industries and approximately 50 per cent of US car manufacturing relied on outsourcing (Gavious and Rabinowitz, 2003).
13. It is important to notice that in-house production does not necessarily exclude sourcing. Sourcing could occur in two ways: through intra-firm sourcing, that is, obtaining components or products from local subsidiaries (in which case it becomes ‘in-house procurement’) or foreign subsidiaries (in which case it becomes ‘off-shore procurement’), and outsourcing (which could occur ‘at arm’s length’ or strategic), when products are obtained from independent suppliers (Kotabe and Murray, 2004).
14. Indications are, however, that only core functions that are running the risk of becoming outdated are usually considered for outsourcing (Baden-Fuller, Targett and Hunt, 2000).
15. An important factor that could change the trade-offs between outsourcing and vertical integration, however, is asset specificity, that is, the extent to which resources are specified to a particular product or context. Outsourcing targets are determined by the dependency of a firm on a particular product or context. High degrees of asset specificity, something that is likely to increase rather than decrease in our globalizing economy, could lead to vertical integration rather than outsourcing (Brandes, Lilliecruetz and Brege, 1997).
16. Other factors that are also important in outsourcing include exchange rate fluctuations, infrastructure, industrial and cultural environments (nationality, demography and business practices), logistics and inventory management (Kotabe and Murray, 2004).

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5 Socialist economies in transition: urban policy in China and Vietnam

Y.M. Yeung and J. Shen

Introduction
China and Vietnam share a common characteristic in that they have experienced remarkable economic growth and urban transformation since opening up their economies after decades of strict socialism and self-imposed isolation. China reopened itself in 1978 and its breathtaking economic development and urban change have been widely documented (for example, Yeung and Chu, 1998, 2000; Ma and Wu, 2005). In China’s silent revolution, its cities have been playing catalytic roles in connecting local processes to globalization, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and spearheading socioeconomic change (Yeung and Hu, 1992; Yeung and Sung, 1996). Likewise, Vietnam opted for a policy of openness since 1986, through a process called Doi moi (meaning ‘economic restructuring’), a decade after the war of liberation ended. The pace of economic development and social modernization has fluctuated over the years but has strongly rebounded since 1997. Vietnamese cities have been leading the country in a process of extraordinary change, with an annual economic growth rate of 7 per cent in the period 1993–2004, and at 8.4 per cent in 2005, second only to China.

This chapter focuses on urban policy in China and Vietnam during the period of post-reform development. First we will look at how China’s cities changed. Attention will then be devoted to urban policies related to urban areas, international links in the age of globalization, rural–urban migration in the context of social change and what challenges that poses to urban management. Finally, urban governance will be examined against the background of decentralized decision-making, of stringent political control and people’s desire for increased participation. In the case of Vietnam, urban policy will be studied as it pertains to the accelerated pace of economic development of the country over the past two decades after it began to open up to development.

Urban change in China
At the macro level, the most important and obvious element of change in the urban scene is the fast growth and increase in the number of China’s cities during the reform period. As Table 5.1 shows, the number of cities has increased from 223 in 1980 to 649 in 2004, of which the number of cities with a population of over a million inhabitants has simply exploded. Extra-large cities of over two million inhabitants have grown among the fastest, from seven to 21, and ‘million’ cities increased from eight to 30 in the period. This is clear evidence that the long-held policy of restricting the growth of large cities and promoting the growth of small and medium-sized cities has failed miserably in the reform period. Cities with aspirations to grow in size and importance have paid little attention to policy structure and have essentially followed their own trajectories.
However, the level of urbanization in China remains low compared with its rate of industrial and economic development relative to other countries. The fifth population census of 2000 showed that 36.09 per cent or 458.44 million of the population was urbanized. By 2005, China’s urban population reached 562.12 million, or 42.99 per cent of the total population. It is anticipated that the level of urbanization will increase by 1 per cent per year in the foreseeable future (China Mayors Association, 2003, p. 39). With an enormous rural population facing high levels of unemployment, there is potential for massive rural–urban migration. From 1958, China was perhaps the only country that was able to contain its population growth successfully by strictly applying its household registration system. By 1984, pressure began building up for the rural population to migrate to cities. The first thaw of the age-old system began to appear and, hence, the beginning of a new period of rapid urbanization and the explosive growth of Chinese cities followed. Various estimates have put rural–urban migrants to cities, generally known as temporary or floating population, especially in the coastal region, to around 140 million in 2003, or about 10 per cent of the total population and 30 per cent of the rural labour force (http://english.people.com.cn). As later sections will illustrate, rural–urban migrants have become a key element in shaping and reshaping the present character and future trajectory of Chinese cities.

### Urban land

Since the mid-1980s, the rate of change of land from agriculture to non-agricultural land uses has been the highest and the most widespread in China’s history. This especially applies to the coastal provinces where population densities have traditionally been high and economic growth the fastest. Non-agricultural land use expansion in these areas has been on the increase, while there was a steady decline in cultivated land. The increase of land use in China’s largest cities is well documented, as revealed by satellite data. Landsat images created during the 1980s and 1990s revealed that land occupied by non-agricultural land uses in 27 of China’s largest urban regions increased from 3267 sq km in 1986 to 4907 sq km in 1996, or by 50 per cent. In the period from 1968 to 1996, Dalian topped the list of cities in having urban land increased by 213 per cent, followed by Shijiazhuang (110 per cent) and Guangzhou (109 per cent) (Ho and Lin, 2004, pp. 83, 87).

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### Table 5.1 China’s population growth rates by city size, 1980–89 and 1989–2004

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.0 mil. +</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–2 mil.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>0.5–1 mil.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2–0.5 mil.</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1–0.2 mil.</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1 mil.–</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7.04</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>-2.10</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average/total</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>649</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversion of land from agriculture to non-agricultural use in the coastal provinces occurred almost without control. All conversions were determined by market forces through decentralized decision-making bodies (away from the central government) without the necessary institutions and laws to manage the process in an orderly way.

Before the economic reforms of the early 1980s, rural land was collectively owned by farmers. Urban land did not gain in value because it was allocated freely by administrative fiat. However, urban reform necessitated a land market. It came largely as an adopted version of the Hong Kong model. All urban land belongs solely to the state but can be leased for a fee, in the Chinese case, for a period ranging from 50 to 70 years. The urban land market is primarily based on the notion of land use rights (LURs) and is open to a competitive bidding process. Land sale is negotiated, tendered or auctioned. The inaugural land sale took place in Shenzhen in 1987 and the model was rapidly adopted and replicated in cities across the country. One drawback in this market process was that auctioning became only a small part of the competitive process. In all urban land leased between 1993 and 2000, not more than 15 per cent of the land was auctioned. The remainder of the land was acquired by means of negotiations, which obviously increased the risk of corruption and bribery (Yeh, 2005, pp. 77–8).

The urban land lease formed only one part of the land market though. The other part, inherited from the pre-reform period, is a system of administratively allocated land free of charge. Under normal circumstances, such land was allocated to danwei or government work units such as departments or ministries on quite a liberal basis. When viewed in the emerging urban land market, administratively allocated land entails a huge loss of revenue to the city. Moreover, such land is not subject to official urban planning controls and is largely unregulated. Urban sprawl is not uncommon and can often be traced to this source occurring outside the official planning framework. Hanging on to such prized property, danwei are under pressure to develop their land via purposefully established companies to realize windfall financial gains. Danwei have often been depicted as land masters who are at odds with the city governments because the latter attempt to consolidate their control over the land under their jurisdiction by enforcing urban management. When land is traded by danwei at prices below the land lease system, a black market or hidden market usually emerges. The price differential between the market-based mechanism and the administratively allocated land system is often substantial (Hsing, 2006).

As danwei land masters own much of the urban land and are de jure owners, a new mechanism (institution) of land development right (LDR) has been invented for these land users. The new institution is intended to unlock the supply of land for redevelopment while accommodating and respecting the existing and inherited system of land use rights of the danwei. The land development right is what a sitting danwei can claim and, based on what the land right allows, can redevelop the site it occupies and, if circumstances permit, develop neighbouring sites occupied by other danwei land users. This is regarded as a second best solution because it is viewed that the land development right is still a sub-optimal utilization of scarce land resources (Zhu, 2004).

Over the past two decades since the land market was established in 1987 (with the system of urban land lease coming into existence), Chinese cities have been operating on a dual land market system along with a black market. It is an infinitely complex system subject to uncertainties and the lack of transparency. Yet with the land lease system in place, the beginnings of a rational land market have started to take shape. A land rent gradient is
gradually formed, with the highest value set at the city centre and progressively petering out towards the urban fringe. Factories, institutions, living quarters and other land uses occupying central locations that are not needed there have been moved out to outlying locations. Chinese cities have been undergoing an intensive process of renewal and spatial reorganization in response to opportunities and pressures emanating from the new land market. In the process of redeveloping Chinese cities, city governments concerned have not benefited from the land market process. Instead, it was the danwei land masters who gained handsomely from the new situation. It has been estimated that the loss of revenue to the state by the early 1990s, would be at least in the order of RMB10 billion, or US$1.16 billion, a year (Yeh and Wu, 1996, p. 351). A recent thorough study of the land development process in China has concluded that the peculiar dual-track system of land management, designed to solve land use problems, has turned out to be one of the root causes of black markets, corruption and social discontent. The black market is active and pervasive, allowing corrupt state officials to gain sizable ill-gotten wealth and social injustice perpetuates this (Lin and Ho, 2005, p. 432). When countervailing forces are at work in the urban land market, a truly competitive land market system faces innumerable obstacles for its realization. The juxtaposition of conflicting elements in the land market means that the system is baffling enough for Chinese developers, let alone foreign entrepreneurs.

As rapid development and transformation has occurred in Chinese cities, many processes have been working in conjunction and sometimes against one another. On the urban fringe, urban sprawl has become a problem with haphazard development. Economic and technological development zones (ETDZs) have proliferated on land acquired from farmers. Similarly, large housing projects have been developed on rural land acquired through the black market. Many of these developments do not have proper provision of water supply and sewers and cause acute environmental problems. A survey has shown that as much as 96 per cent of development took place in Shanghai in the period 1980–90 in the suburbs and on the outskirts through conversion of agricultural land (Zhu, 2004, p. 1254). On the other hand, within the city proper, large-scale residential communities have appeared to replace formerly self-contained communities of danwei, who have divested themselves of the responsibility of providing housing for their employees. New social areas are being formed and reformed, with some catering for the newly rich. Indeed, gated communities have emerged as a new phenomenon for those with the means to ensure privacy and comfort. Nevertheless, in addition to the drive towards affluence by individuals and families, there is an almost pathological drive for many cities towards growth and importance. It has been lamented by academics and shrewd observers that some cities, even smaller ones, aspire to greatness by building large city squares, monuments, highways and developing parks. For example, a county town in Shandong called Linyi has built a city square of 24 hectares, half the size of Tiananmen square in Beijing or five times the size of the city square in Moscow (Fu, Chen and Dong, 2003, p. 31; Yeung, 2006). This is an appetite for grandeur beyond reason or any sense of reasonableness that is extremely wasteful of valuable urban land resources.

On the other hand, some large coastal cities in China do present beautiful and impressive skylines to signify that they have come of age and are ready to enter a new century full of confidence and vigour. Most of the FDI in China’s real estate has centred on the largest coastal cities, such as Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, which vie for attention and comparative advantage as they are playing more active roles in the increasingly
globalized economy, especially after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. China’s coastal cities provide fertile ground for foreign architects and planners to create new urban imagery in the new built environment. With Beijing going to host the Olympics in 2008, Shanghai the World Expo and Guangzhou the Asian Games in 2010, the governments in question will capitalize on these grand events to improve their economic strength and infrastructure, including a new look of globalness and architectural creativity.

**Globalization and urban restructuring**
Large-scale foreign investment and labour-intensive export-oriented industrialization are important processes especially in the coastal regions of China. A city’s openness to foreign investment has a positive impact on its development. Generally, cities are the main destination of foreign direct investment (FDI). The inflow of FDI to China increased from US$1.26 billion in 1984 to US$60.63 billion in 2004. The accumulated inflow of FDI reached US$562.11 billion in the period 1979–2004 (NBS, 2005b). From 1998 to 2004, the number of FDI firms increased from 26,442 to 42,753 (Table 5.2). By 2004, FDI firms accounted for 23.69 per cent of employment and 19 per cent of value-added tax for all industrial firms in China. As a result, firms invested by Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and foreign countries form an important economic sector in China, enhancing China’s manufacturing capability in applying modern technology, producing new and quality products and increasing export. It also changes urban economic structure.

### Table 5.2 Industrial firms invested by Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and foreign countries in 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of firms</th>
<th>Sales revenue (RMB billion)</th>
<th>Profit (RMB billion)</th>
<th>Value-added tax (RMB billion)</th>
<th>Employees (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China (1998)</td>
<td>26,442</td>
<td>1,560.46</td>
<td>41.86</td>
<td>52.11</td>
<td>7.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (2000)</td>
<td>28,445</td>
<td>2,254.57</td>
<td>128.25</td>
<td>73.89</td>
<td>8.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (2004)</td>
<td>42,753</td>
<td>5,783.15</td>
<td>345.48</td>
<td>121.56</td>
<td>14.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>213.51</td>
<td>14.78</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianjin</td>
<td>1,277</td>
<td>259.27</td>
<td>21.05</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>4,851</td>
<td>879.09</td>
<td>57.12</td>
<td>17.07</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongqing</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>40.40</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td>11,069</td>
<td>1,655.63</td>
<td>88.73</td>
<td>27.01</td>
<td>5.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share in the total of all industrial firms (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China (1998)</td>
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<td>China (2000)</td>
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<td>China (2004)</td>
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<td>Beijing</td>
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<td>Tianjin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chongqing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guangdong</td>
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</table>

*Note:* All firms refer to non-SOEs with sales over RMB5 million and all SOEs.

In coastal cities, the contribution of FDI firms was much greater, resulting in an increasing gap in economic development between coastal and inland cities. In Shanghai, the contribution of FDI firms was 63.41 per cent to sales revenue among all industrial firms in 2004. Cities in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Dongguan are really manufacturing bases of transnational corporations (TNCs), which contributed over 65 per cent of total gross value of industrial output (GVIO) (Statistical Bureau of Guangdong, 2005). Most of these firms’ products are for exporting to overseas markets, significantly expanding China’s export capacity. Import is also boosted as the operations of TNCs import many components and raw materials to China through their global production network. Chinese cities have been chosen for low-cost manufacturing processing largely due to cheap labour and land, as well as their stable political condition, with significant implications for the income and welfare of urban working class and rural migrants.

Due to the orientation of FDI firms to the international market, these firms contribute significantly to China’s expanding international trade. They accounted for 57.07 per cent and 57.83 per cent, respectively, of the total export and import of China in 2004. As a result, China’s ratio of export to GDP reached 35.88 per cent in 2004. This is largely due to a very high ratio in coastal export-oriented economies. The ratio was 81.66 per cent in Shanghai, 188.24 per cent in Shenzhen and 252.12 per cent in Dongguan, which was comparable to 156.33 per cent in Hong Kong, a well-known international trading hub of the world. Thanks to large-scale export and import of FDI firms, China moved up the ranks in export steadily from 32nd in 1978 to 3rd position in the world in 2005.

Due to rapid industrialization and economic development, China’s position in GDP also moved up quickly from 7th in 1998 to 4th place in 2005, just after the United States, Japan and Germany. Nevertheless, with a population of 1.3 billion, China’s GNP per capita was only US$1740, ranked 128th in the world in 2005. Even if GNP was adjusted by purchasing power, its GNP per capita was only US$6600, ranked 107th in 2005 (World Bank, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/, accessed on 14 October 2006). Furthermore, China’s economic development is accompanied by a widening gap between urban and rural residents as well as among the urban residents. While net income per rural resident increased significantly and the Engel coefficient fell from 67.7 to 45.6 in the period 1978–2003, the ratio of disposable income per urban resident to net income per rural resident increased from 1.86:1 to 3.21:1 in the period 1985–2004 (NBS, 2005b). In urban areas, new groups of the poor have emerged, consisting of unemployed, retired and low-income residents as well as rural migrants. This calls for a complete and comprehensive overhaul of the social security and public health systems.

Opening to the outside world and becoming international or even world cities have become the objectives of over 40 Chinese cities. Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen are in a position to become international cities and world cities due to the growing and globalizing Chinese economy (Shi and Hamnett, 2002). Indeed, Beijing and Shanghai were identified by Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor (1999) as Gamma world cities among the 55 world cities. To be an international city, its infrastructure and services must reach the first-class international level and the urban economy is brought into the greater circulation of the world economy according to some Chinese officials (Cook, 2006). The emerging international cities in China are keen to attract regional headquarters and regional offices of TNCs to enhance their international command function. Great efforts
were made to bid for the hosting of major international events such as the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 and World Expo in Shanghai in 2010.

Beijing is the first choice of TNCs for their regional headquarters, R&D centres and investment companies (Zhao, 2005). In 2003 there were 25 TNC regional headquarters and 139 investment companies with functions of regional headquarters. As the national financial centre and due to its easy access to government information and large domestic firms in the capital, Beijing has an advantage over other Chinese cities according to Zhao, Zhang and Wang (2004). In 2003, Beijing had 265 large enterprises (groups). The headquarters of some 73 per cent SOEs (state-owned enterprises) administrated by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission were located in Beijing. In 2005, 91 out of top 500 Chinese enterprises were in Beijing (Zhao, 2005).

Shanghai is another magnet for TNCs. Since the adoption of a national policy of developing Pudong New District, Shanghai has been destined to become the international financial centre of China. One significant step in this direction was the setting up of the headquarters of the Bank of China in Shanghai in 2005. The Shanghai government has adopted various policies to attract TNCs’ regional headquarters and R&D centres: the ‘Provisional Regulations for Encouraging the Establishment of Regional Headquarters of Foreign MNCs in Shanghai’ and ‘Provisional Regulations of Shanghai Municipality on Encouraging Overseas Investment in the Establishment of R&D Institutions’, for example. In 2004, foreign companies established 86 regional headquarters of TNCs, 105 investment companies and 142 R&D centres in Shanghai. There were 84 foreign banks and financial companies in 2005. Eighty per cent of the top 50 banks in the world had set up branches in Shanghai. Over 400 out of top 500 TNCs in the world invested in Shanghai. Many domestic companies also moved their headquarters to Shanghai. Over 200 domestic companies had set up their offices in Shanghai (Zhao, 2005). Some 833 companies were listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange with total capitalization of US$286 billion, ranked 21st in the world in 2005 (World Federation of Exchanges, 2006). In 2005, the share of financial industry in GDP reached 7.5 per cent.

Shenzhen has also become an emerging regional economic centre in the PRD. It has a sound export-oriented economy with a large high-tech industry. Its exports have ranked top among Chinese cities for many years. The export reached US$100 billion for the first time in history in 2005. Among the total exports, 46.6 per cent were high-tech products and 74.4 per cent were electronic products and machinery (Li, 2006). The Shenzhen 2030 Urban Development Strategy was approved by the Standing Committee of Shenzhen People’s Congress in July 2006. Shenzhen aims to become a pioneering global city with sustainable development. Indeed, Shenzhen has made great progress in innovation and technology. For example, two major telecom-equipment manufacturers, Huawei Technology Corporation and Shenzhen Zhongxing Technology Corporation, have emerged in Shenzhen with the support of government in their early years. Their sales revenue reached US$5.6 billion and US$4.1 billion in 2004 respectively (Fan, 2006). Nevertheless, China still needs to import most advanced machinery from foreign countries, accounting for over 60 per cent of the total investment in machinery in the whole country, over RMB1000 billion each year (Le and Wulan, 2006, pp. 54–6). Shenzhen imported US$13.12 billion of integrated circuit (IC) and electronic components but exported only US$0.65 billion in the first nine months of 2005. Due to heavy use of imported components, the share of domestic value-added for high-tech products was only
9 per cent, lower than the 69.9 per cent of traditional products in the same period (Le and Wulan, 2006, p. 19).

TNCs play an important role in Shenzhen’s economy. In 2003, some 98 of the top 500 TNCs had investments in Shenzhen. They set up nine regional headquarters and 26 R&D centres. Several TNCs such as Wal-Mart set up their China procurement centre in Shenzhen (Zhao, 2005). Some 544 companies were listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange with total capitalization of US$116 billion, ranked 33rd in the world in 2005 (World Federation of Exchanges, 2006).

Clearly, some top and large Chinese cities are becoming international cities rapidly. Benefiting from their advantageous status in the administrative hierarchy in the context of the critical role of the state and state-owned sector in China (Zhao, Chan and Sit, 2003), these cities are most attractive to foreign investors and talents. Building on both domestic and international capital, technology and human resources, these cities are becoming major centres of innovation and R&D. Inland cities, however, have significant disadvantages. They are not marketed as aggressively as large cities and are not as integrated in the international economy. This raises questions about the future of the small, medium and inland cities in China.

Temporary population and migration policy
From the 1950s to the 1970s, the household registration (hukou) system served as a mechanism to control population migration directly. Two kinds of hukou status were assigned to people living in rural and urban areas respectively: ‘agricultural’ and ‘non-agricultural’. The non-agricultural population was sponsored by the state with various employment, housing, education and social welfare privileges.

From 1964 to 1978 the term urbanization only referred to people with a non-agricultural hukou status. Shen (2006) calls this the single track of state-sponsored urbanization in China before 1978. Since then a new dual-track urbanization model emerged. The dual track system consists of a new track of spontaneous urbanization involving people with an agricultural hukou status and a reconfigured track of state-sponsored urbanization of people with a non-agricultural hukou status.

The term ‘spontaneous urbanization’ includes urban population with ‘agricultural’ hukou status, who are not entitled to many benefits and privileges. They include local people engaged in township and village enterprises (TVEs) and rural migrants in urban areas (Shen, 2006). Rural migrants constitute the majority of the temporary population whose hukou is not in their place of living. It is noted that temporary population means not permanent urban residents according to their hukou status.

From 1982 to 2000, the urban population in China more than doubled, increasing from 215.71 to 469.57 million. During the period the level of urbanization increased from 21.39 per cent to 37.04 per cent based on adjusted census data (Shen, 2006). While the levels of urbanization in the three regions did not differ that much in 1982 (24.75 per cent, 20.39 per cent and 17.02 per cent in the eastern, central and western regions respectively), urbanization increased significantly in the eastern region (47.29 per cent, compared with only 33.03 per cent and 29.36 per cent in central and western China, respectively). These gaps in the level of urbanization emerged during the reform period.

Although state-sponsored urbanization in the eastern region grew only slightly faster than in other regions, its urban agricultural population grew much faster. From 1982 to
2000 the annual growth rate of the urban agricultural population was 5.94 per cent, 2.65 per cent and 4.10 per cent in the eastern, central and western regions, respectively. The temporary population increased from 6.07 million in 1982 to 39.63 million in 1990 and a massive 109.01 million by 2000.

From 1982 to 2000 the annual growth rate of the temporary population stood at 19.60 per cent, 12.74 per cent and 16.45 per cent in the eastern, central and western regions, respectively. By 2000 there were more temporary people in the eastern region than in the central and western regions combined. Among the top seven provinces, each with a temporary population of over 5 million in 2000, six (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Guangdong and Fujian) were located in the eastern region while only one (Sichuan) was located in the western region.

Overall, both tracks of urbanization were equally important as indicated by the scale of changes. In China as a whole, the urban non-agricultural population increased by 164.46 million, while the urban agricultural population and the temporary population increased by 89.41 million and 102.44 million between 1982 and 2000 respectively. But the speed of spontaneous urbanization was faster than that of state-sponsored urbanization. Clearly, migration to urban areas became an important alternative for many rural people in the 1990s.

According to the 2000 census, people who left their hukou locations (streets, towns and townships) for more than six months were classified as ‘temporary population’. They accounted for 11.62 per cent of the total population in China. Urban areas accounted for 78.57 per cent of the total temporary population (China Data Center, 2003).

Beijing and Shanghai had a temporary population of over four million each, accounting for over 30 per cent of their total population in 2000. Shenzhen and Dongguan had temporary populations of six and five million, respectively, accounting for over 77 per cent of their total population. Shenzhen and Dongguan are located in the PRD of Guangdong province. Temporary population is a major source of labour for Hong Kong-invested factories. There are 87,000 such factories in Guangdong provinces employing over ten million workers (Ming Pao news paper, 14 September 2006). Guangdong had a temporary population of 25.30 million (29.69 per cent of the total population) and 15.06 million were from other provinces in 2000.

With the increasing number of migrants in Chinese cities, an important question that remains to be answered is whether the government should encourage, control or regulate such informal but ‘legal’ migration. Various city governments like Beijing and Shanghai have introduced tight regulations and restrictions on access to certain groups of occupations by people that were classified as ‘temporary population’ (Yu and Hu, 1998). Migrants from outside were prohibited from taking jobs in over 36 occupation categories such as administrators, accountants, cashiers, typists, drivers and lift operators in Beijing in 1998. Generally, these reserved jobs are either well-paid or clean and light jobs that locals are interested in. These cities seem to operate on a work permit system for the temporary population similar to international immigration control systems. Such policy results in unequal competition in the labour market. The discriminative wage policy may result in excess migration and rising unemployment among local residents.

The purpose of the government is to avoid the social responsibility of employment, housing, education and welfare for temporary migrants as the transition towards a market economy is yet to be completed. At the advent of the market-driven economy, various
discriminative measures based on *hukou* status may eventually be abolished. If rural migrants and local residents were treated equally in the urban labour market, inequality would be the result of differences in the more traditional labour market factors such as education, experience and skills. If the government were to enforce a policy of equal employment it would likely reduce the demand for rural migrant labour in cities. Those who do migrate would also have a better standard of living because of the improved wages.

Experiments with *hukou* reform started in some small towns in 1997 and were implemented in all designated towns and central urban areas of county-level cities after 1 October 2001. In these areas, all people can acquire local *hukou* status if they have stable housing or income. In large urban centres, even in Beijing and Shanghai, *hukou* policies have been changed, allowing *hukou* status with different requirements (Shen, 2006). Dependents and skilled people with certain levels of education, such as a bachelor’s degree, or those in the middle or senior ranked technical and professional fields can easily acquire local non-agricultural *hukou* status. Similarly, those who invest in business or buy commercial housing units can also acquire such local *hukou* status. Specific requirements are set up by local urban governments, which vary from city to city, but the general principle was endorsed by document No. 24 of the State Council issued in July 1998. However, the majority of the temporary population still cannot acquire local *hukou* status, although the State Council has asked all urban governments to provide basic education to their children.

From this discussion it has become clear that Chinese cities have used the *hukou* system as a powerful tool to discriminate against rural migrants in order to protect the employment and welfare of urban residents. Once the discriminatory restrictions are abolished, it is feared that Chinese cities may face overurbanization as a result of pressure put on urban communities by rural-to-urban migrants, particularly in less developed regions. However, there might be ways of reducing the influx of rural migrants in an indiscriminatory and neutral manner.

One option would be to improve the economic conditions, infrastructure and public services in rural areas. One major initiative of the Eleventh Five-year Plan (2006–2010) is for the Chinese government to construct a new socialist countryside to achieve these objectives. The new socialist countryside initiative means that the countryside will become the focus of resource transfer and socioeconomic development. It may help improve the economic and social conditions of rural areas, narrowing the gap between urban and rural areas.

There are also a number of options in urban areas. The urban authority could regulate the housing market and illegal housing structures. Only housing with minimum standards and space could be rented out and failing this, the landlord could be fined. Similarly, employers could be targeted for regulating the labour market. In the labour market, the government could introduce a policy of equal opportunities and regulate the minimum standard of working conditions. If workers are guaranteed certain income for a reasonable urban life, then the problem of urban poverty could be reduced. Maintaining certain wage standards should also have the effect of reducing the excess demand for cheap migrant workers. Illegal squatting and hawking in streets could be strictly prohibited, something that would apply to migrants as well as local residents, making the control neutral instead of discriminatory. Although tight law enforcement may provoke social reaction, widespread public consultation and education might reduce tension.
Changing urban governance

The role of cities in the economy and society of China has changed dramatically since the beginning of the reform period. Urban change is clearly linked to the devolution of power. Before 1978, power in the hierarchical administrative system of China was highly centralized, but since the 1980s this has changed. There are clear indications of a tendency towards economic and financial devolution of administrative power. Recognizing the role of the state and global forces, we argue that the local government has become increasingly important in the urban dynamics. The changes in the fiscal system are fundamental.

A highly centralized fiscal system prevailed in China under state socialism up until 1978 (Lu and Sit, 1997). The central government took 44 per cent of the total fiscal revenue from 1949 to 1953. Various forms of central and local fiscal arrangements were tried in the 1970s and in 1976 the share of central fiscal revenue was reduced to only 13 per cent.

There have been four major reforms in the fiscal system since 1980 (Chan, Ying and Cang, 2002). The first reform was implemented in the period 1980–84. The scope of revenue collection for the central and local governments was divided. For local governments with fiscal surpluses, the proportion of the local surplus to be remitted to the central government was fixed. For local governments with fiscal deficits, a fixed quota was set up for subsidy from the central government. The proportion or quota would be fixed for five years. These measures had the effect of encouraging local governments to stimulate economic development to increase their revenue and to control their expenditure. Subsequent reforms were consistent with the spirit of this initial reform.

The second reform was implemented in the period 1985–87. Based on tax-for-profit economic reform, tax revenue was divided into three parts: items for central revenue, items for local revenue and shared items for central and local revenue. The previous contractual system based on proportion and quota was maintained, but was adjusted in the third reform implemented in the period 1988–93. For example, Shanghai would remit a fixed amount of revenue to the central government.

Similarly, a fiscal contractual system was implemented between a province and its subordinate units such as prefecture-level cities. For example, the fiscal contract stipulated that the revenue of cities to be turned over to the provincial government of Guangdong should increase 7 per cent per year for Foshan, Jiangmen, Shaoguan and Maoming beginning in 1985 (Lam, 1999).

In the fourth reform of 1994 a tax assignment system was introduced. Circulation tax became a major source of tax revenue. Different kinds of taxes were designated as revenue for the central and local governments. After the reform, the share of the central government in fiscal revenue increased from 22 per cent in 1993 to 55.7 per cent in 1994. A tax rebate system was also introduced for the central government to return the extra tax collected to local governments due to the new tax assignment system (Chan et al., 2002).

The new tax assignment system increased the share of central government in the fiscal revenue. But local urban governments still possess overwhelming autonomy in economic administration. Since the late 1990s, local governments, firms and the non-state sector have emerged as major agents of investment.

Urban governments have adopted a number of strategies to capture financial gains within their boundary. First, they are keen to improve their infrastructure and to engage in large projects such as new urban districts, new development areas, university parks, convention and exhibition halls, museums, theme parks and city squares, to name but a
few. Second, tax concessions and other policy incentives are offered by the urban governments to attract foreign investment. Third, urban governments have developed close relations with local firms by direct or indirect participation and intervention. Urban governments nurture and support SOEs on the one hand, and attract and accommodate TNCs, on the other. Many joint ventures are also formed between SOEs, TNCs and the private sector. An informal local growth coalition is formed between urban governments and enterprises.

Fourth, the commodification and marketing of land and real estate have created substantial land-based interest for local governments since 1988. Urban governments acquire significant amounts of land revenue due to the huge difference in the value of land when it is turned from agriculture into industrial and urban land for commercial buildings, offices and housing. This is a major force driving changes in urban administrative boundaries/areas in China.

Indeed, converting urban areas has become an important measure in promoting urbanization in China. It refers to the designation of new cities and towns and the constant expansion of city and town boundaries. In China, cities could be designated at the provincial, prefectural and county levels. Since 1978, the government has increasingly recognized the important role of cities in the development and modernization of the nation. With the adoption of a ‘city-leading-county’ system in the late 1980s, cities were officially considered the economic driving force behind the country’s regional economy.

Although no official policies on large cities have been announced as yet, evidence shows that dramatic growth has occurred in cities such as Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou. The introduction of the vice-provincial city concept in 1994 was instrumental in this process. The vice-provincial city is of a higher status than a prefectural-level city but lower than a municipality, which is under the direct administration of the central government. In 1997, there were 15 such cities. These cities are given a privileged position in the national plan in that their economic plans are listed separately from their provinces.

For counties without city status, local governments are keen to acquire urban status for economic, land and strategic purposes. One major form of city designation in the reform period is the so-called ‘re-designation of a whole county as a city’. A whole county is re-designated as a city if it meets the criteria for city designation. Over 70 per cent of the current cities in China are designated as such. A county-level city often consists of several towns and townships. For example, Chonghua County in Guangdong was designated as a county-level city in 1994. Its largest town, Jiekou, only had a population of 0.1 million in an area of 49 sq km. In the remaining 14 towns, each only had a non-agricultural population of less than 5000.

The system of city-leading-counties is another important way of expanding the administrative area of a city. By 1994, the city-leading-county system was implemented in all provincial units except Hainan province in China. The system is designed to enhance the integration of a central city and its surrounding hinterland. But in some cases, there are intense conflicts between the governments of the central city and the county-level units. When a county is under the administration of a province, it has a large degree of autonomy. But when it is governed by a prefecture-level city, the city tightens its administration on the county. A central city may give priority to its urban proper, i.e., the old urban districts.

Urban expansion also takes place when a city annexes a county or a county-level city as its urban district and when two or more cities are merged. This has been a new trend
since 2000. When a county or a county-level city is designated as an urban district, it is
totally absorbed by the prefecture-level city. After the change, an urban district has less
power and less conflict with the city. An urban district is a part of a city and is not an inde-
dependent and complete political unit. Many political and economic matters are governed
by the city government rather than the government of the urban district.

Overall, urban governments play a leading role in cities, focusing on economic devel-
opment, foreign investment and big projects but often ignoring the needs of the general
public. They pay much less attention to improve the living environment and social secu-
ritv provisions that are less tangible but need large amount of financial resources. For
example, less than 50 per cent of wastewater is treated in most cities. There are also
increasing conflicts between the urban government and residents on matters of urban
renewal, land appropriation and the impact of infrastructure projects. Further reform in
urban governance is needed to make urban governments accountable and transparent in
decision-making.

Urban change in Vietnam
Vietnam is a naturally well-endowed, crescent-shaped country with an area of 331,033
sq km and an exceptionally long coastline of 3,200 km fronting the South China Sea. It
is one of the low-income countries of East and Southeast Asia, with a GDP of
US$45,210 million and a per capita income of US$554 (2004). As a socialist country
that opened up its economy to the world in 1986, Vietnam shares China’s trajectory of
rapid economic growth. As in the case of China, cities have also played a vital role in its
economic growth.

When the war of liberation ended in 1975, Vietnam had a population of 48,030 million,
of which 9,021 million lived in cities, accounting for only 18.8 per cent of the population.
A decade later in 1985, on the eve of the adoption of the policy of Doi moi, the corres-
ponding figures were 59,136 million, of which 11,568 million or 19.6 per cent were urban-
ized; and in 2005, 84,718 million, of which 22,246 million or 26.4 per cent were urbanized
(UN, 2006). It is clear from these three sets of figures that Vietnam’s urban population
changed relatively little and the level of urbanization hardly increased in the first decade
after independence. However, in the two decades after it opened up, the urban population
has almost doubled and the level of urbanization has increased to 27 per cent. It is sub-
mitted that explicit and implicit urban policies have resulted in a more salient urban
profile of the country.

Explicit policies
Historically, the level of urbanization in Vietnam, like China, remained low because of
strict control over the internal movement of people. In fact, the country is committed ideo-
logically to a policy of developing the rural areas. It has been the policy of the govern-
ment to limit population growth in the urban areas, particularly in the three largest cities –
Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), Hanoi and Haiphong – and to decrease population in the
Red River Delta and the central coastal area. Consequently, HCMC witnessed an out-
migration of 100,000 inhabitants from 1981 to 1982, while Hanoi lost 11,000 people from
1984 to 1989, according to the 1989 population census (Yeung, 1993). As part of a large-
scale de-urbanization and resettlement policy from 1976 to 1986, people from HCMC and
Hanoi were relocated to New Economic Zones in the northern and central regions of the
country. However, a large percentage of the population was still concentrated in three urban development poles: Hanoi–Haiphong, HCMC–Bien Hoa–Vung Tau, and Nha Trang–Da Nang–Hue, with secondary poles in the North Central region centred on Vinh and the Central Plateau region focused on Dalat. The first two poles mentioned were identified as incipient extended metropolitan regions (EMRs) (McGee, 1995; Laquian, 1996; see Figure 5.1).

Source: Adapted from McGee (1995).

Figure 5.1 Main development zones from Vietnam
Prolonged warfare and 40 years of a centralized economy have taken their toll on cities in Vietnam, however. By the early 1990s, years of urban neglect resulted in a critical shortage in housing, woefully inadequate infrastructure, grave environmental pollution, and serious unemployment and underemployment. The urban predicament can be traced to many factors arising from decades of economic stagnation. First, in Vietnam, urban and rural budgets were not separated, with several layers of administration always claiming their share of the budget. Urban governments therefore hardly ever had sufficient funds to meet demands, with the exception of HCMC, which had a stronger revenue base. Second, the institutional arrangement for urban management lends itself to duplication and unclear definition of authority and responsibility. There is a lack of a set of regulations and procedures that are applied nationwide to the cities. This has created ambiguities and confusion in the minds of officials, citizens and, above all, foreign investors. For example, half of the urban housing is owned by private and religious communities, and the problem of land ownership is compounded by the existence of more than one source of record-keeping. Third, the legal framework within which urban development takes place is weak and incomplete. The master plan approach is widely adopted in urban planning, but without statutory power built into it. It consequently offers nothing but guidelines to urban development. Fourth, ineffective urban administration to date has been hampered in part by the lack of adequate basic information and lax development control. There is a general lack of socioeconomic information and data on most urban areas, even in as sophisticated a city as HCMC (Yeung, 1993).

During the Fourth Five-year Plan (1986–90), a programme of economic renovations was proposed as part of the process of opening up. These included elimination of state subsidies, price deregulation, increased financial autonomy to state enterprises, improved banking facilities, a new Foreign Investment Code, and almost all goods and services are sold in the open market. These decisions forced the restructuring of state enterprises and signalled the end of the concept of the ‘iron rice bowl’, both favourable to urban growth and development (Forbes, 1995).

Implicit policies
In 1986, Vietnam adopted a new open policy modelled on China and in 1990 began an ‘economic renewal’ programme, targeted at foreign investment to drive the economy. However, the government suddenly changed tack and by the time the Asian financial crisis struck in 1997, most of the foreign investors had departed. The situation has since turned sharply for the better, with Vietnam being perceived by such observers as Bill Gates to be a candidate for the next miracle economic growth (Wen Wei Po newspaper, 2 May 2006, p. A21).

Foreign investment, in fact, has returned with a vengeance, with the total investment capital committed at US$40.8 billion and US$24.6 realized in 2003. The industrial sector accounted for the largest share of the capital inflow, with a total of 34 per cent, and is heavily concentrated in the cities. HCMC and Hanoi attracted almost half of the total FDI, with the main investors from Singapore, Taipei (China), Japan, South Korea and Hong Kong (China), in that order (Leproux and Brooks, 2004). Over the past five years, some 180,000 private enterprises have sprung up, equivalent to four times the number in the 1990s. By contrast, the number of state-owned enterprises has shrunk from 12,000 to 2000 over the same period. The emergence of the private sector is owed to the infusion of
foreign capital attracted by Vietnam’s favourable investment environment highlighted by a young (with half of its population aged below 30) workforce, low wages at half of China’s going rates, and its strategic location astride the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean. The establishment of the first Stock Exchange in HCMC in 2000 and of the Growth Enterprise Market in Hanoi in 2005 is indicative of the thriving economic situation there (Lin, 2006).

As recently as 2003, HCMC attracted 30 per cent of Vietnam’s FDI and generated 40 per cent of its exports, with less than 10 per cent of its population. In 2005, Hanoi for the first time overtook HCMC in FDI, capturing $1.6 billion of the total $6.2 billion. The north is therefore riding a second wave of economic development (Johnson, 2006). Over the past few years, Vietnam has been following a new trade policy road map. It includes tariff reductions, the removal of quantitative restrictions and other measures aimed at laying the foundation for its entrance into the World Trade Organization (IMF, 2006, p. 3), to which it was admitted in November 2006.

In his first visit to Vietnam in April 2006, Bill Gates predicted that the country will be a top-notch out-service software centre. In 2005, software and IT companies recorded an increase of $0.7 billion in their service income, a 40 per cent rise over the year before. Many such firms have been initiated by returning Vietnamese who left the country after the war and who have brought back capital, education and experience from abroad. According to official estimates, there were 180 such enterprises, with 1380 projects. In the high-tech sector in the United States, one estimate put professionals hailing originally from Vietnam to be around 10,000 (Xu, 2006).

At the 2006 National Assembly Congress, Vietnam elected Nguyen Minh Triet President and Nguyen Tan Dung Prime Minster. They not only typify a new generation of more youthful leaders but also signal the beginning of bold political change and an enlightened government (Liu, 2006). In announcing the Five-year SEDP (Social Economic Development Plan) Plan (2006–10), the government also announced the vision of Vietnam to become an industrial country by 2020. All the above implicit policies briefly touched upon point to the important role that cities will play in the national and economic development of the country in the future.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has attempted to highlight some of the major urban policy changes that have occurred in two socialist economies in Asia that have forsaken their central command economies in favour of market economies. The transformation of their economies and cities has been spectacular and eye-catching. All signs point to the fact that the switch to an open market economy is a permanent one.

We have shown how rapidly cities in China have expanded through a combination of a virile land market combined with land obtained during a previous process of land allocation based on administrative fiat at no cost. A complicated process of land development has ensued with the dual-track land market having to interact with black markets and other complicating factors.

As China’s economy is opening up, it is embracing the impact of globalization in its many facets, including those that impinge on its cities, especially large cities in the coastal region. The links between these cities and the outside world are increasingly strengthened through their export-oriented economies and growing foreign direct investments. A few
leading cities such as Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen have engaged actively in globalization and aim to become truly international cities.

Another key dimension of urban change in China has been the ever-growing flows of rural–urban migration. Since the age-old *hukou* system has become relaxed since 1984, numbers of rural immigrants to the cities have been increasing by leaps and bounds. The government has allowed them to be registered as ‘temporary population’ in cities and they have become an important but cheap source of labour for the booming urban economies. Barriers to migration still exist but they have tended to be ameliorating over time. Meanwhile, new migrants to the cities are still facing hardship in their struggle to make a new life for themselves. These peoples play an important role in shaping the future character of Chinese cities.

Finally, Chinese cities have witnessed vast changes, physically and from the viewpoint of administration. As part of economic reform and an open policy, authority and decision-making have been decentralized to the city level and below. There have been notable changes in the administration of urban areas, including fiscal planning. Cities have become key agents in the active promotion of local economic development, development zones and various investment projects. Urban governance is changing, with the government also having to contend with a community that is much more aware of socioeconomic changes and development outside China than before.

The chapter has also provided a brief description of the urban profile of Vietnam, which has continued its march towards openness and rapid economic development. This especially applies to its cities since the country adopted an open policy, despite the setback at the time of the Asian financial crisis. Urban policy in the country is back on the path of systematic change in line with a more robust economy in which foreign investment and participation have become important pillars of growth and development.

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Human mobility in a globalizing world: urban development trends and policy implications

W.A.V. Clark

Introduction
The twenty-first century will have to contend with two demographic issues – a growing older population and an increasingly mobile population. On the one hand there will be ageing populations in Europe, Japan and North America, and on the other, young mobile populations in and from China, India and Africa. The old notions that have been used to explain immigrant flows – economic opportunities, structural imbalances and state economic and geopolitical policies, while still relevant, will need to be supplemented by paradigms that include a focus on refugees, amnesty and undocumented flows. The immigrant flows of the past three decades have already created large immigrant stocks in Europe and North America and with policies that privilege family migration it is likely that immigration flows will increase simply as a function of existing immigrant population stocks. The flows may also generate unemployment and unassimilated populations in the new host countries. It is almost certain that Europe and North America will be faced with dual populations (and their associated political outcomes) – an ageing native-born citizenry and youthful immigrants. These changes at the global level will be played out in community and neighbourhood changes.

This chapter examines the nature, size and outcomes of international migration flows and their implications for local community changes. It examines the way in which these flows have changed over recent decades, connects these changes to globalization and examines how local labour markets are being transformed by these global flows. I review the current thinking about reasons for international migration, document the size of the flows and their composition, including the rise in undocumented migration, and draw on some data from Southern California to provide details on how these changes are being played out in local contexts. The chapter concludes by revisiting the discussion of whether or not the large-scale international flows from new ethnic origins will bring about a clash of cultures, whether we will pull together or pull apart, in the coming decades.

While some have argued that the change in international migration is unprecedented in its scale and scope, others see it as a continuation of a process that began a century ago when rapid population growth, urbanization and the transformation to a modern industrialized society was initiated, with declining death rates and rising fertility rates. Those who argue in favour of viewing the rise in international migration as part of an ongoing process play down the view of international migration as a crisis and suggest that it is better seen as embedded in the changes that flow naturally from an increasingly interconnected world.

Theories of population movement
Generally, the research literature has divided the factors that encourage migration into push and pull factors – opportunities and immigrant stocks in the destination country are
pull factors, and negative factors in the origin countries push migrants to leave. In this conceptualization economic migrants are encouraged (pulled) to move by the jobs across the border and are pushed by the unavailability of any work in the source country. Increasingly, family networks increase the likelihood of flows by providing contacts and reducing the risks of migration. Borjas (1989) has suggested that the factors are not equally weighted in terms of their impact on migration and they change over time. Supply push factors may be strongest at the initiation of migration streams but later in the process the pull of families may play a stronger role.

Young people move for jobs. Most international migrants move from lower to higher wage labour markets and this explains why most of the movement has been to high-income countries. However, as the stock of international migrants has increased in developing nations there are growing movements of people for family reunification, as well as for employment. Immigrants entering the United States in 2005 were more likely to be motivated by family reunification as the primary reason than simply employment-based reasons. In the United States in 2004, nearly 70 per cent of immigrants were admitted as part of the family reunification programme and only 13 per cent were admitted as part of the employment visa programme (INS, Abstract, 2005). This is not to say that the immigrants who arrive as family members do not take jobs and enter the labour force. The issue is that many family migrant households include children who need education, health care and other support services. This burden is often borne locally while the benefits are broadly speaking to the national economy.

Martin (2005b) distinguishes between economic motivations and non-economic motivations and places family reunification within the non-economic factors. Yet, there is a debate over how to address the varying roles of economic and non-economic factors in international migration – a debate that is largely between those who emphasize the neoclassical economic approach to international migration (Borjas, 1989) and those who emphasize the changing world order as the central stimulus for increasing flows from developing to developed countries (Massey et al., 1993). Neoclassical theories of migration privilege jobs and opportunities as the driving force in relocation. This literature, stimulated by Sjaastad (1962) and extended and developed by a wide variety of authors (Borjas, 1989; Hatton and Williamson, 2003) seeks to explain migration as the disequilibrium between earnings in an individual’s home country, and the possible earnings in a migrant destination, modified by the costs of immigration. In this conceptualization, individuals (and households) are more likely to migrate the greater the disparity between the wages in the origin and the destination (Hatton and Williamson, 2003). The theory also notes that the likelihood of migration will decline with the age of the individual, as the remaining working life becomes shorter. Thus, for any given incentive, migration will be greater the larger the proportion of the origin population that is in the younger working ages. Human capital is a central part of the neoclassical theory – migration will increase with skill level if the return to skills is greater in the destination than the origin. Thus, we would expect that information-based societies with a demand for skilled and educated workers will generate a selectivity in migration from source regions.

In contrast to the neoclassical explanation for high levels of international migration, those who invoke an explanation for migration based on a changing world order, suggest that the flows must be seen in the context of inequality, asylum seeking and refugee migration (Massey et al., 1993; Massey, 2005). In this context, very large proportions of the
flows are detached from economic pulls and pushes, and reflect survival strategies by workers increasingly disconnected from their labour markets. Migration becomes a survival and investment process by families who send money back to origins as a long-term survival strategy. The emphasis on context-dependent flows, described sometimes as the new economics of a changing world order, emphasizes the contrast between increasingly flexible labour markets, but rigid national boundaries and controls on migration. Several recent papers, which stress the inability of the neoclassical model to explain international flows suggest that in fact, non-economic factors are now more important in migration decisions than economic factors (Hugo, 2005).

There is no doubt that the stock of previous migrants from a source country, living in the destination, the so-called ‘friends and relatives effect’, is a critical factor in the continuing flows between origins and destinations. However, it can be viewed either in a neoclassical or a changing world order perspective. Hatton and Williamson (2003) emphasize that even the friends and relatives effect can be interpreted within an economic framework. In this view, a large number of previous flows increases destination-specific utility, and so reduces the loss of ethnic capital. Large immigrant stocks reduce the migration costs for following flows.

Clearly, the neoclassical economic approach does not account for the constraints of policy and assumes relatively free movement across borders, something that is no longer true. Still, overall, the body of research that has been published in the last decade finds that migration is negatively related to source country income per capita and to source country inequality (Yang, 1995) and it is positively related to measures of the migrant stock at the destinations. Clearly, stocks matter whether we interpret their impacts as social or economic. But migration was also positively related to measures of political rights and individual freedoms in source countries and negatively related to political instability and, in at least one study, that was the single most important determinant of all immigration to the United States in the period 1982–86 (Kamemera, Oguledo and Davis, 2000). Distance, relative income and US unemployment all mattered. Similar work by Clark, Hatton and Williamson (2002) showed that the net effect of lower levels of income and education in South America compared with Western Europe was to raise the typical South American countries’ migration rate by 25 per cent over that of Western Europe. Relative inequality also raises the migration rate from the typical South American country by 46 per cent over that of the typical Western European country. A youthful population in the source country also has a positive effect, but its impact is more modest; it raises the migration rates by about 11 per cent. Again, greater distance reduces the migration rate, being landlocked reduces it, while being predominantly English-speaking raises it, as does the stock of previous immigrants from a particular country (Clark et al., 2002).

Whether families come with work visas or as participants in family reunification, in the end most of the world’s migrants are in the workforce. Overall, the estimates are that about half of the world’s 175–190 million immigrants are in the labour force (United Nations, 2004b). There is no international database that provides information on immigrant workers by skill, but the general perception is that migrants in most developed countries are at the extremes of the skill levels and either provide basic lower-level services or high-level contributions to the information economy. Martin (2005a) has suggested that migrant skill levels tend to have an hourglass shape – the top with tertiary education and the bottom with elementary school or less.
Whether travelling with visas or not, crossing international borders to settle or work is both difficult and stressful, and increasingly so, as developed nations have emphasized border control, but it has come just at a time when globalization has generated a greater awareness of the opportunities and possibilities.

Links to globalization
We are familiar with the way in which business and technological interaction has increased in the past two decades. We use, even overuse, the term globalization to capture the complex nature of the increasing integration of economies and societies around the world. Certainly, capital moves globally and nation states are now caught up in a changing world as jobs move ‘offshore’, manufacturing production is replaced by services, and the knowledge industry changes the nature and pace of the inter-connections between countries. Inexpensive telephone connections, cheap international travel and e-mail exchanges have linked the world in a way that is quite different from the period before the growth of computers and information technology. Multinational corporations manufacture products in many countries and sell to consumers around the world. Simple statistics capture the nature and increasing reach and range of globalization. Trade between countries as a percentage of gross world product has increased from about 15 per cent in 1986 to nearly 27 per cent in 2006. Communication has changed – 30 per cent of the world’s population are cell phone users and it is estimated that Internet users will soon reach a billion.

Money, technology and raw materials move with ease across national borders. It is perhaps not surprising then to find that there has been a concomitant increase in the movements of people across national borders. Even though many argue that globalization will have important positive effects on poverty reduction there are still large numbers who are living on the margins of the emerging global economy (Friedman, 2004). It is many of those people who form the increasing flows of undocumented populations who move for economic advantage, to escape poverty or simply to follow flows of family migrants to new and richer opportunities.

Globalization has probably created new wealth and arguably lifted a large number of people in developing countries out of poverty. Still, the gap between rich and poor has not narrowed significantly and in some cases, economic disparities are growing, rather than declining. Developing countries are struggling with high levels of demographic growth and are not producing enough jobs to deal with their expanding numbers of young people. In this context it is not surprising that people are looking beyond their national borders to opportunities in the developed countries. We can expect more immigration flows, not less, and probably more undocumented immigration in the coming decades. Whether, globalization will transform the inequalities between the developed and developing world is still an open question, although the evidence from market economies is that it will over the longer perspective.

Questioning globalization and re-imagining international flows
Globalization is sometimes seen as a new era, a post-millennium era in which we will enter a new world, global, post-modern, post-national and hybrid (Friedman, 2004). Those who take this position, argue that we have entered a world that once was local, but is now global, a world that has changed from the less to the more inclusive. Because outsourcing has
created ‘high-tech’ centres in India and around the world, Friedman comes to the conclusion that the world is flat – that the playing field is even. At least one commentator has suggested that the world may be flat only if you are 35 000 feet in business class, otherwise it is very, very lumpy. Moreover, there is considerable evidence, which suggests that our world has been in the process of change for at least a century. Hirst and Thompson (1996) focus attention on the role of submarine cables from the middle of the nineteenth century and the increase in foreign direct investment, which began well before World War I. In fact, there is a strong argument to be made that the rapid population growth, migration and overseas investment and world development, before World War I was as much a process of globalization as it is today. What is different, of course, is the shift from a world based largely on industrial processes to an economy that privileges information, and a world in which industrial production exists within a world of information technology. One might argue that we have entered a second stage in the globalization process. It still has considerable similarity with the earlier industrial globalization – high immigration rates, increased foreign capital flows, but now with flows from politically unstable nations, and increased undocumented migration and growing repatriation of earnings to families left behind.

Demographic change and the nature and size of global flows
During the twentieth century the world population increased from 1.6 billion people to 6.1 billion people and now it has increased further to 6.5 billion (United Nations Population Division, 2005). Much of the growth has been in the past half-century (Figure 6.1a). At no time in the past has the world population grown so quickly or to such a size. Although the rate of growth has slowed, the world population will still reach about 9.1 billion people by the middle of this century. Of course, the actual number will depend on the extent to which family planning spreads more widely and on our ability to control the


Figure 6.1 (a and b) Growth of world population (a) and the stock of international migrants (b) (persons living outside their country of birth)
The annual increment to the world population continues to be more than 77 million persons a year. India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria and the United States account for half of that growth. While there is less concern about providing food per se for this growing population, there are real questions about access to safe drinking water, health care and human population security. Population growth alone will continue to stress the world’s ability to provide a clean and safe environment. At least a part of the difficulty of providing a safe environment is related to the rapid expansion of the world’s urban population.

The world population living in urban regions and cities reached approximately 3.2 billion persons in 2005 and is expected to rise to more than 5.0 billion persons in the next 25 years. The world’s population is at an historic turning point. Within a few years, half the world’s population will be urban (www.peopleplanet.net – ‘The world comes to town’). The change in the last half-century has been significant; in 1950, the world was about 30 per cent urban – 52.5 per cent in the more developed regions and a little less than 18 per cent in less developed regions. Now in 2005, about 75 per cent of the population in developed regions is in urban areas and a little more than 43 per cent in developing regions. Along with a growing world population, there will be continuing increases in urban populations especially in developing regions.

Cities and urban areas are increasing in numbers and size (Figure 6.2). They are gaining an estimated 60 million people per year. In many developing countries, cities are growing two to three times faster than the overall population growth. Some cities have astonishing growth rates – Dhaka doubled in population between 1990 and 2000. Other cities in India have also had very strong growth rates. Even though as we begin the twenty-first century cities continue to be engines for economic growth in a global economy, they often face a crisis in their inability to deal with the massive influx of people. In many of these cities poverty is endemic and discontent and civil unrest could become a serious problem if the growth is not paralleled with a concomitant growth of the urban infrastructure and it is to cities that much of the international flows of migrants persists.

**Flows, numbers and correlates**

Along with population growth the number of people who live outside their country of birth has increased dramatically (see Figure 6.1b). Now about 175–190 million people live outside their country of birth. While at one level the 175–190 million people who live outside of that country of birth is certainly large, many of the world’s 6.3 billion people will move only short distances if they move at all. Many of the people who do move and who live outside their country of birth are legal migrants, but many others are undocumented workers, asylum-seekers and refugees. There are major migration streams from Central America and from Asia to North America, and other important streams from North Africa, Eastern Europe and Russia to Northern Europe, and flows from the Philippines, Indonesia and India to the Middle East. But it is important to note that there are also large-scale flows between countries in South America, Africa and within Southeast Asia. The streams are not constant and change over time, with changes in economic factors and in the political contexts of sending and receiving areas.

In addition to the very large number of people who live outside their country of birth, there is a substantial number of migrants who move within their own countries. These internally displaced populations have now reached about 27 million people, and the
number is growing (Clark, 2006a). Internally displaced populations are those that have been forced to flee their homes because their lives were in danger from political conflict or environmental degradation. Unlike refugees, they have not crossed an international border.

Overall, there are more migrants in developed nations than in developing nations (Table 6.1). The increase was from about 32 million to 110 million in developed nations in the 40 years between 1960 and 2000 (Table 6.1). Between 1980 and 2000, while the increase in less developed nations was only from 52 million to 65 million, the foreign stock in developed countries doubled. Most OECD nations have between 5 and 15 per cent migrant populations. However, there are some countries with considerably higher percentages, including Australia with 25 per cent, New Zealand with 23 per cent and Canada with 19 per cent. International migrants by region of destination varies from the six million in Latin America and the Caribbean, and a similar amount in Oceania, to the 41 million in North America and 33 million in Europe (Table 6.1). Indeed, the United States dominates with more than 35 million foreign-born residents. Germany, Russia, the


Figure 6.2 The growth of the world’s population

Growth in the number of large cities in the developed and developing countries, 1950–2000.

Number of urban areas of more than one million people

Developed countries

Developing countries

1950 1975 2000 2020

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Ukraine, France, India and Canada all have more than five million foreign-born residents (Figure 6.3). In percentage terms the countries with the highest proportion of foreign-born persons are the Gulf States nations of United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait. Jordan and Israel also have very high percentages of foreign-born residents.

The old pattern of a century ago of flows from Europe to North America and to Australia and New Zealand has become a much more diverse set of origins and destinations, reflecting the increasingly global nature of migration. The flows to New Zealand

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Table 6.1  International migrants by region of destination, 1960–2000 (millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>174.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed nations</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>110.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing nations</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR (former)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America (Caribbean)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

Figure 6.3  Foreign-born stock by major national destinations, 2000

Ukraine, France, India and Canada all have more than five million foreign-born residents (Figure 6.3). In percentage terms the countries with the highest proportion of foreign-born persons are the Gulf States nations of United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait. Jordan and Israel also have very high percentages of foreign-born residents.

The old pattern of a century ago of flows from Europe to North America and to Australia and New Zealand has become a much more diverse set of origins and destinations, reflecting the increasingly global nature of migration. The flows to New Zealand
and Australia are still large but they come now from Asia, Central Europe and myriad other destinations. A century ago they came from Europe when Europe itself had only a trickle of immigrants. Now there are nearly 19 million foreign-born residents in Europe (Table 6.2). There has been increased diversity, both in the country from which international migrants come and in the destinations that they choose. Now migrants from many developing countries, particularly in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean have become numerous in Western Europe and North America. It is still true that proximity is important and that people in general move within their broad regions where there are historical ties and cultural similarities. But it is clear that the richer OECD countries are receiving large and sustained flows of immigrants (Table 6.3). It is also true that every year more and more migration occurs between developing countries, from Bangladesh to India, or from India, Egypt and Yemen to the Persian Gulf States.

As long as high birth rates and poverty continue to place pressure on populations, migrants will see advantages to moving to countries with more resources and greater opportunities. Many developing countries experience inflows of people from other developing countries. This ‘south–south’ migration, from Guatemala to Mexico for example, occurs for the same reasons that people migrate to developed countries.

In 2006 the total population of Western and Central Europe, the Balkans and Turkey was 594 million. The European Union alone (the EU 25) had 462 million people. Europe is not growing from natural increase – the natural increase is only about 0.7 per 1000 inhabitants – almost all the growth in Europe is coming from immigration, and in some cases as in Spain, Portugal and Italy that growth is substantial. The foreign-born stock as a share of total population in 2005 varied from a low of 1.8 per cent in Poland to a high of 23 per cent in Switzerland (Table 6.4). In many European countries more than 10 per cent of their population is now foreign-born.

With free entry across the EU countries there is considerable movement from regions of job deficits to job surplus and the Schengen Agreement (1985) and subsequent Schengen Convention (1995) virtually guarantees free movement within the EU. Thus, Ireland, with a growing economy, has received large numbers of new immigrants in the past ten years. The EU is also committed to developing a common policy on immigration. The goals will include the efficient management of migration, the pursuit of

---

**Table 6.2 Traditional countries of immigration and Europe, 1910 and 2000 (thousands)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pop.</td>
<td>Migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>4455</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7207</td>
<td>1587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1008</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>91972</td>
<td>13516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Europe*</td>
<td>143099</td>
<td>3348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: * Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembour and Switzerland.

immigrant smugglers, and common asylum policies (Salt, 2005). Already there is evidence of the increasing flows from Eastern European countries into Germany and Spain, but also into Ireland. The anecdotal descriptions of French waiters in London and French computer programmers in Dublin are simply the indications of the movement of Europeans within the EU for economic opportunities outside their places of birth (New York Times, 2 June 2006).

North America has also had substantial immigration, but while the United States is home to 35 million foreign-born persons they make up only 12 per cent of the US population. Migrants from Mexico are the largest single group of all foreign-born persons in the United States; they make up almost half. There are also large numbers from all the Asian countries and especially China, Korea, Japan and the Philippines. Relatively high foreign-born birth rates have generated a combined foreign-born and first-generation population of more than 50 million persons, about a sixth of the US population. It is likely that the migration pressures on the United States and on Canada too will continue to rise during the next decade or two. The continuing differential rates of population growth in Central America and recurring political and economic crises, as well as potential natural disasters, are likely to compel additional individuals and families from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>126.8</td>
<td>141.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>648.8</td>
<td>685.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>271.5</td>
<td>232.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>227.3</td>
<td>250.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>345.8</td>
<td>331.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>379.3</td>
<td>373.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>849.8</td>
<td>1064.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD (2003), Trends in international migration 2003, Paris: OECD (adapted from Table A1.1).
Central and South America to migrate north. Over the longer run, declining population growth and increasing economic growth in Mexico will diminish migration pressures. At the same time the continuing US demand for labour and the extensive family ties in place will sustain Mexico’s rank as the primary sender for immigrants, both legal and illegal to the United States. While the southern border is a major transit point for undocumented Central American residents, the long US–Canadian border will continue to be a major transit point for undocumented Asian immigrants bound for the United States.

While most migrants crossing international boundaries are a combination of labour migrants and those seeking family reunification, there are large numbers of refugee and asylum moves as well. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has defined refugees (still only those who cross an international boundary) as those who move for a well-founded fear of being persecuted or where their safety and freedom are threatened by external aggression or generalized violence in their country of origin. A wider definition (Olsen, 1979, p. 130) recognizes that refugees may be ‘forced to leave their homes because of a change in their environment which makes it impossible to continue life as they have known it’. There are approximately 8.4 million global refugees currently (2005). This is a slight decrease from previous years and is in fact at its lowest level for some time. The largest number of refugees, nearly one-third of the total worldwide, are in Africa (Table 6.5). Nearly two million refugees are in Europe. Afghanistan continues to be one of the single largest countries for the origin of refugees; under the UN mandate at the end of 2005, 1.9 million Afghan refugees were reported by 72 asylum countries.

Table 6.4 Foreign-born populations (250,000+) in European nations – ranked by share of total population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Foreign-born (thousands)</th>
<th>Foreign-born share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1,234</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>10,144</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6,471</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,638</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5,408</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4,790</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,519</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Internal displacement, of course, does not generate international migrants but it does impact the national distributions of population. It comes about from two primary forces – political conflict and environmental stress. Africa continues to be the continent most affected by internal displacement. It is estimated that over 12 million people across some 20 African countries were displaced internally at the end of 2005. Most of these were in the Sudan’s Darfur region (Clark, 2006a). Asia is similarly an area of both displacement from political conflict and from environmental change, and how much from environmental change is hard to estimate.

We can draw parallels between the world population growth, the increase in international migration, and outcomes for our interconnected world. Both foreign direct investment and remittance transfers have grown alongside increasing interconnection (outsourcing in place of worker flows), more migration and the connected transfer of funds to countries of origin (Figure 6.4). These parallel changes reflect a world of increasing connection and one in which international migration is playing an important role, certainly for remittance transfers. We can argue that foreign direct investment and remittance transfers are two sides of the same process. The investment transfers take advantage of business opportunities and the lower wages of foreign-based workers; the remittances are the flows from workers who have been able to move back to their families who have not been able to migrate. We might also suggest that the increase in foreign direct investment may in turn be stimulating the amount of international migration. Certainly it is increasing the linkages between developing and developed countries. The number of persons living outside a country of birth was about 60 million in 1950 and grew steadily to 100 million by 1980, and since that time has nearly doubled to between 180 and 190 million. Foreign direct investment, which was about US$240 billion in 1970, doubled by 1980 and tripled in the next ten years to 1990. That process of increase has continued to the present time. World remittances totalled only US$22 billion in 1960, the first date for which we have reliable information, and by 2005 were more than US$230 billion. Remittances to Mexico from the United States increased from about US$1 billion in 1980 to US$16 billion in 2004, reflecting the worldwide increase in migrants and their increased income transfers home.

### Table 6.5 Refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons and other displaced persons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of persons (2005)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>4,929,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>226,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>5,427,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South and Central America</td>
<td>2,513,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>549,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>167,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>66,786</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The numbers in Sub-Saharan Africa include 1.3 million displaced persons in Somalia and the Sudan, in the Middle East 1.2 million persons in Iraq, and in South America 2.0 million persons in Columbia.*

*Source: United Nations (2005).*
Borders and boundaries – managing migration

There is an ongoing debate about the role of borders and boundaries in controlling and managing international immigration. On the one hand, Custred (2003) argues that borders matter, both in an instrumental and a symbolic sense, for the assertion of power and legitimacy and as the way citizens imagine their nations as sovereign communities (p. 9). On the other hand, some think that borders will eventually melt away in the face of new market forces, resulting in what Ohmae (1999) envisions as a borderless world. Indeed, in the European Union in its latest form, internal borders have been significantly reduced, and there are relatively free movements of migrants between countries. Some even go so far as to argue that any border enforcement policy is based on misconceptions, and that international migration is a natural outgrowth of market expansion and economic integration (Massey, 2005). In this conceptualization, international migration should be managed so that there should be choices for both partner nations. Migrants should move freely in response to opportunities because, she argues, they will eventually move back to Mexico. However, such an approach may not fully recognize the externalities that can arise with relatively free or totally free movement. Who pays for education, health care and community services in an open border world, and what of crime and extradition, currently a touchy subject between Mexico and the United States? Criminals do flee to Mexico and are difficult to bring before US courts (MacDonald, 2004).

The debates about borders and national control have become more intense as the United States has attempted to control its borders, to prevent terrorist activity. Now even the border between United States and Canada has taken on a greater significance. Once described as the longest undefended border in the world, it is increasingly of concern to policymakers who worry about movements across that border. But it is the Mexican border that is at the heart of most of the discussion and engenders the most strongly held
opinions. Not only is it a border between two nation states, it marks a boundary between two culture areas, and a divide between the prosperity of the developed world and the poverty of the communities along the border. The border also divides countries that have different concepts and approaches to law and extradition. Mexico serves as a safe haven for many former migrants who move back across the border when they have committed crimes (MacDonald, 2004). But these are sensitive issues and often the academic community is unwilling to raise the problematic issues that arise from drug trafficking, crime and human smuggling that occur across the US border with Mexico. Once that border was relatively porous, now, rightly or wrongly, it is increasingly difficult to move easily from Mexico to the United States. However, the continuing rise in the undocumented population is testimony that walls do not keep determined migrants from entering the United States nor does the Mediterranean boundary keep migrants from leaving North Africa for Europe.

Rise of the undocumented

The rise in the undocumented population arriving in the United States and Europe in the last decade or decade and a half is now a subject of both political and public debate. There are about 35 million foreign-born residents in the United States and more than 11.5 million of them are without documentation (Figure 6.5). The fact that about 7.5 million of the 11.5 million or more unauthorized migrants arrived in the last ten years is what makes this change so different from the flows of immigrants in the past 30 years. In Europe the numbers are less sure but there may have been more than three million illegal immigrants in the European Union by the late 1990s and the number will

![Pie chart showing the composition of the foreign-born population in the United States](image)


Figure 6.5  The composition of the foreign-born population in the United States
certainly have increased (United Nations, 2004b). The increase in unauthorized immigration has led to calls for both amnesty programmes, and in the United States for greater enforcement of the US–Mexican border. With the significant increase in the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States, and in Southern California in particular, there is also an increasing concern about the outcomes for immigrants and the impacts on local communities.

Nationally, the best estimates of the undocumented population in the United States suggest that it is about 11 to 12 million people. These estimates, based on the Current Population Survey (CPS), also show that as much as two-thirds of the unauthorized population have been in the country for ten years or less (Passel, 2006). The undocumented population is slightly more male than female, and about 16 per cent of the undocumented population are children. Although it is difficult to be precise, the current estimates are that the unauthorized population is growing at about 500 000–700 000 persons per year. Certainly that number is consistent with an increase in the undocumented population of about ten million in the last 15 years. Beginning in 1989, not long after the last amnesty in 1986, there has been a steady growth in the undocumented population (Figure 6.6).

Undocumented migration is not only an issue in the United States, there are increasing issues related to undocumented populations in the EU as well. A recent news report began with the headline: ‘Half a million would-be immigrants awaiting to make the journey to Spain’s Canary Islands. Then on to the rest of Europe’ (Expatica, 2006). Europe is a magnet for undocumented immigrants from Africa and Eastern Europe just as the United States is for migrants from Mexico and Central America. Unlike the relatively accepted

![Graph showing the increase in the undocumented immigrant population in the United States](image)

**Note:** The bands suggest the uncertainty attached to the estimates.

**Source:** Passel (2006).
statistics on undocumented immigrants in the United States the data from Europe is less complete. The estimates from the Office of International Migration suggest that there are eight million undocumented immigrants in Europe. Salt and Almeida (2006) rightly raise questions about the reliability of the figures on migrants generally and clearly, they must be treated with caution. Still, Boswell and Straubhaar (2004) suggest that estimates of around 500,000 migrants who enter EU countries illegally every year are reasonable. Commonly, illegal immigrants enter Europe legally but then overstay their visas.

As the EU has restructured, the borders are now not the individual countries making up the EU but the borders at the edge, in Southern Spain and Eastern Poland. It is these borders that are subject to the pressure of new flows of undocumented immigrants from Eastern European countries (Alscher, 2005). Poland has become a transit corridor for border flows. Between 1996 and 2003 more than 35,000 undocumented immigrants were apprehended on the eastern border of Poland. It is true that these numbers are far lower than the apprehensions on the US border with Mexico but they are an indicator of the changing flows and their pressures.

The number of illegal workers is put at around 500,000 in Germany, 300,000 in France and up to 800,000 in Italy. There may be as many as 570,000 in the United Kingdom. Of course, as in the United States, the numbers and the estimates are problematic and we need to reiterate that there is considerable room for error in the size of the estimates (Boswell and Straubhaar, 2004). However, there is little doubt that the number of illegal entries will continue to climb, lured by jobs and the linkages to family members already in Europe. As in the United States the illegal employment problem is the outcome of two related processes – restrictive legislation on legal labour migration and employers who want to minimize costs by employing cheap labour. Since the 1970s’ restrictions on labour migration, and fewer native-born workers who will work in agriculture, cleaning and catering, there has been an increase in the number of undocumented workers in these industries. Again, as in the United States, it is the undocumented population that is willing to work for lower wages often in substandard working conditions. They take these marginalized jobs as a step on what they hope will be the ladder out of poverty, or to escape even more difficult political and economic situations in their countries of origin.

It is estimated that nearly 7.2 million unauthorized migrants were employed in the United States in March 2005, almost 5 per cent of the civilian labour force. Of course, they were a much greater percentage of particular occupational categories such as household services, retail services and construction as is illustrated with data for Southern California (Figure 6.7). That most of the immigrant population works in unskilled occupations is consistent with our knowledge of immigrants who arrive with little formal education. They are in just those jobs that in a globalized economy are now neither rarely unionized, nor well-paying, and no longer provide a step on the ladder of upward mobility.

While we can be relatively sure about the numbers, the ages and educational characteristics are much more difficult to ascertain. To answer these questions, I use a relatively unusual data set on families and neighbourhoods in Los Angeles from the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey (Clark, 2006b). As expected, undocumented immigrants in Southern California are largely Hispanic (99 per cent), they are, by and large, young (72 per cent under 35 years of age) and have little education (only 22 per cent have a high school education or better). The contrasts with the documented population provide a useful understanding of the age and educational differences. Nearly two-thirds of the
undocumented population are under 35 years of age and nearly two-thirds have less than a high school education. The documented population is nearly the reverse of that. Nearly 70 per cent of the documented population are over age 35 and nearly half have a high school education or more.

Given that such large numbers of immigrants have low-skilled jobs, live in very poor neighbourhoods and are subject to the unremitting problem of gaining a foothold in a new society, why do they come and why do they take low-paying often informal sector jobs? The lure as in the past is the possibility of a better life and steady employment even if they come as family migrants. Moving from a rural-sector uncertain-employment context in Mexico to Los Angeles increases the probability of being employed, and, indeed, if we use the data on remittances, suggests that it is a successful strategy. It is clear that workers in California are able to find sufficient work to send back what amounts to 10 per cent of the Mexican economy (I noted earlier that the remittances to Mexico total US$16 billion). It is relatively easy to understand the attraction of communities across the border, especially when there are family ties to smooth the way, and it is equally easy to provide an answer to why they work in the informal economy. For many workers without documented status they accept jobs in the informal sector as a survival strategy. Undocumented workers have lower employment rates and are also likely to have part-time employment, which in turn emphasizes their likelihood of being in marginal employment and hints at the likelihood of ending up in the informal sector.

The question that naturally emerges from the previous analysis is whether the United States and perhaps to a lesser extent some European nations with two-tier labour systems

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**Figure 6.7** Major employment activities of undocumented immigrants in Southern California

that arise out of undocumented flows, are developing ‘quasi-slave’ societies. Certainly the jobs that undocumented immigrants do in Europe are not very different from those they do in the United States. They work as nannies, in household care and in low-level service jobs in restaurants and cleaning services. These populations are clearly paid much less than others in the labour market. Their vulnerable situation gives rise to a two-tier labour market in which the beneficiaries are individuals who gain inexpensive services, businesses, which are able to benefit from lower labour costs, and the population in general from lower-cost food, vegetables and clothing.

Transforming localities
Migrants choose locations and in doing so they transform the local economies, the local communities and by extension political processes. Whether we engage in dialogues about diversity or lament the changing structure of our societies there is little doubt that international migration has set in process a change in the ethnic composition of the developed societies. While some celebrate the new diversity, others like Anthony Browne (2002) lament that ‘Britain is losing Britain’, and Hanson (2006) writes about ‘France’s immigrant problem and ours’. Who is right, is there a right, in this debate about changing demographic composition? Certainly there are now contentious debates not just about the levels of immigration but about the changes that are occurring in communities across the large metropolises of the developed world. But first we can record the level and nature of the community changes that have occurred in the past decade and a half especially in the United States.

Transforming local labour markets
In the United States, migrants now (2000 Census data) make up about 16 per cent of the labour force, well above their proportion of the population as a whole (Clark, 2003). It is a nearly 200 per cent increase in the proportion of the foreign-born in the labour force in the past two decades. In the big immigrant states California, New York, Texas, Illinois and Florida, and their labour markets, the foreign-born make up the majority of the workers in some industries and occupations. In the construction industry Spanish is the language of the construction site, and the heavy manual labour is increasingly the province of young Mexican and Central American workers. They are also increasingly the tile and brick layers, masons and stone workers. In the personal service industry, nannies and other household help are likely to be Central American, while in the nail industry the workers are most likely to be women from Vietnam and Thailand. But it is important to realize that in the United States the foreign-born workforce is a presence in all occupations, not just in services, construction and agriculture (Table 6.6). The pattern is somewhat different in Europe where there are greater controls on workplace participation. The data for the United Kingdom show that many legal immigrants are in the professions. Still, local labour markets in London, Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris do have large numbers of foreign-born workers. Construction sites in Germany, the Netherlands, France and Italy employ Eastern Europeans, Poles, Ukrainians and Czechs who have moved in search of jobs and opportunities.

In the United States the increase is not just in the service and construction industries. There have been rapid increases in the number of foreign-born teachers, doctors, lawyers and health professionals, especially the latter. Foreign-born persons hold more than
14 per cent of all jobs in the medical profession, and in the engineering and science professions. On a visit to a hospital or doctor in Southern California there is nearly a one in five chance of being seen by a foreign-born nurse or doctor (Clark, 2003). Entry into professional occupations still requires significant levels of education and skills and so immigrants who come with English language skills and previous training are likely to do much better and make faster progress up the economic ladder.

Thus, the local labour market at its most visible, in the services contacts that we make at the grocery store, the hardware store and even government agencies, often shows two faces. On one hand, the face of the local labour market is the skilled well-educated worker who may be from India or from the Middle East or China who has little difficulty in communicating in the local labour market. The other face of the local labour market is the shop assistant who has limited education and often limited English language skills. The outcomes can be outcomes of tension and cultural clash. We will return to this issue in the conclusion.

The local labour market in some cities in the United States is also increasingly an informal labour market where new immigrants are hired on a temporary basis. This does not appear to be so prevalent in European nations where the controls on employment are more strict than in the United States and will become more so in the United Kingdom if the identity card is put in place. In Los Angeles, there is a growing divergence between the number of employees reported by employers and the number reported in the Current Population Survey (Figure 6.8). Beginning about 1990 and widening since then, reports from employers are significantly lower than the reports from the Current Population Survey. The gap hints at a growing under-reporting of employed persons and in turn suggests a growing and now sizable unregulated labour market. The lower wages and often poorer working conditions are the outcome of an informal labour market and in turn impact the ability of workers to make progress.

Transforming local communities – diversity and cultural change

Just as the labour markets change so too do the communities of individuals and families. Communities in the United States that were once the bastion of little league baseball are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial/professional</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical/Sales/Admin. support</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision production</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operators/Labourers</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming/Forestry</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The data for the United Kingdom are based on work permits and are not strictly comparable to the survey data from the United States but they clearly show the difference in immigration policies.

now centres of soccer and it is not just the new immigrants who play, but the native-born as well (Price, Cheung and Friedman, 2005). It is a true community transformation that changes local mores and culture. The most visible changes are in the ethnic restaurants and in the signs for ethnic food stores, beauty shops and cheque-cashing services. As the cultural landscape changes so too does the political landscape, as new immigrants provide new ideas about community organization and participation. Still, it is the ethnic diversity that has both positive and negative connotations.

Diversity has been celebrated in North America, especially in Canada, as the beginning of a new blended society. It is more apparent in California and the West than in the East but demographic changes are diffusing across the American landscape, and the European, New Zealand, Australian and Canadian landscapes too. Those changes have perhaps been more muted in Europe where concentration rather than diffusion seems to be the current pattern but that will change too. Still, the changes in large cities like London are now dramatic as whole sections of the city become Albanian, Somali or Ukrainian.

What is the current thinking about incorporation and assimilation? The years since 9/11 have witnessed a change in these notions and it seems that there may be a shift back to
emphasizing incorporation and assimilation and a shift away from multi-culturalism. Multi-culturalism arose as a counter to normative concepts of assimilation and especially in countries with large numbers of new immigrants – countries like Australia, Canada and to a lesser extent Holland. Multi-culturalism arose as a counter to the perceived ethnocentrism of assimilation. With its emphasis on mutual respect of different cultures and groups, it shifted the dialogue away from melting pot metaphors in which groups were submerged to a process of cultural celebration and preservation. In perhaps the most detailed recognition of a multi-cultural perspective, Canada in its Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2002) explicitly detailed the ‘two-way street’ approach to integration. While newcomers were expected to adapt to Canada, Canadian society and its institutions are expected to adapt to a diversifying population (Biles, Tolley and Ibrahim, 2005). Recently, this notion has come under serious questioning with the inflow of very large numbers of new immigrants. While some see multi-culturalism as a way of encouraging integration policies, others, such as Schlesinger (1992) have suggested that multi-culturalism can be a tool for creating if not encouraging segregation and separation (Duncan, 2005). The recent debates over the ‘veil’ in British society are just one more manifestation of the cultural re-examination of integration and assimilation.

There is a tension about the expected decline in the white majority, sometimes expressed as a fear of the coming changes of a multi-minority society (Maharidge, 1996), or at least dismay about the declining ‘Americanness’ of the United States (Schlesinger, 1992). Indeed, Schlesinger fears the dis-uniting of American society and worries that a multi-ethnic or multi-cultural society could go the way of other ethnically divided nations with at the very least growing tensions and animosities amongst ethnic groups. In contrast, the more optimistic argue that the coming changes will celebrate the great diversity that is America and that different groups will enhance the dynamism of society as the new groups ‘assimilate’ if not to, at least with, the American population (Plotke, 1999). The debates over how this will take place are contested – what sort of incorporation of new groups will occur? Because for many, assimilation is no longer easily accepted as a description of the future of American society and there is concern about the future of the ‘American Society’. Might the United States follow the path of other bifurcating nations like Russia and Yugoslavia?

What is the extent of community transformation? What do communities at least in North America look like? They are mixes not just of the major ethnic groups, Asians, Hispanics, whites and blacks but also a myriad of different Asian, Hispanic white and black ancestry and origins. California is no longer a white majority and many large metropolitan areas are pluralities (Figure 6.9). Many other cities have mixes of Asian, Hispanic and African American populations, which are between 30 and 40 per cent. Monolithic white metropolitan areas are a feature of the past. Canadian cities are also complex mixes of ethnic and racial groups. Nor is it only cities in North America – Amsterdam, London and large European cities are also increasingly mixes of different ethnicities.

Hispanic and Asian populations are spreading out from the traditional arrival point cities. Los Angeles and New York, the traditional Hispanic metropolitan areas, had 30 per cent of the Hispanic population in 1990 but that had declined to 23 per cent in 2004 (Frey, 2006). Now the growth of ethnic groups is in the fast-growing second-tier metropolitan areas – Las Vegas, Atlanta, Orlando and Phoenix. In the last half-decade from 2000
to 2005, ethnic minorities contributed most of the gains in central metropolitan counties. They are the demographic lifeblood, in the central cities of older metropolitan areas, but they are also fuelling the growth of suburban communities. Perhaps the most telling comment about changing communities is that 18 of what Frey (2006) calls the ‘melting pot metros’ have majority minority child populations. In fact, the US child population is much more racially diverse than the adult population, which presages the changes to come.

Cities like Washington DC, which was once discussed from the perspective of black and white separation, are now mixtures of multiple groups from many different countries. In the 1990s, nearly a quarter of a million immigrants from 193 different countries chose the DC metropolitan area (Price et al., 2005).

In many ways Washington is emblematic of the kinds of changes that are taking place in metropolitan areas outside of the gateway entry points. Washington, unlike Miami or Los Angeles, where one or two immigrant groups dominate, has a much more eclectic mix of immigrants from Central America, South America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The library in Montgomery County, Maryland welcomes visitors in 11 languages (Price et al., 2005). In Washington, as in other metropolitan areas new immigrants arrive in the suburbs, as well as in the central city. The flows of immigrants to Washington

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**Figure 6.9** Ethnic mix across cities in the United States with more than 500,000 population and no majority group

*Source: American Community Survey, 2005.*
reflect the bifurcated flows to many metropolitan areas. It includes an influx of educated immigrants, including scientists, as well as lower-income newcomers who work in construction, cleaning and personal services.

There is no doubt that the increased international migration of the last two decades is fundamentally changing the composition of local communities. Where the post-World War II flows were mostly within developed countries, those flows are now from low income to high income and from countries with populations that are very different in their cultural and ethnic backgrounds from the countries in which they arrive. There is much greater involvement of Asian, African and Latin American migrants in the migration flows to developed economies. There has been too, considerable conversation about the emergence of transnational migration and transnational communities. Whether or not we accept the arguments about transnationalism there is no question that there is a greater diaspora than in the past. It is the implications of these changed flows that are at the heart of much of the discussion of how communities will evolve and change in the future. Whether there will be an evolution to assimilated societies or a breakdown in cooperation and the emergence of conflict is unclear, but it is certainly a question that is increasingly at the centre of discussions on immigration and will be the focus of some concluding comments in this chapter.

**Pulling together or pulling apart – migration apocalypse or new world**

*Migration as crisis and the future*

From a minor role in demography, international migration has morphed into one of the most contentious issues in discussions of demographic change and inequality. During the 1990s, there emerged a growing concern with the global population explosion, increasing inequality and increased population movements between these unequal nation states. In ‘The coming anarchy’, Kaplan (1994) portrayed a world of increasing tension, violence and civil breakdown as an outcome of massive immigration across national borders. This was paralleled by Weiner’s (1995) *The global migration crisis* and Brimelow’s (1996) *Alien nation*. These books and articles like them suggested that unless America in particular, but obviously Europe too, took dramatic steps, the survival of the Anglo-American race was at stake. At its extreme, in the Brimelow version, the United States is a fragile lifeboat that is pulling the economy of the entire world, but with open borders and the ethnic invasion of the multitude of coloured aliens the lifeboat is likely to sink. Pulling up the ladder, or to change the metaphor, closing *Heaven’s door* (Borjas, 2001) are necessary responses to the crisis of immigration and undocumented immigration in particular. To these writers our world is in crisis and immigration is at the heart of the crisis. The crisis requires a fundamental change in national policies, including the militarization of borders, vastly changed rules of entry, and new policies to deal with the immigrant undocumented population that is already here.

But are we already in fact in crisis mode, and how likely are Europe and North America to receive continuing vast numbers of immigrants? An extensive and excellent review by Zolberg (2001) evaluates the pros and cons of a migration crisis. In the end he comes down to the position that although there is indeed increased international migration and that large numbers of people driven by economic circumstances to migrate have done so, it is not clear that this process will continue, or that migration is ‘out of control’. Even though
authors like Castles and Miller (2003) refer to our era as the age of migration, in fact, only about 2 per cent of the population in the world’s countries is foreign-born (Zlotnik, 1998). Zolberg (2001) even goes as far as to argue that 300,000 to 500,000 undocumented immigrants a year, while worrisome, does not amount to a loss of control over our borders. The other authors in the same volume, in general, come down on the view that there will be continuing migration and the issue is dealing with the flows humanely and effectively – to balance the needs of migrants who are willing to work hard with protections for native-born workers and recognition of the costs to local communities of large-scale immigrant flows. Ultimately, the solutions for a more effective and humane international migration need to focus as much on dealing with refugee-generating behaviour in the developing world as policing the US borders. The issue should be more one of coming to accommodation, than of confrontation and contest.

While the optimists amongst us will opt for a view that new integrated and assimilated societies will emerge in a collaborative multi-cultural society, others see the possibility of considerable cultural conflict and that it may be difficult to reconcile increasing diversity with social adaptation and social cohesion. Only two decades ago, OECD countries were largely homogeneous. The number of migrants to New Zealand, Australia, Britain and the European countries generally was relatively small. Often in the case of Europe and Britain, those populations were of European ancestry and fitted relatively easily into the culture of their adopted country. Certainly their children married and became part of their new societies. As the flows increased and often the new immigrants concentrated in particular residential areas, questions of their long-term integration were raised in their countries of new settlement. Perceptions that immigrants were unwilling to become parts of their new society fuelled tensions about their commitment to their new countries of adoption. The greater size of the flows exacerbates the tendency to remain separate, to seek out similar groups and to live separately, to attend mosques and not churches, to wear veils and to assert a right to cultural practices that may be illegal in their new country. That separatism has led to debates, about commitment, about whether or not the new immigrants will become a part of the new society. Perhaps they will remain unassimilated (though there is a vigorous discussion about the relevance of assimilation as a concept for modern societies) and adhere to their own cultural and social norms.

The role of the nation state – are we losing Britain/America?
As the number of immigrants has increased so has the concern about their role in the wider political society. At its extreme, it takes on the concern expressed by Browne (2002) and Hanson (2003) where Britain is losing Britain or America is losing America. These who worry point out that this immigration is different from flows 100 years ago. Then the flows occurred over a set period of time and died away. Now with the sustained migration pressures from developing countries, the huge disparities in wealth between developing and developed economies and the widespread knowledge in the developing world of the opportunities in Europe and more broadly, the OECD, has led to a process that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The differences between much of Africa and South India in levels of poverty, education, women’s rights and other measures of development, and those same levels in the OECD are clearly a factor in generating an impetus to movement if not actual flows (Figure 6.10). Over the long run it would be short-sighted not to expect at least some population movements from these countries to Europe and
North America. The demographic stress in Africa in particular is likely to have long-term impacts on migrant flows, in Africa as well as from Africa to North America and Europe.

The potential for continuing flows raises the issues of participation in the nation state. The traditional concept of citizenship is changing if it has not already changed completely. In the past the norm was to be a citizen of one state. Perhaps on migration that citizenship was transformed. Now dual citizenship is common. In the past, the expectation was that legal immigrants would apply for citizenship and commit themselves to their new country. Now more than half the world’s nations recognize dual citizenships. Does this matter? At least some worry that more liberal citizenship potentially divides the loyalties and changes the nature of political commitment.

There appears to be a major gap between the views of the elites and the views of the population as a whole. Polls in the United States and in Britain regularly show that the public is concerned and would like changes in the number and flows of immigrants. These populations do not necessarily want to stop immigration. But they do feel that the process and rate of change may be beyond the ability all the society to integrate. On the other hand the political structure, perhaps influenced by lobbyists for businesses wanting low-cost labour, or immigrants rights groups wanting greater access for disadvantaged groups, still favour maintaining or increasing immigrant flows. It is this difference that is currently being debated in Washington.

**Inequality and its implications**

There are wiser and perhaps more thoughtful voices than those of Brimelow and his counterparts in Europe, Le Pen and Enoch Powell. Voices that suggest that the immigration flows will likely moderate and that the evidence for continuing flows is far from
overwhelming. Moreover, it is not at all clear that immigration will overwhelm their new destinations and despite the debates about assimilation many immigrants inter-marry and blend into their new societies. Still, the more strident messages have pointed out the reality of an ageing relatively affluent white society and a growing ethnic and underprivileged society. It is a situation to which the world as a whole has paid only scant attention. The world still pays little attention to the continuing gulf between the one-fifth of the world’s population that lives on less than US$2 a day and the rest. While aid may not be the solution it is hard to accept that the OECD spends US$300 billion in agricultural subsidies while restricting imports from developing countries.

Global migration has highlighted what has always been pushed under the rug – global inequality. Now in the twenty-first century it may be global migration that will force us to examine and deal with the continuing inequities in demographic structures and social outcomes. But, just how we will deal with the immigration problem is far from clear – but we can say that a pause in the flows, a process of documentation (identity cards) may be the price for a more coherent policy of citizenship and incorporation. It will be Britain still and it will be America still, but not the ones we know.

Notes
1. Later in the chapter I examine some occupational data for the United States and the United Kingdom. Certainly the US data tend to an hourglass shape but the UK data show that legal immigrants are more likely to be in professional and managerial positions. Clearly, the occupational distribution depends on national immigration policies with respect to entry.
2. There is growing evidence that the flows may be stabilizing or even declining. See Salt (2005).
3. It is useful to compare figures 6.1 and 6.4 as they suggest similar trajectories.
4. In 2005 an Hispanic mayor, Antonio Villareagosa, was elected in the City of Los Angeles.

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Further reading


7  Migration and social mobility in urban systems: national and international trends

A.J. Fielding

Introduction

This chapter will draw upon data from the UK and Japanese Population Censuses, and in particular the ONS Longitudinal Study for England and Wales, to support a number of generalizations about the relationships, within hierarchical urban systems, between social mobility and geographical mobility. It will address both intra- and intergenerational social (occupational) mobility, migration at both the intra- and international scales, and movements both up and down the urban hierarchy. The primary focus will be on migrations within, and into, high-income countries such as those found in Western Europe and Northeast Asia.

Three groups of questions will be addressed:

1. Those concerned with the links between social mobility and geographical mobility such as ‘Do migration rates differ systematically by social (occupational) class?’ ‘Does the evidence support the idea that social mobility and geographical mobility are related to one another?’ ‘Do those who migrate experience (on average) upward or downward social mobility?’ ‘Do those who move occupationally, experience (on average) greater or less geographical mobility?’ ‘If there are systematic relationships between social mobility and geographical mobility, are they the same for men and for women?’.

2. Those concerned with how these intra-generational relationships between social and geographical mobility are affected by whether or not the migration is up or down the urban hierarchy, or within or between countries, such as ‘Do migrations up the hierarchy facilitate the social promotion of both men and women?’ ‘Do migrations down the hierarchy result in social demotion for both men and women?’ ‘Do international migrations show the same social mobility features as internal migrations?’ ‘If not, in what respects are they different, and why’.

3. Those concerned, not with the social mobilities of persons within their lifetime (intragenerational), but instead with the transmission of occupational class characteristics from one generation to the next (intergenerational), such as ‘Do the occupational locations of the sons and daughters of international migrants (“1.5 generation” if they migrated with their parents as children, “second generation” if they were born in the destination country) differ from those of their parents?’ and ‘How do the social mobility trajectories (both in education and employment) of second generation immigrants compare with those of the host population?’.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter (and probably also the ability of its author) to cover research on all these issues for all the high-income advanced capitalist countries. Instead, while there are a number of references to the United States, and to EU countries other than the United Kingdom, most of the empirical material used will relate to just
three countries: (1) England and Wales (observed together), where the linking of census records for individuals from one census to the next allows extremely valuable longitudinal research to be conducted on these questions; and (2) Japan, where one finds the much more usual situation of a dependence on cross-sectional data, and where the ‘normal’ national census results will be used.

Internal migration and intra-generational social mobility

As an individual’s education/employment and relationship/family ‘double’ biography unfolds he/she typically moves residence from one place to another (thereby adding a third biography, to produce the so-called ‘triple biography’). It is now extremely unusual for a person to live out their lives and to die in the house in which he or she was born. It is conversely more and more common for a person to move away for (higher) education, on to a new place (or places) for employment, to other places during marriage/relationship and family formation and dissolution events, perhaps once again at or around retirement age, and often finally to yet another place when it is no longer possible to live life as an independent person. But however complex these individual paths are, and of course they are very complex, they do show regularities – they are very distinctively patterned in space and over time.

This section focuses on the moves that are more than just local (that is, are interurban and/or interregional in scale) but are not international, and on moves that take place during that part of people’s lives when they are in, or are seeking, employment (that is, the economically active age groups). It explores the connections between moving geographically (migration) and moving socially (that is, from one kind of job or one status of employment to another).

On the basis of evidence drawn from the ONS Longitudinal Study for England and Wales, a number of broad generalizations about the relationship between migration on the one hand and occupational class and social mobility on the other can be made. First, there is an inverse relationship between the need to migrate and the actual migration rate. Those who need to migrate the least (because they are in secure, well-paid middle class employment – for example, professionals and managers) actually migrate the most, while those who need to migrate the most (because they are in insecure, poorly paid working class employment – for example, manual workers) actually migrate the least. Table 7.1 (taken from Fielding, T., 1995) shows that the interregional migration rates for professionals (these were social class ‘stayers’ in that they were professionals in both 1981 and 1991) and managers were 204 and 195 respectively, that is, well above the national average of 100, while that for blue collar workers was just 46 – way below the national average. (Please note that the figure for the unemployed, at 121, is, perhaps surprisingly, not that far above the national average.) This paradoxical relationship between migration and class also means that, other things being equal, upward social mobility, on balance, increases the likelihood of interregional migration.

Second, there is a strong positive relationship overall between social mobility and geographical mobility. The evidence for this assertion is provided by Table 7.2 (also taken from Fielding, T., 1995), which shows that, with the interesting exception of managers, the interregional migration rates of the social class stayers were less than average (the diagonal values are less than 100), while those for the social class movers were above average (the off-diagonal values are mostly over 100).
Third, internal migration, on balance, sharply increases the likelihood of upward social mobility. This is demonstrated by the data in Table 7.3 (taken from Fielding, 1998a) where the rates of upward mobility over a ten-year period into the professional and managerial middle classes (the so-called ‘service class’) are shown. For the economically active population as a whole the figure was 11.4 per cent. This increased slightly if males only were considered, and increased again if housing tenure, region of residence and occupation of origin were counted in. But the really large increases in the probability of upward social mobility occurred with interregional migration. Most of the rates on the right-hand side of the table are about twice as high as those on the left, indicating (despite the fact that causality is in both directions – see Cote, 1997) that the chances of social promotion are greatly increased by geographical mobility.

Table 7.1 Interregional migration rates by social class (England and Wales = 100) (1.096% sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational class</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>In labour market in 1991</th>
<th>In labour market in 1981 and in 1991</th>
<th>In labour market in same class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>35365</td>
<td>15.15</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>26449</td>
<td>11.33</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie</td>
<td>22548</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>57163</td>
<td>24.49</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>68783</td>
<td>29.47</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>23109</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>233417</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 7.2 Interregional migration rates for each social class transition (standardized to class of origin in 1981 = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social class in 1981</th>
<th>PRO</th>
<th>MAN</th>
<th>PB</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>BC</th>
<th>UE</th>
<th>Total labour market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this point it is probably necessary to explain the class categories used in these analyses. The social classes used (see Savage et al., 1992 for details) are as follows:

1. A very small upper class of capitalists (so small, in fact, that this group is ignored altogether in these tables); three middle classes based in turn on three assets.
2. The professionals (based upon the acquisition of special credentials or qualifications, for example doctors, lawyers, musicians and teachers).
3. The managers (based on special experience of, and demonstrated skill in, mobilizing and controlling the labour of others).
4. The petite bourgeoisie (based upon the ownership of the means of production, for example a small family-owned manufacturing company, an independent retail outlet, or a self-employed service worker such as an electrician or plumber); three working classes.
5. The white collar working class (for example low-level employees in shops and offices).
6. The blue collar working class (low-level employees doing manual work in factories, on building sites etc.).
7. The unemployed. For the purposes of this research, the unemployed are treated as part of the working class rather than as a separate ‘underclass’.

Table 7.3  Interactions between interregional migration, social class, housing tenure, gender and region, as they affect entry to the service class (professionals and managers), England and Wales, 1971–81 (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total only</th>
<th>Males only</th>
<th>Total only</th>
<th>Males only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) In labour market in 1971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Owner-occup. only</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East only</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Owner-occup. only</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar only</td>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Owner-occup. only</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East only</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Owner-occup. only</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Entries from education 1971–81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Owner-occup. only</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East only</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Owner-occup. only</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The data refer to people in England and Wales at both dates. A rate of entry into the service class is calculated by dividing the number of people entering the service class in 1971–81 by the number of people in the category of origin in 1971. The rates of entry are therefore transition probabilities × 100. Data for the South East interregional migrants are for flows TO the South East.

This brings us to the fourth generalization, which has turned out to be the most interesting and provocative of all. There seems to be a kind of circulatory system that links social and geographical mobility during an individual’s life course. This is conveniently encapsulated in the concept of the ‘escalator region’. ‘Escalator regions’ are regions that usually contain large metropolitan cities (for example, ‘global cities’ such as London and Tokyo), and that act as ‘engines’ of social promotion into middle (and upper) class jobs. They do this by (1) attracting from other regions through in-migration a large number of educated and ambitious young adults at the start of their working lives (akin to stepping on the escalator); (2) promoting these young people at rates that are higher than those found in other regions of the country (akin to being taken up by the escalator); (3) losing through out-migration a significant proportion of these upwardly mobile people at later stages in their working lives or at, or close to, retirement (akin to stepping off the escalator).

Evidence drawn from the ONS Longitudinal Study data set, which links census records at the individual level for about 1 per cent of the population of England and Wales (giving a sample size of about 500 000 persons), strongly supports the notion that the London region (South East England) acts like an ‘escalator region’ in the UK space economy. Table 7.4 (a and b) and Figure 7.1 are taken from Fielding (1992). They show: (1) In Table 7.4a, the flow of migrants to the London region is strongly biased towards young adults coming from education and unemployment in 1971 when they lived outside the London region, to enter professional, managerial and low-level white collar jobs by 1981 when they lived inside the region. (2) In Figure 7.1, those who did not migrate faced very different rates of upward social mobility into professional and managerial (service class) middle class jobs depending on where they lived. There is, in effect, a distinctive ‘geography of opportunity’ in Britain, and this geography greatly favours those who live in the London (South East) region. Here the rates of movement into managerial employment were much higher, from both education and working class jobs, than they were in other parts of the country. (3) In Table 7.4b, the flow of migrants from the London region is strongly biased towards older people coming from middle class jobs when they lived in the London region, to enter retirement or the ownership of small or medium-sized businesses when they lived outside the region. (Incidentally, analyses of the ONS Longitudinal Study data sets over the three intervals 1971–81, 1981–91 and 1991–2001 have shown that these relationships between migration and social mobility within hierarchical urban systems are quite remarkably stable over time. Specifically, the arrival of the ‘Thatcher’ era in the 1980s did not, contrary to the author’s expectations, alter the patterns to any significant degree.)

One can then ask if the escalator region effect works equally well for men and for women. This leads to the fifth generalization. Migration up the urban hierarchy (that is, migration to the London region from other regions), on balance, increases the likelihood of upward social mobility for both men and women, but especially for women; migration down the urban hierarchy (that is, migration from the London region to other regions) is neutral or advantageous for men but is severely detrimental to the work histories of women. The evidence for this is provided by Figure 7.2 (a and b) (taken from Fielding and Halford, 1993). Here the distinctiveness of the flows to the South East region for men and women (Figure 7.2a) and from the region (Figure 7.2b) are shown by comparing these flows with all interregional migration flows in England and Wales. Clearly, both men and women gain by migrating to the London/South East region,
but this is much more clearly the case for women (where all the transitions imply side-
ways or upward social mobility) than for men (where some of the salient transitions are
downwards such as ‘education to unemployed’ and ‘education to blue collar’. Notice in
particular, the extraordinary frequencies with which women make the transitions from

Table 7.4a  The social composition of migration flows TO the South East region from
everse in England and Wales, 1971–81 (location quotients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social class in 1971</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>PB</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>BC</th>
<th>UE</th>
<th>TLM</th>
<th>RT</th>
<th>OT</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service class</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourg.</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in labour</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  A location quotient of 1.00 means that the transition in question is equally as important in the flows
to the South East as it is for all interregional migrants in England and Wales. This table excludes deaths and
‘not found’.


Table 7.4b  The social composition of migration flows FROM the South East region to
everse in England and Wales, 1971–81 (location quotients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social class in 1971</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>PB</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>BC</th>
<th>UE</th>
<th>TLM</th>
<th>RT</th>
<th>OT</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service class</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourg.</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in labour</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  See above.

Figure 7.1  England and Wales: social mobility of non-migrants by standard region
education and low-level white collar jobs to managerial positions – the London labour market seems to be particularly advantageous to the upward career development of women. When it comes to migration from the London region, a very different picture emerges. For men, the transitions that dominate are those into retirement, and into the petite bourgeoisie (that is, achieving autonomy by becoming the owner of a small or medium-sized business). At the same time there are interesting ‘sideways’ movements such as ‘professional to professional’. This can take the form of people gaining qualifications and experience in the high-cost South East, but, as a result of nationally negotiated wage structures, enjoying the same income and status in a low-cost region outside the South East where, as a result, they could afford a much better house and a higher standard of living. If they time such a move correctly, they can also ‘surf’ the wave of house price inflation as it moves out geographically from the centre (London) to the periphery (by selling high and buying cheap). For women a much gloomier picture prevails. The dominant transitions are into ‘other’ (that is, out of the labour market altogether), and downward, such as into unemployment from white collar jobs, and into low-level white collar jobs from professional employment. Clearly, however favourable a
move away from London is for family-related reasons, it is very damaging, on average, for the career prospects of women. This gender asymmetry in the social mobilities of men and women as they move up and down the urban hierarchy is a most intriguing outcome of this research.

The results discussed above for men (notably the signs of downward mobility) tie in closely with our final generalization about the link between internal migration and intragenerational mobility. The net social class effect of migrations to and from the large metropolitan escalator region is to contribute (albeit in quite a small way) to the social polarization of that region. This is demonstrated in Table 7.5 (taken from Fielding, 1993) which shows the social class ‘balance sheet’ for South East England. The net effect of all the social class transitions associated with migration flows to and from the region is to add to the ‘service class’ of professionals and managers, and also to the unemployed, but to subtract from the petite bourgeoisie, and from the white collar and blue collar working classes.

There has been a lively research interest in the links between migration and social mobility in the recent period, and this has included a continuing curiosity about the usefulness of the ‘escalator region’ metaphor (see, for example, Kim and Kontuly, 2006). Some of this research has also used the ONS Longitudinal Study for England and Wales. While largely confirming the generalizations presented above (for example, Bruegel’s, 2000 work confirms the results as they relate to both class-specific mobility and to gender differences), they also add important qualifications. In Champion’s recent work (2004), there is an emphasis on the sizeable return flows from the London region at ages well before career maturity and

![Figure 7.2 (a and b) (continued)](image-url)
retirement. This fits in well with one of the striking features of the Japanese pattern of life course migration (see below). He also shows that there are no major differences between those who return ‘early’ and those who returned ‘late’. This suggests that the early returners were probably not engaged in a ‘return of failure’. In recent work by Findlay (2006) on Scots in the South East, he also emphasizes early return, but he erroneously assumes that the escalator region idea is limited to the notion that people were promoted to their jobs in the South East, whereas it also, in fact, includes those he calls ‘elevators’, that is, young adults who were only promoted after they entered the region. His results do, however, confirm many of the correlates with upward social mobility listed in Table 7.3 above (for example, the importance of housing tenure), and he adds some interesting material on the importance of university degree qualifications – many of the migrants from Scotland had

Table 7.5  A social class ‘balance sheet’ for the South East region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SC</th>
<th>PB</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>BC</th>
<th>UE</th>
<th>TOT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total in class in SE in 1971</td>
<td>15,989</td>
<td>5,036</td>
<td>24,154</td>
<td>29,426</td>
<td>2,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Additions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers into class within SE</td>
<td>5,011</td>
<td>2,188</td>
<td>3,457</td>
<td>3,553</td>
<td>2,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entries from educ. within SE</td>
<td>3,498</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>6,362</td>
<td>4,990</td>
<td>1,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other entries within SE</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>3,630</td>
<td>1,731</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-migrants from E&amp;W</td>
<td>2,389</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1,338</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: in class in 1971</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In labour market in other class in 1971</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In education in 1971</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In other in 1971</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total additions</td>
<td>11,968</td>
<td>3,093</td>
<td>14,787</td>
<td>11,092</td>
<td>4,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Subtractions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers from class within the SE</td>
<td>2,660</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>5,246</td>
<td>5,827</td>
<td>984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>2,777</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirements within SE</td>
<td>1,814</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>2,638</td>
<td>4,357</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other exits within SE</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>4,856</td>
<td>2,092</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-migrants to E&amp;W</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>1,777</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: in class in 1981</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In labour market in other class in 1981</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In retirement in 1981</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In other in 1981</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total subtractions</td>
<td>8,161</td>
<td>3,175</td>
<td>16,107</td>
<td>16,361</td>
<td>1,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net change 1971–81</td>
<td>+3,807</td>
<td>−82</td>
<td>−1,320</td>
<td>−5,269</td>
<td>+2,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net migration 1971–81</td>
<td>+619</td>
<td>−98</td>
<td>−439</td>
<td>−490</td>
<td>+160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in class in SE in 1981</td>
<td>19,796</td>
<td>4,954</td>
<td>22,834</td>
<td>24,157</td>
<td>4,641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The data exclude migrants to and from the rest of the world and ‘not found’.

degree-level qualifications and did well, but the non-degree migrants from Scotland also seemed to achieve upward social mobility more frequently than their English counterparts. In a related paper based on the same research, Findlay et al. (2006) suggest that maybe one of the reasons why return migration of Scots from the London region has taken off in the last inter-censal period is the rapid increase in opportunities for professional and managerial employment in Edinburgh. This point was also made in relation to recent changes in the migration flows to and from Manchester (Devine et al., 2003). In other words, ‘escalator’-type processes might well be operating in other metropolitan regions in the United Kingdom, albeit on a much smaller scale than in London.

Have these ideas about the links between social and geographical mobility been taken up by disciplines other than geography, and in countries other than the UK? Economists have come to realize that human capital availability is the most consistent predictor of urban economic performance. In a recent paper, Gordon argues that the attractive power of major cities with a specialization in high-order services ‘is not simply a consequence of the available opportunities, but rather reflects a capacity of particular places (notably the more diverse major cities) to offer the sort of open, tolerant environment in which creative people tend to thrive, both socially and economically’ (Gordon, 2005, p. 6). Then he argues that ‘initial salary differences are insufficient to account for the drawing power of major cities for the highly skilled’ but instead, due to the particular way in which big city labour markets function, it is the ‘expected career progression, and hence faster earnings growth’ that is a central factor. He concludes that such ideas are ‘consistent with the familiar characterizations of London as an “escalator region”, promoting upward social mobility among the qualified young workers that it draws in’ (ibid. 6). The political significance of this connection between migration and occupational mobility within an escalator region has also been realized by policy-oriented urban economists. In a paper significantly entitled ‘Growing together: London and the UK economy’, the authors write ‘London gains from the net inflow of talented people, and the rest of the UK gains when people migrate out from London later in their careers taking their skills and experience with them’ (Greater London Authority, 2005).

Using data on the labour market entry of British university students, Faggian and McCann analysed the relationships between migration (‘human capital flows’) and ‘regional knowledge assets’. They note that net migration flows are generally towards areas of higher nominal wages, and that:

nominal interregional wage differences in Great Britain appear to reflect variations and constraints in the spatial pattern of the graduate employment opportunities, which themselves appear to be related to the rank-order of the area within the national urban hierarchy, centred around London and its hinterland. (Faggian and McCann, 2006, p. 481)

Within the centre-periphery structure of the space economy heavily dependent on the performance of London:

it appears that employment and migration patterns within Great Britain exhibit life cycle effects according to a regional ‘escalator’ process in which young persons are attracted to London and the South East from other regions in order to enter employment and training and only later in life move to other regions to work. (p. 481)
They conclude (p. 497):

the role of universities in acting as a conduit for human capital flows into a region appears to be very important. Universities attract students into a region, and many of these subsequent graduates will remain in the local region for employment if the local economy is strong. This process itself also contributes to the future innovation performance of the local region and this cumulative migration-innovation effect is critical in the case of the London region.

Sociologists working on social mobility have also found important connections with migration and the urban hierarchy. For example, in a longitudinal study that focused on those who, at the start of their secondary education in 1982, were considered to be ‘destined for success’, Power, Whitty and Edwards (2006) found that by and large their educational promise had been realized, and that part of their success could be put down to their mobility, and to their connections with the London economy. They write (p. 243) that ‘the degree of spatial mobility appears to be connected to educational and occupational status’ and ‘almost three-quarters of those with PhDs were highly mobile, and a similar proportion with (only school-leaving qualifications) as their highest qualification were “static”’. Referring to the South East as an ‘escalator region’ they show that ‘although only a quarter of our sample started their education in the South East, over a half have lived there at some point during the last ten years, and a substantial minority (41 per cent) are located there now. This suggests a general pull towards the South East’. They add, however, an interesting qualification:

our high-flying respondents in the private sector were indeed concentrated in the South East, reflecting the uneven distribution of financial and other private producer services. The wider geographical distribution of our high-flying respondents in the public sector (however), reflects the more even distribution of state funded services, particularly relating to health. (p. 243)

What about outside the United Kingdom? Is there evidence that these generalizations apply also in other EU countries, in the United States, and in other cultures such as Japan? Using longitudinal data for the Netherlands, Mulder and Van Ham (2003) found that long-distance internal migrations were beneficial to the occupational achievement of both men and women as were migration histories that included a stay in a large city. This confirms earlier work by Van Ham in which he found that workplace mobility was instrumental in career advancement and that longer-distance moves were associated with greater advancement than short-distance ones:

However, the analyses also confirmed that women with a partner form an exception to the rule. For them, workplace mobility has no effect on career advancement. A probable explanation is a tied-mover effect. Some women with a partner accept a job over a longer distance for the sake of the career of the male spouse, because the household as a whole migrates. The conclusion is that, for women, workplace mobility is only instrumental in career advancement when jobs are accepted over a long distance for their own careers. (Van Ham, 2001, p. 304)

This fits in nicely with the asymmetric gender outcomes discussed earlier in relation to moves to and from London (those by women towards London being primarily for their own career development, while those away from London would, in many instances, be linked to the careers of their partners).
social mobility relationships, also based on longitudinal data, produced similar results, notably that migrants from rural areas in Norway on average gained higher economic and cultural capital resources than non-migrants (Rye, 2006).

In their work on occupational and geographical mobility in the United States, Lin and Christiadi (2002) produced results that match fairly closely those already discussed in this chapter. For example, they found that migrants were more occupationally mobile than non-migrants, and that people in higher occupational ‘strata’ were more interregionally mobile than those in lower ‘strata’. But in other respects, their paper is unhelpful, first because its methodology is unnecessarily complicated, and second because it contains spurious claims about the originality of its findings.

Finally, we can turn to some recent research on internal migration in Japan to examine whether or not the ‘escalator region’ metaphor and other generalizations about the migration and social mobility relationship apply equally to a country that, although technologically sophisticated and wealthy, nevertheless differs from other high-income advanced capitalist countries in certain significant respects. First, there is no doubt that the Tokyo metropolitan area dominates the Japanese space economy at least as much as London does in the United Kingdom or Paris does in France (Fielding, 2002). It is also the case that the Tokyo region attracts vast numbers of able and ambitious young people at the start of their adult lives either as students attending its prestigious universities or for employment in a highly diverse and opportunity-rich labour market. There is also a consensus among researchers that upward social mobility rates are higher (perhaps especially for women) in the Tokyo region than they are elsewhere in Japan. But that is where the similarities end. In many other respects Japanese life course patterns of internal migration are very different from those of Western countries. This is shown in Figure 7.3 (taken from Fielding and Ishikawa, 2003), which compares the correlograms of Japan and Britain for the spatial relationships between age-specific net migration rates and age structures. If ‘like attracted like’ and high geographical mobility prevailed, then high positive correlations would arise in the diagonal values from top left to bottom right (with high negative values in the top right and bottom left-hand corners). This happens to some extent in the case of Britain, but in Japan it is clearly not the case. What the correlogram for Japan shows is that migrations of all ages avoid the areas (mostly peripheral regions and rural areas) where older people live and are attracted to areas where people in their forties live. These tend to be high-income areas with good job prospects. But three other features of Figure 7.3a are very interesting. The first is the massive net gains of young adults in those areas already containing many young adults (notably, of course, the main university cities of Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka etc.). Second, the interesting (albeit minor) feature of return migration of young adults to rural areas shown by the plus correlation between net migration of people in their late twenties and areas with many elderly people. This would seem to be associated with the obligations of young adults (especially the eldest son) towards parents who are running farms or small businesses in remoter, mainly rural areas. Finally, there is the strong tendency for the elderly to move to where people in their forties and late teens live. One can be fairly confident that this reflects the movement of elderly parents towards the current residential locations of their children and grandchildren, in a society in which the family bears the brunt of the care of the elderly rather than the state or private residential homes. Above all, however, what Figure 7.3a shows is that there is no significant ‘stepping off the escalator’ in Japan. That is to say,
Note: Japan: matrix of special correlations at prefectural level between age-specific net migration rates 1985–90 and location quotients for populations by age group 1990.

Source: 1990 Census.

Figure 7.3 (a and b) Correlograms of Japan (a) and Britain (b) for the spatial relationships between age-specific net migration rates and age structures
older working age and retirement migrants assuredly do not migrate to places where older people live (that is, to the non-metropolitan, mostly peripheral and rural areas of the country). What this research on migration and the life course in Japan shows is that we should be careful about assuming that generalizations based upon data for Western

\[\text{Age structure}\]

\[\text{Net migration}\]

\[0.75 \text{ to } 1.00\]
\[0.50 \text{ to } 0.75\]
\[0.25 \text{ to } 0.50\]
\[0.0 \text{ to } 0.25\]

\[0.0 \text{ to } -0.25\]
\[-0.25 \text{ to } -0.50\]
\[-0.50 \text{ to } -0.75\]
\[-0.75 \text{ to } -1.00\]

\text{Note:} \quad \text{Britain: matrix of spatial correlations at county/region level between age-specific net migration rates 1990–91 and location quotients for populations by age group 1991.}

\text{Source:} \quad 1991 \text{ Census.}

\text{Figure 7.3 (a and b) (continued)
countries will apply also to countries that have very different social histories, cultures and political economies.

**Internal migration and intergenerational social mobility**

Intergenerational social mobility has been a major focus of sociological research for a very long time. In a recent study based on the ONS Longitudinal Study of England and Wales data set, Buxton et al. (2005) show that the likelihood of a man becoming a professional or manager is 59 per cent if his parent (usually father) was a professional or manager, but only 27 per cent if his father was in a semi-skilled or unskilled occupation. They conclude:

these results show clearly that the occupation, education and family building patterns of young and middle aged adults still appear to vary considerably by parental social class. Those with parents who had a professional or managerial occupation when they were children were the most likely to themselves have this type of occupation in early mid-life, particularly if they came from a two- rather than a one-parent family. Parental social class was (also) strongly associated with educational attainment, which is an important determinant of occupational opportunity. (p. 25)

They did not, however, enquire as to whether or not the parents had been geographically mobile. So, for the moment at least, we do not know for England and Wales what the effects of internal migration are for the ‘second generation’, that is, those who were born to migratory parents. As Recano and Roig (2001) point out, regrettably ‘most existing studies on internal migrants examine only the consequences of the move for the migrants themselves’. We should, perhaps, take a leaf out of studies of international migration and get interested in what happens to second-generation internal migrants.

Recano and Roig take an important first step in this direction in their study of the educational careers of the offspring of internal migrants in Spain. They hypothesize, on the basis of studies of international immigrants in Europe, ‘that the second generation and the so-called 1.5 generation (will) perform relatively worse than their native peers, in the sense of dropping out of the education system earlier, even when demographic and socio-economic factors are controlled for’. They also anticipate, however, ‘that integration patterns are diverse; some specific groups may even outperform natives, and outcomes may vary greatly by receiving region and cohort’ (Recano and Roig, 2001, p. 7). This is indeed what they find. Natives with immigrant parents are only 81 per cent as likely to enrol in university as the indigenous population. But the contrasts between regions of destination are sharp. In Catalonia and the Basque country, two regions with stronger cultural identities and that tended to attract less qualified migrants, second-generation educational performance was distinctively poor:

In Madrid, on the contrary, (migrant/non-migrant) origin is not significant; if anything, the odds of enrolling in university would actually be higher for the 1.5 and the second generation than for native children of natives. This lack of uniformity in educational outcomes among regions suggests that structural factors, that is, factors specific to the social and economic contexts of the host regions, matter. (Ibid., p. 10)

**International migration and intra-generational social mobility**

Unlike the case of the last section, it is possible, due to the existence of a rich literature, to make a number of fairly bold generalizations about the intra-generational social mobilities of international migrants to advanced capitalist countries (those that follow are
taken from Fielding, 2005). First, with respect to occupational social class before and during international migration, four broad generalizations can be made:

1. It is generally not the poorest who emigrate, due in part, of course, to their inability to pay for a successful migration (the exceptions to this are important, notably forced migration and debt-bondage).

2. Other members of the working classes may have good reason to emigrate, and the means to do so, for example, through the pooling of family resources to pay the people smugglers, but their migration to high-income countries is constrained by those countries’ immigration policies that favour people with high-level qualifications or wealth over the unskilled and poor.

3. Members of the middle classes have good reason to emigrate both for the higher wages they might obtain for the same work they are already doing, and for the better prospects they might gain for their children. But their migration often involves downward social mobility (brain waste), and a loss of status and power (for example, no servants).

4. Finally, for those with significant wealth, emigration is generally not a problem. Most countries of immigration have schemes to allow the entry of those who will make major investments in their economies.

Second, with respect to social class after migration, seven broad generalizations can be made:

1. There are big differences between intra-generational and intergenerational social mobility. Most first-generation migrants are confined to the working class jobs they take on arrival, or they achieve modest upward mobility through the small business sector. Second- and subsequent generation ‘immigrants’ often achieve upward social mobility into professional occupations through the acquisition of formal qualifications (see Clark, 2003 for an account of the way that immigrants are ‘remaking the middle class’ in the United States).

2. At the same time, however, members of immigrant minorities have a strong tendency to be downwardly mobile into unskilled working class jobs and unemployment (and putting (1) and (2) together accounts for the ‘segmented assimilation’ emphasis in much of the literature on the social mobility of immigrants).

3. When compared with the social class trajectories of the host population, immigrant minorities tend to be highly concentrated in the petite bourgeoisie, and the small business sector plays a major role in upward social mobility.

4. A key role in the upward mobility of immigrants into professional and managerial occupations is played by cultural capital (especially language proficiency). Those who lack such assets tend to be confined to working class jobs or to jobs in ethnic enclave economies.

5. Gender relations inherited from the country of origin often determine whether members of ethnic minorities enter white collar or blue collar jobs. For example, where a strong family system is combined with patriarchal gender relations, women often work in blue collar jobs in family-owned companies.

6. Ethnic differences seem to matter a lot in determining rates of upward social mobility, so that immigrant groups arriving at the same time and sharing similar initial class
locations, are nevertheless likely to experience different class trajectories in the country of destination.

7. Finally, class location in the receiving country is likely to be greatly affected by the legal status of the immigrant; those who are invited key worker immigrants are likely to join the middle classes, those who are ‘permanent residents’ or co-ethnic returnees will usually form part of the stable working class, while those who are ‘overstayers’, or are failed asylum-seekers, or who entered illegally, will tend to belong to the ‘underclass’.

Many of these generalizations are, once again, supported by analyses based on the ONS Longitudinal Study of England and Wales, which is ideally suited to the task of monitoring the social mobilities of immigrant populations (Byron and Hoggart, 2004). Figure 7.4 (taken from Fielding, A.J., 1995) shows the salient transitions (that is, rates of flow that are above average for the whole population) for Afro-Caribbean and South Asian immigrants in England and Wales. One feature is common to both – the high propensity for transitions into unemployment (six in each case). But in other respects, the two patterns are distinctly different, for example, in the case of the Afro-Caribbean population there is no salient upward mobility flow into the petite bourgeoisie, whereas for the South Asians there are five such flows.

![Figure 7.4 (a and b) The social mobility of Afro-Caribbeans (a) and South Asians (b) in England and Wales, 1971–81]

*Note:* The social mobility of Afro-Caribbeans in England and Wales 1971–81. Only salient links are shown. (Crown Copyright Reserved.)
Table 7.6 (taken from Fielding, 1998b) shows the salient transitions for the 1981–91 period based upon the self-ascribed ethnic categories that were included for the first time in the 1991 Census. It can be seen that first there is, once again, a very high propensity for downward mobility into both blue collar jobs and unemployment for both ‘blacks’ and ‘Asians’; second, that upward mobility into the petite bourgeoisie is very important for both Asian men and Asian women; third, that there is a stable Asian professional middle class; fourth that upward mobility into the professions for blacks is largely confined to women; and finally, that Asian women have higher flows into the blue collar working class, whereas Asian men tend to go into the white collar working class (the transitions for those entering the labour market from education will be discussed below). Do these results conform to other studies on the intra-generational social mobility of immigrants in the United Kingdom? We can answer this question by turning to the useful review of recent research by Kempton (2002). Drawing mostly on the UK Labour Force Surveys, these studies show that about 10 per cent of the UK workforce is made up of those who were born abroad. Those from developing countries, however, constitute only about one half of this total (the rest coming largely from other EU countries, North America and Australasia), and this means that, as with internal migration there is a tendency for net migration to the United Kingdom to add to both the top and the bottom of the social structure:

**Note:** The social mobility of South Asians in England and Wales 1971–81. Only salient links are shown. (Crown Copyright Reserved.)

*Figure 7.4 (a and b) (continued)*

Table 7.6 (taken from Fielding, 1998b) shows the salient transitions for the 1981–91 period based upon the self-ascribed ethnic categories that were included for the first time in the 1991 Census. It can be seen that first there is, once again, a very high propensity for downward mobility into both blue collar jobs and unemployment for both ‘blacks’ and ‘Asians’; second, that upward mobility into the petite bourgeoisie is very important for both Asian men and Asian women; third, that there is a stable Asian professional middle class; fourth that upward mobility into the professions for blacks is largely confined to women; and finally, that Asian women have higher flows into the blue collar working class, whereas Asian men tend to go into the white collar working class (the transitions for those entering the labour market from education will be discussed below). Do these results conform to other studies on the intra-generational social mobility of immigrants in the United Kingdom? We can answer this question by turning to the useful review of recent research by Kempton (2002). Drawing mostly on the UK Labour Force Surveys, these studies show that about 10 per cent of the UK workforce is made up of those who were born abroad. Those from developing countries, however, constitute only about one half of this total (the rest coming largely from other EU countries, North America and Australasia), and this means that, as with internal migration there is a tendency for net migration to the United Kingdom to add to both the top and the bottom of the social structure:
The foreign-born population is concentrated at both the low and the high ends of the skills distribution. The foreign-born are more likely to be highly qualified, with 19 per cent of working age people holding degrees, compared to 15 per cent among the UK-born. However, a greater proportion among the foreign-born also have no qualifications (19 per cent compared to 16 per cent). (Kempton, 2002, p. 12)

Thirty-one per cent of the foreign-born have arrived within the last ten years, and when these recent arrivals come from developing countries, their occupational status in the United Kingdom tends to be low (this fits with the ‘new immigrants’ flows in Figure 7.4). The probability of unemployment is high among ethnic minority immigrants, ‘with Pakistanis, Black Africans and Caribbeans being the most disadvantaged’ (ibid., p. 18). The studies also confirm the importance of the small business sector for the upward mobility of South Asians, and the significance of language proficiency. Finally, the report emphasizes the enormous importance of London as the main receiving region for

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**Table 7.6a** The social mobility of ethnic minorities in E&W, 1981–91: the black community (E&W = 100; only salient transitions are shown)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SC in 1981</th>
<th>PRO</th>
<th>MAN</th>
<th>PB</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>BC</th>
<th>UE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourg.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
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<td>102</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>230</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>104</td>
<td>175</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total lab. mkt</td>
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<td></td>
<td>135</td>
<td>219</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>112</td>
<td>199</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SC in 1981</th>
<th>PRO</th>
<th>MAN</th>
<th>PB</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>BC</th>
<th>UE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>106</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>175</td>
<td>107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourg.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>107</td>
<td></td>
<td>118</td>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total lab. mkt</td>
<td>149</td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>343</td>
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<td>Immigrants</td>
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<td></td>
<td>114</td>
<td>183</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>217</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IZES: ONS (Office of National Statistics) Longitudinal Study (Crown Copyright Reserved).

The foreign-born population is concentrated at both the low and the high ends of the skills distribution. The foreign-born are more likely to be highly qualified, with 19 per cent of working age people holding degrees, compared to 15 per cent among the UK-born. However, a greater proportion among the foreign-born also have no qualifications (19 per cent compared to 16 per cent). (Kempton, 2002, p. 12)
immigrants to the United Kingdom: 'more than 40 per cent of migrants live in London, making up 26 per cent of London’s population. This compares to only 10 per cent of the UK-born population living in London’ (ibid., p. 3).

This last point raises an intriguing issue. It is of the utmost significance that much of the highly skilled migration to countries like the United Kingdom and almost all of the (post-facto) unskilled migration, is movement up the urban hierarchy, and in particular to metropolitan cities like London, cities that have already been characterized as social class ‘escalator regions’ for internal migration. Is it not possible therefore, that such cities are now operating as social class escalators for international migrants as well? Such a perspective had already been addressed by Andersson in his study of immigrants in Sweden (Andersson, 1996, but see also Fielding and Mizuno, 1996 and Fielding, 2002), but it has also recently been taken up by Conradson and Latham in their study of New Zealanders in London (Conradson and Latham, 2005). In Andersson’s study he shows that the non-Scandinavian-born people in Sweden were highly concentrated in the three largest cities

### Table 7.6b The social mobility of ethnic minorities in E&W, 1981–91: the Asian community (E&W = 100; only salient transitions are shown)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Social class in 1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SC in 1981</td>
<td>PRO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourg.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total lab. mkt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Social class in 1991</th>
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<tr>
<td>SC in 1981</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petite bourg.</td>
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<td>White collar</td>
<td>118</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total lab. mkt</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ONS (Office of National Statistics) Longitudinal Study (Crown Copyright Reserved).
that attracted around one-third of all immigrants (and also of high-income non-
Scandinavian-born), which was more than twice their proportion of the total population
(15 per cent) (Andersson, 1996, p. 15). But he also shows that the upward social mobility
of immigrants in Sweden is not as focused on the capital city as it is for the Swedish-born.
He writes:

tentatively, I would argue that the labour market for (the) highly educated is somewhat less com-
petitive outside the capital region, and this provides better opportunities for highly-educated
immigrants to succeed elsewhere in the country. Furthermore, the relative success for immigrants
having a low education level in Stockholm might be an effect of the relative over-representation
of low paid service jobs in the area. (Ibid., p. 19)

Conradson and Latham emphasize the growing significance of international migration
to the population growth and employment stability of the London region (as does Dalla
Zuanna, 2006 for the metropolitan regions of Northern Italy). They then ask if educated
New Zealander immigrants are drawing upon London as an escalator region (that is,
seeing it as a place in which they can develop their careers and achieve upward social
mobility). In about a third of the cases they interviewed the answer was clearly yes
(Conradson and Latham, 2005, p. 166), but in many other cases the situation was more
complex than this. What was happening was that young educated New Zealanders were
using London to obtain ‘overseas experience’, to widen horizons, to travel in Europe, and
to experience other cultures. Their move to London was as much, if not more, a 'rite of
passage' as it was part of a carefully planned strategy for career development. Those who
were seeking to use London as a base for career development were trying to join the pro-
fessional and managerial elites, whose career paths and ‘spatial trajectories’ have been
very effectively described by Beaverstock (2005) in his research on British inter-company
transferees in New York’s financial district.

Does evidence on the class locations of international migrants in Japan conform to the
generalizations listed above, or are we, once again, finding that Western models do not
fully apply to Japan? Analyses based on the foreign population recorded in the 2000
Population Census show that, for six out of the eight main immigrant groups in Japan,
the so-called ‘new immigration model’ offers a plausible explanation of their occupational
class profiles (four of these eight profiles are shown in Figure 7.5 (a, b, c and d) and are
taken from Fielding, 2006). Japan has largely been ignored as a country of immigration
(and the notion that it is such, is still highly controversial in Japan) (Goodman et al.,
2003). But the country is, to a certain degree, ethnically diverse (Weiner, 1997), and much
of that diversity comes from past ‘oldcomer’ and recent ‘newcomer’ immigrations. The
Koreans, who migrated voluntarily or were conscripted to work in Japan during the colo-
nial period (that is, when the Korean peninsula was part of greater Japan in the period
1910–45) form a large part of the oldcomer migrants (see Ryang, 2000, for an excellent
insight into their situation today). Despite the fact that they were overwhelmingly
recruited into blue collar jobs in the mines and factories, their occupational profile today
(now, of course, mostly composed of members of the second and third generation) does
not differ very greatly from that of the host population (represented by the horizontal
location quotient line of 1.00 in Figure 7.5a), except perhaps that they show a stronger
presence in the petite bourgeoisie (that is, they have achieved some upward mobility
through the owner-managership of small businesses).
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.50

Occupational structure (width of column equal to size of sector in total workforce)

Location quotient (i.e., Korean workers relative to total workforce – national average = 1.00)

Managers and officials
Personal services
Professional and technical
Sales
Clerical etc.
Trans/comm.
Production workers

Source: 2000 Census.

a(ii) Japan’s Korean population in 2000
Japan’s total 528,094 = 4.17 per thousand population


Figure 7.5 (a–d) Occupation structure and population of Koreans (a), Filippino (b), Brazilian (c) and other foreigners (d) in Japan, 2000
b(i) Japan: occupational structure of Philippine nationals in 2000 (relative to total workforce)

Location quotient (i.e., Philippine workers relative to total workforce – national average = 1.00)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional and technical</th>
<th>Clerical etc.</th>
<th>Sales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Census.

b(ii) Japan’s Filippino population in 2000

Japan’s total 93,352 = 0.74 per thousand population


Figure 7.5 (a–d) (continued)
Migration and social mobility

Source: 2000 Census.

(c(i) Japan: occupational structure of Brazilians in 2000
(relative to total workforce)

(c(ii) Japan’s Brazilian population in 2000

Japan’s total 188190 = 1.48 per thousand population


Figure 7.5 (a–d) (continued)
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.50

Occupational structure (width of column equal to size of sector in total workforce)

Location quotient (i.e., other foreign workers relative to total workforce – national average = 1.00)

Source: 2000 Census.

d(ii) Japan’s other population in 2000

Japan’s total 126021 = 0.99 per thousand population


Figure 7.5 (a–d) (continued)
The Koreans were joined after the mid-1970s by young adult Asian women from the Philippines and Thailand, many of whom were recruited into the Japanese sex industry (Komai, 2001). The occupational distribution of people from the Philippines (Figure 7.5b) (over 80 per cent of whom are female) shows the effect of this even today, though notice that production workers are also over-represented in this minority's population.

After 1990, the newcomer population was suddenly increased by the arrival of ‘nikkei-jin’. These are the descendants of Japanese migrants to South America (Figure 7.5c) who now work in car components factories and the like, that is, in those places where it is difficult to recruit good-quality native workers (Tsuda, 2003 and Hirabayashi, Kikumura-Yano and Hirabayashi, 2002). Their occupational profile is extremely distinctive – whatever their jobs were before they left Brazil, they are now blue collar production workers, and their segregation from the Japanese population at the local level is also very great (Iida, 2001). Finally, Figure 7.5d shows the occupational location of ‘others’ (mostly Westerners). This displays the other side of globalization for these are the professionals and managers employed by major companies in the producer services, by government agencies and by universities. It is extremely significant that these immigrants, unlike the three other groups discussed (but in common with the Chinese), are very highly concentrated in Tokyo. These findings confirm that in the matter of the intra-generational social mobility of international migrants, Japan is very much conforming to the patterns seen in other high-income capitalist countries.

**International migration and intergenerational social mobility**

This final section of the chapter examines the changes in occupational social class locations between the migrants themselves and their children, both those who accompanied them during the migration (the 1.5 generation) and those who were born in the receiving country (the second generation). Four broad generalizations can be made. The first is that the children of immigrants, on balance, do better than their parents. In some accounts this is due to the fact that their parents suffered downward social mobility when they migrated, and so all that is happening is that the children are regaining the social standing that their parents lost. But it seems that where no downward mobility occurred, the next generation do no worse than the equivalent sections of the host population, and there are some signs that, on balance, they do rather better. Second, the next generation are very liable to downward mobility into working class jobs and, above all, into unemployment. Third, there are large differences between the performances of next-generation children in education and in work. The notion of segmented assimilation is relevant here. This states that second-generation immigrants ‘assimilate into three different segments of the receiving society: the mainstream or middle class, the underclass, or their own ethnic community’ (Crul, 2005, p. 1). Finally, the notion that the next generation will become more spatially dispersed than the original migrants (based on the expectation of successful assimilation accompanying greater language proficiency etc.), is not borne out by the facts.

To what extent do the findings based upon the ONS Longitudinal Study of England and Wales support these generalizations? From Figure 7.4 and Table 7.6 we can see that the entrants from education are very vulnerable to entering unemployment, but are, in specific cases (such as ‘Asian’ young men and women in the 1981–91 period) entering professional occupations at higher rates than the population as a whole. We also know, from
the ONS Longitudinal Study data for 1991–2001, that the London (South East) region, while losing white British, other white and mixed race people at high rates (−6 per cent, −12 per cent and −11 per cent respectively) and Bangladeshis and Chinese at low rates (−1 per cent), gains population by net migration for all of the remaining ‘ethnic’ groups. In particular, it gains Indians, Pakistanis and Black Africans from other regions of the country at high rates (+8 per cent, +6 per cent and +10 per cent respectively) (Fielding, research in progress). So no simple spatial spread of ethnic minority populations into the host population (at least at the broad regional level) is occurring.

It is Platt’s work (2003), however, that uses the ONS Longitudinal Study data set to best effect when it comes to the next generation. She compares the jobs that children of Indian and Caribbean migrants were doing in 1991 with the jobs that their parents were doing in 1971, and compares these transition matrices with that for white non-migrants. The results are extremely clear: (1) Indians pass their professional and managerial (service class) positions on very successfully to their children. Their children also achieve upward mobility at higher rates than the host population, and suffer downward mobility at lower rates than the host population. (2) Caribbeans on the other hand, fail to pass on their service class jobs, and show lower rates of promotion into service class jobs, and their downward mobility rates are universally higher than for the host population. (3) Indians and Caribbeans are alike in one important respect, however, – both have higher rates of flow into unemployment than the host population. These results clearly confirm the first three of the generalizations listed at the beginning of this section.

An emphasis on the concentration of immigrants and their children in the worst jobs and in unemployment characterizes the pessimistic tone of a recent paper on an intergenerational analysis of immigrants in France (Meurs, Pailhe and Simon, 2004). They write:

the performance of first- and second-generation immigrants on the labour market is far from converging with that of native French people. The risk of being unemployed is much higher for first and second-generation immigrants than for people whose parents were both born in France. They are more often in precarious employment (part-time and temporary jobs) than French natives and they are still stuck on the lowest rungs of the social hierarchy. Nevertheless, the social position (of the next generation) is higher than that of their parents and they are less segregated on the labour market. (Ibid, Abstract).

For a broader picture of the position of the second generation in Europe we need to turn to the major projects reviewed by Crul (2005) (but see also King et al., 2006, for a recent summary of research on life course and generational aspects of European immigration). Crul writes

an important place in the debate about the second generation is reserved for the importance of class. The minority position of many second-generation groups in the US and especially in Europe coincides with a very low class position. If one takes class in consideration, (however), the gap with children from native-born parents often narrows considerably or even disappears. (Ibid., p. 2)

He then goes on to review the cross-national studies of second-generation social class mobility, and reveals that the differences between countries are rather surprisingly significant (national context having formerly been mostly taken for granted). For example, ‘at the top end of the ladder, we see that far more second-generation Turks in France,
Belgium and the Netherlands enter preparatory tracks for higher education than in other countries’ (ibid., p. 3). On the other hand:

the apprenticeship system in the two predominantly German-speaking countries (Germany and Austria) ensures a relatively smooth transition (from school to work). Unemployment among second-generation Turks in countries with apprenticeship systems is three to four times lower than in France, Belgium or the Netherlands. Such systems apparently give young people with low vocational diplomas a start on the job market – a step much harder to accomplish in countries without such a system. (Ibid., p. 4)

Finally, the evidence on the internal migration of second-generation immigrants is beginning to take shape. In their study of the transitions from school to university to work in the United Kingdom, Faggian, McCann and Sheppard (2006, p. 9) note that:

our focus on university graduates suggests that non-White ethnicities are much less mobile than Whites in the early stages of a student-graduate’s career (that is, between domicile and higher education). This may well also imply that the long-term earnings potential of non-White graduates is also reduced, due to the impacts on their subsequent migration behaviour (lower initial migration propensities are highly correlated with lower subsequent migration propensities, and both are correlated with lower overall lifetime earnings).

Ellis and Goodwin-White, meanwhile, have been interested in the idea that the integration of the next generation should imply their spatial dispersal from the settlement locations of their parents. But when they put this to the test by examining inter-state migrations of the 1.5 generation in the United States, they find something quite different. The probability of inter-state migration goes up as the proportion of foreign-born goes down. They find that ‘concentration deters (the mobility of the 1.5 generation) to an even greater extent than it does for their parents’ generation (and this) is sufficient to challenge predictions of second generation dispersal’ (Ellis and Goodwin-White, 2004, p. 19). The conformity of this finding with the ONS Longitudinal Study data for England and Wales mentioned above is striking.

Concluding remarks

The research reported in this chapter has demonstrated that there are many close connections between migration and social mobility within hierarchical intra- and international urban systems. Three results seem to stand out from the rest:

1. The powerful positive association between migration and social mobility. On average, the ‘spiralist’ metaphor seems to work – if one moves geographically one is likely to move up socially.
2. The usefulness of the ‘escalator region’ concept in generalizing about the role of major metropolitan city regions in the formation of professional and managerial middle class careers.
3. The vulnerability of migrants to downward mobility into the manual working class (internationally) and into unemployment (internally).

To these important results we should attach an equally important message – to ignore the class locations and work histories of migrants is to run the risk of allowing ‘migration’ to
become a ‘chaotic concept’, that is to say, a term that means so many things to so many people that it has come to mean nothing to anyone. We can only understand the migrants themselves, and the places they transform through their departures and arrivals, if we fully explore the class positions they occupy, and the changes that their class positions undergo during their own lifetimes, and those of their descendants.

References
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Migration and social mobility


Introduction
Over the last few decades, social exclusion analysis has gone through significant methodological transformations. Originally centred on the observation and classification of poverty and types of poor, and on the construction of appropriate indicators of poverty and deprivation (Townsend, 1993), the focus shifted from the late 1980s, towards the analysis of social exclusion as a multi-dimensional process, occurring at a variety of spatial scales (Moulaert, 1995; Paugam, 1996; Moulaert and Scott, 1997; Mingione, Kazepov and Zajczyk, 1997; Mingione and Oberti, 2003).

Social exclusion
First, the notion of social exclusion was introduced. On the basis of a well-organized literature review, Vranken (1997; 2001) identified three more or less complementary readings of ‘social exclusion’:

[social exclusion may be seen] in terms of denial or non-realization of social rights. (Vranken (2001) citing Room, 1991, p. 5)

[social exclusion] concerns the gap that exists between situations or groups in one or more areas of social life; this gap does not necessarily relate to poverty. (Vranken, 2001)

[social exclusion] is a process, while poverty is one of its results. (Vranken, 2001)

Much of the recent progress in social exclusion analysis has followed the lines of the third reading, that is, social exclusion as a process with a variety of dimensions and results (Paugam, 1996). This approach offers a firm answer to the tendency to ‘segment’ or ‘atomize’ the analysis of the factors of poverty, as is done in some of the debates on the phenomenon of ‘new urban poverty’; these sometimes compulsively explore ‘new’ causes of urban poverty without referring back to the structure of exploitation and exclusion inherent in capitalist and hierarchical societies and economies (see, e.g., Knecht, 1999). This increases the risk of a ‘stigmatization’ of urban poverty and exclusion, considering the ‘excluded’ and the ‘poor’ as ‘bearers of urban social pathology’ (Baeten, 2001).

In the academic world, social exclusion has become increasingly theorized as a multi-dimensional process combining various mechanisms of exclusion: exclusion from the labour market, non-eligibility for social security rights, dropping out from, or no access to, the educational system, limited or no political rights, no access to the housing market, and so on. However, to arrive at a really multi-dimensional and dynamic analysis of social exclusion, it is necessary to spell out the articulations between these mechanisms.
Another improvement in recent literature on urban social exclusion analysis is the stress laid on the spatial scales of social exclusion processes; social exclusion and deprivation at the neighbourhood level in particular, became a major focus of research (Moulaert, 1995; Madanipour, Cars and Allen, 1998). The real challenge, however, was to give clear spatial recognition to the various processes of exclusion that had been identified in the literature of the last ten years. Significant contributions were rendered in Moulaert, Rodriguez and Swyngedouw (2003), who examined the impact of economic restructuring processes on social exclusion, using a large number of European case studies. They focused on the spatial scales of these processes, making distinctions, for example, between global processes of manufacturing restructuring conveyed through international capital, and local processes of displacement in the housing markets generated by failing rent control in local public policy. Special focus was given to the articulations between multi-scalar processes, such as the distortion of real estate markets in several inner-city neighbourhoods as the outcome of a combination of investment by international and national capital and the land valorization strategy of local authorities. In many cities, this combination has led to the relocation of less well-to-do families to more peripheral neighbourhoods.

Spatial recognition of various processes of exclusion and inclusion were also studied from the viewpoint of local social policy and welfare systems, and the interaction of these with the dynamics of the labour market, the local communities and support networks, demography and family institutions (Mingione and Oberti, 2003).

A more recent step in the analysis of social exclusion dynamics, is the use of the multi-spatial scale approach to exclusion processes as a starting point for the definition of new strategies to combat poverty and social exclusion, both within the local social economy with its multi-level governance dynamics (Moulaert et al., 2000), and the multi-level social protection and welfare systems (Saraceno, 2002b).

In the next section, we explore the frontiers of the scientific analysis of exclusion dynamics. We also go on to show in the following section how these frontiers provide the basis of a more institutional and place-specific analysis.

‘State of the art’ analyses of exclusion dynamics

Major contributions to integrating various dimensions of social exclusion processes are provided by a variety of authors from different disciplines.

As we saw in the first section, the analytical focus in exclusion/inclusion research moved away from poverty and deprivation indicators, to processes leading to, confirming or reinforcing the state of poverty. Many exclusion processes, and various links between them, are recognized, with lack of access to regular labour markets still being accepted as the dominant driving force of exclusion (Morlicchio, 2000).

Different social science disciplines employ differing emphases when analysing these processes and the links between them. In sociology and political science, following Esping-Andersen (1990), Kazepov, Benassi and Mingione (1997) examined the variety in welfare systems within European nations. The urban dimension receives a strong focus in this work, and the authors recognize how the specificity of institutions, traditions, policy, social networks and demography can play a significant part in moulding local exclusion and inclusion processes. Until recently, the state of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
social security system depended almost entirely on a professional career within a specific national socioeconomic system and its associated institutionalized wage–labour relationships (Boyer, 1986). Rights to replacement income for the individual (sometimes extended to family members), depended on the job trajectory of the employee who had become ill, handicapped or unemployed. Today, Portugal and Spain have introduced systems of minimum welfare rights for the ‘non-career poor’, following the example of Northern European countries, which have had such a protection system since the 1970s or early 1980s. However, these rights vary strongly among countries (Compendium DG Social Policy), regions and cities (Saraceno, 2002a), and are usually more limited than those granted to citizens with long-time working careers who, in Northern European countries, rely on the ‘regular’, ‘non localized’ welfare systems. On the whole, social protection rights relate to a territory and an activity, or to sector-bound social citizenship, which in turn is dependent on the strength of the social protection system and the rights that various categories of citizens and non-citizens hold within it.

This leads us to another process of social exclusion and inclusion extensively studied in sociology, geography and political science: international migration. This can present a major opportunity for migrants and their families to improve their economic well-being (King, 1993).

However, in the present sociopolitical conjuncture, international migrants, especially those originating from outside Europe, end up in the remotest outskirts of the labour market, in the secondary part of the regular employment system or in the informal economy, thus often being deprived of the most elementary social protection rights (Hillmann, 1996; Pugliese, 2002b). Socioeconomic exclusion of migrants in particular cities has been a research issue as well.

The real discrimination affecting citizens in cities and neighbourhoods has often been determined by the quality of the social relationships in the urban regions and neighbourhoods where they live. But income conditions and models of consumption that indicate severe deprivation do not necessarily imply an equal level of overall social exclusion. On average, the economically less well off display the material, psychological and cultural resources (working tradition, capacity of adjustment, inter-ethnic forms of solidarity) needed to confront the initial discomfort of their condition and to keep them safe from the risk of social exclusion. Consider the following example: in the historical centre of Naples, the protection given by the neighbourhood informal network is very important also for the migrants, even if the protection varies according to the ethnic or national community to which they belong (see Morlicchio, 2001).

In social economics, urban geography and sociology, research has focused on the role of economic restructuring in local inclusion–exclusion processes. Several socioeconomic subsystems – such as production, labour markets, distribution of income and wealth – were evaluated as to their potential inclusion–exclusion effects at the local level. In Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez (2002) and Moulaert et al. (2003), this evaluation is carried out through the ‘crystal’ of large-scale urban development projects, implemented in 12 European metropolises. These projects are examined by their impact on urban labour markets, income distribution, real estate and housing markets and so on. In most cases, real estate market allocation dynamics generate displacement of population groups to less desirable quarters, with limited service provision, and increased polarization in the labour market.
This research also reveals the impact of public policy on spatial and social polarization. So-called new urban policy – see the last section of this chapter – based on real-estate-led development, accompanied by elite planning, deregulation of land markets and decline in urban social policy, does not offer solutions to the growing social polarization created by the economic restructuring processes of the 1980s and early 1990s; quite the contrary in fact (Moulaert et al., 2002). Of course, national and local qualifiers are highly relevant to the real impact of this mechanism; depending on the democratic control, the relations within political coalitions, and so on, large-scale urban development projects can be integrated within broader urban development strategies, which may also include microscopic neighbourhood upgrading, improvement of social services, institutionalization and funding of the social economy and so on; or may lead to large-scale intra-urban social polarization.

It is important to stress that a multi-dimensional dynamic approach to social exclusion/inclusion mechanisms in the city involves evaluating the role of agents and processes that are active at higher spatial scales: global consultancies and architecture offices, international and national banks, global companies locating in the new grand shopping complexes. These global players have a tendency to import, or seek to promote, the modes of deregulation that fit them best (flexible labour markets, free movement of capital) and, in this way, become instrumental in weakening social protection or hampering the socio-economic integration of deprived groups and individuals in urban societies.2 But it is not only global players who set the change agenda; urban real-estate-led development, factoring inequality in income and wealth-generating processes, is very often influenced by local corporatist interest groups, as illustrated, for example, by the Centro Direzionale in Naples (Cavola and Vicari, 2000).

From the above, it becomes quite clear that the focus in poverty and exclusion analysis has shifted from observing and typifying the categories of the poor and factors of poverty, to the analysis of the various processes of exclusion and integration. The links between these processes remain to be explored further. Since the labour market is still recognized by most analysts as the main mechanism of exclusion/inclusion, it makes sense to start the linking endeavour from there, and to determine how other processes of exclusion and inclusion relate to labour market dynamics (Morlicchio, 2000). Such an approach would also be historical revenge for a missed chance by sociology in the 1970s, when labour sociologists working on segmented labour markets, and social analysts of poverty failed to match their approaches and, as a consequence, closed the way to a more process-oriented analysis of poverty and exclusion.

The role of ‘specific’ mechanisms in social exclusion dynamics – Mediterranean cities, with a focus on Naples

In the Southern European literature on poverty and exclusion, some authors are right to point out the tendency to generalize observations concerning the mechanisms of exclusion in ‘Northern’ European countries, to all countries in Europe (Mingione, 2001; Pugliese, 2002a; see also Morlicchio, 2004). These authors stress the differences between the North and South of Europe, and even North America, in the role of the formal labour market, the social protection system, social networks, social space, demography and family composition. First, we present the arguments developed by these authors; then in the next section we put them in the context of a broader methodological discussion.
The socialization of exclusion in Mediterranean cities

Mediterranean cities are characterized by distinctive patterns of poverty and social exclusion, involving high levels of unemployment and underemployment, income poverty, lack of universal minimum income schemes, traditional family models, a low rate of female participation in regular labour markets or independent professional occupations and the absence of ‘ghetto poor’.

For various reasons, literature analysing urban poverty and social exclusion in Southern European countries is rather scarce. One reason is that until just a few decades ago, poverty had been mainly a rural phenomenon in Southern European regions. At that time, the majority of the population was still rural and agriculture was the main economic sector. The late shift to a manufacturing economy involved intense processes of de-ruralization, urbanization and modernization, causing a brutal fall in rural employment and, at the same time, producing urban unemployment and irregular low-paid jobs in building and private service activities. These processes have also marginalized women and confirmed them in their role as housewives. As urban migration led to the disappearance of informal social services and the traditional forms of family solidarity (like the peasant extended family networks) and community networks, the need to provide childcare and other family support became crucial to enable women to enter the labour market. In the absence of such services, women are doomed to stay at home and take care of their children, even if they badly need additional income. Moreover, as Pugliese argued for the Italian case:

while the rural class of self-employed workers and their dependents might have benefited in the last decade from a flow of social security income that kept them substantially sheltered from poverty and misery . . . we cannot say the same for the urban population. It is here that we record the main conditions of distress that are not compensated, if not exceptionally acute, by welfare provisions. (Pugliese, 2002a, 144–5)

Are exclusion processes different in Southern Europe?

Anticipating the definitive answer to this question, we could argue that it depends on the level of generality by which we analyse exclusion dynamics. If we accept that exclusion dynamics lie within a multi-dimensional process that includes most types of dynamics as well as a variety of scales of spatial materialization, then of course there is virtually no difference in explanatory factors of social exclusion between North and South. But if we stress, from the beginning, the specificity of institutions, family structure, links between formal and informal labour markets, and so on within particular cities and neighbourhoods, then of course the explanations will be different. Let us first apply the second approach, and then use the first one to create methodological unity among institutional diversity. To avoid any misunderstanding, let us clarify from the start that most of the authors cited here tend to agree with this distinction between levels of analysis (for example: global, national or local; labour market vs. labour market for a specific sector or activity) and to agree that analyses pursued at several levels should be interpreted interactively.

Labour market dynamics

The restructuring of the European economy over the last 25 years has had a proportionately negative impact on employment in Southern Europe. In any case, in Southern European countries, contemporary ‘victims of the labour market’
are found not so much in the vulnerable sectors employing the ‘Fordist working class’ – the ‘losers’ that Kern and Schumann (1984) contrast with the ‘winners’ – but among the ranks of construction workers, those in unstable and part-time employment without social security protection and very low wages, and the long-term unemployed (mainly young and female) living in low-income households. Irregular, small jobs (sometimes within the crime circuit, like drug dealing) continue to offer an outlet for unemployed people (Morlicchio, 2001). In fact in Southern Europe few workers find employment in the traditional Fordist sectors, which offer high protection to the insiders, that is, the ‘internal labour market workers’, usually adult males. Moreover, the Fordist branch plant economy that created some manufacturing employment in the Mezzogiorno, for example, has suffered badly from global restructuring that made many local manufacturing establishments close down and low-skilled workers redundant (Martinelli and Gadrey, 2000).

In addition, the concentration of unemployment and unstable employment patterns in particular neighbourhoods call for quite specific explanations relating to social culture, social reproduction and interaction patterns within those areas (Pugliese et al., 1999).

System of social protection

Obviously, the differences between Northern and Southern European countries as regards the characteristics of the new urban poor are not only related to the structure of the labour market. Access to social services and the level of protection provided by the welfare system must also be taken into account. The literature makes frequent reference to a ‘Latin rim’ (Leibfried, 1993) or to a ‘rudimentary assistance regime’ (Gough et al., 1997). But more recent studies criticize the view that the welfare state in Southern Europe has been rudimentary or underdeveloped. Instead, they argue for the existence of a specifically Mediterranean model of social protection, with a particular mix of strong family support, weak public policies and market dependency, which worked fairly well in the post-war period in guaranteeing social cohesion (Mingione, 2001; Kazepov, 2005; Morlicchio, Pugliese and Spinelli, 2002), but not in reducing the level of poverty and its intergenerational transmission.

In most Southern regions of Europe, social security rights are indeed very limited. Moreover, as welfare income is often within the competence of municipalities, significant differences also exist between the welfare benefits in cities and in regions (Mingione and Oberti, 2003). As a rule, one can say that the long-term unemployed can only partially or temporarily benefit from welfare income, and at a level that is insufficient to allow for a decent standard of living. For many Neapolitan families, for example, it is more appropriate to consider any welfare income as a windfall, to be added to the ‘regular’ income obtained from petty jobs in the informal economy.

Family structure

In Southern cities of Europe, and in casu Naples, and despite the urbanization process signalled above, the extended family still functions as a cushion against extreme poverty (Morlicchio, 2001). But as the income crisis persists, the number of breadwinners decreases, savings evaporate and average incomes lose purchasing power. As a consequence, there is an erosion of the spending capacity of the precarious family – often including members from two or three generations – and budgeting problems become quite acute. This gives rise to what has been called the ‘familization’ of poverty (Mingione, Oberti and Pereirinha, 2002, p. 52).
The persistence of the large family as a solidarity structure does not mean that the so-called small, single or one-parent family is absent from the Southern scene. Although statistically less significant, this ‘typically Northern’ phenomenon, that is, the proportion of lone mothers (Bimbi, 2000) and youngsters with a fragile income status, is increasing (Spanò, 2002). Given the limited rights to even a low substitute income, the threat to survival is probably more serious in Southern than in Northern cities (Saraceno, 2002a).

**Education and the labour market**

The schooling and employment problems of youngsters in Southern Europe have become increasingly acute. School dropouts, low education levels, and so on, should not be attributed to a low-level educational system, but to a spiral of demotivation fed by decreasing job opportunities, increasing educational failure, peer behaviour among dropouts, and so on. Within the climate of a continuing brain drain of skilled persons to Northern Europe (including Northern Italy and Spain), and a lack of professional experience owing to scarce employment opportunities, all this pushes the average skill level of the Southern labour force further downward. Of course, this phenomenon is quite comparable to the qualification and employment problems experienced by migrant youngsters in Northern European metropolises but it is typically Southern in that it affects large sections of the labour class population, irrespective of race. Moreover, two other factors interfere with the educational system in Southern Europe.

The first concerns a problem of spatial planning and the built environment; this includes the lack of school buildings (which implies rotating classes and teaching times), the use of inappropriate buildings or vandalism affecting school infrastructure.

The second problem concerns the relationship between the educational system and the family. Negative attitudes amongst pupils and parents due to peer behaviour among young school dropouts, and the absence of a respected and valued school culture, are reinforced by a lack of professional experience as well as demotivation amongst teachers. Moreover, there is a scarcity of further resources and services (like full-time school-wide or personal tutoring), which if present, could overcome the initial social disadvantages and stimulate social integration via the educational system. As a consequence, children are more likely to fail, and to abandon school in favour of occupational experience. The countries of Southern Europe show particularly high levels of young dropouts, most of whom leave school several years before reaching the legal minimum age. As Klasen (2001) shows, more than 10 per cent of the Southern European population (respectively 11 per cent in Greece and in Portugal, and 17 per cent in Spain) is in this position, as opposed to just 3 per cent in Sweden. Moreover, the proportion of the population not attending school at the age of 17 is respectively, 44 per cent in Greece, 27 per cent in Portugal and 25 per cent in Spain. Klasen explains that ‘educational systems that fail a proportion of their students not only lead to social exclusion through denying them this basic right of citizenship in sufficient quality, but also through fostering social exclusion as adults’ (2001, 435).

This sociocultural reproduction of under-educated young people, socialized in the same context of lifestyle and consumption expectations as their higher-educated peers in other industrialized countries, but with modest personal resources, that is, with a lack of professional experience and a limited social capital, leads to severe tensions between means and aspirations (Spanò, 2001). As observed previously, this phenomenon is comparable to the qualification and employment problems experienced by migrant youngsters.
in Northern European metropolises, but is typically Southern in affecting large sectors of the labour class population, irrespective of race.

In some cases and contexts, young school dropouts end up becoming involved in illegal activity, such as drug dealing and theft. Looking at some relevant data regarding Naples: according to the Ministry of Justice, two-thirds of young people convicted by the juvenile magistrates of Naples are of Italian nationality, and come from families in which one or more members (generally the father or the brother) already have a criminal record. Of these young offenders, 58 per cent did not complete their compulsory education and 51 per cent come from families with five or more members, which in Southern Italy bear the highest risk of poverty (one in three large families is poor) (Ministero della Giustizia, 2001).

In the first half of the 1990s, there was an increase in the negative consequences of a low schooling level among women in Southern Europe. Despite a general increase in female integration into labour markets, there is evidence as compared with other countries, of a much greater polarization in female employment rates between those with high, and those with low, levels of education. This gap exceeds 30 per cent in Italy and in Spain, while skilled work is more evenly distributed across genders in Northern European countries. The gap becomes even higher (48 per cent in Italy and 39 per cent in Spain) if the presence of preschool children in the household is taken into account, in addition to the level of education attained (Cantillon et al., 2001).

Local networks Possibly the most typical of all features of social exclusion/inclusion dynamics in Southern European societies is the survival of various types of network: family, kinship and neighbourhood relationships. These, it should be said, are practically non-existent today among the ‘national’ populations in urban Northern Europe, but remain significantly present among its migrant populations (Hillmann, 1996).

There are many dimensions to these networks. Kinship solidarity is a positive feature of the human race, and its revival would certainly be welcomed in Northern Europe. Too often, however, this solidarity is lauded as an excuse by policymakers to postpone the implementation of basic social protection rights or social services. In addition, these networks may lead to a variety of ‘lock-in’ situations. First, networks involving kin do not generally provide innovative ideas for tackling unemployment and income severance problems. Second, within the networks, feelings of self-sufficiency may become self-perpetuating, leading to minimal demands on outside institutions or to knitting new relations with other network organizations. As a consequence, few innovative attitudes in educational and labour market behaviour are acquired.

In addition, the classical political networks seem to have lost their impact (Cavalli and de Lillo 1993). Evidently, the deep crisis of the traditional ‘clientelist’ political parties has created a vacuum that has yet to be filled by other organizational arrangements, with the possible exception of the family. Recent evidence suggests that the labour market is ruled by competition over particularly scarce resources. Beyond the family and peer groups, network relations are poor in providing access to information about the availability of work, or any other type of job opportunities, for the most precarious groups in the Southern urban labour markets.

Neighbourhood effect In most poor neighbourhoods in Southern European cities, the exclusion of young people from the labour market, arising not only from difficulties in
education and initial experiences of failure, but also perhaps from a disadvantaged family background, could have very similar consequences (access to work and income, integration or exclusion from sociocultural and sociopolitical networks) to those experienced by youngsters in other European cities.

Generally speaking in Southern cities, rather than any striking neighbourhood concentration of low-income families or other vulnerable groups, there is a general distribution of ‘scattered areas’, in which trouble spots and ghetto risks may occur more frequently. In so far as they exist, these deprived areas are situated as a rule, either in the historical central neighbourhoods, or in the more contemporary suburban social housing estates, which are often lacking in facilities.

Also, the processes of urban segregation based on ethnic characteristics, which operate in cities such as Brussels or Amsterdam (Musterd and Murie, 2002), are not so apparent in Madrid, Barcelona, Naples or Palermo. The low incidence of migrants relative to the resident population (about 5–10 per cent in the large Southern cities as opposed to much higher percentages in other European cities), and the recent and fragmented nature of immigration (involving a wide range of nationalities and ‘entry routes’), do not give rise to highly segregated areas, even though forms of racism, housing problems and discrimination in access to welfare services occur frequently.

Another important difference, North–South, is found in housing conditions and the high incidence of owner occupation in Southern European poor urban areas (85 per cent in Spain and 70 per cent in Italy according to the last Population Census); owner occupation, often based on self-built constructions, makes low-income families less willing to abandon their residential area, and more keen to maintain a positive image of their neighbourhood to prevent depreciation in house value.

All in all, in Southern European cities, the concentration of low-income families in the under-serviced areas of the city centre or in the suburban areas lacking public facilities, has not resulted in the creation of ‘ghetto-like’ neighbourhoods with concentrations of the socially excluded and the poor, and with which they become identified. From this point of view, the comparison that we might reasonably draw with forms of urban poverty in the US inner cities, is with the Hispanic population; family networks play a similar role and again there is a high diffusion of odd jobs among the adult members, who are then not totally excluded from the labour market (Moore and Pinderhughes, 1993).

Rather than a perception of ‘concentration effects’ (see, e.g., Wilson, 1987) a better description of the situation of most urban Southern European poor neighbourhoods might be in terms of ‘integration in precariousness’. These poor areas are not characterized by a high concentration of individuals or families surviving outside the formal labour market, or by the collapse of personal social networks leading to occupational opportunities. In a situation of ‘integration in precariousness’, family members are able to solve their problems on a daily basis, through a combination of kinship and family support and odd jobs (Vicari, 2001, p. 105).

Methodological consequences of the Southern critique

Most of the ‘Southern corrigenda’ of the ‘Northern reading’ of social exclusion mechanisms in cities and neighbourhoods are quite appropriate. Methodologically speaking however, the ‘Southern factors’ are not necessarily ‘new’ explanations; rather, their inclusion into the explanatory framework demands a re-equilibration of exclusion dynamics across
various spatial and institutional scales. We address this in the next section, and in the final section we dwell briefly on the policy analysis consequences of this analytical repositioning.

A multi-dimensional methodology for studying social exclusion in metropolitan areas
Discussion on a future research methodology for the study of social exclusion within metropolitan areas, and especially in urban neighbourhoods, hints at the need to combine several levels of analysis, with types of social exclusion process as the most abstract categories, and neighbourhood (community) features as the most concrete (Figure 8.1). In fact, the neighbourhood can be considered as the scale at which institutional dynamics and agency, taking place within a diversity of geographical ambiëts, crystallize.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential exclusion processes</th>
<th>Mechanisms of exclusion</th>
<th>Articulations between mechanisms (illustrations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour market</td>
<td>– Racial and gender selection</td>
<td>Access of low-skilled migrant youngsters to underpaid informal economy only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Diplomas and certificates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Segmentation in sectors and job categories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational system</td>
<td>– Selection of pupils/students</td>
<td>No or only occasional access to social security benefits for youngsters belonging to large families of long-term unstably employed or disconnected from inclusive networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Particular school culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Financial selection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security system</td>
<td>– Regular job history required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Nationality criteria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Sectorally organized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International migration</td>
<td>– Ethnic differentiation as a ‘smartcard’ to access various spheres in society</td>
<td>Only clients of local politicians find rapid access to social housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Limitation of labour market, residence and political rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social networks</td>
<td>– Affinity (culture, profession …) as adhesion factor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Strong detachment between networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing market</td>
<td>– Housing and land price</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Zoning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Transportation mode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political system</td>
<td>– Party membership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Institutional and personal proximity to leading politicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.1 Social exclusion mechanisms: the articulation of ‘abstract’ categories of exclusion
Levels of analysis

In almost all the contemporary studies reviewed here – with the exception of the new urban poverty literature – exclusion leading to poverty and socioeconomic deprivation is seen as the combined outcome of several processes. Most of these processes can be identified as abstract categories of exclusion – see Figure 8.1 for a tentative classification.

But of course, if these explanatory categories are not well defined, any articulations between processes are easily misunderstood. For example, myopically examining young school dropouts who subsequently find no job, and making this analysis in a geographical area where these youngsters are statistically over-represented, may lead to the conclusion that they have no job because they had no education and failed the necessary vocational training. But looking a bit further at articulation with other explanations, preferably in a concrete time, society and space setting, one will probably soon observe that these young people come from families with perpetual income problems, who lack access to professional networks, have no high-school culture, and are located in a neighbourhood that is underprovided with physical and institutional capital and/or in a city in the turmoil of economic restructuring. To avoid the non-recognition of certain processes because they are not very active in certain situations, or because their articulation can only be recognized through a more structural analysis, it is methodologically strategic to consider all potential exclusion/integration processes as a first stage of the analysis, and to look at their concrete articulations and local imprints in a second stage.

A non-exhaustive list of ‘abstract’ potential exclusion processes can be found in Table 8.1. Since most agents in society are related to the various processes, by being (more or less) ‘in’ or ‘out’ of them, most systems in society are potential and effective ‘includers’ or ‘excluders’, and it is important to discern the mechanisms of exclusion (integration) that are active (Moulaert, Delladetsima and Leontidou, 1994). The table illustrates how articulations between various exclusion dynamics underlie typical multi-dimensional exclusion processes. The combination of several logics of exclusion already provides a more realistic view of how exclusion works (see Moulaert et al., 2003, Chapter 4). For example, long-term beneficiaries of minimum replacement income should be prime candidates for access to social housing. But in reality, social protection systems provide quite different opportunities depending on country, region or city. This will affect an individual’s potential to enter the social housing market, as will belonging to social networks and political ‘clientelist’ service networks. In addition, in several (national, local) social housing systems, nationality is either a formal or informal criterion for access to social housing (Edgar, Doherty and Meert, 2002).

Institutional and spatial scales

Of course, combining the logics of ‘abstract’ processes of exclusion does not provide the whole picture of methodology in social exclusion research. Again, from the survey of the literature we learn that:

- Exclusion processes interact with, and often reinforce, each other. But to understand the particular nature of group or individual exclusion, these articulations must be studied empirically as well.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Title of research project</th>
<th>Keywords (reduced list)</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>URSPIC</td>
<td>Urban Redevelopment and Social Polarisation in the City</td>
<td>Large urban redevelopment projects, social exclusion, global economic processes, global–local interaction</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ifresi.univlille1.fr/SITE/URSPIC/Index.htm">http://www.ifresi.univlille1.fr/SITE/URSPIC/Index.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELSES</td>
<td>Evaluation of Local Socio-Economic Strategies in Disadvantaged Urban Areas</td>
<td>Local economic development, urban regeneration areas, urban policy, employment, social exclusion, institutional context, organizational structures, indicators and data</td>
<td><a href="http://www.elses.ils.nrw.de/">http://www.elses.ils.nrw.de/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URBEX</td>
<td>The Spatial Dimensions of Urban Social Exclusion and Integration: A European Comparison</td>
<td>Spatial segregation, social exclusion, economic restructuring, community, policy impact, comparative, ethnic minorities</td>
<td><a href="http://www2.fmg.uva.nl/urbex/">http://www2.fmg.uva.nl/urbex/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETWIXT</td>
<td>Between Integration and Exclusion: A Comparative Study in Local Dynamics of Precarity and Resistance to Exclusion in Urban Contexts</td>
<td>Precarious households and individuals, access to resources, social exclusion processes, policy, households</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGINE</td>
<td>Economic Growth and Innovation in Multicultural Environments</td>
<td>Cultural diversity, cities, growth, innovation, culture, trust, social capital, knowledge spillovers, governance, social exclusion</td>
<td><a href="http://siti.feem.it/engine/index.html">http://siti.feem.it/engine/index.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINGOCOM</td>
<td>Social Innovation, Governance and Community Building</td>
<td>Social innovation, local development, community development, governance, civil society, public sector, private sector, social economy, social relations, human needs, policy</td>
<td><a href="http://users.skynet.be/frank.moulaert/singocom/">http://users.skynet.be/frank.moulaert/singocom/</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are significant differences among institutional systems. These systems are territorially bound (nation, region, city . . .). The differences can only be methodologically apprehended through institutional analysis. Institutional analysis is appropriate in evaluating not only welfare systems or labour market regulations for example, but also informal network dynamics.

The analysis of ‘place’ then becomes the ultimate challenge for the social exclusion analyst. Place as ‘social space’ crystallizes the particularity of exclusion processes, social welfare regimes, local policy, and so on, but also of local demography, network dynamics, school and labour market dynamics. Place becomes a multidimensional exclusion and integration process by itself: as a vortex of social forces, it rejects or accepts, integrates or repulses, deteriorates or upgrades its inhabitants, and so on (Madanipour et al., 1998; Moulaert et al., 2003).

Table 8.1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Title of research project</th>
<th>Keywords (reduced list)</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Life in a World of Limitations</td>
<td>employment, education, social welfare, Islamophobia, institutional context, political context, labour market, social capital, methodology, event histories, survey, database</td>
<td>KATARSIS Growing Inequality and Social Innovation: Alternative Knowledge and Practice in Overcoming Social Exclusion in Europe</td>
<td>Inequality, social exclusion, responses to exclusion, social innovation, cities, urban, knowledge, resources, individual level, collective level, creativity, agency, empowerment, participation, labour market, social economy, education and training, housing, neighbourhood, health, environment, governance, democracy, methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KATARSIS</td>
<td>Growing Inequality and Social Innovation: Alternative Knowledge and Practice in Overcoming Social Exclusion in Europe</td>
<td>Inequality, social exclusion, responses to exclusion, social innovation, cities, urban, knowledge, resources, individual level, collective level, creativity, agency, empowerment, participation, labour market, social economy, education and training, housing, neighbourhood, health, environment, governance, democracy, methodology</td>
<td><a href="http://katarsis.ncl.ac.uk/">http://katarsis.ncl.ac.uk/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMO-LOGOS</td>
<td>Development Models and Logics of Socioeconomic Organization in Space</td>
<td>Socioeconomic development, development paths, development models, comparative, historical, spatial analysis, multidimensional analysis, theories, institutionalism, institutional dynamics, regions, cities, capital accumulation, sociocultural dynamics, state regulation, policy, policy analysis, cohesion policy</td>
<td><a href="http://demologos.ncl.ac.uk/">http://demologos.ncl.ac.uk/</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** In Europe, starting in 1996, the European Commission’s Research Directorate has launched a number of calls for research on social exclusion and inclusion processes and agency. This table provides the titles, keywords and websites of the projects that show the strongest affinity to the topics and approaches addressed in this chapter.

- There are significant differences among institutional systems. These systems are territorially bound (nation, region, city . . .). The differences can only be methodologically apprehended through institutional analysis. Institutional analysis is appropriate in evaluating not only welfare systems or labour market regulations for example, but also informal network dynamics.
- The analysis of ‘place’ then becomes the ultimate challenge for the social exclusion analyst. Place as ‘social space’ crystallizes the particularity of exclusion processes, social welfare regimes, local policy, and so on, but also of local demography, network dynamics, school and labour market dynamics. Place becomes a multidimensional exclusion and integration process by itself: as a vortex of social forces, it rejects or accepts, integrates or repulses, deteriorates or upgrades its inhabitants, and so on (Madanipour et al., 1998; Moulaert et al., 2003).
Individual or community development trajectories

In the social science literature on exclusion, a large part of the work is based on the study of personal or family histories and trajectories. There have always been social situations where individuals, because of various existential accidents, have been less able to provide for themselves. But when it comes to analysing the basic issue or condition of poverty – that is, who are poor, why they are poor and where they live – the simple recourse to individual trajectories is not sufficient and will not lead to a proper identification of typologies and processes. This is especially the case when the research focus is on a certain stage in an exclusion process, that is, at a point where a biographical breakdown has already been made, thus hiding significant parts of the overall story.

Individual trajectories are studied either in a statistical, or an anthropological way, or by a combination of both. This combination is essential: by looking at the anthropological content, the statistics acquire a human perspective, which is needed to draw conclusions that are policy-relevant. But this statistical–anthropological synthesis is not sufficient to close the circle of social exclusion/integration research methodology. Individuals and groups are part of a society, a community and a place. To understand personal and group trajectories, they should be studied in conjunction with society and community development trajectories. Welfare regimes, demography, labour markets, educational systems, networks, and so on, fall within the scope of this ambition and should be studied in a ‘path-dependent’ way.

The future design of a research methodology for the study of social exclusion in urban settings will need to integrate better the study of groups and individuals with the study of society and community development. To accomplish this, it will be necessary to combine various spatial and institutional scales with several levels of abstraction. But before continuing on the future of urban research methodology, let us first examine the evolution of urban policy, and how it has been linked to urban research.

The role of policy and strategy research

The evolution of research on exclusion and poverty, from the measurement of types, as well as factors of poverty and deprivation, to the multi-dimensional, multi-level and multi-scalar analysis of exclusion processes, implies an inherent evolution in the attitude of social policy towards combating poverty, and in the links between research and policy. Starting some 20 years ago within social science in Europe, there has been an evolution from a sectoral approach (social, economic, cultural, housing, environmental etc. policy) to an integrated approach to urban policy. During the 1990s, this was reflected in the urban policy of several European cities, which showed a strong interest in integrated approaches (area-based urban development, integrated area development (IAD)) (Moulaert et al., 2000, Chapter 3). However, in contemporary urban policy practice, new urban policy – neoliberal urbanism – dominates, influenced by neoliberal economics and justified by neoliberal discourse (Broomhill, 2001; Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2005).

Towards integrated urban policy in Europe (1990s) . . .

Since the EU Poverty 3 programme (end of the 1980s, early 1990s), social policy to combat poverty has evolved from *kurieren am Symptom* (cure the symptoms) only – by providing income compensations and social services to the less well off – to a more active social policy that stimulates vocational training, networking among peers, local development strategies
in fragile neighbourhoods and localities. At the urban level this policy approach is reflected in multi-agent, multi-agenda and multi-level governance approaches to neighbourhood and city development. The approach is known in policy practice as area-based and place-based development (Madanipour et al., 1998; Gillen, 2004), integrated area development (IAD) (Moulaert et al., 2000) and multi-dimensional strategic planning with a strong focus on the local area (Albrechts, 2004). Of all these approaches, IAD is the most concerned with overcoming policy fragmentation from a social inclusion point of view.

IAD by-passes the simple logic of integration of various policy domains and logics, and combines them into one: it structures them around one single logic, that is, that of social innovation based on basic needs satisfaction and innovation in local social relations (neighbourhood governance) (Moulaert, Delvainquière and Delladetsima, 1997).

According to the IAD rationale, disintegrating forces in local economy and society processes, and incoherence among strategy approaches, could be overcome by putting the needs and the sociopolitical organization of deprived or excluded groups at the heart of local redevelopment strategies (Jacquier, 1990; Favreau and Lévesque, 1999; Fontan, Klein and Lévesque, 2003; Cersosimo and Wolleb, 2006). The philosophy of the IAD model is based on the satisfaction of basic needs. This satisfaction is achieved by the combination of several processes: the revealing of needs by grassroots movements and through institutional dynamics, the integration of deprived groups into the labour market and into local production systems (construction of housing, ecological production activities, urban infrastructure development, social services, SMEs for manufacturing and trade), and training, which would provide access to participation in the labour market. Institutional dynamics play a predominant role in the process of empowerment that should lead to economic proactivity. Institutional dynamics nourish in a permanent way both local democracy and relationships with local authorities and other private and public partners situated outside the locality, but participating in local development. The local community should repossess its own governance, and thus make its own movements central to the renaissance process at the heart of urban social policy (Martens, 1996). Relatively successful policy experiences have been analysed in Antwerp (Christiaens, Moulaert and Bosmans, 2007), Bilbao (Rodriguez and Martinez, 2003) and Hamburg (Lawaetzstiftung, 2006).

In Southern Italy however, integrated programmes for urban development tend to be more sporadic, with limited responses to public protests and criticism of the urban renewal process, and no conscious strategy to promote the participation of residents. There was no genuine intention to inform and consult with citizens and local groups in advance, in order to promote participation in the design and management of interventions and propose alternative measures. The main reaction to this exclusion from the decision-making process seems to be one of frustration, giving rise to social protest and conflict. Moreover, when employment is the overriding concern, participation in housing improvement schemes may not be a priority, and therefore not productive, particularly for people directly affected by long-term unemployment who cannot afford them anyway. Reliance on IAD schemes could have offered a solution, but these are non-existent at the moment.

... Overruled by (neoliberal) new urban policy
But IAD has been short-lived, or became re-invented as social policy only (such as in neighbourhood contract policy as fostered by EU Urban Programmes, successfully
applied in the Brussels and Rome agglomerations among others municipalities). As pointed out previously, the liberal makeover in economic policy (new economic policy) has also affected urban policy. Neoliberal urban policy today is usually labelled new urban policy or new urbanism.

New economic policy is the policy platform of conservative liberalism. Contrary to what its ideology pertains to, conservative liberalism has always maintained a very special and intimate relationship with state intervention. It seeks to reorient state intervention away from monopoly market regulation and towards a marshalling of state resources into the social, physical and geographical infra- and superstructures that support, finance, subsidize or otherwise promote new forms of capital accumulation, by providing the relatively fixed territorial structures that permit the accelerated circulation of capital, and the relatively unhindered operation of market forces. At the same time, the state withdraws to a greater or lesser extent, from socially inclusive blanket distribution-based policies and from Keynesian demand-led interventions, and replaces them with spatially targeted social policies and indirect promotion of entrepreneurship, particularly via selective deregulation, the stripping away of red tape and the investment in infrastructure for business.

One of the key components of the new mode of socioeconomic policy in cities has been a gradual shift away from distributive policies, welfare considerations and direct service provision towards more developmental market-oriented and market-dependent approaches aimed at pursuing economic promotion and competitive restructuring. In most cities, urban revitalization is presented as an opportunity to change economic sectoral hierarchies and functions within the urban region, creating new jobs and strengthening the city’s position in the urban division of labour. In this way, the search for growth turns urban renewal into a mediated objective, a necessary precondition for economic regeneration. Although this general trend takes quite distinct forms in different cities, project-based urban interventions generally involve critical changes in priorities and the ascent of a more assertive, dynamic and entrepreneurial style of urban governance. Planners and local authorities adopt a more proactive and entrepreneurial approach, aimed at identifying market opportunities and assisting private investors to take advantage of them. To enact such an approach, large-scale urban development projects (UDPs) are privileged; they are elected as the saviours of rundown neighbourhoods, creators of new jobs and wealth, thus indirectly providing the necessary social services and welfare.

However, the expected equilibrating impact of new urban policy and UDPs has not materialized. In many cases, targeted neighbourhoods have benefited from UDPs in terms of economic growth, infrastructure renewal and improved visibility in national and international circles; but anticipated opportunities for work, housing and social services for the (original) inhabitants of these neighbourhoods have only rarely materialized and, in many cases, because of peaking land and real estate prices in the renovated neighbourhoods, inhabitants were forced to move to cheaper housing estates (Moulaert et al., 2003).

In Southern European cities, dividing lines between more neoliberal and more socially integrated area-based urban policy approaches are harder to draw. Urban policies in Southern Italy, for example, have traditionally been characterized by fragmented, non-coordinated and voluntary actions. For a long time, they have mainly been oriented to improving housing conditions, without paying attention to the urban externalities linked to social exclusion in more deprived neighbourhoods. Delays caused by the slow working
of the municipal ‘machine’ were particularly evident, but were also due to economic, social and infrastructure problems, and to the absence of a national policy defending an articulated strategy of intervention in deprived or forgotten areas, which would support and coordinate local initiatives. Furthermore, Southern European cities have suffered from the lack of a real local policy of citizen participation. They are faced with a patchwork of initiatives and actors that have produced multiple forms of participation in different sectors but have lacked overall coordination. However, in spite of these problems, Southern European cities can offer a myriad of remarkably positive experiences; these are mainly the achievements of volunteer associations, public agencies and various organizations such as trade unions, catholic groups of volunteers or groups of organized recipients of unemployment or minimum income (Lepore, 1989; Laino, 1999; SINGOCOM).

**Links between research and policy**
From this short evolution in policy, we have learned that research (methodology) has had an impact both on policy views and on actual policy. This is particularly evident in the 1990s when integration of sectoral policies was on the rise, and materialized in various area-based or multi-scalar-level policy models.

By stressing the multi-dimensional and multi-scalar dynamics of exclusion processes, policy discussions have been opened for interventions in various exclusion/integration processes at a number of spatial levels. In this way, social exclusion research has contributed to putting local development, vocational training, adapted education, specific services to lone parents and so on, on the policy agenda, and has contributed to better linkages between policy domains, or even to an integration between them, to achieve a multi-dimensional city development agenda.

However, as we saw, the euphoria of the integrated approach was short-lived. Not only did it come through in a just few cities, and to different degrees, but it also gradually had to give way to the neoliberal credo and the new urban policy. This shows us the fragility of the link between urban (policy) research and urban policy. A number of questions arise in this context. Do contemporary social scientists eat too often from the hand of their ‘bread lords’ (public agencies, private sponsors) and fall easily into the trap of confusing grounded analysis with the abiding dominant discourse and policy views? Or are social scientists involved in permanent power testing with policymakers and economic as well political stakeholders, whose interests serve as cyclical filters for the policy feasibility of urban research? These are important questions, and the analytical tools needed to answer them may not yet be available.

**Conclusion: brooding about the future of urban policy analysis**
In this chapter we have examined various aspects of research methodology in the study of social exclusion in urban Europe, and policies aimed at overcoming it. We focused particularly on Southern European cities (stressing Naples) and their neighbourhoods.

From our research we learn that for a long time in modern history, Southern European cities, such as Naples, have been affected by endemic and often acute material poverty, by precarious labour market conditions and a lack of essential welfare services. Using Ada Becchi’s terms (1989), we need to be very cautious in considering poverty and precariousness as expressions of, for example, a ‘Neapolitan model of survival’. This ‘model’ is based on an unbalanced combination of resources of a purely redistributive nature, such
as the recycling of second-hand or stolen goods, welfare transfers and the support from kinship networks. Such a representation often gives a misleading description of impoverishment trajectories that contain many anachronistic elements hardly useful in understanding the development of social exclusion, in determining its individual or area-based features and in explaining the role of large-scale changes in the metropolitan economy and its labour markets. This example stresses the need for improvement of the methodological approach, to enable the working out of a balanced combination between ‘historical’ and ‘new’, ‘structural and ‘contingent’, ‘institutional’ and ‘behaviour-based’.

First is the importance of abstract analysis preceding (new) empirical research. Inspired by a wide range of theoretical contributions, distinctions between types of exclusion processes can already be made at the abstract level. However, as illustrated in Figure 8.2, a higher level of insight can be acquired by considering concrete articulations between (abstract) ‘logics of exclusion’. In most cases, as the concrete is to a large extent an outcome of social and individual development trajectories, this needs a historical perspective.

Second is the importance of involving various spatial and institutional scales in the analysis. In this way, we can reveal the material nature of exclusion dynamics and the features of the concrete condition of groups and individuals in specific space–time conjunctures. However, these empirical dimensions can never substitute for theoretical instructions that reflect ‘systematic insights from past research’.

Third, and given the focus of the analysis, neighbourhood as ‘urban place’ is singled out as the local crystallization of exclusion/inclusion processes in their different dimensions. Here, labour market, income generation, education and training, peer networks, local culture and so on, make themselves known in existentially tangible terms, within the context of real-life local communities, disrupted as they may be (Fisher, Sonn and Bishop, 2002).

Fourth, the relationship between social policy and research must be reconsidered. Social exclusion research has recently enlightened new avenues for social policy. And social science research has become involved in policy evaluation, especially with respect to labour market and social welfare measures (Ferrera, 2005; Saraceno and Brandolini, 2006). However, over the last decade, urban policy in Europe has subjugated social development agendas to economic and physical renewal approaches. In the 1990s, the lauded area-based community development and IAD models had been applied relatively successfully (Laville, 1998; Madanipour et al., 1998; Moulaert et al., 2002; Fontan et al., 2003). Today they are in retreat, under pressure from rediscovered real-estate- and free-market-led urban development policy. Contrary to the area-based policy models, this new urban policy approach is not based on carefully led research but on a discourse that fits the neoliberal revival.

Between expensive neoliberal policy proposals and actions for urban regeneration, and social science research showing that inequality grows when these are enacted, the urban social exclusion/inclusion community is faced with a great dilemma. On the one hand, it has discovered that integrated urban policy successfully targets different urban policy objectives (growth, diversity, employment, physical upgrading, cultural emancipation, social and political inclusion); but on the other hand, this policy model is losing ground in favour of the new urban policy. To overcome this dilemma, the research community should probably enter into more public debates, disseminate the results of its urban policy views more effectively to the public and to policymakers, and at the same time, give more room to the views and experiences of the public and policymakers within their analysis.
Methodologically speaking, this means a return to a holistic-pragmatic stance in social science.5

Notes
1. Between December 1998 and 31 December 2000, Italy experienced a brief experimental period of RMI (Reddito Minimo d’Inserimento or Minimum Welfare Income). Overall, 35,000 families were involved, of whom 90 per cent were migrants from 24 municipalities in the South (Mezzogiorno). See Baldini and Bosi (2002); Sacchi (2005).
2. See URSPIC (Urban Redevelopment and Social Polarisation in the City) website http://www.ifresi.univlille1.fr/SITE/URSPIC/Index.htm.
3. Within the EU at present, only Italy and Greece do not have such a scheme as a part of institutionally acknowledged social rights. In Spain, the system is still regulated at the regional level and in Portugal, it is a very recent addition to the system of social protection. See Saraceno (2002b).
4. Vulnerable groups, living in neighbourhoods where almost one out of two residents is poor: see Wilson (1987; 1996); Jargovskys (1996).
5. Moulaert and Nussbaumer (2005), searching for the most appropriate analytical approach to the social economy, argue that the aforementioned ambitions of social science research will best be achieved when pursued in the context of a holistic methodology. In fact, the latter manages fairly well to build a bridge between the structural patterns and specificity of particular cases, between theory building and outlier analysis, between path-dependency and contemporary reflections, between institutions and agency as well as between analysis and policy orientation. It would be worthwhile to examine the potential of holistic methodology for analysing exclusion–inclusion processes and increasing the policy relevance of research in this field.

References


Further reading


9 Crime and urban living: conditions, theory and policy options
H.S. Geyer and B.A. Portnov

Introduction
One of the contradictions of our urban society is that people have to live together to reap the benefits of agglomeration, commonly measured by access to diverse employment, cultural and educational opportunities. However, living together in a society where the incomes and ethnic backgrounds of people differ substantially, invariably causes tension and anxiety amongst inhabitants. As urban communities grow, positive externalities of urban agglomeration tend to increase, but, at the same time, negative externalities of urban living also intensify. Although crime and violence do not occur in the same degree throughout all cities and are not related directly to urban size, even in economically advanced societies, violence and crime have become endemic. Also, the origin and target areas differ from case to case.

While urban statistics of homicides, assault, rape and abuse in the developed world fluctuate over time, some showing short-term downward, others upward trends, violent crime in urban areas seems to be a steadily growing phenomenon worldwide (O’Connor, 2006). Experience has shown that containing it is not easy. In fact, one of the biggest challenges of our time is not only finding ways of reducing crime and uncivil behaviour between inhabitants of cities but to contain and if possible reduce the forms of excessive violence that have become part of the urban scene today.

Every day, the average First World citizen gets bombarded by news of death and destruction in their own cities:

Nine out of ten of the most criminal ethnic groups in Sweden come from Muslim countries such as Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Malmö, Sweden, is set to become the first Scandinavian city with a Muslim majority within a decade or two. It has nine times as many reported robberies per capita as Copenhagen, Denmark. The number of rape charges in Sweden has quadrupled in just above 20 years. Rape cases involving children under the age of 15 are six times as common today as they were a generation ago. Most other kinds of violent crime have rapidly increased, too. Instability is spreading to most urban and suburban areas. (The Brussels Journal, 28 March 2006)

The U.S. Justice Department reported on Sept. 25, 2005 that there were 5,182,670 violent crimes in the United States in 2004. There were 21.4 victims for every 1,000 people aged 12 and older, which amounts to about one violent crime victim for every 47 U.S. citizens. Crime rate remains at 2003 level, study says. (The Washington Post, 26 September 2005)

According to figures released by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), murder increased by 2.1 percent across the United States during the first six months of 2005, compared with the same period of 2004. A total of 4,080 murders were reported in cities with more than 10,000 people, while homicides were up 13 percent in cities with a population of 10,000 or less. Murder rate in small cities jumps 13 per cent. (USA Today, 20 December 2005)
Camden in New Jersey has become the most dangerous city in the United States, with its homicide rate more than ten times the national average and robbery rate, more than seven times the national average. Camden, N.J., ranked most dangerous U.S. city. (The Washington Post, 22 November 2005)

Spain experienced its worst terrorist attacks yet, days before its presidential election in 2004.

Towards the end of 2005 France experienced its second serious spell of violence since the student-labour riots of 1968.

Although England had to endure terrorist attacks from the Irish Republican Army in the past, and uprisings occurred amongst Asian youths in Leeds a few years ago, its first terrorist attacks in which a significant number of civilians had died, occurred in July, 2005.

Sensational? Perhaps . . . Dark, certainly, but whether we like it or not, these statistics have become part of our daily information smörgåsbord. That is what we see and hear every day and that is what we need to digest. And if we are lucky we only have to deal with crime levels in the First World, which are still relatively low compared with parts of the developing world where violent crime has been taking on mind-boggling proportions. The Middle East, Africa, Asia, South and Central America, and parts of Central and Eastern Europe have all been featuring strongly in this area in recent years, to such an extent that some of the countries in these regions could indeed be called nations that are at war with themselves. Although scenes of atrocities on both sides of the ethnic divide in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia are still vivid memories, countries that have recently been in the news for similar atrocities include Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, the DR Congo, Rwanda, Liberia, Burundi, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Venezuela and Bolivia, to name but a few. The list goes on and on. Scenes of the most shocking forms of disregard for human life (as is shown in Figure 9.1) have sadly become the order of the day in certain countries. Organized crime and violence in some countries have been rising to the level of genocide and ethnic cleansing, resulting in more than 20 million refugees and other displaced persons worldwide today (UNHCR, 2006).

Even South Africa, a nation that is generally regarded by the uninformed as relatively peaceful in African terms and is seen to have largely overcome its historical social divisions, had, according to a CNN survey, a crime level 54 times higher than England in 2002. Since then the crime rate has increased in many respects. Over the past three years between 21 000 and 26 000 homicides have occurred annually, while over the past year 53 000 rapes, 260 000 grievous assaults and 1.9 million incidents of robbery, hijacking and malicious damage of property have been recorded. The number of fatalities is roughly as high as the average number of people killed in the United States per year (O’Connor, 2006), a country with a population of almost six times the size of South Africa. Taking into consideration that the percentage of unreported crimes is much higher in countries such as South Africa than in First World countries, as shocking as they already are, the statistics still do not accurately reflect the true reality.

Crimes that used to be less violent are now turning more violent. An example is house-breaking in South Africa. Previously, burglars tended to break into houses when the inhabitants were absent. Such incidents rarely turned violent except in some cases when burglars happened to be caught red-handed. Because of the high crime levels generally, steps have been taken by homeowners to increase the security of their homes, making it more difficult for burglars to access their targets. Through time and method displacement (Saville, 1998), burglars have changed their tactics. They now tend to lie in wait for homeowners outside...
the premises after an evening out. Taking them hostage at the garden gate they force them by gunpoint to deactivate their security systems and open their safety boxes. Otherwise, homes are entered heavily armed and in numbers while inhabitants are asleep. Burglars do not bother to disguise themselves any longer. Victims are simply killed afterwards as a ‘protective measure’ to prevent robbers from being identified. Carjackings have also become a deadly experience for the same reasons. As a result, crimes that used to be regarded as ‘petty’ have since become violent, often taking on typical forms of urban terrorism.

Motives for criminal acts
An early contribution to the study of crime in urban areas came from Shaw and McKay’s (1942) analysis of crime rates in major American cities. After observing that juvenile delinquency persisted in certain urban areas even after their population changed, Shaw and McKay concluded that the following urban conditions are concomitant with high crime rates: obsolete housing, population change, concentration of minorities, poverty and, most notably, a lack of social control, attributed to a collapse of institutional and community-based networks in physically and socially deteriorated environments. Several follow-up studies also reported the persistence of high crime rates in urban slum areas (Schuessler, 1962; Quinney, 1966; Curtis, 1974; Martin, 2002; Ceccato, Haining and Signoretta, 2002).

Whereas Shaw and McKay (1942) and subsequent studies focused mainly on delinquency rates, contemporary criminological literature distinguishes between criminal involvement and criminal events. Criminal involvement refers to the process through which individuals become involved in crime-related activity. Concurrently, criminal events refer to the commission of a specific type of crime and to physical and socioeconomic conditions affecting it (Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Hirschi, 1986).

Classical criminological theories deal primarily with factors and forces leading to criminal involvement. Since the early 1970s, however, criminologists have devoted considerable
attention to criminal events, attempting to explain the choice of criminal targets and crimi-

nal behaviour in general through better understanding of the physical, organizational and
social environments that make crime possible (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993;

Poverty has always been recognized as an important reason for the occurrence of urban
crime, unrest and violence. Despite the fact that an urban bias in capital investment has
been a longstanding tradition in countries all over the world (Lipton, 1977), poverty and
poor living conditions have been and will remain a significant phenomenon in many urban
areas. This especially applies to urbanization in the developing world. Part of the problem
in developing countries lies in the inability of a large segment of migrants to urban areas
to compete successfully for employment under competitive urban employment condi-
tions. Those who migrate from deep rural areas (as large proportions in developing coun-
tries often do) are often unskilled, semi-skilled at best, and are unable to find employment
immediately, let alone decent shelter. This is not a recent phenomenon. It is a natural
process in the developing world that has repeated itself throughout the ages. To accuse
well-established, comparatively financially better-off urban communities and urban gov-
ernments of being guilty of engineering economic and social inequality, while it is more
caused by continuous streams of uncompetitive migrants than any other factor, seems
unfair. This is no reason for complacency, nor does it mean that economic inequality
should be accepted as a given. However, urban poverty has been and remains one of the
principle sources of crime and violence in urban societies all over the world.

Cultural and religious di-

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erences have also always played an important role in urban
tension, violence and crime. Differences in the way in which people live, at home and in
the surrounding area, determine how other people will perceive them. Whatever the cause,
crime and violence are adversely affecting living conditions of countless innocent people
in urban areas on a daily basis and it is the duty of every person to try and find answers
to reduce or eliminate crime and violence. Altruism, the need for one person to show love
and affection towards another to make urban society work (Miller, 1991) is an obviously
lacking ingredient on the part of those who participate in destabilizing activities.

Historically, race (which often personifies culture and religion) has played and is still
playing a major part in the incitement of violence and hate crimes all over the world, some-
times by majorities against minorities and vice versa. Hate crimes falling into these cat-
egories are usually perpetrated by individuals against individuals but they are also usually
individualized manifestations of one or other form of mass psychosis – actions of members
of particular groups in a society who regard members of another group as a threat. More
often than not these acts are an indication of the presence of potentially ‘hard’ community
boundaries – boundaries that are regarded as the dividing line between ‘them’ and ‘us’.

To distinguish between different kinds of crime and assess their (potential) impact on
the people living in cities, one needs to understand the factors that drive urban crime and
differences in interpretations of those factors.

Theoretical perspectives on crime

Reasoning in crime

The effect of crime can be measured emotionally, financially and physically and can
be approached objectively or subjectively. Based on this, contemporary mainstream
Criminology divides the criminal behaviour, according to Mantle, Fox and Dhami (2005) into two groups, classical and positivist. In classical thinking the seriousness of the crime, according to them, receives most attention, while less attention is given to the circumstances under which the crime occurred. Positivists on the other hand largely regard criminals as people who have not been properly socialized. This is a deterministic approach to crime in which environmental factors and the possibility of rehabilitation play a major part. On the other end of the scale lies the hard-line approach in which people are expected to behave in a civil manner. People who fail to do that should be punished and the standards should be rigorously applied.

The most popular theories that attempt to explain the spatial patterns of crime occurrence are the routine activity theory (RAT), the crime pattern theory (CPT) and the rational choice approach (Lattimore and Witte, 1986; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993; Trasler, 1993; Felson and Clarke, 1998; Weisburd and McEwen, 1998; Elffers, 2004; Rengert, 2004).

According to the rational choice perspective, the offender seeks to benefit from criminal behaviour, making rational calculations about potential gains (or losses) accruing from the selection of a target, the physical effort required to reach it (such as commuting), and the risks involved (Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Lattimore and Witte, 1986; Trasler, 1993; Swartz, 2000). Rational activities are regarded as systematic and logically executed and because they are aimed at maximizing their usefulness, a wide spectrum of probabilities, values and outcomes are considered. According to rational choice theory criminals are rationalists who consider the costs and benefits of their actions before acting. By and large, the purpose of actions are to minimize pain and maximize gains. Becker's (1968) utility theory falls into this category. He uses the criminal's cost–benefit analysis as proof that criminal behaviour is a rational economic activity – a response to a specific set of prospects and discouragements (De Haan and Vos, 2003).

In their critique against rationalism, positivists argue that a distinction should be drawn between different kinds of criminal activity in terms of rational thinking. Certain actions can be regarded as calculating and professional, such as bank robberies and terrorism. Others, such as shoplifting and vandalism (might sometimes) occur impromptu, on the spur of the moment, and impulsively, with less planning going into the deed (Walsh, 1986; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). The premeditated consideration of gains and losses in the latter kinds of crimes, however brief that may be, cannot realistically be eliminated as a factor, though. Gottfredson and Hirschi also touch on the role of self-control when contemplating a criminal deed. Although there is clear evidence to dispute this, rational criminal theorists are sometimes accused of overlooking social contexts such as emergencies or reciprocal relationships caused by factors such as (relative) deprivation, racism, urban dislocation and unemployment (Krivo and Peterson, 1996; Jacobs and Wright, 1999).

A theoretical approach that has subsequently gained considerable popularity is the concept of 'bounded' rationality. According to this the human's ability to process information is limited (Clarke and Cornish, 2001). Choices are almost always subjectively made in what can be regarded as the 'awareness space' or familiar environments of the criminal. ‘Value’ adds a qualitative dimension to the classical utility function while risks serve as the negative trade-off. The latter play a central role in the determination of probabilities in potential gains and losses in a plan of action under consideration, and how risks are assessed depends largely on how they are represented. More often than not,
choices are based on subjectively considered probabilities. Factors such as the relative deprivation of potential perpetrators or how they assess the vigilance levels of potential victims, their ability to resist, and current crime levels could play a role in how probabilities are assessed. The mood or state of mind of the decision-maker is also an important determining factor (Johnson and Payne, 1986; Walsh, 1986). But so is publicity. This is especially true for certain kinds of criminal activities. An act of terrorism is one of the types of crime that falls within the ‘rational choice’ category. There are clear indications that elements of terrorism have been encouraged by extensive, especially sympathetic television news media coverage in the Middle East in recent years.

Positivists tend to emphasize determinism and believe that environmental influences in criminality could be overcome by scientific treatment. They believe the latter should receive greater emphasis than criminal deeds as such to protect society (Jeffery, 1971).

Moving beyond the classical systemic approach to criminology, routine activity theory (RAT) represents an ecological approach to crime. According to RAT, a crime occurs if there is ‘a convergence in space and time of three minimal elements: a likely offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian against crime’ (Felson and Clarke, 1998). It bases predictions of patterns of criminality on frequency and success rates of criminal acts within geographic space. In this approach ‘hot spots’ or ‘localities of convergence’ of crime and violence serve as important indicators of likely future locations of criminal activity, while the prevailing social, structural and economic conditions under which such acts occur can be used to explain why such localities are crime-prone (Oberwittler, 2004). The theory focuses on the characteristics of crime rather than the perpetrators. Routine activities theory states that criminal offences are related to the nature of everyday patterns of social interaction between people. There are three crucial components of crime: offenders, targets and guardians. If any one of the former two is missing, crime cannot occur. If the latter is missing, crime is likely to increase. The probability of crime occurring is directly proportional to the size of the pool of potential offenders and the size of the pool of suitable targets, and indirectly proportional to the number of capable guardians. Social changes in society could also play a role. The increase in both parents working and decrease in meaningful family and communal life are causes for a decrease in capable guardians in neighbourhoods, which in turn are conducive to conditions of social disorganization (Hirschfield, Johnson and Bowers, 2001). Since increasing numbers of women have been entering the employment market, gender differences have also occurred in preferences of acts of crime and their role in crime. Similarly, age plays a role in differences in preferences and roles in crime.

Another recent addition to the general theory of crime is the crime pattern theory (CPT). This theory places emphasis on how people interact with their physical environment, expecting an offender to look for potential targets around personal activity nodes (such as home, school, workplace or entertainment areas) or along the pathways linking these nodes (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993; Felson and Clarke, 1998).

There are four things that fundamentally determine a target’s risk of attack: its value, its inertia or mobility, its visibility and accessibility. Potential targets could be a person, an object or a place. Guardians could be classified as formal or informal. Informal guardians could consist of friends, passers-by and staff and co-workers. Examples of formal guardians are: the police, security guards, neighbourhood watch arrangements,
locks, fences, barriers, lighting, alarm systems and closed circuit television systems. Offenders fall into two categories: those who commit a crime for gain and those who do it to fulfil a need. The force that drives the former is often greed and the latter, conditions such as poverty and addiction. Then there are environmental factors that are conducive to criminal activity. Examples are: living in a violent culture where crime seems to be the norm, peer pressure, coercion, illiteracy, unemployment, family background, mental illness, envy and rebellion against authority. Beliefs could also play a role in criminality. Examples are: a belief that a particular crime is not wrong, unlawful, violent protest on a matter of principle, prejudice against a certain minority or ethnic group and violent forms of religious fundamentalism.

While many focus on the offender and the victim in crime and violence, others focus on the conditions under which crime and violence tend to occur (Kennedy and Forde, 1999). Routine activities theory focuses on both and is therefore classified as an opportunity theory (Felson and Clark, 1998).

In an attempt to bridge the gap in the rationalist–positivist dichotomy, Kissner (2004) says that the widely held belief that there are paradigmatic differences between the two traditions is false. The classical theory has, according to him, ‘withstood the test of time’ and ‘still applies generally’. The narrowly held view that classical theorists support the concept of free will unconditionally and underplay, if not ignore the role of individual motivational differences in criminal behaviour, is incorrect. But so is the view that positivists unconditionally subscribe to determinism and necessarily over-emphasize motivational cause in criminality:

Acceptance of the great divide forecloses the assignment of clear, mutually reinforcing theoretical tasks to the two traditions, since the traditions view themselves as operating upon completely different core assumptions . . . [It] situates positivists in the dark realm of individual motivational differences that operate as natural causes and classical criminologists in the sunlit realm of sovereign reason. (Kissner, 2004, p. 5)

**Violence and crime**

There are two kinds of violent crime: instrumental and expressive. The aim of the first is to improve one’s financial or social position in society, the latter to relieve either frustration or anger. However, the distinction between the two is far from watertight. Both factors together often play a role in violent crime as the continuing violence in Iraq has shown. The Kurds and Shiites are a majority in the resource-rich north and south of the country respectively, while the Sunnis, who as a minority controlled the country politically for a long time, are a majority in the resource-poor west. Much of the continuing fighting in the country revolves around the fact that the latter have lost their political control over people and resources in areas where they are a minority. The systematic killing of white farmers in South Africa and the suicide bombings in Israel, Afghanistan and Iraq occur both for economic and retributive (ideological) reasons.

Vulnerability has proven to be a major incentive for violent crimes. Women, children and the elderly are often regarded as easy targets. Larger communities that are unaccustomed to excessive forms of crime and violence could also become targets. The increase in armed robberies in Sweden in recent years in which (mostly) Muslim migrants have found ordinary Swedes to be easy targets, stem from the fact that locals are unaccustomed to this kind of crime and are consequently unable to defend themselves appropriately.
Perpetrators have described Swedes as ‘weenies’ that hand over their money at the slightest signs of physical danger (*The Brussels Journal*, 2006).

Vulnerability is also often the cause of repeated victimization. Two features of repeated victimization have now been sufficiently established as causes: risk heterogeneity and event dependency. If a particular target appears attractive in an environment where risk factors are relatively low, it is ‘flagged’ and repeatedly exploited. And if the success rates in the exploitation of particular targets are high those targets tend to be repeatedly victimized. In Britain it was found that 16 per cent of people experience property crime, but 2 per cent of them experience 41 per cent of it. Similarly, 8 per cent of people experience personal crime, 1 per cent of them 59 per cent of it. These patterns of behaviour tend to corroborate the rational choice theory. The conclusion is drawn that crime rates may vary from area to area but repeated victimization tends to occur disproportionately in crime-prone areas (Farrel et al., 2005).

Victim precipitation (Wolfgang, 1958) is often used in the incitement of violent crimes in urban communities that are at odds with one another. It has become an important instrument in the advancement of social and political agendas at higher levels of spatial aggregation. It often starts at the individual level or in small group action but the aim is usually to incite violence on a larger scale. This action normally follows the same pattern: offenders offend someone or a group in order to provoke retaliation by the offended, in which case the offender then claims victim status. This is an often-used tactic at the urban level in areas where racial or religious tension exists between inhabitants. Sometimes victim precipitation could have international consequences. One of the clearest examples of this happening is the capturing and killing of Israeli soldiers by Hisbola fighters to provoke retaliation by Israel in the recent Israeli–Lebanon debacle and to claim victim status afterwards.

Most hate crimes can be linked to human rights, women’s rights and victims’ rights violations. Some regard all violent crimes as hate crime. It is argued that perpetrators do not care for the life and rights of victims. Others make a distinction between ‘bias crime’, ‘bias incidents’, and ‘ethno-violence’ (Perry, 2003). The question can be asked whether the violent crimes that are often committed in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Israel could really be regarded as simply bias crime. And contrary to general wisdom, hate crimes do not always occur between minorities and majorities in culturally diverse societies. In the United States it was found that almost half of all the hate crimes against Asian Americans were perpetrated by African or Hispanic Americans (Perry, 2003). The fact that the latter are both minorities shows that, proportionally, the incidents of violence between these groups are much higher than the national average for the country as a whole.

**Space and crime**

Terms such as ‘hot spots’, hot places, hot routes and hot objects show that location is a central issue in most crimes. The location of a criminal relative to a target and the target relative to guardians determine the risk factor for both the criminal and the victim. Mistakes are sometimes made on both sides. There are areas that are sometimes regarded as unsafe, such as small alleyways that, in particular areas, do not experience much crime, while there are areas with high levels of pedestrian movement that may seem safe but are not. Criminals and potential victims use location for apposite reasons – the former to select the most appropriate setting to commit a crime and the latter to judge when conditions are safe or not.
There is a general need amongst people to feel safe in their residential areas though (Hillier and Hanson, 1984). Factors that are regarded as important in feeling safe include ‘How much can I see?’ (visual field) and ‘How much am I seen?’ (visual control). For some, living in open integrated residential areas where others can see them, means having visual control. For others, visual control means living in secure areas where access is limited and where not many people (some of whom may be prospective criminals) can see them. Factors that play a role in both are street lighting, the transparency of fences, road crossings, street furniture, trees and pedestrians.

Eck and Weisburd (1995) looked at the significance of ‘place’ qualities (localities with particular features) in crime. They studied four areas of research: the concentration (or absence) of crime around particular facilities and addresses, the preventive effects of various place features, the mobility of offenders, and how targets are selected by offenders. The study has shown that certain businesses attract crime disproportionately compared with others. In other cases it was found that only a few of a specific type of business attracted an overwhelming percentage of crimes associated with that kind of business (Sherman et al., 1996). Law enforcement agencies tend to focus on the latter because they believe it is more effective in deterring criminals overall (Braga, 2005).

The journey-to-crime notion is an important concept underlying nearly all major contemporary theories of criminal behaviour, specifically the rational choice theory and CPT (Elffers, 2004). According to the rational choice perspective, criminals attempt to minimize the cost of commuting to a crime scene while maximizing the target’s value (Lattimore and Witte, 1986). According to CPT, criminals look for targets within a familiar environment where they spend most of the time or travel often (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993). Rengert (2004) distinguishes between three key elements of journey-to-crime areas: (1) the starting or reference point where the crime journey begins, (2) the direction of the criminal move and (3) the distance to the crime scene from the reference point. The maximum distance the criminal travels is often referred to as the ‘range of operation’ (Van Koppen and De Keijser, 1997).

All other things being equal, the criminal tends to choose the opportunity closest to home to minimize the commuting distance, especially for sneak crimes such as residential burglary (Rengert, 2004). This phenomenon serves as a basis for various probability strategies of criminal profiling, according to which the expected value of a target depends on the distance to it from the offender’s home: ceteris paribus, the further the target, the lower its expected value (Elffers, 2004). The most common distance decay functions (DDF) used to explain criminal behaviour are the negative exponential, normal, linear and truncated negative exponential (Snook et al., 2005).

In recent criminological literature, various arguments have been presented to explain why distance decay in crime patterns tends to occur. These arguments include natural time constraints, high costs of reaching remote targets and limited information available on remote locations (Elffers, 2004).

Some empirical studies (see, inter alia, Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984; Fritzon, 2001) suggest that criminals tend to refrain from operating near their homes or around heavily policed public places such as transportation nodes (Block, 2000). According to Brantingham and Brantingham (1984), criminal activity tends to be relatively low near the offender’s home base because criminals (especially those involved in property offences) take precautionary measures and create a ‘safety’ or ‘buffer’ zone where they do
not operate. Instead, they travel away from their home neighbourhood in order to decrease the likelihood of being recognized and arrested. Phillips (1980) termed the zone in which felony targets are rarely chosen the ‘buffered distance decay’.

Yet empirical evidence about the existence of buffered distance decay is not entirely conclusive. For example, two separate studies carried out in Chicago by Block (2000; 2004) led to somewhat different results. In particular, the study of the travel patterns of robbery offenders (Block, 2004) showed no ‘donut hole’ in criminal operation patterns, while the study of street robbery in the vicinity of Chicago rapid transit stations (Block, 2000), indicated a clear one-and-half block (ca. 300 m) buffer zone around train stations generally avoided by criminal offenders.

Ackerman and Murray (2004) also cited several authors that have focused on conditions and spatial distributions of crime. In consecutive studies in the United States, Shaw and McKay (1929; 1931; 1949) found high levels of crime to be linked to social disorganization, a condition that is associated with neighbourhoods with a low socioeconomic status, ethnic heterogeneity and high residential mobility. Many studies subsequently confirmed this and added variables to the list: high levels of poverty and unemployment, large concentrations of minority youths and advanced degrees of urban dereliction (Harries, 1974; Ackerman, 1976; Dunn, 1980; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1980; Rengert, 1981; Brown and Oldakowski, 1986; Kohfeld and Sprague, 1988; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Ackerman, 1998).

Then there appears to be no particular role of city size. Thus, recent data on victimization rates in major European cities show no obvious relationship between the population size of localities and their annual crime rates (see Figure 9.2). Much thus depends on a variety of local and exogenous factors, such as culture, law enforcement and attitude towards law and order.

In the United States the incidents of violent crimes are inversely related to city size, with rates of violence in mid-sized cities being higher than in larger cities. However, these trends obscure more complex spatial patterns: central city households in the United States are more likely to be victimized by crime than residents of suburban settlements and rural areas (see Figure 9.3). In contrast, in Canada, violent crimes are inversely related to city size but property crime rates are directly related to city size. Globally, levels of crime are higher in countries where people feel economically deprived. Property crime is related to the economic hardship of the young all over the world. More than half of the burglaries and theft from cars in 49 countries, representing all regions of the world, are related to: the level of urbanization, economic deprivation and affluent lifestyles (people going out during evenings). Crime tends to increase where economically deprived youths live close to affluent people. When crime prevention techniques are employed in a city, crime tends to spill over to adjacent smaller cities (Ackerman and Murray, 2004).

It is often said that most crimes occur in a small number of locations, affect a small number of victims, and are committed by a relatively small number of people (Birks, Johnson and Bowers, 2005). The claim that the impact of crime is sometimes ‘overblown’, due to the ‘inaccuracy of common knowledge’, does not diminish the mental fear factor effect on inhabitants though. Whether crime in one area is high or low relative to other areas, the randomness of crime makes every inhabitant in their own mind a potential victim. That is what causes people to fear its effect. If the fact is added that crime rates recorded by police in the world’s industrialized countries are now three times higher than
Note: As the figure shows there appears to be no obvious relationship between population size of localities and their crime levels, implying that there is no necessary link between agglomeration of people in urban areas and victimization rates.


Figure 9.2 Crime rates in major European cities as a function of their population size

Notes: As the figure shows, residents of the densely populated urban areas are more likely to be affected by crime, than people of suburban towns and residents of rural communities.


Figure 9.3 Victimization rates by groups of localities in the United States
30 years ago (Ackerman and Murray, 2004), then statements about the relative insignificance of the scale of crime, overall, are hardly comforting.

Another issue that should also not be underestimated is the ‘Foucault factor’. Postmodern society, according to him (Foucault, 1967), is thoroughly social and susceptible to immense social variation and change (Seidman, 2004). In a chain of cause and effect, this creates uncertainty amongst people living in democratic societies because their openness leaves them feeling vulnerable. And because they are vulnerable in so many areas they tend to doubt their governments’ general ability to provide sufficient security at the micro level. It is therefore not uncommon for them to seek their own forms of security by separating themselves spatially from socioeconomic layers they regard suspect in terms of security risks. As a result the postmodern urban society tends to be socially and spatially fragmented with physical forms of security becoming a very visible factor, especially in crime-ridden areas.

**Inequality and crime**

Violence and crime are not necessarily attributes of urban areas. Indeed, many major cities of the world such as Seoul in South Korea, Beijing in China, Vancouver and Ottawa-Hull in Canada are quite safe places to live in. Although there is no obvious relationship between urban agglomeration and crime incidence (see Figure 9.2), there is another attribute of urban living that makes victimization by crime more likely. This attribute is spatial economic disparity, which manifests itself in a close proximity of the rich and poor within enclosed urban space. Such proximity is likely to ‘modify’ the effect of urban density, which is not necessarily adverse in itself, into something far more explosive and dangerous.

Although environmental criminology generally acknowledges the existence of a trade-off between distance to a crime target and the target’s value (Lattimore and Witte, 1986; Rengert, 2004), this simple relationship may not be sufficiently informative. In particular, much may depend on the wealth of a potential ‘crime target’ relative to that of a ‘crime source’. Consistent with the relative deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966; Swartz, 2000), even a neighbourhood that is not particularly wealthy may attract criminals from nearby poor neighbourhoods and towns. It may thus be expected that the close proximity of the rich and poor in densely populated urban areas becomes a driving force behind urban violence. Indeed, Mexico City, Johannesburg, Rio de Janeiro and Colombo, which are world ‘leaders’ in urban crime and violence, are also notorious for the gigantic societal disparities they display. In his seminal book, *How the other half lives* (1890), the American journalist Jacob Riis pictured what became evident from later empirical studies (Boggs, 1966; Philips, 1980; Portnov and Rattner, 2004), that is, the link between income inequality, intra-urban proximity and crime.

The violence and crime in urban areas is subject to a trade-off between a natural tendency to travel less and the spatial distribution of targets perceived by criminals as potentially attractive. This perceived attractiveness is a relative notion: it increases proportionally to the relative disparity in the welfare levels between a place of potential criminal act and a place of criminal residence. The aerial proximity of poor and wealthy localities (i.e., intra-regional income disparity) tends to increase property crime rates in wealthy places.

According to a recent study by Portnov and Rattner (2004), localities with high rates of property crime are often surrounded by localities with relatively low crime rates. The underlying cause of this spatial pattern has a simple explanation: wealthy places become magnets for the crime-prone residents of poor neighbouring towns. Unless
affluent communities are well protected by fences, gates and private security, such communities are easy and desirable targets for potential criminals.

Whether it is concern for the safety of our possessions or the desire to choose the best place to buy a home, crime is a feature of society that everyone wishes to avoid. It is therefore in the best interests of society to minimize the spatial unevenness of urban development wherever possible, by providing, inter alia, more equal access to employment, education and cultural opportunities for all residents of urban areas, notwithstanding their cultural backgrounds, levels of income or ethnicity.

Crime and defensible space
In the early 1970s, criminologist C. Ray Jeffery (1971) and Oscar Newman (1972; 1975), an architect who had worked on the relationship between urban space and crime and violence in crime-ridden areas of New York for many years, put forward the idea of ‘defensible space’. The concept was offered as one of the ways in which violence could be curbed in urban areas where urban crime and violence had spiralled out of control (Turner, 2004). Since then the idea has widely influenced practitioners in the fields of urban planning, urban design and architecture, especially those working in the lower income and public housing environment (Atlas, 2001). Actual results on how the concept of defensible space has been able to avert crime and violence are mixed (Baran, Smith and Toke, 2006). Some evidence has been found that support the theory of defensible space while others have found negative results.

From the outset the idea of defensible urban space was destined to become controversial. In certain circles it is regarded as a politically loaded concept. Opponents regard it as a politically dangerous idea that should be discredited at all cost especially since there are signs that the gated community development has become a popular way of countering crime in cities all over the United States and is fast gaining ground in cities all over the world. If it were to take hold and become popular, so they believe, it would ultimately lead to wholesale segregation and the fragmentation of urban space, an outcome that is in direct contrast to Jacobs’ (1961) utopia of fully integrated and open urban societies in which there are few signs of social and economic stratification.

Critics have been trying their utmost to disprove the usefulness of the concept to avert crime. In their discussion of the concept, politically loaded rhetoric is often used in an attempt to discredit it. Terms such as urban ‘fragmentation’, ‘segregation’, ‘fortressing’, ‘social exclusion’, ‘polarization’, ‘inequality’ and ‘isolationism’ are often linked with the concept (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Grant, Greene and Maxwell, 2004). Even distorted representations of what is implied by the term defensible space or carefully selected cases are sometimes used to disprove its potential usefulness, even to the extent, so one feels, that practical usefulness of the concept is sacrificed for the sake of scoring ideological points.

Proponents, on the other hand, regard it as a potentially useful concept. Cast in the gated community mould it serves to increase housing densities, makes higher design standards and higher-quality open spaces possible, creates an environment in which a sense of community can be nurtured and creates safer environments to live in (Grant, 2005). Applying it to the public housing environment, they believe that if the concept were to be applied correctly, it would not only improve living conditions for inhabitants but also reduce opportunities for uncivil behaviour and the destruction of property, curb crime and violence without destroying socially and economically well-integrated urban structures (CUPR, 1996; Hirschfield
et al., 2001). Another related argument that can be raised is that it is generally justified in an era where violent crime is on the increase in large parts of the world. In violent societies, such as some in the developing world, making defensible space a priority has become an absolute necessity among many – an attempt to turn *dystopia* into *eutopia*.

Gated development has become a common sight in urban township development across the colour line in South Africa in recent years, for instance. For them, gated communities have become *heterotopia*, a safe space where home can become the historical heterotopic home once again. It ties in with the government’s vision of urban densification and at the same time creates spaces in which a larger proportion of the targeted section of the population can feel relatively safe. Even those who do not live in gated areas safeguard themselves by putting up walls around their properties, mimicking gated development.

In other parts of the world, the threat of what is regarded by a majority of people as looming *social dystopia*, has become so enormous and real (especially in urban areas), that governments are turning their countries into ‘gated states’. In certain cases, such as in the United States and in Gibraltar (two examples of many in the world) it is to prevent large numbers of lowly qualified people, who cannot find employment in their own countries from infiltrating the United States and Europe illegally (see Figures 9.4a and b). The argument is usually offered that most of these migrants will find it difficult, if not impossible, to find employment in the competitive foreign urban employment markets of the United

![Image](image-url)

**Figure 9.4 (a–c)** Photos of walls erected to safeguard communities

Sources:  
(a) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States%E2%80%93Mexico_barrier [US/Mexico];  
(b) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ceuta_border_fence [Morrocco/Ceutar, Spain];  
(c) http://www.vtjp.org/background/wallgraphics.htm [Israel].
Figure 9.4 (a–c) (continued)
States and Europe. This is based on experience that those who cannot find employment in the formal economic market or cannot make a living legally in the informal economic sector will more than likely resort to illegal activities to make a living. In others countries, gating is used as a last resort to attempt to reduce the real threat of violent attacks against their citizens, as in the case of Israel (see Figure 9.4c).

National gating is a seemingly desperate attempt by authorities to safeguard their citizens at the macro scale, while community gating is the result of communities trying to safeguard themselves under Foucaultian urban conditions at the micro scale. At both levels the main issues at stake are the role of basic human rights in urban living and in the management of urban areas. Several aspects of basic human rights are at stake in the concept of defensible urban space. First, is the concept of freedom of movement, second, the right to protection of privacy, third, the protection of the right to choose, fourth, the right to safety and protection.

Clearly, not all of these human rights lie on the same level of enforceability. At the international level the state has the responsibility to take steps to protect its citizens from any form of threat, real and potential. However, an underlying issue in the protection of citizens against illegal immigration is the principle that neither the person that is born in relative prosperity in a developed country nor the one that is born in relative destitution in a developing country had personally anything to do with his or her fortune or misfortune at the date of birth. It is chance that determines the fortunes of people. It could therefore be said that the former does not have the inherent right to prevent the latter from access to resources that could change that latter’s fortune – perhaps one of the reasons why scores of people attempt to cross international borders daily in their hunt for improved living conditions elsewhere. However, the flip side of the argument is that people in a country create their own fortunes. People in North America and Western Europe have worked for what they have achieved and their governments have the responsibility to protect their citizens’ assets and their way of life.

The same principle also generally applies to the micro level. Although the right of access to public space is an important issue, the right of a non-resident for instance to have casual access to an area in which she or he is not resident is obviously less pressing than a resident’s own right to protection or his or her right to privacy. If the argument were to be raised that we are dealing with ‘public’ space then the case can be made that the ‘public’ space is largely meant to serve the people living in that area than for someone else to enter the space in a casual manner.

A synthesis
In the introduction we wrote about one of the contradictions of urban society. People have to live together to reap the benefits of agglomeration economies but people with different incomes and ethnic backgrounds living together within dense urban areas invariably causes tension and anxiety amongst inhabitants. This is especially true of certain parts of cities, whether that city be London, Cincinnati, Jerusalem or Baghdad. The agglomeration of people in such environments makes a significant proportion of urbanites apprehensive and in certain parts of cities, perhaps even fearful. This may not show all the time in the day-to-day activities of people in the cities but it shows in how people react towards each other in everyday situations in the city. And it certainly shows at night. This is so because that is how people have been conditioned. They know that as long as
people have been living together in cities there are people living in the same cities who are aggressive towards others and would harm them if they had the opportunity to do so. Whatever the reason for this aggression, it is a fact of life – one that is confirmed in the audio and written news media all over the world, day by day. But people are also generally afraid (at least apprehensive) of ‘other’ people, not because the latter are necessarily aggressive or pose any threat, but simply because they are different, have different cultures, live differently and have different habits. Xenophobia is a naturally inborn characteristic of humans. People feel more ‘at home’ with people who are the same than with people who are different.

These two factors, and maybe also a third, entrepreneurship, have played an important part in bringing about the postmodern urban condition. It will be argued in this chapter that, on logical grounds, crime is perhaps the principle reason for urban fragmentation – that it may have caused the other two factors to also have become important in the creation of the postmodern environment. The reason why crime has played a dominant role in postmodern urbanism is because people know that they cannot rely on government to protect them everywhere all the time, and to expect that would be unreasonable. They may see justice meted out by government to wrongdoers afterwards, if they are lucky, but invariably government action comes too late for the victim. People therefore know that they have to take whatever lawful steps they think are necessary to protect themselves at home and at the workplace.

Ideologically, there are two views of how the problem of crime at home and at the workplace could be overcome. One school of thought relies on a double-edged approach: the ‘global’ integration of society in order to remove distrust, xenophobia, and ultimately also social and economic inequality between people on the one hand, and on the other, the mixing and densification of land uses. This is what could be termed the utopian approach, one that is generally supported by the socially liberal ideological lobby. People in this lobby believe that crime can be most effectively countered by an ‘open’, economically mixed and socially integrated urban society. This is the vision of the ‘new urbanism’ and is heavily based on Jacobs’ (1961) views on circulation of people and appreciation of public spaces, a vision that has been elevated to near-gospel status in liberal circles.

Those that have difficulties with the socioeconomic elements of the approach may regard it as ‘impractical’ and ‘a utopian idea’ that is a bridge too far on a global scale given the degrees of social differences that exist in urban societies all over the world. Those who are opposed to the mixed land use elements of the approach may argue that it does not take into account the changed scale and spatial economic requirements for agglomeration economies in a large part of the modern business environment of the twenty-first century. While there is considerable scope for some IT businesses in the pentenary sector (Geyer, 2002) to be mashed with the residential component, and these opportunities should be taken whenever they present themselves, the clock simply cannot be turned back to the good old days when people could get along without the car and could walk to wherever they needed to go to in most other respects of the business sector. Implementation of this approach would require large-scale top-down intervention by the state, and its direct and indirect economical and financial implications will be too costly to contemplate.

The other school of thought, generally supported by the economically progressive lobby accepts the fact that people are different and will always be different. People are inherently asymmetrical in terms of their culture and their abilities, and this is reflected
in differences in their ways of life, their skills levels, productivity and economic standing. This situation is likely to remain so despite efforts made by the private and public sectors to narrow the profile. This lobby believes that it has a right to its preferred lifestyle, has a right to regard and use its properties as commodities, and sees physical protection (of which gating has become a popular means) as an effective method of safeguarding them from crime.\textsuperscript{13} In fact, the usage of terms such as ‘desirable neighbourhood’, ‘housing investment’ and ‘housing features’ (the latter often also referring to built-in crime-preventing security systems) by developers in the commodity housing environment has much to do with improved security in protected neighbourhoods. Even people falling in community housing categories have benefited from defensive urban space strategies such as ‘Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design’\textsuperscript{14}.

Those who have difficulties with this line of thinking may argue that it is a socially and economically divisive approach that is responsible for the fragmentation of the urban society. Whatever one’s conviction, the Foucaultian trends in the current Western urban society are becoming more visible by the day. It is thoroughly social and susceptible to immense social variation and change that create uncertainty amongst democratic societies with an open lifestyle because their openness makes them feel vulnerable. People react by separating themselves spatially from socioeconomic layers they regard suspect in terms of security risks. In their minds the increase in crime and violence in cities worldwide confirms the correctness of their interpretation of matters and few people can justifiably blame them. Until these trends in crimes and violence in the urban environment are reversed, the growing popularity of defensive space in free societies is likely to continue.

**Notes**

1. And it is believed that only approximately 10 per cent of rapes are actually reported.
2. This number excludes illegal possession of guns, drug trafficking and driving under the influence.
3. In a report-back of the SA Police Service in September 2006, the police stated: ‘Cash-in-transit heists have increased 74.1 percent in the past year . . . Car hijackings were up 3.1 per cent, truck hijackings 10.9 per cent, and bank robberies 1.7 percent . . . It seems that people are being fatally wounded during incidents like this because criminals increasingly use heavy-calibre firearms. The number of criminals involved in such incidents has also increased. The chances are that . . . perpetrators of crime will shoot bystanders to “defend themselves” or otherwise facilitate escape. In addition, victims of robberies and car jackings increasingly tend to defend themselves with firearms against robbers’ (Crimexpo, 2006).
4. Factors that come into play here include: aims and objectives, areas of experience (the ‘knowledge market’), assessment and planning and gain.
5. People’s minds are limited in terms of their capacity, duration and ability to analyse and store information. As a result, simplifying strategies are often used when choices are made. One strategy often used is to simplify the range of issues by eliminating some of the complicating aspects and then considering only the remaining aspects carefully. Another is to consider all the relevant information but allow for trade-offs between positive and negative qualities. The former is known as a ‘non-compensatory’ and the latter a ‘compensatory’ strategy (Johnson and Payne, 1986).
6. Objective rationalization is when all aspects of an issue are thoroughly considered while only part of the whole is considered in subjective rationality.
7. In subjective probabilities moderate and high probabilities tend to be underestimated while low probabilities are often overweighted (Johnson and Payne, 1986).
8. According to Bursik (1988) social disorganization is ‘the inability of local communities to realize the common goals of their residents or solve commonly experienced problems’.
9. However, in countries such as the United States the concept of the informal guardian is being undermined by people’s fear of legal retribution. So, passers-by tend not to get involved.
10. Others who have attempted to narrow the divide between crime theorists are Sampson and Wooldredge (1987), Bursik and Grasmick (1993), Routtree, Land and Miethe (1994), and Miethe and Meier (1994).
11. It has been found that crime increases in smaller cities in the United States as a result of the social after-effects of post-industrial de-industrialization. The social after-effects include issues such as black
unemployment, weak family structures, poverty and low educational attainment. Currently a large percentage of African American people in the United States is uneducated and unemployed. Finding permanent employment is becoming harder because few of them finish high school. In 2000, 65 per cent black male drop-outs in their twenties were unemployed. By 2004 this number had grown to 72 per cent. In 1995, 16 per cent black drop-outs in their twenties spent time in jail. By 2004, 21 per cent were or had been incarcerated before. By their mid-thirties this proportion increased to 60 per cent (Boyed, 2006).

12. The concept has widely been implemented in the United States (Atlas, 2001) and the United Kingdom (Hirschfield et al., 2001). It seems as if practitioners tend to regard the concept of defensible space – local security and community building – with less distrust than a particular intellectual school of thought that speaks out against all forms of spatial defence while favouring the ideal of global integration of people and of urban space.

13. At the same time this lobby acknowledges the fact that not all people have the same convictions, nor is it adamant that everybody should share this conviction.

14. ‘CPTED’ of the US Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Policy Development and Research have found that crime in public housing areas is mostly committed in public areas. Crime rates generally increase as building height increases but it increases proportionally faster in public spaces in and around low-income public high-rise buildings. Private, identifiable spaces are usually well-maintained and well-kept while public spaces that are used by many, are not (CUPR, 1996).

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10 The threat of urban terrorism: observations and policies options

H.W. Richardson and P. Gordon

Introduction
Although urban terrorism has been a major problem for many years (e.g., the ETA in Spain, the IRA in the United Kingdom and many pro-Palestinian groups in Israel), it moved to the forefront of urban problems only after 9/11. That event was a climacteric, not only because of its scale, but primarily because it brought home to America that the country was not immune to this problem. In the few years since 9/11 there has not been enough time to reach a consensus about the policy implications of urban terrorism. There are disagreements about what should be done, and there are serious trade-offs that have to be resolved. This chapter explores some of the options.

Why city targets?
A key assumption is that terrorists attach considerable priority to urban (especially big city) targets. There are several reasons for this. First, unlike many terrorist groups in the past, the ‘new’ terrorists apparently want to inflict severe human damage (in terms of deaths and injuries) without prior warning. This implies unannounced attacks in cities because people concentrate there. This does not mean that terrorists are indifferent to acts that result in economic damage, but these are most appealing when they are a by-product of attacks against humans. This helps to explain why 9/11 was such a ‘success’.

Second, there is such a proliferation of targets in cities that it is impossible to protect them all. Non-urban targets (e.g., nuclear power stations) can be protected via a perimeter approach that would have to be penetrated for an attack to be successful. Except for special events (e.g., a political party convention), that type of approach is infeasible in cities because it would be so disruptive of urban life. Given the proliferation of targets, the protection provided has to be highly selective, focusing on public buildings, major economic installations, transportation infrastructure and a few other priority sites.

Third, many of the ‘best’ targets, for example, key economic facilities (such as seaports and airports) and iconic buildings, are located in cities. An attack on an airport, for example, could easily inflict severe and simultaneous economic and human damage. On the other hand, an attack on an iconic building might inflict neither, killing and injuring few people and with minimal economic consequences. Its success would be gauged by a different measure, the creation of psychological damage and panic. This explains why significant resources are devoted to protecting the Statue of Liberty (a relatively easy target to protect because of its offshore location; Parkinson, 2007).

People terrorism vs. place terrorism
Four decades ago, in the field of regional policy, a distinction was drawn between ‘people prosperity’ and ‘place prosperity’ (Winnick, 1966; see also Bolton, 1992). In attempting
to address the problems of interregional and intra-metropolitan poverty, people prosperity implied the redistribution of income directly via the tax system and/or in-kind subsidies, while place prosperity meant providing grants and/or low interest loans to locations, such as depressed towns and impoverished neighbourhoods with the idea that this would help people indirectly (e.g., via job creation).

Analogously, we developed the concepts of ‘people terrorism’ and ‘place terrorism’. People terrorism implies that the most effective protection against terrorist attacks is to identify, and presumably monitor, potential terrorists. Place terrorism, on the other hand, reflects the more popular view that the best way to counter terrorism is to protect targets. Place terrorism is primarily an urban strategy, while people terrorism is not. Instead, people terrorism implies two main actions: protect the borders and, in recognition that terrorism can easily and may increasingly be home-grown, domestic surveillance. This requires a completely different type of resource allocation than following the place terrorism approach. The rationale for the place terrorism strategy is that we lack the resources to protect all targets, and the more resources we devote to target hardening the more vulnerable the many soft targets become. The primary defect of the people terrorism strategy is that it is much more likely to result in objections from civil rights proponents because it can (and probably will) result in turning people away at the borders and requires what hostile reactions might describe as a domestic espionage system. A second possible objection is that it is as difficult to control the borders as it is to protect targets. We reject this argument if most of the resources currently devoted to place terrorism strategies were transferred to people terrorism approaches.

**Recovery and mitigation vs. prevention**

It is generally regarded that new terrorist attacks in the United States and other countries (especially in Western Europe) are inevitable, regardless of how many resources are committed to prevention and protection. United States aviation is an excellent example. A very high proportion of the resources of the US Department of Homeland Security have been devoted to aviation, perhaps primarily for public relations reasons in light of the trauma of 9/11. Yet it remains problematic how much more secure we are. Many types of explosives would not be detected, cargo is still not screened, and a suicide bomber with checked luggage has many methods to succeed. An arguable, if extreme, position is to shift all resources from protection to recovery and mitigation. Because we cannot protect all targets, or indeed protect any target with a 100 per cent guarantee, then why bother? This is probably too extreme, so a more moderate approach is to continue to protect some key targets but to shift more resources into emergency disaster management, relief, recovery and mitigation.

**The fortress mentality**

The opposite approach to people terrorism is to adopt what we call the ‘fortress’ approach. This implies maximizing the level of protection for as many targets as possible within cities. It requires many instruments: physical barriers to keep vehicles (especially trucks) away from buildings; building designs that make buildings look more like mausoleums than beautiful expressions of architecture; a strong police and security presence; and high-tech surveillance such as ubiquitous CCTVs (‘Big Brother is Watching You’).
The British adopted a version of the fortress mentality many years ago as a defence mechanism against the IRA, especially after the 1996 bombing of Manchester (including micro-security policies such as no trash barrels at rail stations, CCTV, street closures, barriers to traffic and strong police presence). However, it did not stop the 7/7 bombings, although the CCTVs found substantial ex-post information. Also, pushed to the extreme, it can make city living inconvenient if not miserable. As a one-off approach to deal with special, rare events, it may work, but as a permanent approach it is hardly viable. Moreover, the use of physical barriers and building design as a counter-terrorism strategy has significant aesthetic costs in how cities look.

The United States and other countries are actively engaged in the fortification of their major cities and public buildings to thwart attacks by vehicle bombs and other weapons of mass destruction. For those concerned with the real threat of terrorist attack, but who are also troubled by the increasing proliferation of barriers, bollards, armed guards and gatehouses around buildings and public spaces, Coaffee (2003) provides a balanced view of what might be regarded as militarized urbanism. His research primarily focused on the IRA terror campaign against UK cities, elaborated in light of 9/11. It asks the important question of whether erecting hard, physical barriers around buildings and public spaces makes us safer, and if so at what cost.

There is an element of circular reasoning that fortifying our cities may increase rather than reduce our fear, and the enhanced fear may reinforce the demand for protection. However, it is by no means clear that the substantial resources expended make us any safer and the consequent reduction in access detracts from the value of urban life and its built environment. As pointed out not only by Coaffee but also by Glaeser and Shapiro (2002), security concerns were possibly the dominant explanation of the origin of cities. Making the city secure is a necessary but not sufficient condition for building and maintaining its economic and commercial base. Because of the huge resource requirements, we end up with protecting parts rather than the whole. The private sector focuses on protecting office buildings and shopping malls (against both crime and terrorism) and residential developments in the form of gated communities, while the public sector concentrates its attention on a limited set of public buildings. The negative consequences are increased social segregation and reduced access and mobility for all. Of course, there are merits in reducing the access of terrorists to target buildings because the effects of an explosion decay rapidly with distance and buffers (e.g., concrete bollards) dramatically reduce the risks from vehicle bombs. However, there is a trade-off in terms of the damage to the quality of urban life. There is a heavy price to pay if we have to tolerate mass agoraphobia and what Richard Little calls ‘architectural taxidermy’ (Little, 2007).

However, Coaffee’s (2003; 2004) explanation of the City of London’s cordon approach, securing the perimeter (the so-called ‘ring of steel’) rather than attempting to protect a large number of individual buildings, may offer a more cost-effective approach to protecting against truck bombs, for example, limiting truck access to a very small number of access routes and strict monitoring and response to violations. This has merit, but there are two problems. Cordon solutions are much more difficult in almost every US city than in the City of London because of the lower density settlement pattern. Second, the 7 July 2005 London bombings illustrated the damage that a backpack bomber could wreak, and although s/he is likely to show up on CCTV (at least under UK conditions) it would be difficult to be suspicious of every backpacker.
The urban transportation sector illustrates the trade-offs very well. In some large cities, such as New York, London and Madrid (but not others such as Los Angeles and Houston), trip makers use public transport to minimize door-to-door travel times. If security checks increase trip times and if security costs raise transit fares, this is a not insignificant cost. Another interesting sidebar is that an unstated rationale for the London congestion pricing scheme introduced in February 2003 is that all the cameras installed around the Borough of Westminster are a potentially important surveillance instrument against terrorist intrusion. This is a good example of the ‘dual function’ approach: policy instruments to deal with terrorism may have other important non-terrorist objectives that increase their appeal (in this case, the non-terrorist goal was the primary objective).

Coaffee’s research was based primarily on the British government’s response to the IRA (Irish Republican Army). Via a multiple strategy of restricting access to the financial hub (the City), ubiquitous CCTVs and other limitations of personal freedom, the government was, at least, partially successful. Attacks continued, but the IRA terror campaign eventually petered out and its political goals remained unfulfilled. However, this strategy offers little promise in the post-9/11 world. The campaign against the IRA was to make both attacks and escape so difficult as to deter activity. Also, the IRA bombers usually issued warnings to ensure that civilian casualties were at a more or less tolerable level. The post-9/11 bomber, on the other hand, appears to be interested in maximizing casualties and has much less fear of being caught. Also, the eventual ‘success’ against the IRA relied as much on intelligence and informants as on the physical protections. This is consistent with the people terrorism approach suggested here, and certainly may have implications for counter-terrorist strategies in the United States. The other choice for urban residents is whether they prefer to live with risk or fear; the resolution of this choice will determine whether or not the fortress mentality will prevail.

**The decentralization approach**

Historically, security concerns resulted in compact cities. Many cities in medieval times were walled cities, where the walls provided protection against hostile attacks. Some of these cities survive today: York, United Kingdom; Avila, Spain and Carcassone, France are merely three of many examples. Changes in technology and in attackers’ psychology have led to an alternative desirable urban form from a terrorism perspective. In current circumstances, where attacks are more likely to be spatially focused, the preferred urban form is much more likely to be dispersed.

We argued earlier that urban targets are especially attractive because they are spatially concentrated. If this is the case, it follows that geographical dispersion can spread the risk, both conceptually and spatially. Urban decentralization, and perhaps even more intraregional and interregional decentralization, not only reduces the damage risks but decentralized targets are much easier to protect (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002; Frey and Leuchinger, 2007). There is no strong reason why government buildings, especially federal and central government buildings, should be located centrally. As for private facilities, a centrally located sports stadium, such as the famous new Millennium Stadium in Cardiff, Wales, poses many more risks than a peripherally located stadium.

Despite the promotion by planners of compact cities for environmental and sustainability reasons, from the counter-terrorism perspective a decentralized, dispersed
metropolitan region is preferable. It is much less vulnerable because economic agents can relatively smoothly shift their activities to other centres within the metropolitan area if one centre (such as the central business district) is attacked. Decentralization increases resilience, regardless of whether we are talking about the electricity system (Lave et al., 2006) or protecting buildings against vehicle bombs (Little, 2007). Even 9/11 demonstrated resilience because of the very rapid relocation of economic activities to other sites in Midtown Manhattan, suburban New Jersey and other locations.

However, Drennan (2007) draws another interpretation from the 9/11 experience. Despite the relocations, one-half of the displaced offices found alternative space in downtown Manhattan itself. The obvious implication is that advantages of agglomeration economies outweighed for many firms the risk aversion and lower costs benefits associated with decentralization. He specifically attacks Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) for their belief that terrorist risks undermine agglomeration economies and will spread out development.

‘Bounceback’

The ‘bounceback’ hypothesis is that from the economic impact perspective urban economies recover very quickly from a terrorist attack. An excellent example is 9/11. Many of the most severely impacted forms were back in business at alternative sites (e.g., in New Jersey) within a few days, and the New York City economy recovered within one to two quarters (Drennan, 2007). Of course, the consequences of physical structure damage continue to this day. The Spanish tourist industry revived within a few months after the Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2005 (Buesa et al., 2007) and the impact on London’s economy of the 7 July 2005 subway and bus bombings was indiscernible. Other examples are somewhat more sobering. It took Bali two years to recover fully from the 2002 bar bombing, and it was a similar story with the 1997 Luxor (Egypt) terrorist attack. Even in the 9/11 example, the airline industry did not recover its passenger totals until the middle of 2005.

Some proponents of the ‘bounceback’ hypothesis argue that the economic impacts of terrorist attacks (and natural disasters) are relatively minor because the output losses are quickly recovered. As an example, Leamer and Thornberg (2006), argue that the consequences of a bomb attack at the Los Angeles-Long Beach twin port complex would be moderate, if not minimal. There are three potential problems with this argument. First, the recovery may be incomplete (e.g., some businesses affected by business interruption impacts may close down permanently), and we have insufficient real world examples to test this. Second, significant resources are spent on repair and recovery, and all these resources have opportunity costs. This important point is ignored by those who argue that the long-term economic consequences of a disaster are a ‘wash’.

Vehicle bombs

One of the simplest types of terrorist attack is a bomb in a vehicle (truck or car). This has been used repeatedly in Iraq, and Table 10.1 shows its efficacy over several decades. However, there is no strong correlation between bomb size and the number of fatalities. The US Embassy attack in Nairobi is a good example. The implication is the need to protect against cars and even individuals, not only large trucks.
Solving urban terrorism abroad
Thinking outside the box comes up with an unusual solution to the urban terrorism problem: dealing with the problem abroad. The argument here is that homeland security cannot solely be solved domestically; it has an international dimension. The logic is based on the idea that terrorism is born out of a particular context. If the Palestinian problem could finally be resolved, if the problems of the poverty populations in many Middle Eastern countries could be addressed, if the direction of foreign policy of the key Western countries could be changed, then perhaps the risks of terrorist attacks would be reduced. There are three problems with this position. First, it is completely untested. If terrorism is driven by fanaticism and religious zeal, economic conditions are irrelevant. Jihad will trump poverty alleviation and foreign policy reforms. Second, it is arguable that it cannot be implemented for political reasons. For instance, a Palestinian solution cannot be resolved from one side but requires the cooperation of many parties. Third, unless they were driven by concern for their less advantaged human beings, many of the 9/11 and, to a lesser extent, the 7/7 terrorists were well educated and far from impoverished.

Table 10.1  Major terrorist vehicle bomb attacks, 1946–2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Size of bomb (kg TNT equivalent)</th>
<th>Casualties (# killed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St David Hotel, Jerusalem</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Marine Barracks, Beirut</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>5550</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Embassy, Beirut</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Axe, London</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Trade Center, New York</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Community Center, Buenos Aires</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred P. Murrah Building, Oklahoma City</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khobar Towers, Dharan, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Embassy, Nairobi</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sari Club, Bali</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>750–1000</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriott Hotel, Jakarta</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Hospital, Mozdok, Chechnya</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSBC Bank, Istanbul</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:  Little (2007).
Simulations

Because of the absence of a terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11 and a moderate number of attacks elsewhere, except for Iraq, estimates of the potential economic impacts have to rely primarily on ‘what if’ scenarios. Our research group in CREATE (the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events) at the University of Southern California has carried out several simulations (a radiological bomb at the twin ports of Los Angeles-Long Beach [Gordon and Moore et al., 2007], an attack on theme parks [Richardson et al., 2007], blowing up a downtown office building [Richardson et al., 2006], a shoulder-based rocket attack on an airplane [Gordon and Kim et al., 2007]) that show that the economic impacts can be severe. We use two models: SCPM (the Southern California Planning Model) for regional impacts and NIEMO (the National Interstate Economic Model; Park et al., 2007) for national impacts. Both models are input–output models; SCPM has a built-in transportation network and a freight network is being added to NIEMO (Cho et al., 2001).

To give an idea of scale, the bomb at the ports was a US$38 billion event, a theme park attack in Florida or Southern California cost up to US$23 billion in economic losses, the downtown Los Angeles office building attack was more moderate (only US$6 billion), while the airplane attack (assuming a seven-day shutdown of the system and a slow two-year recovery) cost US$250 billion (for more details, see Richardson, Gordon and Moore, 2006, 2007; Public Policy Institute of California, 2006; Richard et al., 2006; Gordon and Kim et al., 2007). Another study (Zimmerman et al., 2007) estimated the economic losses (i.e., business interruption, transportation congestion and fatalities) of an attack on the New York City electricity system resulting in a one-day blackout; the costs amounted to US$2.348 billion. All these are significant losses. They justify significant investments in protection, mitigation and/or recovery.

Conclusions

There are no firm conclusions to this discussion because we have not yet reached a consensus on how to combat urban terrorism, whether foreign or domestic. There is a need to continue to assess risks, to decide to what locations and targets scarce resources should be allocated, to determine the trade-off between hardening city targets and keeping our urban environments as open societies, to balance between people terrorism (e.g., border control and domestic surveillance) and place terrorism (e.g., protecting buildings and sites), to evaluate the threats to the transportation system (all modes), and to explore whether a partial answer to homeland security problems can be found abroad. These very difficult problems are exacerbated by the way, hardly surprising, that homeland security resource allocation has been politicized.

Notes

1. Although the research in this chapter was partially supported by the United States Department of Homeland Security through CREATE, grant number EM-2004-GR-0112, any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Department of Homeland Security.

References


Further reading


Introduction
The global population is at a turning point. For as long as there have been people on earth, more lived in rural than in urban areas. Now we are at the break-even point and are in the process of entering a new era where more people are living in urban than in rural areas. Currently there are six cities with populations of more than 15 million, 21 with more than ten million, 50 with more than five million and more than 400 with more than one million inhabitants (City Mayors Statistics, 2006). As Zane Yost (1998) remarked: cities are organic bodies. Just as it will be almost impossible for a person ten times the normal size to survive in an environment designed for normal-sized people, cities that have grown disproportionately large are finding it increasingly difficult to remain functional. Apart from trying to maintain reasonably mobile in an environment that tends to become increasingly travel-unfriendly, the larger and denser cities become, part of remaining ‘functional’ lies in finding ways for different people to live peacefully together. And yet, it is these differences between people and the way in which they behave differently under similar circumstances that have always been one of the important driving forces behind the dynamism of the city.

An important element of this quest for peaceful cohabitation is finding ways of better understanding the implications of the relationships between space and place in the built environment, something that is becoming increasingly difficult. Why? Because most cities in the world, especially those in the developing world, continue to grow, and those that are not growing as fast any more or have stopped growing are continuously ageing. But whether they are growing fast or not, and whether parts of them are ageing or not, they are continuously being transformed and reinvented by the people who live in them or have an interest in their well-being. Inhabitants are constantly forced to keep on interpreting changes that are occurring in their cities and then reinterpret the relationships between space and place in terms of those changes as they occur.

By looking at the fundamentals of urban space and how it is filled in by the urban dweller to become ‘place’, an attempt will be made in this chapter to unpack some of the arguments that form the background of the debates surrounding concepts such as urban densification, smart growth and market-driven urban development. Underlying questions that need to be answered are: what is the definition of a community, what are its spatial properties and manifestations, what are the fundamental forces that mould it, what policy measures are employed that potentially affect it, and what are the potential consequences of current policy thinking on it.

One of the challenges of our time is to overcome the apparent difficulties policymakers across the political spectrum have with recognizing the advantages and disadvantages of views that their opponents hold on issues revolving around spatial, social and economic convergence and divergence in the urban environment. Terms such as ‘urban densification’,
'market related expansion', ‘urban fragmentation’ and ‘social inequality’ have generated so much political and intellectual noise over the years that it seems difficult for proponents and critics on either side of the divide to hear one another. In fact, when it comes to these issues, it sometimes seems as if more people practise Bourdieu’s belief that ‘reality is fuzzy – our job is to make it fuzzier’ (Bourdieu, 1993a, 1993b; Cresswell, 2002, p. 379).

**Communal space**

As in the case of the terms ‘society’ and ‘group’, ‘community’ always implies differentiation or classification of some kind, something that permits description or characterization. And that is not possible without determining limits or boundaries, a depiction of certain people who fall inside relative to those who fall outside a particular boundary or definition. A community therefore has to have discerning qualities or characteristics. It has to have boundaries and although they sometimes are geographically based, it is not always the case. Some communities are culturally founded, others intellectually, and still others religiously, economically, interests-wise, and so on. Those that are geographically founded can be shown on a map but others are cognitive creations – constructs of the mind that cannot always be clearly delimited.

Communal space is therefore varied and layered. Some forms are loose, fluid and dynamic, others stable, even rigid. Some are tolerant and overlapping others, others xenophobic and isolationist, some with penetrable boundaries, others impenetrable. Wherever one goes, examples of all of these kinds of spaces can be found in urban areas all over the world. That is what makes communities varied and layered and what makes their presence in the urban environment interesting. In fact, it is this variety that fascinates people and to a large extent drives the tourism, movie and television industries worldwide. Without it, our world would indeed be a dreary and uninteresting place.

In the social sphere discerning qualities of people (and therefore also communal space) are usually most visible at the micro level because that is the level where the social impact is direct and the impact is felt the strongest on the individual. Due to the friction of distance and time the intensity of direct social interaction of individuals tend to taper off very steeply from the centres of their activity spheres. That is why individuals operate more regularly and more intensely within community context at the local level and that is why social interaction becomes so meaningful at that level.

Expanding on Weber’s (1929) conceptual model of layers of human activities and applying it specifically to human settlement patterns, Figure 4.2 (see Chapter 4, p. 45 as well as Geyer, 2002; 2004) depicts the multi-dimensional character and complexity of human settlements as they unfold over time. Activities in the first layer tend to be rural in character, while activities 2 to 9 usually result in urban settlements.

Viewing the construct from above gives one an overall picture, an external view of the geographical location and density of human activities. This is what one sees when one superficially looks at an atlas or map. Usually the map itself does not reveal much of the intricacies of communal activities within the area. The picture often only becomes meaningful when one begins to analyse the underlying forces that have moulded the features that are visible on the map, that is, the internal view.

To be able to understand the logic behind the potpourri of communal spaces and the social and economic dynamics that drive them, one needs to study the layers of interrelated human activities that produce them. Only then can one comprehend the complexity
of the situation. To understand how different communities are formed and how they are related to one another in geographical and economic space a cross-section needs to be made through the same set of strata shown in Figure 4.2 for each area. Only then does one begin to understand the complexity, variety and interrelatedness of the human activities that occur in that area. Without it the concept of communal space cannot easily be fully understood.

What can be deduced from the model (Figure 4.2) until now is that although the map represents a still picture of the composition of communities in the area, layers of human activities and the relationships of activities between the layers are far from stagnant. Some, as James (1952) in his classical piece explained, are dynamic and change constantly, while others are stable and are slow to change. But when the model is studied from a longer-term perspective (see the diagrammatic representation of time on the right side of Figure 4.2) it gains further dynamism. As the construct is moved backwards into the past one obtains a historical perspective of how the different layers evolved over time to bring about the current situation. When it is projected into the future one gets an indication of how things eventually might turn out. As the model is fast-forwarded from any chosen point in the past to what it looks like today, one would more than likely detect significant changes in certain areas over time. Certain communal boundaries might contract or expand, others might remain relatively stable, while others might even disappear. The same is likely to happen when the scale of the picture is changed. If one were to zoom in and out of the picture, certain communal spaces are likely to become clearer and more defined while others will fade away, even disappear.

It is the geographical footprint of the activities represented by the layers in the figure that gives meaning to social and economic space. Space therefore gets ‘coloured in’ by different people in different ways and it is the different combinations of ‘colour’ that turn undefined space into defined spaces and ultimately into places. It can therefore be said that all communal space must necessarily have ‘place’ qualities. Without it communal space would not be discernable. As the term ‘place’ is used in this context, it not only has location, it also has emotional meaning. According to Karjalainen (2000) place is incorporated into the ontological anatomy of human experience. It reflects our engagement in the world outside and inside ourselves. Meaning is attached to the notion of place through our perceptions: ‘Place is a nexus of meaning constructed by experience. In this sense, place is not a neutral, objective segment of physical space but a site of concrete human involvement. As a result, place is not only a tangible landscape but also intangible mindscape, indeed, place is a fusion of the two’ (Karjalainen, 2000, p. 1).

The different manifestations of space are looked at next.

**Layers of space**

While a considerable body of literature has developed on the differences between ‘space’ and ‘place’ and the way in which the relationship between the two gives meaning to each other, not enough attention has been given to how the two relate to urban living in an environment of increasing hostilities between inhabitants. It is difficult to give meaning to the term ‘place’ without the term ‘space’ because in its most basic form, ‘place’ only implies ‘locality’ which cannot be understood outside its spatial context. In itself, ‘space’ has no meaning. It is a dimensionless mathematical conception, a continuous extension that only acquires meaning when given specific dimensions or when linked to definable objects, concepts or ideas.
Human spatiality is layered, influenced by natural systems and shaped by political economics and cultural politics. The nature of the latter two tends to be complicated, not transparent, and subjective (Camp, 2002). The first facet of space, also called ‘first space’, consists of our ‘perceived’ geophysical environment. It is tangible and can empirically be mapped and measured. ‘Second space’ is a creation of the human mind. It is ‘imagined’ representations of mental or cognitive space. ‘Third space’ is our ‘lived reality’, ‘coded spaces of representation’ that mould and give meaning to social life (Soja, 1996; Berquist, 1999; Flanagan, 2001; Boer, 2000). Some simply refer to the three categories as perceived or material space, conceived or designed space and lived or applied space respectively (Camp, 2002). Although Soja (1996) sees all three facets as intertwined, he regards second space as the space of domination, ‘of power and ideology, and of control and surveillance’ while third space represents ‘dominated space’ (Flanagan, 2001).

How third space can be socially engineered and manipulated through socialist-oriented thinking (eclectic or otherwise) to recreate social and economic space as part of their struggle to liberate and emancipate and free society from a neo-liberal thinking (Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 1996) is one means to an end. Another, and this remains the main aim of this chapter, is to see how different urban policy options are likely to affect space over time and when that happens, how the changes in space are likely to impact on their place qualities. Ultimately the aim is to see how third spaces can be utilized as a means to transform them into ‘places’ where people could feel safe or at least less vulnerable than at present. The purpose of this endeavour is to link the abstract realm of second space thinking with the concrete realities of third space praxis in a way that will create an environment (‘places’) that will reduce social tension.

To be able to analyse the likely impact different urban policy measures might have on urban space and especially on urban ‘place’ qualities, one must first determine which factors are important to be kept in mind when place qualities are assessed.

**Instincts, human nature and space**

For the purpose of bridging the void that exists between those who feel threatened by the thought of open and integrated urban societies and those who become nervous by the idea of defensible urban space, four factors that largely determine the way in which people live together in society need to be recognized.

First, self-survival is a basic natural human instinct and society looked at from that perspective is inherently (in the first instance) self-centred. To compete for survival in a society where people are inherently unequal in terms of their mental, physical and intellectual abilities cause insecurity to some degree in all people. It can therefore be said that mental insecurity is part of the human condition. Characteristics such as possessiveness, competitiveness, domination, extroversion, indecisiveness, introversion and many others – in essence all different manifestations of ‘fixed action patterns’ (to use the psychological term) born of insecurity – are instinctive qualities that are drawn upon from time to time for the sake of self-preservation. Judged on the relatively small proportion of people who tend to be over-confident, daring and enterprising, and as a result of that, ‘come out on top of the rest’ in life, perhaps a majority of them tends to be defensive, modest and minimalist in their approach to self-survival.

Second, people tend to classify whatever they see – a characteristic that is partially driven by insecurity and partially by their inquisitiveness. It is interesting, for instance, to
try to think of anything that interests people (something they ponder or talk about) that is not somehow classified or compared. In fact, it is people’s inquisitiveness and their universal urge to classify that drive the human mind. This was confirmed by Aristotle when he concluded that logic requires a definition of a word to place the thing referred to by the word in a class, and explain how it is distinguished from other things in the same class. Without it the human brain struggles to grasp the meaning of things.

Much of the classification that people do is related to self-preservation and therefore their classification tends to be qualitative, that is, to find out whether a condition, situation or person is safe, beneficial, exciting, acceptable, dependable, achievable, good, strong and a host of other qualitative (and quantitative) categories, or not. Acquaintances that are positively classified are often regarded as friends, people in ‘our’ camp. The remainder, including strangers, are either regarded as foes or at least someone to feel indifferent about or not to be (immediately) trusted. Classes (qualities) that are most often visited in the minds of people fall into two categories: ‘familiar’ or ‘strange’; ‘good’ or ‘bad’; ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’; ‘acceptable’ or ‘unacceptable’; ‘comfortable’ or ‘uncomfortable’; ‘beneficial’ or ‘unbeneficial’; seldom anything in between. In fact, when a decision has to be made about something or someone that could affect one’s well-being, personal qualitative classifications almost always only contain ‘black’ and ‘white’ classes, seldom ‘grey’, and when grey, they almost always imply a compromise of some kind – that is, moving elements of something that were previously classified as negative to a positive category. And to compromise almost always means accepting something that does not come naturally to that person, a situation that in the long run causes tension and stress. That is why it is so difficult for humans to practise altruism (Miller, 1991) – one of the basic moral conditions for survival of the human race. The more compromising the circumstances, the greater the psychological stress factors. This especially applies to the complicated urban environment where people are often required to compromise, that is, listen to something they do not necessarily want to hear, see something that disturbs them, or are expected to react to or act in a manner that differs from what they really think or feel. The impact of cultural and personality differences and pressure to maintain high levels of productivity tend to claim their toll on the emotional condition of the individual over time – making it necessary for them to ‘take a break’ from that environment from time to time. To survive psychologically under these circumstances humans need a retreat, a ‘place’ where the ‘greys’ and ‘blacks’ of everyday (urban) life can be minimized. One such area is ‘home’ (Karjalainen, 2000).

The binary opposition of post-structuralists, who argue that meanings and intellectual categories and classes are unstable and shift over time (something that is generally accepted, also by this author), does not invalidate the binary predisposition of humans. Binary choices simply tend to expand or move along as meanings and perceptions change with the shifting of conditions or with the addition of new variables to the list. To deny the binary proclivity of humans is to deny the existence of human nature. Nowhere is there clearer proof of this than in the very academic environment in which we find ourselves. Euphemistically-termed ‘schools of thought’ often put scholars in opposing camps or clubs – the ‘us groups’ versus the ‘them groups’. This is a condition that often causes one group to segregate themselves intellectually from another and to be intellectually, even socially, hostile to the opposing group(s). The deep-seated antagonism between proponents of different schools of thought in the very field in which we find ourselves in this chapter can often be intuitively sensed in publications. In terms of human reaction
towards one another in the built environment morality may cause larger proportions of inherently negative key stimuli to be moved to the positive side of the balance-sheet, but that does not diminish the crucial significance of the human’s binary proclivity. And it certainly does not reduce the impact of mental stress brought about by our instinctive binary proclivity. Hypothetically speaking it could be said that had it not been for people’s binary proclivity, proponents of different schools of thought would have been much more willing to consider the logic arguments of opponents’ points of view. But unfortunately this is not the case. The binary proclivity of humans is alive and well, despite post-structuralist claims to the contrary.

Third, people have a natural desire to ‘belong’, hence the saying: ‘birds of a feather flock together’. The human’s ‘club mentality’ is not a racial issue, although, to be honest, culture more often than not does have a lot to do with it. It points to interests, lifestyles, background, beliefs, living conditions, the stage in people’s life cycles, and so on. The club mentality is, once again, driven by an inherent feeling of insecurity – that is, finding safety in an environment that is familiar or represents ‘common ground’. Generally, ‘home’, ‘community’, and the immediate surrounding environment in which a person lives are one environment in which this need is most satisfactorily fulfilled.

Fourth, people tend to interact on a small scale, mostly one-on-one, even within a group, large or small. They seldom interact comfortably on a large scale, and even if they do, they still tend to focus on individuals in the group – those with whom they make the most pleasant eye contact or with whom they, intuitively, feel most comfortable with. This tendency is also essentially linked to a feeling of insecurity. The natural inclination of people to deal with other people on a small rather than a large scale becomes most apparent in the tendency of most people to show some form of ‘stage fright’ when they feel exposed or overwhelmed, especially when they unexpectedly have to deal with large groups on their own. Also, traces of insecurity can be seen in two opposite instinctive human responses that are found very often: blind admiration or jealousy towards someone who represents or possesses something you desire but is out of reach.

A combination of the third and fourth characteristics cause people to prefer to live in little, identifiable places, small villages or neighbourhoods, cells with which they can identify, even when they live in cities. That is why cities tend to have organic structures, why they grow by means of multiple cell division, and why people often attach more than usual significance to the names of ‘their’ streets, residential areas and cities than others. That is also why demographically and socially, communities have always possessed a cell-like structure and why it is difficult for people to behave differently.

People are unhappy when they are isolated for long periods from society, even isolated or ostracized within society. But too much close interpersonal contact for too long between too many people without sufficient affinity for one another (an outcome of the desire for people of likeness to be together) can also lead to stress. It makes people want to spend some time alone, or at least spend time with people they have sufficient affinity for, to relax. That is why people need a place of retreat, a safe haven where they periodically can go to, to isolate themselves from other people who are different from them, a place where they can drop their ‘guards’ to recuperate mentally and physically. This is a basic need of people.

The less familiar the circumstances under which people interact, the more demanding the environment becomes and the more stressful people tend to become. This is the basic
reason why people spontaneously arrange themselves in familiar groups. It is the potential tension between the familiar and unfamiliar, between what is safe and what is unsafe that determines the position and nature of boundaries between people and communities. Whenever enough people feel safe with a particular set of trade-offs between what they regard as familiar, harmless, comfortable, desirable and acceptable and what they would regard as unfamiliar, unsafe, uncomfortable and unacceptable, a community bond develops.\textsuperscript{4} Once community or ‘place’ boundaries have been established in urban space – and such boundaries are not necessarily well-defined lines on the ground – people tend to defend it. If this familiar environment or common ground is threatened, people feel threatened. But politics (or the defending of schools of thought) have a lot to do with how threatening community formation is perceived. That is why some people see gated communities as a potentially dangerous form of community formation, a threat to an open and socially integrated society, while the same critics will have no problem whatsoever with the century-old ‘Chinatown’ or ‘Little Italy’ in their midst, for instance.

A combination of people’s competitiveness, their periodic need to interact, and their periodic need to retreat creates the necessary dynamism for development, discovery and innovation in the urban environment. That is why, according to Friedmann (1972), the urban environment is so conducive to social and economic development. Tension between factions within the built environment causes a continual struggle between opposing communities with different lifestyles. Methods often used by communities to maintain acceptable living conditions include:

1. the deliberate repression of the ‘them group(s)’, not giving them any room to express themselves in any way;
2. depending on dominant-minority proportions, the effective segregation of the ‘us group’ from the ‘them group(s)’;
3. effective neutralization of the ‘them group(s)’ and their views and lifestyle(s);
4. accommodation of the ‘them group(s)’ and their views and lifestyle(s); and
5. complete adoption of the views and lifestyle(s) of the ‘them group(s)’ by the ‘us group(s)’.

Normally, the ‘struggle’ and ‘opposition’ is friendly, neighbourly and non-confrontational, but sometimes the opposition between factions can become strong, unyielding, visible and divisive. Factors such as economic, cultural and especially religious differences, expressed in political terms, are often the cause for intense spatial opposition. How often have we heard opposing groups expressing their desire to either defend the ‘freedom loving lifestyle of the West’ or the rejection of the ‘immoral lifestyle of the infidels’? Differences that are significant enough for them to be willing to lose their lives in defending them.

For the reasons outlined above the question of how to deal with cultural diversity in urban areas remains a contentious policy issue. Ideologically, people see the possible solutions to the problem differently. By and large, social liberals support urban multiculturalism, more often than not in unqualified terms. Fundamentalist thinking in this group implies the ‘pulping’ or ‘mashing’ of urban society – that is the cultural mixing or atomizing of urban societies to such an extent that cultural differences become a non-issue. Idealists amongst social conservatives believe in the ‘melting pot’ concept – the cultural homogenizing of urban societies along prescribed cultural lines to such an extent
that cultural differences become a non-issue. The former believe urban society should be
infinitely tolerant of cultural diversity. The latter hold the opposite position. In countries
where cultural differences are created by immigration they believe immigrants should
abandon their culture and adopt the dominant culture of the host nation, or, if they want
to maintain their culture, become socially invisible. None of the two ideals is realistic or
generally achievable under real-life conditions in a free society, neither as a prescriptive
policy control measure nor as an absolute normative condition.

A more reasonable position would be to accept the following two realities. First, some
aliens are willing to adapt culturally, others not, and have the right not to. This also
applies to countries where cultural differences have not been created by recent immigra-
tion but have persisted for centuries such as in former colonized countries. Second, some
people have particular, even peculiar ‘place’ preferences, and have the right to exercise
such preferences. As a result, certain cultures mix more readily in the urban environment
than others. Muslim fundamentalists, for instance, are offended by the lifestyle of certain
Westerners. Acceptance of these realities necessitates a tolerant approach to ‘place’ qual-
ities and morphological options in the urban environment. Uniform urban policy,
whether it slants towards a universally ‘mashed’ multi-cultural environment or towards a
‘melted down’ cultural homogeneity is an unachievable objective in a free society.

This argument ties in with another contentious issue: the urban poor and how they
relate to the more prosperous parts of the urban society. Supporters of market-driven
urbanization are usually also supporters of the ‘competitive state’ concept. They are nor-
mally economically (neo-) liberal, many of them finding themselves in the social conser-
ervative camp, while opponents are usually socialist-oriented, supporters of the ‘welfare
state’ concept, and are typecast as social liberals. The division is not always clear-cut,
however. Some overlap of sentiments may occur around the centre.

The former understand that the numbers of the poor in cities are continuously bol-
stered by Myrdal’s (1957) cumulative causation effect and that the problem of urban
inequality is therefore a fact of life, not a conspiracy of one section of the population
against another. Although the problem should receive continuous attention they see it as
a persisting condition, one that has been with us for as long as people lived in cities and
is likely to continue despite our best efforts to create opportunities for the lagging segment
of the population to catch up. They generally feel that poverty is not an unqualified amorph-
ous condition. Although there are some who are poor through no fault of their own,
there are others whose poverty is largely self-inflicted. In the case of the latter, long-term
fatalism – a mentality of ‘do as our parents did, live the way our parents did’ – without a
willingness to break the destructive mould, plays an important part in their plight. As a
result, neoliberals feel that the society at large should do as much as possible to improve
the conditions of the former but, at the same time, more responsibility (pressure) should
be placed on the latter to make use of opportunities (especially education facilities) that
exist to improve their competitive standing in the urban economic environment. It is their
view that government should provide incentives (often through monetary policy) to indi-
viduals to fulfil their own destiny by liberating them economically and by creating oppor-
tunities for them to prosper.

The other group, on the other hand, regard the poor as deliberately disadvantaged
by the former group. They unconditionally sympathize with the poor as the ‘voiceless
community’ and often blame the ‘system’ for the persisting inequalities without critically
looking at what the poor could reasonably be expected to do to help themselves. This group sees economic socialism and political-economic intervention as crucial in an engineered condition of equality – a process in which the government should play a dominant role through judicial, regulatory and fiscal control measures.

Justification for positions taken towards the end of this section will be found in the next section.

Cohesion versus divergence
The main underlying point that has been made up to now is that people need one another to survive in the urban environment but it seems as if a part of the overall psychological and socioeconomic structural make-up of urban areas makes it difficult, even prevents them from living as completely spatially, socially and economically integrated societies. Although the reasons for this contradiction are well-known they are not always openly recognized.

There are cohesion forces at play that hold urban populations together, despite their diversity. Apart from well-established positive economic (Hurd, 1924; Haig, 1926; Christaller, 1933; Lösch, 1954; Alonso, 1964) and social agglomeration forces that prevent cities from disintegrating, security also plays an important part. They force people to live together but the way in which people interact makes it difficult for them to forge complete cohesion. Interaction typically occurs in two ways, bipolar and parallel (Philbrick, 1957). Parallel interaction occurs when two or more individuals have similar needs for engagement with another person located elsewhere, such as people forming an audience for an entertainer or people living in a suburb relative to a city centre. However, all interaction between two individuals necessarily occurs in a bipolar fashion. As a result, spike-like (nodal) clusters of bipolar personal connections tend to develop between an individual and other individuals at locations where substantial time is spent (such as the person’s permanent residence, for instance). These spike-like arrangements of personal bipolar connections form the activity patterns or kinetic space of a person over a period of time (Doxiadis, 1970). As time goes on the person’s activity sphere or kinetic space keeps on expanding at a decreasing rate until, theoretically, it reaches its maximum.

Due to their proclivity for small, intimate, and familiar spaces as well as the effect of friction of distance, people normally tend to only maintain regular close personal informal relationships with a few people, some in the area in which they live and work, and a few elsewhere. However, they cannot escape interaction with other people they come into contact with in their immediate environment on a daily basis. Less personal but regular social interaction necessarily tends to occur with a larger number of people at work and at home, but other than that people tend to largely live together as strangers in a city. They see one another and observe one another’s appearances and behaviour in the streets and in buildings, react superficially to each other’s movements and gestures (mostly avoiding one another respectfully), interact superficially whenever necessary, and intuitively form opinions and classify people and situations around them as they observe them – all of this happening without really knowing one another. By and large, this is how people in cities live. Over a period of time each person maintains a relatively small number of ‘us relations’ and a large number of ‘them relations’. To create an urban environment in which individuals in a city would feel comfortable and safe, all the fundamental factors of social interaction discussed above need to be kept in mind.
The urban spaces that are talked about here are subjectively created and can be likened to the true original meaning of the term ‘habitus’ described as ‘formed systems of durable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles that generate and organize practices and representations’ (Jenkins, 1992). This is how most people see urban spaces and why they typecast different parts of them differently – regarding them as ‘places’ rather than just amorphous, structureless, ‘open’ urban spaces devoid of subjective character. Even in cases where negative connotations are attached to ‘places’, such as ‘slums’ and ‘ghettos’, attempts are usually made to transform them from ‘places’ burdened with a negative image to places with a positive one.

Dictionaries describe the term community as people living in the same area, or a group of people with joint interests, ownership, fellowship and identity of character (Barnhart, 1969). Such spatial relationships can be of cultural, social, religious, economic or intellectual origin, often a combination of several of them, and usually (but not necessarily) manifest in all three spatial spheres, first, second and third space. Looking at interaction from a social angle, space is shared when the kinetic fields of individuals intersect, and the closer the spatial interaction gets to a person’s personal space the more important cultural, behavioural or personal compatibility becomes. A large proportion of daily activities in urban areas occur in acutely shared geographical space.

Two aspects of the term ‘social interaction’ are relevant in this chapter: formal and informal. It is the interplay of activities of people in a mixture of these two realms in the urban environment that largely determines the ‘place’ qualities of different parts of urban social space in a particular city. On the one hand, people’s personal choices in spontaneous, informal social interaction are affected by their level of development, their interests and their perceptions, all of which are tinted by their culture – that is, their language, religion and social habits, all rolled into what could be called their ‘way of life’. That is what determines the ‘place’ qualities of the urban space that is occupied by actors involved in that social interaction. A person whose way of life differs significantly from the living conditions of others immediately around them in the neighbourhood often results in that person leading a discontented and isolated life in the neighbourhood.

Because of their proximity, informal social interaction, however brief and superficial, is something that cannot be avoided between individuals living in the same neighbourhood. Behaviour is influenced (and in certain communities even enforced) by the dominant culture in the area. The degree of expected compliance to particular norms and forms of behaviour in a community can simultaneously act as a cohesive and centrifugal force. For those that tie in, it is a strong force of cohesion. For those that do not, it is a strong determinant of social diversity, much stronger than what is normally recognized.

Contentment of inhabitants in a neighbourhood largely depends on the ‘place’ qualities of the area. The attributes of the land, property, inhabitants and shared goods and services give neighbourhoods their distinctiveness (Webster, 2003). Lifestyles, shaped by the culture of people, play a large part in the creation of place qualities in the neighbourhood. The larger the cultural, religious and economic differences are between people living in an area, the potentially sharper and more defined their social spaces become. That is why, according to Zelinsky (1971), a locational shift of a person from one community to another with an entirely different social composition a city block away represents a more significant and often more stressful change, both for the migrant and the host
community, than a move of a person from one community to a similar community thousands of kilometres away.

Attributes are rarely uniformly distributed throughout a neighbourhood. In socially divisive areas they could differ from street to street, in which case more than one community would exist in the same neighbourhood. Such conditions could have a significant impact on experiences of urban living and patterns of social interaction within the urban environment. Although ties of deep friendship are not necessarily formed between people living in the same area, a special bond of mutual belonging normally develops between them. Their experiences of quality of life are largely determined by the living conditions created by the inhabitants of the area through their customs and lifestyles. Similar lifestyles, mutual respect and friendliness amongst inhabitants bring contentment in the sharing of urban space while hostilities have the opposite effect. This is a universal principle.

In the open and free urban environments of the post-modernist world, increasing numbers of people with diverse cultures and lifestyles tend to live in the same areas. This has turned erstwhile fairly homogeneous urban spaces where people had similar lifestyles and customs into diverse societies where homogeneity can usually only be achieved in micro spaces, and often only through negotiations between neighbours. The negotiation of pleasing micro neighbourhood attributes between inhabitants through implicit and explicit contracts (Webster, 2003) is becoming increasingly necessary, and successes increasingly difficult. As a result, more and more people are opting for urban management and urban design principles in which a variety of small, intimate cells of residents with compatible lifestyles are created. This could be regarded as one of the most significant trade marks of the post-modern urban society.

However, there is resistance. Policies that have allowed the influx of relatively large numbers of foreigners to First World countries have been met with considerable opposition of late. Although the reasons for this are well-known, few, especially the politicians, are ready to admit the real reason behind the immigration scare. Migration numbers were previously regarded as manageable. Many migrants used to adopt their host nations’ culture and those who did not melt in were small enough in numbers not to pose a threat. However, migration pressure is on the increase, a large proportion of it illegal. Not only the numbers but also the nationalities of some of these migrants have become politically sensitive issues. Some find it difficult to adapt culturally, while others tend to be hostile towards locals for economic, political and religious reasons. As a consequence migration laws are being tightened while ostracizing tactics of host nations towards foreigners are slowing down post-modern change. Although generally regarded as typically American, the ‘melting pot’ concept applies to the same if not a greater degree in most countries of the world. This has clearly been demonstrated in the recent uprisings in France (Holmes, 2006). Norms are largely determined by the dominant culture of the local society, which, more often than not, can also be traced back to particular dominant (or otherwise historically deep-seated underlying) ideological and religious convictions.

When the cultural behaviour of foreigners ties in with the norms of the local society, or when they are different but not assertive in their way of thinking and manner of conduct, they are regarded as ‘socially compatible’. If not, they become part of a ‘minority group’, a term that has normally clear ethnic, religious and cultural (and more often than not also underlying material) connotations. The generality of this phenomenon all over the world
serves as a clear indication that compatibility does not always come that easy to members of minority groups. Members of such communities (especially first-generation minorities) who either find it difficult or impossible to adapt due to specific cultural habits or religious convictions, often prefer to form their own cultural-religious safe havens by clustering together in what they eventually regard (even brand) as their ‘own’ areas or ‘their territory’. The boundaries between such communities and those of others around them are often quite visible and sharp but they are not necessarily hard and confrontational, as the existence of Chinese communities in North American cities for a long time has demonstrated. But sometimes such boundaries are not only sharp, they are also hard – representing very steep gradients of non-tolerance from within the boundaries of what non-conforming groups often regard as ‘their territories’. Examples of these are enclaves created by gangs and certain pockets of cultural and religious groups in cities all over the world. The social integration approach (which aims to distribute diversity thinly enough not to adversely affect the social conditions of the majority overall) obviously would not work among these communities.

Although particular economic ideologies are usually blamed for the problem of social polarization, especially when inhabitants of such social pockets of minorities can also be linked to general conditions of poverty and economic inequality, they are often self-inflicted. In fact, the relationship between ideology and social urban structure is not clear-cut at all. The reality of ‘minorities’ and the spatial polarization of some groups from societies at large are visible in countries with governments that cover the entire spectrum of practised political ideologies today. A good example is the French society, which is known for its socially liberal and economically socialist orientation, yet its alleged cultural intolerance and economic discrimination against Muslims of African descent have widely been described as principal causes for the recent spate of violence in the country (Holmes, 2006). But it could also be argued that had the Muslims not alienated themselves through their beliefs and habits and were willing to mash socially and culturally with the French society at large their social polarization would not have occurred to the agree that it did.

Addressing the criticism of ‘fragmentation’ in the post-modern urban society, the most fundamental factor that determines spatial urban structure in a society is the basic personal human right of choice of association. People have a right to differentiate themselves from others through their own conviction, choice or behaviour, in a way that makes this distinction visible in urban space. The forming of distinguishable communities in this way (segregation if you will) is a legitimate human right to choose. The right of people to associate with whoever they want to is an age-old liberal principle. If these choices result in the formation of distinguishable communities, which they often do, then they should be tolerated on condition that they are not criminal and do not impede others from forming or belonging to communities of their own choice elsewhere within urban space. Turning urban space into urban ‘place’ is an outcome of living the human ‘condition’. The choice whether people want to form part of a ‘human cocktail’ (mixed, integrated urban societies), or one of the smaller pieces of the human urban ‘fruit salad’ (fragmented post-modernistic urban form) or want to melt into larger distinguishable ‘urban patches’ (segregated, modernist urban forms), is entirely up to the individual. If this result tends toward urban modernism and structuralism under certain circumstances, and toward post-modernism and post-structuralism under others, then both forms (even within the
same city or parts of a city) should be tolerated. Achieving either form of extremism (i.e.,
the ideal of ‘totally ‘open’, integrated but socially and economically diverse societies, or a
totally ‘melted down’ state of social unity) in a continuum of urban spatiality seems only
possible under tyrannical extremist ideological praxis. Activists who tend to drift towards
either outer extremes of the divide in this debate run the risk of becoming irrelevant. Even
in culturally homogeneous areas, differences in levels of development, personalities, abil-
ities, means and priorities lead to cell-like urban structures, each with its own particular
‘place’ qualities. The real world is inherently varied and unequal and is likely to remain so
as long as there are people on earth. Trying to undo or deconstruct fundamental social
processes – spaces that have evolved spontaneously over time – goes against human nature
and is bound to fail. This we have seen in Bellamy (1888), Gillette (1894) and Le
Corbusier’s (1922) proposals of what they regarded as an urban utopia – egalitarian, even
uniform living conditions for people of all walks of life in urban areas. But these propos-
als soon proved to be examples of urban dystopia – conditions that deprive the individ-
ual of his or her individuality and that can only be created when they are enforced upon
through extreme conditions of state tyranny. History has taught us that people cherish
their freedom. Only when urban dwellers are allowed to choose who they want to associ-
ate with and are allowed to create their own living spaces will ‘places’ be created where
people’s happiness is best secured.

Urban policy and third space
The end remarks in the previous section can be stated as a universal ideal. People want to
live under the best possible environmental conditions, and they are willing to sacrifice for it.
Experience over many years has taught us that, although some people are initially forced to
live under less pleasant circumstances in older suburbs or in mixed land use areas inside or
close to city centres, those that can afford it move to cleaner suburban areas or even to small
urban areas outside the built-up areas of cities as soon as conditions allow them to do so.
According to Hart (1983) people in the former group, that is, the less well-to-do whose pri-
ority it is to find employment and cheap accommodation in the city first, even if they ini-
tially have to live under less ideal living conditions, are driven by ‘productionism’. As soon
as circumstances permit, however, most people choose to move away from such locations to
more pleasant living conditions in the suburbs and in more rural settings outside the city, hence
the tendency of urban sprawl at first and later even counterurbanization (Berry, 1976;
Champion, 1989; Fielding, 1989). The latter group is driven by ‘environmentalism’, that is,
people who have ‘arrived’ financially and are able to make pleasant living conditions rather
than employment their priority (Geyer and Kontuly, 1993; Geyer, 1996).

That is why similar trends in urban evolution are visible all over the world. In the begin-
nings, cities may have a mono-nodal structure, an urban area dominated by a central busi-
ness area, but as cities grow and residential areas become more and more dispersed, the
mono-centric spatial structure becomes increasingly inefficient and costly. Commuting
costs, rising land values and ageing infrastructure cause some economic activities to
decentralize (Richardson, 1980). Market forces come into play causing decentralized
nodes to develop, turning once mono-nodal urban structures into multi-nodal structures.
In the process, central business districts may lose their original function, forcing them to
transform (Fogelson, 2001). Meanwhile decentralized nodes expand, some of them even
turning into modern, vibrant ‘edge cities’.
In an attempt to slow down, stop, or even reverse these needs-driven urban morphology trends, urban densification and mixed land use policy strategies are being suggested by environmental and social interventionists in many parts of the world. In many respects these suggested policies have a significant potential impact on living conditions in cities and on urban communities, issues that squarely fall in the domain of institutional economics.

In institutional economic terms, a neighbourhood is regarded as ‘a nexus of contracts that assign property rights over local public goods and private goods’ (Webster, 2003). Economic property rights are de facto. Legal property rights are de jure and are designed to protect the former. Similarities in tastes combined with affordability create markets in housing. Neighbourhoods represent similar, even identical tastes in private and public goods on offer. Protected high-density and cluster housing options are a popular form of organizational order that allow property owners to form ‘housing firms’. High-density and cluster housing serve as pools of property rights for the sake of protecting that right, maximizing collective advantages and minimizing the deadweight of shared costs. This kind of housing holds advantages such as the creation of an environment in which inhabitants can feel safe while at the same time reduce (even eliminate) the responsibility of government to provide and maintain public services.

Much is being made of the role that central-oriented urban densification, combined with the mixing of land uses, can play in making the urban environment organizationally more efficient while, at the same time, also causing savings in transportation costs (Breheny, 1996). One of the principal arguments that is raised in this lobby is that central-oriented urban densification will increase residential densities, revitalize brownfields, improve urban ecology and reduce the costs of providing infrastructure (Wackernagel and Rees, 1999; Burton, 2000).

However, the upgrading of infrastructure in built-up areas is usually an expensive exercise, more so than on virgin land. Experience has taught us that new infrastructure rarely links well with existing infrastructure due to product and design changes. It is also often a cumbersome process causing considerable damage to established flora as well as other existing interwoven infrastructure that did not need an upgrade at that stage. Replacing one type of infrastructure usually necessitates extensive reparation of other civil services in the area and even the replacement of infrastructure, which otherwise would not have been necessary due to collateral damage. Giving these facts does not mean that brownfield development is wrong or should not be pursued; on the contrary. Brownfield development is necessary but should not be offered as an alternative to market-related urban development. It is simply part of the process of urban regeneration.

How making the city more urban would improve urban ecology – that is, the interaction of plants, animals and humans with each other and with their environment in urban or urbanizing settings – is not clear. The opposite generally applies when urban densification occurs (von Hoffman, Belsky and Lee, 2006).

It has been found that urban densification tends to exacerbate the plight of the poor in the developing world. Higher urban densities and the consequential increasing pressure on urban land are pushing the urban poor further onto hazardous land. It further marginalizes them and increases the rate of environmental degradation in urban areas. In these cases post-modern urban forms of development have been found to exacerbate rather than solve the problems that modern forms of urbanization are alleged to have
caused – the spread of slums and urban decay in old and undesirable neighbourhoods (Pantelic, Srdanovic and Greene, 2005).

Another key argument linked to this is that higher urban densities linked with the mixing of land uses will cause reductions in transportation, which in turn will reduce environmental risks such as global warming, a condition that is largely linked to high levels of carbon dioxide emissions caused by automobiles. Although air pollution caused by automobiles has undoubtedly a negative effect on the air quality in cities, the overall effect of the automobile, let alone industrial emissions, on global warming is still a highly disputed matter (see Chapter 18).8

This does not diminish our duty to do whatever we can to reduce the levels of carbon dioxide emissions in cities, however. But increasing urban densities and the mixing of land uses are not the final solution to the problem because they will not necessarily bring about transportation savings. In fact, the only way in which it could be argued that the mixing of land uses will positively affect transportation costs is under the assumption that a majority of people will necessarily find employment close to home, an assumption that is generally refuted by anecdotal evidence of work–home travelling time in cities all over the world. It is also said that the average American could expect to change jobs 15 times over the course of their lifetime. Finding jobs close to where you live every time is simply an unrealistic expectation.

Looking at it from a pure locational-economic point of view, much of the potential advantages of scale and agglomeration economics created by the clustering of businesses at certain locations might be lost, jeopardized at best in the mixed land use scenario. This not only applies to ‘stationary’ businesses but also to the transportation sector, which depends on viable volumes of cargo and people moving from the same general origins to the same general destinations. Fragmenting these economies by mixing land uses puts this important element of urban economics at risk.

Another point that should be made here is that urban sprawl is an inevitable outcome of urban agglomeration and no urban densification policy can prevent it from happening. In fact, sprawl is not nearly as negative as some are making it out to be. Through the effect of market forces on sprawl, the deconcentration of businesses has led to the transformation of urban areas from mono-nodality, to multi-nodality and in certain cases even post-multi-nodality. In the process, sprawl and the deconcentration of businesses have actually improved urban efficiency. This particular debate touches on the issue of agglomeration economics. The same positive externalities and increasing returns to scale that initially caused businesses to cluster in central areas have since caused the formation of suburban commercial and industrial centres. Not only do firms benefit from each other through linkages and increasing customer support there but the public at large benefits from cheaper, more viable public transport options as a result of the concentration of businesses in particular locations in the city.

In this debate it is argued that city centres in cities that have advanced to the multi-nodal urban form have lost their erstwhile attraction because they have lost many of their businesses to edge cities. These shifts were mainly caused by traffic congestion in city centres and high costs of land and services there. According to this lobby, large amounts of traffic are now generated in and around edge cities between business nodes and adjacent suburbs and in the process, fewer commuters travel between suburbs and city centres. As was mentioned before, development costs, that is, the combined costs of land, the provision of
services and construction are often less on decentralized undeveloped land than on brownfield sites. The market-related lobby, therefore, can also claim the same advantages in the lowering of environmental risks associated with high levels of transportation than the densification, mixed land use lobby.

Another argument used by the proponents of the urban densification lobby is that it would reduce the amounts of agricultural land that would otherwise be gobbled up by urban sprawl, a factor that has wider ‘place‘ consequences. In contrast, proponents of the market principle in the United States calculated that if all the people in the country were to live in urban areas at the current densities, only around 3 per cent of the country’s agricultural land will be used – an insignificant amount in their estimation.

Several other issues related to urban densification and mixing of land uses have not been sufficiently debated yet. The economic implications of a policy of urban densification and mixed land uses discussed above are just part of the concerns that need to be considered. Central to the theme of this chapter is what impact urban densification and mixed land uses would have on the ‘place’ qualities of urban space. There is no question that one of the inevitable outcomes of urban densification over the longer term would be to make urban areas more ‘urban’ and at the same time less liveable no matter how ‘smart’ the development. And adding mixed land uses to the ‘more urban’ environment will also make the city ‘more busy’. There is overwhelming anecdotal evidence that people prefer to live in environmentally pleasing areas (Wells, 1902; Burgess, 1925; Hoyt, 1939; Berry, 1976; Hart, 1983; Geyer, 1996) and that the infiltration of business and industries into residential areas ultimately leads to the relocation of those who can afford it to areas that are offering more pleasant living conditions. Those who cannot afford it simply have to live with the consequences.

Unless high-quality mixed business and residential environments can be ensured through high-quality development projects, the gradual infiltration of businesses into older residential areas is normally followed over the longer term by falling land prices for residential use, the infiltration of lower-income residents, the eventual relocation of the businesses that moved in and caused the transformation in the first place, and ultimately into the development of ghetto conditions in such areas. This has been proven over and over again through the course of history. Given the high costs involved in creating quality townscapes in high-density urban areas, such as the ‘Canary Wharfs’ of this world, for instance, it is unrealistic to expect large numbers of people, especially people in the lower-income brackets to afford living in human-made idyllic residential islands. Even for those who can afford living there it is unrealistic to expect the high levels of ‘urban-ness’ in those areas not to impact negatively on the ‘place‘ qualities that are necessary for people to wind down at home. If having your own private space means finding it only between the walls of your home, boxed in between others, more often than not high up in the air, with public open spaces as the only option of ‘connecting’ with the natural environment for large parts of the year, then the negative consequences of urban densification over the longer term deserve much more serious contemplation than they have received until now. These are the reasons given by inhabitants for the failure of the high-rise public housing formula in post-Second World War urban England and it is perhaps one of the most important reasons why so many people who have the means to do so choose to relocate from busy inner city locations to more rural settings close by, despite the risk of higher commuting costs.
There is no doubt, however, that the policies of urban densification and the mixing of land uses are justified, that the former will eventually result in bringing per capita living space levels closer to per capita personal space levels, while the latter will surely add hereto uncalculated pollution, intensity and psychological costs to the mix. Ultimately an urban environment will be created in which neighbours will have no choice but to try and negotiate contracts of decency and civility between them in an attempt to reduce the negative externalities of noise, air, water, visual and social pollution on their lives – steps that are likely to increase tension between them, not reduce it.

Conclusions
People want to live in a place, not simply in urban space. To turn urban space into place, it needs to be defined, needs to be given character. The entire city does not have one and the same indistinguishable character. The culture and lifestyle of the people who live in an area determine its character. If they are happy where they live they will take ‘ownership’ of it. That is, when the streets in which they live, their living environment, become ‘theirs’. The distinction between people who have taken ownership of an area in which they live and those who do not, lies in the way in which they observe space. There is the universal and situational aspects of human spatiality (urban space as observed from the outside) and place as ‘experienced’ and ‘felt’ by people who have a ‘stake’ in the area. The difference lies in the way in which a person, who lives in an area, sees it and the way in which tourists see it. If there is a feeling of ‘ownership’ amongst inhabitants, then there is a basis for cohesion. It is under such conditions that the term ‘grouped association’ becomes socially meaningful. It reflects conditions that are conducive for community life. It creates an environment where people can create a ‘home’, a place that people can call ‘theirs’, where they can let their guard down, where they can psychologically recuperate from the hustle and bustle of city life, where they can walk their dog, can have meaningful relationships with neighbours, and above all, where they and their children can feel safe.

Why is this important? Because people want to belong. That is why they tend to operate in cell-like structures – among friends, at work and in the community, through their children at school and through charity, cultural and social and religious organizations. In all of this they recreate the village effect. That is, the structure and scale in which people operate and which they understand. People do not want to live under amorphous conditions. The more people feel socially insecure and physically unsafe in the urban environment the more one could expect them to seek security in their own urban creations. This is what caused gated communities and that is what they essentially represent. They reflect a desire to recreate the rural village, an area where they feel safe and where they feel their loved ones will also be safe. It was a desire during the Roman period and it still is an inherent desire today. Sure, the ‘commodity element’ has crept into the equation, and some use the argument to accuse those that do use it of creating ‘spaces of privilege’, but that is the outcome of the idea of a free society. Using the marketable elements of housing for one’s own economic benefit is one of the choices one has – it is no crime and no one in a free market environment has the right to prevent someone from utilizing it.

These observations encapsulate the core of the issues that were dealt with in this chapter. People are different. They have different means, they have different backgrounds, have different abilities, like different things, lead different lives, and consequently also
prefer different living environments. That is why civil liberties are important. Choosing one’s living environment within the scope of one’s means is a basic human right. If there are opportunities for people to become part of a smaller, safer community, then they have the right to make that choice. Essentially, the post-modern urban environment has a fragmented eclectic character. We are living in an era where governments (society at large) cannot guarantee one’s safety, and as time has taught us, ultimately secure our social and economic well-being. This is something we have to do ourselves, individually and as communities with common interests. Foucault believed that societies will become fragmented for the sake of safety and security and based on what we increasingly see happening in cities all over the world, he certainly was not wrong.

Notes
1. Crime in urban areas, much of it violent, is a steadily growing global phenomenon (O’Connor, 2006).
2. Even if an object or subject is casually observed or contemplated in its individual state and in a manner that does not require conscious consideration (classification or reclassification) relative to other comparable objects or subjects, that object or subject is mentally considered in the class in which it has been placed by that person without declassifying it first. Classification therefore remains relevant even when the classification of something is not at stake at all.
3. And because people tend to be suspicious and critical towards others (yet again a by-product of our self-surviving nature) there is normally more black than white in our judgment, which means that compromise is more often required from the average person than not.
4. As was mentioned before, community formation even occurs in the intellectual environment. When people have different views about a topic, as is the case in the theme of this chapter for instance, ‘communities’ (euphemistically called ‘schools of thought’) are formed.
5. Habitus as embodied in individuals is regarded as ‘an active sediment of past experiences which functions in the present, shaping perceptions, thought and actions and thereby shaping social practice in a regular way’, while class habitus manifests itself ‘as a collective and homogeneous phenomenon, mutually adjusted for and by a social group or class’ (Johnson and Payne, 1986; Jenkins, 1992).
6. This does not mean that there are not prestige high-income residential areas close to city centres. Cities such as Toronto, Paris, Edinburgh and many others are known for their gentrified high-income areas close to city centres.
7. Some call it ‘greenfield’ development, others the ‘crabgrass frontier’ (Jackson, 1985).
8. Danish researchers have provided experimental proof that just five years of cosmic ray activity can have as much effect on the earth’s climate as the last 170 years of all human-made carbon dioxide emissions put together (www.junkscience.com).

References


PART FOUR

ISSUES OF URBAN GOVERNANCE
12 Smart growth as ‘new’ metropolitan governance: observations on US experience

G.O. Braun and J.W. Scott

Introduction
The ‘smart growth’ (SG) movement in North America, and especially in the United States, is an example of metropolitan planning informed by global paradigms of sustainable development. At the same time, SG is also an example of how global governance and sustainability paradigms are being translated locally into practice. SG can be described as a set of urban development practices that has emerged from US (and, to an extent, Canadian) policy experience since the 1970s. As a ‘continental’ agenda, SG can be understood as a comprehensive strategy of regional sustainability that suggests that economic efficiency, environmental protection, a high quality of life and social equity can be achieved through concerted and negotiated land-use polices. Among other things, SG envisions compact development and redevelopment of existing cores, reduced suburban sprawl and transit-oriented land use. Furthermore – and significantly – SG strives to offer urban living and the advantages of proximity to services and amenities to an increasing portion of the population.

SG has evolved out of governance quandaries in North American urban regions: these have been characterized by a continued trend towards political fragmentation and local no-growth policies, exacerbated in the United States by a remarkable increase in plebiscitary planning initiatives. These, in turn, have served to facilitate sprawl in outlying areas, drastically increase housing prices in more attractive suburbs and detract from coherent attempts to address sprawl-related issues. The spatial contradictions of urban economies, particularly evident in the case of US metropolitan areas, have also served to promote agendas of SG. Job–housing imbalances due to a lack of supply of housing for all market segments and the ever-increasing costs of commuting have been often more threatening to regional growth than ‘regulation’ or ‘state intervention’ (ULI, 2002; ABAG, 2004). The goal of SG is thus to establish new rules governing urban development logics, promote institutional change and thus discourage entrenched practices that perpetuate urban sprawl and its negative effects. As Chen (2000, p. 84) reports: ‘widespread concerns about sprawl have unleashed a wave of innovation. It includes creative economic incentives, new construction technologies, rewritten building and zoning codes, sophisticated marketing and demographic forecasting techniques, and a push to inform the public about scientific estimates of the costs of sprawl’.

This contribution will focus on the phenomenon of SG in the United States as an example of the contingency of ‘new regionalist’ governance discourses and practices. At the same time, no discussion of SG would be complete without a treatment of its shortcomings and debates regarding its ambitious claims. In terms of governance, SG raises important questions as to the feasibility of ‘volunteerist’ approaches to metropolitan growth management. Furthermore, it has been argued that SG not only disregards
‘natural’ processes of urban development, differentiation and growth (and thus overstating the danger of sprawl) but is also an ‘elitist’ project that increases housing prices (Cox, 2001; Braun, 2005).

This contribution will discuss SG as a contextual application of new regionalist thinking in North America. It begins with a brief overview of new regionalism in the United States, then proceeds with discussion of SGs emergence as a metropolitan planning agenda. The second part of the chapter considers challenges facing the implementation of SG as well as criticisms regarding the feasibility of SG as an effective form of growth management. This critical discussion will be exemplified by a short analysis of Portland, Oregon’s urban containment policies. By way of conclusion, the authors offer several observations regarding the overall policy significance of the SG movement.

New metropolitan regionalism in the United States

New regionalism (NR) is founded on the belief that the interdependent urban region (rather than the nation-state) is the vital locus of political community, economic well-being, citizenship and governance (see, for example, Barnes and Ledebur, 1998; Scott, 2001). NR advocates also aim to empower communities and actors within the metropolis and thus to generate significant changes in how policies for the metropolis are negotiated and defined (Scott, 2005).

To a certain extent, NR defines itself in opposition to previous top-down initiatives for creating metro governments. The drive for metropolitan government during the 1950s and 1960s was basically an attempt to bound metropolitan space functionally and politically through the creation of managerial organizations and structures representing electoral constituents (counties and cities). Typical of the ‘old regionalist’ campaign was the attempt to make membership in regional councils obligatory and to secure binding regional powers (especially planning) for metro government. This was largely achieved in the European context and to varying degrees in Canada. However, the story was quite different in the United States, where very few working examples of metropolitan government in the stricter sense exist (Cullingworth and Caves, 2003). As is well known, the drive to induce metro regions in the United States through legislation and coercion eventually succumbed in the United States to a deep cultural resistance to restrictions on property rights and the effective lobbying of interest groups with a clear economic stake in continued sprawl.

Metropolitan regionalism in the United States has been fuelled, among other things, by the phenomenon of mass suburbanization, urban–suburban diseconomies in service provision, deteriorating air quality in urban areas and a loss of open space. Above and beyond this, the loss of community identity, the perceived disfiguring of the landscape through cheap, utilitarian and monotonous construction as well as the unimaginative scope of local zoning codes enraged an entire post-war generation of US urbanists (see, for example, Wood and Heller, 1962). Ideologically speaking, however, overtly top-down approaches to metro governance have become ‘politically incorrect’ and governance rhetoric has shifted appreciably in favour of municipal partnerships, horizontal coordination and greater burden-sharing at the local level (Sancton, 2001).

The emergence of SMART GROWTH agendas

In analogous manner to NR, SG can be seen as a reaction to persistent governance gaps; it has developed as a response to a complex political economy of suburban development
(including a housing industry biased towards ever-increasing land consumption) and a governance vacuum exacerbated by municipal fragmentation within most metropolitan regions. Above all, SG is a radical (albeit market-oriented) attempt to deal with the phenomenon of sprawl. Sprawl has been generally identified as the proliferation of low-density, functionally segregated, disparate and over-scale developments dependent on the automobile (Hayden, 2003). The ideological and political struggle against sprawl has raged ever since the advent of mass suburbanization as a socio-spatial issue in the 1950s. Initially, anti-sprawl voices focused on the environmental costs and negative fiscal impacts of rapid suburban growth; as they were generally far from available public services and other amenities, fringe communities struggled with the finance of costly infrastructure while automobile traffic increased unabated (RERC, 1974; Wievel, Persky and Sendzik, 1999; Transportation Research Board, 2004). Anti-sprawl voices were also joined by an eloquent group of landscape conservationists who lamented the disappearance of open space and the degradation of the built environment (Whyte, 1968; Kent, 1970). By the late 1980s, sprawl was also seen to carry with it a high social cost. This involved what was seen as a loss of community and local identity. More recently, sprawl has also been related to health issues, such as obesity and a lack of mobility.

Already in the late 1970s, US communities concerned about the long-term negative effects of unregulated expansion of residential and commercial development began to institutionalize controls on growth through a variety of means. These controls, embodied by the 1977 plan adopted by the City of Petaluma (in the San Francisco Bay Area – SFBA), were, generally speaking, the result of citizen pressure and often enforced through local referenda. With slow growth initiatives and plebiscitary measures (known infamously in professional circles as ballot box planning), citizens were able to force local governments to apply moratoria and/or strict limits to residential and commercial development (Scott, 1990; Institute for Local Self Government, 2001). The movement gained momentum in the 1980s and tended to exacerbate patterns of socioeconomic polarization and fragmentation. As local growth controls flourished so did criticisms of municipal elitism and ‘mercantilist’ zoning practices that merely served to increase housing prices in more central sub-areas while shifting the geographical focus of new construction outwards towards regional peripheries (Dowall, 1984).

In response to sprawl and as a reaction to widespread failures to address the negative consequences of sprawl at a regional level, a local (and more or less grassroots) ‘slow growth’ movement started in the 1970s, particularly in western US states. Slow growth was not without its ironies. Rapid development and increasing congestion were seen as undermining local control over community development as well as eroding local identities and qualities of life. However, communities were unwilling to cede planning powers to regional bodies that might have been able to steer growth more effectively. To exacerbate the situation even more, populistic tax reduction measures introduced through the ballot box in the 1970s and 1980s severely reduced local revenues derived from assessed property values. Housing became an unattractive land use from a fiscal point of view, while an increase in residents meant greater service burdens and local government expenditures. Exclusionary zoning practices developed their own powerful political-economic logic, pushing the development of new (and more affordable) housing further into the peripheries of metropolitan areas.

These contradictions between local and regional concerns have proven almost impossible to reconcile using traditional governance approaches. In response to this situation
and the continuing fragmentation of local controls in the United States, the SG movement has sought to offer appealing strategies that mitigate against exclusionary zoning and the parochial ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) mentality of localities. At the same time, a major challenge to regional SG concepts has been the promotion of a much more comprehensive notion of planning and spatial development that, at the same time, elicits local support. For this reason, the basic approach involves the participation of public and private entities in (re)creating an urban quality of life. SG policies, furthermore, are often conceived as learning processes in an attempt to convince localities that density, functional variety, transit-oriented development and a regional perspective are both desirable and necessary.

As a planning concept, SG is perhaps the maximum operational expression of NR in North America; it is the ‘political’ face of new planning paradigms. As Fulton (2000, p. 2) has stated, SG ‘suggests a set of strategies that seeks to accommodate growth at the regional level, rather than restrict it at the local level’, thus transcending local particularisms and NIMBY phenomena. SG accommodates growth by targeting the existing urban fabric and areas most suited for future development, rather than reproducing the suburban sprawl of the past. Instead, growth is to be channelled towards urban cores, around alternative transportation systems and within so-called ‘transit villages’ with a greater mix of functions and housing densities. SG is also an ‘idea’, informed by tenets of the new urbanism and very much influenced by ‘European’ notions of urbanity (Kunstler, 2001), where density, proximity and visual and physical integrity of townsapes create a sense of coherent community.3

At its most successful (such as in the cases of Vancouver, Seattle and Portland) SG has been able to capitalize on popular environmental issues, marshalling local sources of support for metro regionalism while helping to provide a powerful and unifying regional idea. In terms of new governance rules and practices, the case of the San Francisco Bay Area (SFBA) indicates a move in the direction of multi-actor and multi-level partnerships with a heavy involvement of business groups and NGOs (Scott, 2007). The case study of the SFBA also seems to indicate that governance mechanisms espoused by NR and SG advocates seem to thrive in cultural contexts that are amenable to collaborative policymaking. In other words, ‘networked’ societies, versed in lobbying strategy, promotional tactics, entrepreneurial framing of policy ideas, might offer ample opportunity structures for de-centred governance.

The US ‘innovation’ has been one of introducing a new governance perspective to the notion of SG, primarily out of a need to establish lines of communication and cooperation between municipalities and actor groups with a stake in regional development. As a result, redevelopment and densification are being promoted strategically within the scope of inter-municipal and multi-actor partnerships in order to contain the negative costs of sprawl and strengthen core areas of cities. In addition, SG principles are being applied at different scales (that is, both locally and regionally) and in a variety of urban contexts (i.e., older urban cores and new development). As a testament to its popularity, almost all US states have taken up SG agendas, supporting to varying degrees local and regional development initiatives. At the same time, literally hundreds of organizations nationwide have taken up the SG cause. What this flurry of activity actually signifies in terms of more effective regional governance and social equity, is open to speculation.
Challenges facing SMART GROWTH
Discussion will now focus on three specific issues where critical reflection on SG appears warranted. These are: governance issues, the challenge of pursuing objectives of social equity goals and the appropriateness of SG as a strategic intervention into urban property markets.

SMART GROWTH and governance issues
Put rather bluntly, a principal challenge to SG in the United States is the achievement of effective regional governance through ‘volunteerism’. Given that effective formal institutions of regional planning, such as those created in Portland, are rare indeed, much will depend on the willingness of a wide range of stakeholders to commit themselves to a long-term vision of urban growth and development. Above and beyond this, however, the achievement of SG implies an effective negotiation of governance processes that would be difficult even under the most favourable of circumstances. Indeed, the notion of SG suggests an entire set of knowledge, understanding and policy tools that most metropolitan regions in the United States (or elsewhere for that matter) do not yet possess. This kind of urban and regional management expertise will, as most social innovations do, require a learning-by-doing process fraught with potential mistakes.

Furthermore, as the experience of the SFBA demonstrates, for example, sub-regional and inter-organizational partnerships are often necessary for the development of more comprehensive regional governance mechanisms (Scott, 2007). However, the ability to develop a comprehensive vision of development is often hampered by rivalries between actor groups and funding problems. Conflicts of interest abound and local tendencies towards particularistic (and exclusionary) community development persist. Attempts to network neighbourhood growth strategies around the concept of transit-oriented development involve a contentious trade-off between light-rail and other public transit modes and improvements to urban freeway systems. This in itself has resulted in serious conflicts of interest between communities in metropolitan areas. Regional consensus in this area could very well depend upon renewed federal support for transportation improvements and a heightened awareness at the level of state governments for pressing a general SG agenda.4

In addition to these concerns, the networked nature of new regionalist governance could also prove to be an Achilles’ heel in terms of locally responsive and participatory forms of urban planning. Visioning, for example, opens up many questions about representation and the basis upon which decision regarding development scenarios and their implementation are taken. Most decisions regarding land use must be made by local governments, however, the processes involved in informing local decisions could be rather inaccessible to ordinary citizens if organized around selective fora and workshops rather than clearly identifiable regional associations. This could create problems in positively communicating regional ideas and in promoting citizen understanding and acceptance of SG principles.

Issues of social equity
Social equity is not only a question of housing, as most US metropolitan areas are multi-ethnic in nature and often characterized by wide gaps in income and living standards, but housing and access to jobs are the most crucial material components of social mobility. Within the SG context, affordable housing is vital in order to reduce long-distance
commutes and increase opportunities for lower-income groups in established employment centres (traditional urban cores and mature suburbs). Due to drastic increases in regional housing prices and the reluctance of many communities to accommodate housing for groups seen as ‘undesirable’, processes of socioeconomic polarization and ethnic segregation have proceeded apace. Furthermore, more equitable growth is difficult to secure when the ‘Euclidian’ paradigm of zoning still prevails and developers remain reluctant to shift their focus away from traditional suburban projects.\textsuperscript{5}

Gentrification of inner-city neighbourhoods and the social exclusion it entails is inevitable without support for affordable housing. In terms of social sustainability, SG aims to avoid social polarization and exclusion but must work with market forces in order to realize its goals of upgrading urban cores and mature suburbs. The primary stimulus for the construction of affordable housing consists of a mix of federal, state and local grants and tax-based incentives provided to developers, whereby the role of the private sector has rapidly increased in significance. Nevertheless, despite these funding opportunities, there still remain relatively few economic incentives in order to address unequal access to jobs, housing and other opportunities.

Perhaps ironically, SG is proving to be quite popular with affluent communities that have realized the economic and image-boosting benefits that SG strategies can bring. However, wealthy communities enjoy much more economic leverage over banks and developers than struggling cities. In addition, the ‘affordable’ housing provided by these communities is still beyond the financial means of most low-income families.

\textit{Risks of intervention in property markets}

A third challenge to SG, and one that is closely related to equity considerations, is that of reconciling market-oriented planning mechanisms with more global objectives of sustainability. With SG, innovative incentives and planning ideas are helping establish a new regulatory regime that supports compact and mixed-use development, urbanity and local/regional identity. A danger could lie, however, in the creation of market rigidities and developmental counter-effects such as speculative markets, a net loss of affordable housing, congestion in high-density areas and curtailed economic growth through shortages of developable space. Furthermore, it has been argued that SG not only distorts property markets but is also an ‘elitist’ project that increases housing prices (Cox, 2001; Coffman, 2003).

Urban development dynamics in the United States case favour continued spatial fragmentation along functional and socioeconomic lines. Attractive central cities have, to an extent, regained vitality through high-level professional and service industries and a renaissance of ‘urban lifestyles’. At the same time, economic investment continues to follow jobs and housing into peripheral zones where modern infrastructure is concentrated and transaction costs due to regulation are lower. As a result, there is growing demand for both ‘new urban’ and suburban lifestyles. The new urban lifestyles are preferred by non-traditional households recruited for the most part through inter- and intra-urban migration. Suburban lifestyles are preferred by traditional households mainly recruited by intra-urban filtering, segregation and immigration. A third growing market segment is composed of groups who are subject to forced migration; out-priced low-income households have to accept higher density zones either in older housing stock, in infill or affordable housing projects (Katz, 2002).
These current processes will lead to increasingly diverse housing markets in which one-, two- and three-generation households, urban singles, affluent but childless couples and ‘patchwork’ families result in very specific demands for a wide range of housing options and prices. Furthermore, because of increasing socioeconomic polarization, demand for affordable housing will no doubt increase. These very diverse requirements will necessitate the provision of housing options that accommodate changing lifestyles with regard to non-family and ageing households.

The main policy problem here is thus related to conflicts between urban development dynamics and the SG planning project of influencing lifestyle and living preferences of the population. This will have profound consequences for the spatial distribution of affordable housing and different housing options (Stewart, 2006). Market forces are ironically strengthening the hand of SG in terms of providing lucrative incentives for higher density, mixed-use developments within inner-city locations. At the same time, however, the exclusionary nature of ‘new’ high-density urban living has become increasingly evident in attractive cities such as Portland, Seattle and San Francisco. Social sustainability is thus a more difficult proposition as lifestyle effects manifest themselves in the commodification of suburban ‘urbanity’ and inner-city ‘walking neighbourhoods’.

Critics argue that spatially fragmented housing markets could offer greater housing options to a wider spectrum of the population than would be the case of restricted and regimented development as promulgated by SG advocates (Litman, 2004). By forcing growth into designated centres, there is, furthermore, the danger that urban development policies might overshoot the ‘density market’, especially in cities with weaker economies and less favourable locational attributes. This could result in the construction of high-density housing developments for which there is little mid- to long-term demand. In addition, it is argued that ‘densification’ could lead to increased automotive traffic and thus air pollution in central cities, partly because, despite considerable investment in light rail and bus lines, public transportation will not be able to provide commensurate commuting opportunities to employment areas (Cox, 2001). At the same time, areas outside urban growth boundaries and cities where principles of SG prevail are, in many cases, destined to serve as a new housing frontier for those who are unsatisfied with the effects of regional growth management. In such ‘unregulated’ housing peripheries incentives for development could arise that result in yet lower densities, longer commutes to employment and commercial centres, higher shares of substandard housing and yet more dispersed and imbalanced housing and employment development – precisely the results that SG seeks to avoid (Braun, 2004; 2005).

**Portland examined**

Oregon state has a reputation, rare in the United States, for actively steering urban development. Portland, the largest city in Oregon and the centre of a metropolitan region of about 1.5 million inhabitants, is considered a showcase of NR – and of SG in particular – because of early and decisive implementation of measures aimed at regulating suburban land conversion and channelling growth along transit corridors. Furthermore, formal and directly elected regional government (known as Portland Metro) makes Portland an exemplary case of urban management in the eyes of many new regionalists (see Orfield, 2002, p. 119).
Already in the late 1970s the state legislature of Oregon had introduced a system of urban growth boundaries (UGBs) that allowed more effective control over development. In 1973, the state government passed statewide growth control legislation (Senate Bill 100), which required that municipalities define and adhere to outer growth limits of their jurisdictions. Here, the state of Oregon made a bold departure from general practice in restricting local planning autonomy; the designation of UGBs and any amendments made to them require approval by the state Land Conservancy and Development Commission (Freilich, 1999). In addition, Portland Metro also embarked in the 1970s on a policy of transit-oriented development and the promotion of town centres in order to minimize suburban sprawl.

These developments meant a dramatic change in fortunes for Portland, which faced a rapidly declining downtown by the 1960s. The progressive government that came into power in the early 1970s decided upon a strategic and long-term approach to redevelopment that succeeded in converting the central area into a highly attractive and multifunctional space. This was done partly through capitalizing on the urban growth boundaries that forced development inward and partly by using public transit as a major tool for urban improvement and value capture. These endeavours were supported not only by local sources but also by generous federal transit development grants (these require strategic planning processes and long-term perspectives as a condition for the disbursement of grants).

Nevertheless, despite its successes, the experience of Portland since the 1970s manifests some of the limitations associated with implementing SG principles within a market-oriented urban development context. Even after 30 years of consistent and successful application of growth management policies, Portland is still dogged by housing affordability problems, the spectre of social exclusion and the very mundane problem of traffic congestion.

As the case of Portland illustrates, public agencies are vulnerable to the vicissitudes of mercurial capital markets; by ‘borrowing against the future’ and speculating on increasing land values in redevelopment areas Portland has tried to increase its immediate financial sphere of autonomy. However, this has come at a high price. Using expected increases in local government revenues as collateral, Portland has raised considerable amounts for the construction of affordable housing by private developers. However, in order to do this the city has maximized central city property values while, at the same time, massively shifted resources to the private sector in order to provide tax incentives for direct investment in redevelopment areas. This situation has created long-term fiscal strains that could make the long-term support of affordable housing untenable (Prince, 2004).

In addition, and despite its achievements, Portland Metro is forced to work continuously at maintaining political pressure for its SG policies to succeed. According to the 2004 Performance measures report (Portland Metro Planning Department, 2004), the Portland area will accommodate more than 500,000 new residents (a 50% increase) by 2020. This can only be done in a socially equitable manner if all communities agree to continue to allow high-density housing in order to prevent housing prices from rising (and thus shutting lower-income groups out of Metro housing markets). Portland Metro must also constantly struggle with the often politically contentious issues of ‘density’ and affordable housing and with NIMBY phenomena; in other words, a constant process of negotiation and consensus-building is required. One problem that has been identified is the fact that public knowledge of or familiarity with Portland Metro and its regional growth policies is limited. Metro is also under attack from several groups who take
umbrage to the system of land use controls and compact development that are at the heart of the compact region.\textsuperscript{11}

Finally, traffic congestion in Portland remains a problem because public transit is incapable of meeting demand and still cannot provide sufficient service for all parts of the region. Central Portland has become the major job centre so that commuting has increased dramatically, rapidly outpacing public transit solutions. Furthermore, despite the rapid increase in property values in downtown and town centres – and despite UGBs – developable land remains relatively cheap. As a result, suburban development is by far the largest source of housing in the region.\textsuperscript{12} Sprawl (even if of the more compact variety) and automobile dependency thus remain facts of life; what is ensuing as a result is a veritable competition between SG and ‘traditional’ development that could bring with it excessive costs for local governments. In fact, commuter transit use decreased between 1990 and 1999 at a rate higher than any other US urban area of over one million inhabitants. In addition, the 2000 Regional Transportation Plan indicates that over the next 20 years a smaller percentage of jobs and of residences will be within walking distance of transit service. This development could especially burden poor households that generally do not have access to automobiles (Katz, 2002).

**Some concluding remarks**

In the United States, zoning and the character of urban property markets have resulted in homogeneous, ageing, and spatially fragmented social groups located in suburban belts around central cities. One of the principal outcomes of this has been high environmental costs, land consumption and particularistic (NIMBY) attitudes that encumber dialogue between metropolitan communities. SG addresses these issues in a number of ways, increasing both the economic and social desirability of public transit and multifunctional urban spaces at higher densities.

However, as a ‘new’ metropolitan planning mechanism, SG raises a number of questions that beg serious debate. To avoid both the negative effects of sprawl and the danger of housing market and economic inflexibilities, positive alternatives of suburban growth and compact development should be integrated. As Bruce Katz (2002) has argued, SG must be adapted to regional diversity; growth boundaries should be applied in a flexible manner to allow growth and restructuring through physical expansion. Density at certain locations should be only as high as the markets allow in the mid-term. Subsidies – necessary and useful in a short-term view – should continue to be used judiciously and strategically: this is especially important in order to avoid the creation of artificial markets for high-density living that might evaporate as demographic and economic situations change or as speculative bubbles collapse. Furthermore, as might be expected, social equity aspects are either greatly under-funded or often subsumed under other regional issues. As a result, for example, affordable housing is being provided but in rather small numbers.

The success of SG has depended on federal subsidies, tax-based incentives, and in certain cities, on shifting urban economies that favour high-density urban living. These, however, limit the general applicability of SG to prosperous communities. By way of conclusion, the authors suggest that in order to be truly successful in terms of economic, environmental and social sustainability, growth management requires the development of a ‘full cost’ method of accounting. What this means in practical terms is that a more sophisticated approach to revenue redistribution within a metropolitan context is needed in order for SG to actually operate properly as a sustainable growth management tool. In this way, for
example, the costs of sprawl (in terms of social and physical infrastructure and public transit) could be factored in to developers’ costs in suburban areas, thus making compact development more attractive without providing large subsidies.

Undoubtedly, SG will continue to evolve as a paradigm of urban planning reform. The outcomes it eventually achieves will very much depend on the overall political climate for regional governance, sustained federal and state support for public transit, but perhaps most importantly, on innovative regional solutions to the problem of fragmented urban planning and revenue redistribution mechanisms.

Notes
1. See the article by Thomas Bender on ‘Community and social change in America’ as part of the LA Times article, ‘The new isolationists’, which appeared on 2 May, 1999.
2. For an interesting account of California’s ‘tax revolt’, see Peter Schrag (1999). Schrag devotes a considerable portion of this book to tax issues and direct democracy.
3. In order to provide more evidence of the ideational power behind the SG movement I quote William Fulton (2000, p. 3) yet again: ‘we must come to terms with the setting in which we live – the notion that we live in a large, vibrant, and growing region, rather than the “reluctant metropolis” we so often see today. It suggests that we must shape a better balance between inevitable urban growth and the environmental limits that we so often see all around us . . . And it suggests that we must work together as a region by creating and using a whole new set of policy tools to ensure that our regional future will be an improvement over our suburban past, not just a bad replica of it’.
4. In fact, a group of legislators have initiated a statewide ‘Smart growth caucus’ in order to strengthen the policy basis for regional land-use controls.
5. Euclidian zoning refers to the practice of establishing land-use restrictions and minimum/maximum construction densities in order to protect residential areas from ‘incompatible’ activities (e.g., industry). The constitutional right of cities to ‘zone’ for specific functions and densities was upheld in the 1926 Supreme Court decision on Euclid v. Amber Realty. Since then zoning has become the central instrument of urban land-use planning in the United States and has been frequently criticized for promoting low-density, automobile-oriented suburban living. In the words of one interviewee: ‘the culture of zoning is part of a culture of entitlement to the automobile’ (Scott, 2005).
6. Another quandary of SG, especially in western United States, is the increasing popularity of ‘urban living’; a phenomenon that is driving up housing costs and commercial rents not only in downtowns and inner-city neighbourhoods but also in suburban settings. Demographic changes and new lifestyle options have created a market for high-density urban living close to amenities and where public transit allows mobility. As an illustration of this phenomenon, the March 2006 editions of the Alaska Airlines and Seattle magazines were largely devoted to the marketing of urban villages and mid- to high-rise condominium living in western North America. These articles highlighted not only the ‘lifestyle miles’ of obvious candidates such as Vancouver, Seattle, Portland, but also newly ‘re-urbanizing’ cities such as Las Vegas.
7. Interview with Ethan Seltzer, Portland State University, 10 March 2006.
8. TEA-21 refers to the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, federal legislation enacted in 1998. TEA-21 builds on the legislation for more sustainable surface transportation measures established in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA). TEA-21 includes a variety of initiatives to improve safety, ‘protect and enhance’ communities and address air quality and other environmental issues in the face of economic growth and steadily increasing transportation flows. This federal legislation requires regional cooperation in metropolitan areas as a prerequisite for funding of transportation improvements. TEA-21 also mandates metropolitan planning organizations to act as ‘clearing-houses’ for the apportionment of federal funds.
9. Interview with Jillian Dettwiler of Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon (TriMet), 11 March 2006.
10. Property taxes are an important source of local government revenue in the United States. Tax increment financing is based on borrowing against expectations of future revenues generated by higher property taxes; however, this aspect of tax increment financing can be offset by tax exemptions granted to investors who realize projects in designated redevelopment areas or brownfield sites.
11. One particularly vociferous critic of Portland’s regional planning practices has been the Thoreau Institute (http://www.ti.org/) and its staff researcher Randall O’Toole. The institute’s mission is to ‘seek ways to protect the environment without regulation, bureaucracy, or central control’.
12. Interview with Mark Guichard of Portland Metro, 10 March 2006.
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Cities in regions
This chapter examines the recent re-emergence of regional planning as a way of guiding future urban growth in Western cities, illustrated by some case study material from Leeds in the United Kingdom and Cork in Ireland. Our aim is to show how regional planning has emerged as a key tool for territorial management in both the United Kingdom and Ireland. This is a trend that is rooted in some profound changes in our understanding of how cities interact with both their surrounding areas and also the wider world. But equally important, changes in the ‘scale’ of planning for cities also reflect political debates on how best to move towards greater political devolution and how to develop a more integrated approach to policymaking.

The interdependence of cities and their hinterland areas has long been a subject of fascination for commentators (e.g., Mumford, 1961). In the 1960s there was a rapid growth of interest in the apparent merging of cities, notably along the northeastern seaboard of the United States, creating new ‘megalopolis’ entities (Gottmann, 1961). Here the concern was very much about the physical expansion of the city itself. There continues to be strong interest in the idea of such urban archipelagos, as new technologies and new forms of communication allow people and businesses to recast how they use cities, moving away from notions of single, dominant cores to linked nodes across a broader region of cities, satellite towns and development clusters (Pearce, 2006).

In recent years new bodies of work have emerged that address various dimensions of the expanding spheres of large cities. Work on world cities and global cities for instance has addressed the emergence of a group of large and influential cities, said to play a central role in mediating and propelling increasingly rapid and far-reaching flows of people, money, ideas, innovations, goods and services and culture (e.g., Sassen, 1991; Knox and Taylor, 1995). Whilst much of this literature has focused on how such cities function as key nodes in these globalized flows, there is also a strong interest in the implications for the internal functioning of cities, particularly the growing social polarization between the rich and the poor, as both connect into global flows of labour, money and services but in very different ways (Sassen, 1991).

The urban environmental literature has also developed a strong interest in the global reach of cities, fuelled in recent years by scientific breakthroughs that suggest that some pollution impacts are now manifest not simply at local and regional scales, but at transnational and global levels, for instance ozone layer depletion, acid rain and climate change. As global trading has expanded in scope and geographical penetration, the consumption requirements of city dwellers are also seen as creating resource impacts both in neighbouring regions and in far-flung parts of the world. The far-reaching impact of cities on their resource hinterlands is nothing new, as Cronon’s (1991) influential analysis of the
historical growth of Chicago revealed. However, the increased scale, scope, reach and detrimental impacts of global resource and pollution flows does seem to be new.

Reflecting such concerns, there has been a growing academic and policy literature on both urban sustainability and also how planning for cities can help transform the environmental impacts that urbanites exert not only locally but also globally (e.g., Haughton and Hunter, 1994; Sattherthwaite, 1997). Much academic and policy literature has explored the potential for reshaping urban behaviour, so that people in various ways are encouraged to curb behaviours that impact adversely on the environment. For instance, economists have promoted various forms of policy for changing the price of things to better reflect environmental impacts. Similarly, urban and regional planners have used the logic and rhetoric of sustainable development to argue for physically reshaping cities in various ways, for instance, seeking to reduce car dependency (and therefore reduce energy usage, air pollution, noise and congestion) by moving towards higher residential densities and mixed land use patterns, which allow more people to walk or use public transport. The efficacy, equity and desirability of such policies have been the subject of considerable critical debate (e.g., Newman and Kenworthy, 1989; Breheny, 1997; Neuman, 2005).

A further set of concerns for planners has involved responding to fears that expanding cities exert unbalancing effects on surrounding areas, including the loss of valuable agricultural land and claimed adverse impacts on a ‘rural’ way of life and the creation of ‘monotonous’ suburbs. Reflecting growing awareness of how environmental impacts can be ‘exported’ ever further afield, there has been a particular interest in attempts to rethink our understanding of how cities interact with their hinterlands, such as work on urban metabolism (Girardet, 1992) and ecological footprint analysis, which seeks to quantify the external impacts of city residents (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996). These concepts and tools have come under considerable critical scrutiny, concerning whether they are being used too crudely by politicians and planners to justify particular sets of policy interventions over others (e.g., McManus and Haughton, 2006; Haughton, 2007).

As a result of our appreciation of the increasingly stretched nature of various types of material and non-material flows, thinking of ‘cities’ as uniquely global is actually problematic. Rather, we need to recognize that ‘urban’ is simply a convenient construct for understanding particular sets of relationships, involving continually evolving and intersecting sets of networks and nodes. Becoming too focused on the urban-ness of the urban, where its boundaries are, or how people relate within particular boundaries, is to miss the reality of how we all live our lives within increasingly complex, globalized flows of materials, money, resources, ideas, culture and so forth.

This more relational way of thinking about networks and nodes, and places and flows (Amin, 2002, 2004; Healey, 2004), is helpful in challenging simplistic analyses of cities within some preordained set of boundaries. In essence it requires that we de-privilege ideas of a city being a clearly demarcated entity in favour of a perspective that sees the multiple ways in which urban practices are shaped, across different spatial scales, sectoral boundaries and groups within society. But the critique also suggests that much ‘urban’ policy has become too narrowly focused on specific problem areas and issues, where ‘Cities, their people and the complex daily life relations between people and places within and beyond the city, have slipped out of focus’ (Healey, 2004, p. 161).

Taking this perspective then, the study of cities and indeed city-regions must always have regard to the politics of how particular understandings of the nature of ‘urban’ problems
are constructed, examining how certain types of problems come to be recognized as policy priorities over others. It is in this context then that we are interested in the way in which planning for cities is being rescaled, a process that is highly politicized in intent, part of a logic of sub-national territorial management intended to ensure that nations, regions and cities are able to compete against each other in the global economic market place. Given this, the insertion of a regional scale of metropolitan management can best be seen as part of a political agenda to remove obstacles to achieving both the global ‘competitiveness’ of cities and nations, not simply as a means for helping improve sustainability, liveability, or any other such similar label used to help broker local consensus.

What we begin to see here is that the rise of the city-region as a scale of governance is rarely simply about finding the best ‘scale’ for pursuing the development of cities and their regions. Rather, it is likely to be one of an array of experiments aimed at learning how best to deal with the complex reality of how urban lives are structured by processes that work out across a variety of scales, timeframes, and policy sectors. As part of what can at times appear to be almost a frenzy of policy experimentation, planners are expected to help bring coherence to fast-changing, continuously fragmenting patterns of territorial development and governance, as new governance systems are created, reshaped and abandoned in rapid succession.

**Rescaling, governance and the politics of territorial management**

In their excellent review of the emergence of city-regions, Simmonds and Hack (2000) argue that in the period just after the Second World War there were only around ten places in the world with an identifiable form of city-region governance, which had risen to about 150 by the year 2000. They also argue that the trend is currently towards this level of governance for all manner of reasons, including the need to take account of the fact that so much of the key infrastructure of large cities now lies outside the formal political boundaries of the core city itself, from airports to major roads, suburban homes and large-scale outer urban retail and warehousing facilities. In a more detailed analysis of the governance of city-regions in the same volume, Simmonds (2000) develops an argument that there are a range of governance models emerging for city-regions, which can wax and wane in influence over time, from ‘strong’ governance, often involving some form of political and legislative power, to ‘weak’ governance. Typically the latter involves coalitions of local governments and other key stakeholders seeking to coordinate and influence, but without strong regulatory instruments or fiscal resource to back this up.

Whilst there are always strong administrative and functional rationalities for advocating a city-region form of governance, there is also an underlying political set of concerns, which vary over time and between countries. In particular it is helpful to see the ebbing and flowing of official enthusiasm for metropolitan forms of governance as part of a wider pattern of state responses both to earlier rounds of policy initiative and also its desire to define and contain what it perceives as the ‘urban’ problem. There are always advocates for city-region/metropolitan governance, but only at certain conjunctures of circumstances does this enthusiasm then get turned into some concrete form of action.

It is possible to argue that recent attempts to focus on city-regions reflect a neoliberal state response to previous state responses to particular urban crises (Jones and Ward, 2004). From this perspective, institutional reform is as much focused on remedying previous failures of governance and policy as it is on addressing some of the other underlying
economic and social problems of cities. Whatever the underlying logic, it does seem to be clear that we are witnessing a period of institutional turbulence across the scales of governance, what Brenner (2000) refers to as ‘scalar flux’. A central feature of this turbulence at sub-national level is a rapidly changing portfolio of competing and essentially temporary local and regional alliances, charged with competing with each other for funding and powers, in order to carry out various aspects of the nationally prescribed urban and regional development agenda. This allows central governments to lay the blame for any policy failure with these local interventions, and then use this to justify redistributing powers to alternative bodies. This fast and fluid policy environment almost invariably brings a level of incoherence across policy sectors and bodies, which central governments then set out to address through various meta-governance devices for coordinating and joining up policies across various scales and across different policy sectors.

There is no single logic of capitalist development driving forward city-regionalism, nor indeed a single model for metropolitan cooperation emerging. Rather, we are seeing an explosion of experimentation, involving both academic and political debate, and real on-the-ground struggles (see Brenner, 2002 and Ward and Jonas, 2004). This said, a recurrent theme in the current debates is the promotion of city-regions as a means of helping to capture and better mobilize the ‘motor’ of urban economic growth for the cities themselves, their surrounding areas and indeed for the national good. There are usually also claims that this scale of governance is particularly well suited to addressing various aspects of social equity and environmental management. Whilst functional and administrative efficiency arguments may well drive the debate for rescaling governance in one way or another, we would argue that underlying this there is always the politics of who is making the decisions to rescale and why.

It is helpful to see current state restructuring initiatives in light of both popular and political distrust of initiatives run purely out of local government and national government departments, both of which are typically rhetorically constructed as insensitive to local aspirations whilst being overly bureaucratic and inefficient. However, both have the advantage of electoral accountability, which many other forms of governance do not. So one aspect of the emergence of new sub-national governance systems has been an attempt to create a sense of legitimacy for them through enhanced forms of public participation, evident both in the construction of the boards of the new bodies and official expectations for how various stakeholder communities should be consulted over their strategies and work programmes. This process is very evident in regional planning systems, which have been expected to become less technocratic and more participative in their approach. With this new openness comes an expectation from local community groups that they will be able to prevent negative developments from taking place in their areas. Whilst such public engagement is always to be welcomed, it does raise the prospect that well-resourced and articulate communities tend to win out in public debates, typically at the expense of poorer neighbourhoods and poorer people. This feeds a certain administrative and political rationality that achieving spatial equity when faced with entrenched and newly empowered locally mobilized opposition groups might be assisted by adopting a more regional perspective involving participatory forms of governance.

At a mundane yet pervasive level, much suburban politics in the United States and elsewhere is in effect about people in particular suburbs being loathe to join with other neighbouring administrations where this might involve higher taxes or subsidies flowing out
towards lower-income areas, with their lower tax base and higher welfare spending needs. The forces against a strongly mobilized city-regional scale of government may well start to coalesce first and most visibly at the garden gates of the prosperous, well-resourced, educated and articulate.

Against such resistance there is the powerful incentive for the state of creating new institutional ensembles that have the potential to provide a creative new direction for policy, and/or to break with previously institutional inertia, malaise or ineffectiveness. For instance, actors working at a particular scale of planning considered to be contributing to inertia by central government may find their powers diminished and redistributed, as the state seeks to build new more effective ensembles through which its preferred policies can be pushed forward. Decisions to favour one scale or mode of governance over another always reflect a desire to remove perceived institutional impediments to faster development. In the United Kingdom for instance, this is evident in various ways, from the creation of Urban Development Corporations in the 1980s, which took planning powers away from local government, to recent moves to reduce county-level planning powers in favour of regional bodies.

Given the fragmented nature of these various governance initiatives, it is no coincidence that better integrated policymaking has also emerged as a key theme in recent political discourse, often involving the invocation of ‘holistic thinking’ and ‘joined-up government’ as the new panacea. Quite what ‘integrated’ policy is meant to do is not always evident. It becomes clearer when integration is set against what it is meant to replace – silo-thinking, which works against effective relations between policy sectors. A typical example might be allowing house development to proceed faster than the provision of new transport, health or school facilities. This type of integration issue is a long-standing one – what is unique about the contemporary manifestation is that it is having to deal with so very many different policy bodies, created to address a wide range of policy issues, and always involving new constellations of policy actors, involving new boards, staffing and strategies all mandated to coordinate better with the strategies and staff of other bodies operating at various scales. For Jones and Ward (2004, p. 151), this is compounded by the rapid changes in central government departments, many of which bear some responsibility for shaping processes for city-region redevelopment, leading to a ‘crisis of crisis-management through further problems of coordination’. Integration then involves efforts to join things up across policy scales and policy sectors, which are themselves continuously being reconfigured, involving new institutional ensembles of actors from diverse stakeholder groupings.

There is a further aspect to the politics of the integration agenda, perhaps unsurprisingly, of ensuring that maverick stakeholders, political elements or policy sectors are held to some form of corporate responsibility towards an agreed collective strategy for a city’s development. Integrated spatial and sectoral strategies then have become the new way forward for shaping debates about urban futures. But they have not come about without creating some confusion, resentment and indeed resistance. Whilst all the main actors will usually find something positive to say about better integrated territorial management practices, there remains a concern that control is being lost as much as it is being gained.

**Multi-level strategic planning for cities and regions: the Leeds example**

To illustrate something of the complexity of multi-scalar and multi-sectoral approaches to regional planning, this section draws on the recent experience of Leeds in Yorkshire in
the United Kingdom. Leeds is Yorkshire’s largest city, which has experienced a considerable economic turnaround in the past 20 years, emerging as a successful Northern city, albeit one where considerable social problems remain. For the purposes of this chapter, Leeds is an interesting case study because of the very quick insertion over the past decade of a succession of new ‘scales’ of policy for planning and related areas (see Figure 13.1 for a summary picture).

Although both Leeds and the Yorkshire region have a strong sense of historical identity, in practice, notions of the city and its wider region have been more fluid than this suggests. Although Yorkshire is popularly thought of as a standalone county or region, it has not had a significant unified political or administrative identity of its own in recent history. Before 1974, there were three county councils for the Yorkshire Ridings, North, East and West. In 1974 these were abolished and a new ‘standard region’ was created for administrative purposes, Yorkshire and Humberside. This lacked significant political clout, though it did briefly have an Economic Planning Council during the 1960s and 1970s (see Counsell and Haughton, 2006).

Up to the 1974 local government reorganization, Leeds had been a local authority within the West Riding of Yorkshire, a county that stretched some distance north and south of the city, incorporating for instance, the city of Sheffield. The local government restructuring of 1974 saw Leeds emerge as a much larger local authority unit, encompassing some smaller former districts, and becoming one of five such large local authorities within the new metropolitan county of West Yorkshire. It is perhaps worth noting that nationally the idea of city-regions as an administrative unit was rejected at this stage, following the Redcliffe-Maud Royal Commission into local government in 1969, despite a famous minority report by Derek Senior in favour of it (see Leach, 1998).

In planning terms, from 1974 to 1986 Leeds operated as part of a two-tier planning system, where the county council for West Yorkshire was responsible for the ‘strategic’ part of the planning process, whilst the city of Leeds had responsibility for local planning issues. In an overt political act, in 1986 the Thatcher national government abolished the former metropolitan counties, including West Yorkshire, not least as they had provided a focus for opposition to some national government policies. The political agenda of this act of rescaling was fairly overt then. Leeds emerged from this process with stronger powers for both economic development and planning, in theory at least. In planning terms Leeds became a Unitary Planning Authority, responsible for producing its own strategic and local development plan, albeit within a loose framework for collaboration among the other local authorities of the former county council. From the late 1980s, a weak system was created for ‘regional planning guidance’ for Yorkshire and Humberside, which had limited statutory authority and resources behind it.

With the election of a New Labour national government in 1997 this system quickly began to be reworked, as part of the new government’s commitment to devolution. Non-elected regional assemblies were created and given a specific responsibility for producing regional planning guidance, plus more general responsibilities for other types of regional strategies. Regional assemblies are non-elected, led by boards that have strong local authority representation, plus a range of other regional stakeholder bodies. Greater London is an exception, as separate legislation for the capital saw stronger political devolution to the new bodies created there. In 2004 changes in the planning system saw the regional planning process elevated to a statutory function with much stronger powers,
Figure 13.1 Interaction between policy scales and sectors: Yorkshire and Humber
requiring local authorities to collaborate in producing the new regional spatial strategies. As part of the new hierarchy of spatial plans there was the capacity to create sub-regional planning statements, which in the case of Yorkshire and the Humber was to include one for a new ‘city-region’ of Leeds (see below). Local planning powers were substantially redrawn, as part of this rescaling of planning powers, with county council planning powers where they still existed largely dismantled and local planning systems reworked. Planning then has been rescaled regionwards in a major way.

In economic development, regional development agencies (RDAs) were created following new legislation in 1998, gradually attracting greater powers and resources over the years. In Yorkshire the RDA is known as Yorkshire Forward. In its most recent regional economic strategy a strong emphasis was placed on sub-regional investment planning, using the boundaries of the four county councils (three of these are defunct as political entities, but this use of the old boundaries for ‘sub-regional’ partnership purposes is still fairly common). In addition, various other statutory agencies of government (e.g., for heritage, environmental protection, housing), and non-statutory bodies and NGOs, were busily producing regional and sub-regional strategies, all of which in principle were intended to have regard to each other, with the regional spatial strategy providing their spatial expression where appropriate. At the local level, local authorities such as Leeds were expected to create a Local Strategic Partnership involving all key stakeholder groups, which would then develop a ‘joined up’ Community Strategy for their area.

Where this whole process becomes really interesting, if slightly exasperating, is when the already complicated system for linking planning across scales and to other policy sectors has yet new tiers of policy intervention thrust upon it. The remainder of this section examines how new meta-regional and city-regional scales of governance have emerged since 2003. To help illustrate the process we draw on interviews with 15 people during 2005 who were all involved in developing regional, sub-regional and local strategies for planning and development.

In 2003 the national government produced a Sustainable Communities plan, which was primarily aimed at addressing the twin processes of housing market failure in the North, where surplus low-grade housing was being abandoned, and pressures for major new housing development in the South of the country. In the North, the government proposed a series of housing market renewal areas, and in the South, four growth areas. With considerable political capital and government expenditure invested in them these required the creation of new institutional bodies and new strategies, which existing local and regional agencies necessarily needed to work with. Whilst the Leeds local government area did not get one of the nine housing market renewal ‘pathfinder’ areas, it was nonetheless eligible for some funding. Barnsley to the south did have some areas in the South Yorkshire pathfinder area.

In the political fallout of this announcement, which involved pressure from northern politicians keen to plan for growth not simply decline, the government quickly invented yet another institutional form, the Northern Way. This required actors from Yorkshire and the Humber, the North East, and the North West regions to come together and create a new meta-regional strategy. This process was led primarily from the RDAs, so perhaps inevitably focused on economic issues. Out of this process came a new policy imperative, which involved creating a series of city-regions, initially defined with loose, fuzzy boundaries, of which a new Leeds City Region was one. An important rhetorical and political
shift is evident in this process, prompted by a national lobby campaign by eight large local authorities in England, known as the ‘Core Cities Group’. This group, which included Leeds, proved to be politically very influential in promoting a national debate on the potential benefits of city-regions, attracting considerable central government support along the way.

The Northern Way documentation proposed three city-regions for Yorkshire and the Humber, of which Leeds was the largest. Because of the fuzzy nature of the initial concept diagram it was not clear where the boundaries of each city-region were, only that they did not align with any existing institutional geographies. Some parts of the region were not designated as within any of the city-regions, raising concerns for those excluded that they might become marginalized by the new geographies being created. Some clarity on boundaries eventually emerged and began to be used in other official strategy documents. According to the current draft Regional Spatial Strategy (Yorkshire and Humber Regional Assembly, 2005), the new Leeds City Region covers the five local government areas of West Yorkshire (Bradford, Calderdale, Kirklees, Leeds, Wakefield), the whole of Barnsley and York local authority areas, plus parts of North Yorkshire, including Selby, Craven and Harrogate. It contains a population of 2.7 million, 48 per cent of the regional total. In the Development Programme submitted to the Northern Way strategy team in June 2005, the usual policy-speak of improving global competitiveness was allied to a claim that the new city-region made sense as it had ‘strong potential to improve the functionality of the city-region so that it operates as a unified economic entity. Our interventions are aimed at removing those barriers which are currently impeding the city-region’s ability to function as a single economic space’ (Northern Way, 2005, p. 7). The economic and administrative rationalities then were very much to the fore.

Our interviews took place whilst the notion of city-regions was being debated keenly in the region. The long- and short-term histories of regional and sub-regional identity and institution building proved to be an underlying source of tension, which many actors were aware of, even as they tried not to get too mired in the legacy of the past:

There are some controversies about the city-region thing that gnaw away . . . about historic identity . . . and these shouldn’t be overlooked. It’s often quite a big deal for local politicians . . . Here at the regional level we can be quite dismissive about some things . . . but if you’re not a named city-region you might look at things differently. (YHRB7)²

Imposing a spatial structure on this area is riddled with problems of historical policy directives and political machinations, which makes it difficult. (YHLG11)

Perhaps what made the creation of a new city-region scale of governance even more problematic for most of our interviewees was that it was coming on top of so many other recent initiatives for regional and sub-regional institutional ensembles. The result was a multi-layered set of ‘regions’ that all actors needed to engage with at some level, so as not to be left out. This led to some tensions as people sought to make sense of where power and resources lay in the emergent system, especially at the rather cluttered-looking sub-regional level. As one prominent regional player told us:

It feels that five levels [of policy – meta-region, region, sub-region, city-region, local authority] in the North now is too many . . . so it does need resolving . . . about what each of the scales is for. There is a particular need to sort out the city-region–sub-region issue . . . which is the main
blur at the moment. . . . There’s merits of sub-regions and city-regions . . . and it’s quite difficult as to whether you have both or one or the other . . . both feels like it’s too many scales. (YHRB6)

Given the fuzzy boundaries for city regions used in the diagrams in the early Northern Way documentation and the potential for government money to be allocated to organizations participating in associated initiatives, the question of where was in and where was out of these new institutional imaginaries soon became a practical problem for those involved. Added in to this mix was concern about how the city-region idea mapped onto the sub-regional county structures still in use by the major regional bodies. For those areas not clearly in one of the proposed eight new city-regions for the North, things were particularly unsettling, as one regional planner pointed out:

The structures in this region have been based on administrative sub-regions . . . based on the old counties . . . and that’s the way the RDA operates . . . Up to now the RDA has taken the view that it will continue to use those sub-regional boundaries because it set up the infrastructure. And there’s a debate right now . . . debating whether we should move to city-regional boundaries. But that does leave unresolved what to do about most of North Yorkshire. (YHRB4)

Over and above this there was a sense of concern that the new regional and meta-regional policies were being driven in part from the top-down whilst the city-region agenda was being driven more by powerful urban players from the bottom-up. This was confusing to many, not least to those in the voluntary sector with limited resources but keen not to become marginalized by the new structures, as one leading player emphasized:

We’ve got this city-region thing being imposed on the existing sub-regions structures and alliances . . . so people don’t quite know which structure they’re supposed to be integrating with. And there’s a particular feeling that the Northern Way doesn’t apply to the more remote parts of the region . . . so I think there’s an issue there. (YHS8)

What we begin to see from this picture is the way in which policy actors were not particularly resistant to the notion of a city-region scale of administration, but they were resistant to the confusing way in which it was being inserted. More than this, actors were very acutely aware of the fact that it was a politicized form of governance in the making. And as to whether it was creating a better way of addressing the concerns about ‘joined up government’, the responses we got tended to be fairly negative, even for some of those working within major regional bodies:

So there’s been some integration of the thematic and the spatial based on the city regions [Northern Way]. . . . But the fact is that it’s very, very economically driven. You don’t really get the picture of city-regions as the integrated areas that bring all the topics to bear. So the city-region is seen as an economic concept which is about economic growth and that’s the justification for them. (YHRB6)

Certainly for some, the growth in sub-regional scale entities was largely part of an agenda for finding institutional forms that could replace at least some of the functions of local government, which was seen as a very political attack on them. Even those in Leeds who might be expected to be overall beneficiaries were worried about the emergent sub-regional emphasis:
There is a sort of feeling in Yorkshire Forward of sub-regional good, local bad . . . and that’s absolute tosh! That’s been part of the battle that we’ve fought. Whilst there clearly are some things that can be done sub-regionally . . . I think there is a dumbing down of interventions by saying we’ll do them all on a sub-regional basis. (YHS9)

The new city-regions then have created a new set of institutional winners and losers both at particular scales of governance and across them. At the moment it is not clear who the winners and losers will be precisely, but it does look as if regional scale bodies are gaining power and resources. So whether the proposed form of city-regional governance proves to be good or bad for cities such as Leeds very much remains open to debate and further analysis.

Integrated strategic metropolitan planning in Cork, Ireland

For a contrasting experience we turn now to an example of integrated spatial planning within the city-region of Cork in the Republic of Ireland. We draw heavily here on interviews during 2006 with 14 people and a roundtable discussion with eight people from various local campaign groups. We chose Cork initially because during scoping interviews held the previous year with various central government officials, the Cork region was held up as a successful multi-scalar and multi-sectoral approach to spatial planning. With a population of 345,000 and just two local planning authorities, Cork City Council and Cork County Council, the complexities of spatial planning here are perhaps somewhat less than in the Leeds case study.

As in Leeds, there has been a rapid insertion of new policy scales into the hierarchy of spatial plans in the Cork City region, with the recent publication of: the Irish National Spatial Strategy (NSS) (Department of the Environment and Local Government, 2002); Regional Planning Guidelines for South West (SWRPG) (South West Regional Authority, 2004); the Cork Area Strategic Plan (CASP) (Cork City Council and Cork County Council, 2001); revised county and city development plans; and a network of local area plans.

Spatial planning at the national and regional scales is a recent innovation in Ireland, driven by emerging European spatial policy and the need to establish regional structures in order to gain maximum access to EU regional structural funding (Mullally, 2004). Local planning responsibilities in Cork are split between two separate planning authorities, with Cork City Council covering the central parts of the city and Cork County Council responsible for the outer areas. Through to the mid-1990s these local-level bodies were deemed adequate for the needs of the system. However, in the last 15 years or so, Ireland has experienced rapid economic growth with growing pressures emerging for the planning system to cope with the scale and pace of development. Specifically there came to be a recognition nationally that there was a compelling case for strengthening strategic planning at scales above the local level. The Irish National Development Plan identified a need for a national spatial strategy in 1999, leading to legislation requiring the production of a National Spatial Strategy and Regional Planning Guidelines. The National Spatial Strategy was produced in 2002, introducing a framework for spatial development based on key settlements, referred to as ‘gateways’ and ‘hubs’. Cork was designated as one of the nine gateways, which are intended to promote balanced regional growth across the nation. Regional Planning Guidelines were to provide a bridge between the national spatial strategy and local plans, with all completed by 2004.
To provide better cross-sectoral policy integration, Irish local authorities are required to cooperate with a range of other service providers to form County and City Development Boards and prepare integrated strategies for local service provision—along similar lines to community strategies in England. As with their English counterparts though these integrated strategies do not appear particularly closely integrated with spatial plans, as one Cork planner told us:

They don’t have a direct role . . . it’s difficult to define what their powers are. . . . There is a requirement that when we are preparing our development plan it must be in line with the strategy . . . similarly other bodies preparing plans. . . . They haven’t really been fully incorporated into the system. (CLG6)

Despite such misgivings, it is generally recognized that there is a strong history of cooperation over spatial planning between the city and county of Cork going back to 1978, when the first Land Use and Transportation Strategy (LUTS1) for greater Cork was prepared jointly by the two local authorities. This was updated in 1991 (LUTS2). These are both seen as significant documents, helping to support road infrastructure projects in particular. However, they reflected a period when attracting growth was a considerable problem, whilst by the mid-1990s the need to manage growth became much more the central issue. This concern with growth management was a central theme in the most recent plan, the Cork Area Strategic Plan (CASP), published in 2001. This document was produced through a joint committee of the two councils and published a year in advance of the National Spatial Strategy, and three years before the Regional Planning Guidelines for the wider South West region were published in 2004.

A key feature of CASP was its aspiration for better integration of infrastructure provision with spatial planning. Specifically it proposed that ‘infrastructure (including roads, public transport, water and sewerage) and community facilities are provided ahead or in tandem with housing and other uses in all new development areas’ (p. 27), and that ‘an integrated transport system based upon “state of the art” public transport facilities and a well managed roads system’ (p. 27) be provided. Although CASP was prepared in advance of the national and regional spatial planning documents, planners at these higher levels appeared to take on board its key proposals, which fitted comfortably with the concept of a ‘Cork gateway’ in the NSS. Indeed, the integrated approach to planning and infrastructure provision was also endorsed in the NSS and RPG and adopted as a model for elsewhere. The CASP proposals have also been incorporated into revised development plans for the city and county of Cork and into local area plans.

Much of the uncertainty associated with city-region planning in the Leeds case study was linked to concerns about governance structures and inter-authority relationships. Because of the small number of local authorities in Cork and the history of cooperation, there seems to be a widespread acceptance of the city-region concept. There were, though, concerns in Cork about the number of different plans and strategies being prepared, as one spokesperson for an environmental NGO told us:

Have you seen the shopping list of plans that exists! It’s a huge list of plans that’s happened to Cork in the last few years . . . (CS15)
Given the number of plans already agreed, the need for a regional scale of planning covering Cork was questioned by one or two of our interviewees, including a local planner who set out this perception:

[B]y law there’s the NSS . . . RPGs and then county and city plans. In Cork though they took on board CASP and tacked on a bit of Kerry. . . . Politically it made a lot of sense to do it that way . . . because there isn’t really any stomach for regional government really. . . . But also, because we’d got the non-statutory plan CASP already done. (CA11)

It appears on the surface then that the local planning authorities in the Cork City region have, through a cooperative approach, produced spatial plans that are to a degree multi-sectoral and that fit neatly into the Irish hierarchy of spatial plans, which now spans all scales from national to local. In theory, it is a good model of how technically to plan for spatial development in a city-region, but interviews with stakeholders and policymakers highlight mixed opinions on whether it works out as well in practice as it does on paper:

So a lot of these documents are all very well put together . . . and there’s fantastic information . . . but if you were to believe that everything is going to happen in this [CASP] that would be a different thing altogether. (CS17)

We all seem to be agreed on the same thing . . . that we have good plans, but it’s the way they’re implemented. . . . So in theory we’ve a very nice planning system . . . but it’s the implementation as has been pointed out. When someone comes in with a big proposal everyone changes. . . . But planning has to be a bit like that. (CS18)

One of the most notable features of the plan is an attempt to tackle the problem of outward urban expansion to the west of the city, which was leading to considerable problems in the area, including traffic congestion for routes into the city. In a bold attempt to shift the pattern of new development to the east of the city, there was a decision to seek to reopen an abandoned rail line there as a commuter line. National government would only agree to contribute monies for the re-establishment of the rail line if strong planning was in place to guarantee users existed. So to make the railway proposal viable, the planning system had to help ensure that new housing at reasonably high densities would be built close to the new stations, notably at Midleton and Carrigtwohill, existing small towns soon to see considerable growth. Seen from the other perspective, planners were keen only to zone new land for large-scale housing developments where adequate public transport could be provided. This approach is now frequently cited as an exemplar for integrated land use and transportation planning in Ireland. Indeed, one central government official told us how this model was being used to try to influence planners in other parts of the country, using the potential for transport investment as a lure:

So that would be the way we are trying to have the Cork model rolled out. We’ve supported the buses . . . we’ve supported the rail link because of the development patterns that were proposed around it . . . and hoping that the others will follow suit. (IG3)

Locally there was widespread recognition that Cork was receiving substantial new government transport funding precisely because of its integrated approach to city-region planning:
The national support for CASP comes over very clearly in its funding of the railway line . . . and it did help that the steering group included people from the Departments of Transport and Environment. That was a big help when it came to implementation . . . they were sold on it already. (CS6)

It’s the only place in the country where they released funding for suburban rail . . . they couldn’t retro-fit suburban rail anyway if there were low densities . . . all spread out. (CA11)

There were though some concerns that development was taking place in advance of the railway’s opening, as one lobby group told us:

CASP is all very well . . . and Carrigtwohill is developing very well . . . but the rail line still isn’t running . . . and the thing about that in a sense is that people are getting used to driving everywhere in their cars . . . so when the rail link actually becomes established how many people will they take from their cars to get on the train? (CS17)

Other concerns were expressed about the integration of social infrastructure with spatial development. Most social infrastructure in Ireland – health, education, police – is run by departments of central rather than local government, which are perhaps not as closely involved in spatial planning as are providers of transport infrastructure. This led several voluntary sector bodies in particular to express their concern about whether planning was actually working as well as it could as an integrating policy device:

So they gave a huge review of the hospital requirements . . . but the decision had no bearing on the National Spatial Plan . . . or on the existing settlement pattern. So yes . . . health isn’t in there . . . education isn’t in there. You do the plan . . . you advertise it . . . you send a copy of your official document to the Department of Health and then they run out of time! (CA11)

[All the funding comes from central government . . . Schools . . . and there is a plan . . . the money isn’t just given to Cork to decide how it’s going to be spent . . . instead the Roads Authority decides on the roads . . . Department of Transport decides whether the railways are going to get it . . . Okay, they all look at the plan, but whether the schools come . . . I also think there is local vision . . . there are local plans . . . it’s just that there isn’t a mechanism for implementing them. (CS18)

We also encountered concerns amongst interviewees about the ability of the planning system to resist major development proposals in greenfield areas surrounding Cork, to support, for example, regeneration of the docklands:

[You’ll find the document saying the right things [about economic development] . . . but if you look at the decisions . . . it’s hard to say no. . . . The city centre is very constrained. . . . And when that [docklands] was going on, the county council . . . which administers most of the suburbs . . . they were saying that if you get internationally mobile industry . . . we can’t say no for ever . . . so they opened up a few locations . . . one at the airport, which was meant to be for airport-related industry. (CA11)

It should be pointed out though that an official responsible for dockland regeneration in Cork did not see any particular threat from the release of greenfield land at the airport.

In metropolitan Cork, where city-region spatial planning is a reality, the issues raised by interviewees are different from those raised in Leeds. With the approach in CASP
widely supported by national, regional and local governments, our interviewees were largely positive about plans produced at the city-region scale and the political structures established to bring this about. Instead, concerns focused on the ability of the public bodies in Cork to implement what was in the city-region plan, which is perhaps a near universal issue in regional planning.

Conclusions
This chapter has set out to examine the politics of rescaling towards city-region governance, with an emphasis on planning. We have not tried to say that this scale of government is right, or necessary, or in some ways preferable to any other way of guiding future urban development. Rather, our interest has been in seeking to understand why policymakers set out to promote city-region governance, and the way in which this is carried out. This is perhaps frustrating for those who want to be told that a particular form of urban politics or urban management works better than others. But it is consistent with our theoretical stance that actually privileging an urban scale of academic analysis or policy management flies in the face of our increasing understanding of the ways in which ‘urban’ issues are scaled in complex ways, and how attempts to restructure urban governance in favour of particular scales are always politically inspired. Cities need to be understood in terms of how they are constituted by and within broader sets of political, economic, social and environmental forces, which do not of themselves have any necessary affinity with a particular set of ‘urban’ boundaries.

Informed by growing sensitivity to how global economic and environmental forces work out in different city contexts, and the potential role of cities in influencing these forces, current moves towards city-region governance may look inadequate and rather inward-looking. Yet we would argue that what we are seeing here is the emergence of new forms of territorial management, which, whilst struggling for coherence and acceptance, are beginning to develop new approaches to local and regional development. Specifically they are more rooted in an understanding of the potential for cities to manage their own development better for the whole built-up urban area, not just focusing on specific urban political units. And whilst still largely embryonic and indeed all too often tokenistic, we are beginning to see a new sophistication and creativity in how the strategies for cities and their regions reflect on the wider implications of these strategies for their distant hinterlands. Once the new generation of strategies is in place, some of which contain explicit concern for addressing external environmental impacts, we can expect to see them being used to challenge how future urban development processes are being shaped for the good of both individual cities and the wider world of which they are part.

Notes
1. This chapter is based on work supported by ESRC grant number RE-000-23-0756.
2. Henceforth coded references are given for verbatim references. In the interview references the prefix YH refers to ‘Yorkshire and Humber’ and C to ‘Cork’. They are combined with CG, which refers to ‘central government official’, LG to ‘local government official’, RB to ‘employee of a regional body’, S to ‘stakeholder’ and A to ‘academic’. They are numbered separately for each case study, for example YHLG11 is a local government official in Yorkshire and Humber and CS15 is a stakeholder in Cork. One of the Cork quotations, from an earlier series of interviews with national government officials, is referenced IG3 (Irish Government interview number 3).
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14 Cities mediating technological transitions: the adaptability of infrastructure and infrastructures of adaptability?

M. Hodson and S. Marvin

Introduction
Cities have historically been powerfully shaped by the development of key infrastructural technologies. Complex socio-technical systems of water, energy, transport, communications and waste make the concept of the contemporary city possible (Graham and Marvin, 1996; 2001). While there have been dramatic changes in the social organization of infrastructure and drivers shaping its development, the physical infrastructure of the city is often slow to change. This chapter argues, with this in mind, that the central question is not only how do infrastructures shape cities but also how do cities shape their infrastructures, particularly when they have little direct control over private and often liberalized systems? Cities face the challenge of shaping complex technological transitions – refitting new and often hybrid energy infrastructures, laying new ICT systems over old infrastructures, through road pricing and control technologies, introducing decentralized new and renewable technologies into centralized systems (see Graham and Marvin, 1996; Evans, Guy and Marvin, 2001; Guy and Marvin, 2001; Guy, Marvin and Moss, 2001). Yet we lack a systemic way of understanding the role of places in shaping such socio-technical transitions (Eames et al., 2006; Hodson and Marvin, 2006).

Technological transitions (TT) and transition management (TM) approaches have generated considerable interest in academic and policy circles in recent years (Rotmans and Kemp, 2002; Geels, 2004; Kemp and Loorbach, 2005), where, in terms of a loose definition, a ‘transition can be defined as a gradual, continuous process of structural change within a society or culture’ (Rotmans, Kemp and van Asselt, 2001, p. 2). The development of these approaches, much of which has occurred within the context of the Netherlands, may be seen as a response to the complexities, uncertainties and problems that confront many Western societies, in organizing ‘sustainably’ various aspects of energy, agricultural, water, transport and health systems of production and consumption. Problems such as pollution, congestion, the vulnerability of energy or water supplies and so on are seen as systemic and entwined or embedded in a series of social, economic, political, cultural and technological relationships.

The systemic nature of many of these problems highlights the involvement – in the functioning of a particular system and any subsequent transition – of multiple actors or ‘stakeholders’ across different local, national and international levels of activity. With this in mind, such problems become difficult to ‘solve’ and ‘solutions’ are seen to require systemic innovation rather than individual or episodic responses. The point being that ‘these problems are system inherent and . . . the solution lies in creating different systems or transforming existing ones’ (Kemp and Loorbach, 2005, p. 125).
While transitions approaches acknowledge the interplay and interpenetration of different landscape (macro), regime (meso) and niche (micro) levels they say little explicitly about the role of the city and regional scale in processes of transition. This is problematic to us for three reasons. First, a significant level is neither explicitly nor adequately dealt with in an approach that does take the need for multi-level analysis seriously. Second, responsibility for key aspects of technology, innovation and competitiveness policy have been devolved from the nation-state to city and regional scales. Finally, at the city and regional scale significant efforts are now being made to shape technological transitions strategically through systemic intermediaries that systemically mediate relations between technological potentials and local context. Consequently, a key scale is currently inadequately conceptualized or, perhaps at worst, missing from an approach that is generating new insights into technological transitions.

The contribution we want to make to the debate is to develop an understanding of the role of the urban and regional scale within technological transitions. Critically we ask, in what ways and to what extent can cities and regions shape technological transitions? We address this question in the following steps: Section 2 compares the treatment of level within two broad multi-level approaches to technological change. This allows us to engage with transitions debates and connect them with recent debates around the ‘re-emergence’ of cities and regions and, in doing so, more adequately understand their role in transitions. Section 3 examines how cities and regions shape transitions by focusing on the critical role of place-based intermediaries that are established to work between technological possibilities and local context. We examine intermediaries’ roles in developing visions of the future for cities and regions through technological transitions and the work they undertake in building capacity to work towards these visions. Section 4 then takes the example of city and regional hydrogen energy economy development and offers a four-fold typology of understanding relationships between cities and regions and technological transitions and their consequences. Finally, Section 5 offers conclusions around the key question of the extent to which cities and regions can shape technological transitions.

Understanding transitions approaches and cities and regions

This section compares and contrasts the treatment of level within two multi-level approaches to technological change – first through technological transitions and second through urban and regional governance approaches – in order to start building an enlarged conceptual understanding of the active role of place within technological transitions.

Multiple levels within technological transitions

Technological transitions (TT) is a multi-level approach that focuses on three interconnected levels – the landscape, regime and niche. Critically these three levels ‘are not ontological descriptions of reality, but analytical and heuristic concepts to understand the complex dynamics of sociotechnical change’ (Geels, 2002a, p. 1259). Consequently, these levels are understood in the following ways:

- First, the concept of landscape is important in seeking to understand the broader ‘conditions’, ‘environment’ and ‘pressures’ for technological transitions. The landscape operates at the macro level and focuses on issues such as political cultures,
economic growth, macroeconomic trends, land use, utility infrastructures and so on (Geels, 2002b, p. 369).

- Second, the concept of regime operates at the meso level and relates to existing or incumbent technologies being intertwined within a configuration of institutions, practices, regulations and so on, where configurations impose a logic, regularity and varying degrees of path dependencies on technological change. Regime is defined as: ‘the whole complex of scientific knowledge, engineering practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, established user needs, regulatory requirements, institutions and infrastructures’ (Hoogma et al., 2002, p. 19). A regime can also exist through overlapping patchworks of related regimes including, for example, science regimes, policy regimes, technological and product regimes, and so on (Geels, 2004).

- Finally, there are socio-technical niches operating at a micro level. These are ‘protected spaces in which actors learn about novel technologies and their uses’ (Geels, 2002b, p. 365). The niche provides a context for developing radical innovations where initially ‘commercial viability might well be absent’ (Hoogma et al., 2002, p. 25). This requires ‘special conditions created through subsidies and an alignment between various actors’ (Geels, 2002b, p. 367).

Critically the interrelations between these levels are fundamental to TT because the aim of the approach is to address not only the ‘creation of technology, but also its diffusion and utilisation’ (Geels, 2004, p. 898, original emphasis). While landscape pressure may signal broader shifts in the context in which technologies exist – for example, in response to climate change – the emphasis on regimes highlights the issues and complexity involved in enabling and or constraining new technologies breaking through. Often incremental forms of evolutionary change may be more likely than ‘revolutionary’ change: Such reconfiguration processes do not occur easily, because the elements in a sociotechnical configuration are linked and aligned to each other. Radically new technologies have a hard time to break through, because regulations, infrastructure, user practices, maintenance networks are aligned to the existing technology. (Geels, 2002a, p. 1258)

Consequently, in order to reconfigure rigid technological systems and ‘get the new technology on the agenda’ there is emphasis on the potential of previously ‘unproven’ technologies as ‘actors make promises and raise expectations about new technologies’ (Geels, 2002b, p. 367). The constitution of new social networks and the expectations of a technology they present are important in the creation of niches where a variety of possible radical innovations can be generated in ways that are ‘protected’ from the constraints of the regime:

In the niche model, lock-in and path dependency assumptions are relaxed. Various technological options can co-exist over a long period; precisely because of the existence of niches requiring other functionalities . . . Niches may also persist because actors such as firms and governments act strategically by keeping certain options alive which might be important for future competition or other broader societal goals. (Hoogma et al., 2002, p. 26)

Technological transitions are premised not on radical regime shifts but through ‘step-wise process of reconfiguration’ (Geels, 2002a, p. 1272). Regime shifts may take place over
a considerable period of time. Geels (ibid., p. 1262) points out that TT involves the linking of ‘multiple technologies’ and that the use and development of innovations in different domains and contexts see an accumulation of niches – an important mechanism in gradual regime shift. Early linkages between niche and regime may rely on ‘link up with established technologies, often to solve particular bottlenecks’ (ibid., p. 1271). There is an important focus on ideas of technological add-on and hybridization where existing and new technologies ‘form some sort of symbiosis’ (ibid., p. 1271).

Critically the TT approach highlights the importance of the nested interrelationships of wider landscape ‘environments’, the stability and interrelationships of regimes and the innovative possibilities of niches. It outlines a way of thinking about the relationships, resources and practices, including technologies, institutions, skills, and so on, that sustain existing configurations and regimes, but also addresses processes of adapting and evolving such a regime in relation to ‘pressures’ for, and contexts of, new technological possibilities and innovations through processes of branching, add-on and hybridization. But where is the urban and regional scale in this analysis?

Bringing cities and regions to technological transitions

Thinking about different transitions contexts opens up questions about the role of place in transitions. Although we are sympathetic to technological transitions’ commitment to a multi-level analysis and its insights into managed socio-technical change, we have also struggled to understand conceptually and empirically the role of cities and regions in transitions. Are cities and regions simply convenient sites within which niches are developed? Or do cities and regions actively seek to pull down and make relevant landscape pressures in their distinctive local contexts? This then begs the question: can cities and regions establish their own regimes within which niches and transitions are able to exist?

We can only find ways of addressing these questions by stepping outside the TT framework to look at the implications from more critical approaches to technological change that specifically address the urban and regional. The ‘re-emergence’ of the city and region raises critical issues of how we think about the relations between place and transitions. While the multi-level approach is useful in understanding the distributed nature of technological transitions, our critical concern is that institutions, social interests and knowledge are often assumed to be ‘out there’ (Geels, 2004, p. 902). Place is implicit within the three-fold division of landscape, regime and niche. Only within the niche is the notion of place more explicit as some sort of bounded, experimental local context. We argue that TT would clearly benefit from an appreciation of ‘multi-level governance’ and the politics of scale in understanding attempts to shape transitions in place. Key to this is the development of a conceptual framework that permits us to analyse the entangled relations and interactions of governance at different scales that inform potential transitions. This is particularly significant in times of increased ‘globalization’ and neo-liberalism, where the changing role of the state and issues of multi-level governance raise a whole series of issues not only about how we might think about the city and region but also the interrelationships between regions, the local, national and supranational. How do we understand cities and regions through multi-level governance in relation to place-based shaping of technological transitions?

Critical to understanding these shifts are changes in the international economy, through the reconfiguration of national and international financial and political institutions (see
Aglietta, 1979) over the last three decades that have generated neo-liberal pressures for increased ‘competitiveness’, ‘entrepreneurialism’ and ‘innovation’. This raises issues related to both governance and technology, in particular the changing role of the nation-state is important, where we are seeing a shift from the welfare state to a competitive state (Jessop, 2002). The competitive state, has a ‘concern with technological change, innovation and enterprise and its attempt to develop new techniques of government and governance to these ends’ (Jessop, 2002, p. 96). Consequently new configurations of governance create and respond to increasing international economic competitiveness through encouraging (particularly technological) innovation at different scales. These structural shifts have three significant implications for our understanding of cities and regions in technological transitions.

The first of these is to highlight the pervasiveness of notions of ‘competitiveness’ and the ways in which this is manifest in wider ‘pressures for’ city and regional transformation through science, technology and innovation. A closely aligned development in the UK context has been the establishment of regional development agencies (RDAs), in 1999, and many of their local and regional economic governance concerns around competitiveness. This emphasis on narrowly defined features of economic governance has also become a central concern of many local authorities (see Fuller, Bennett and Ramsden, 2004). What often follows is an institutionalization of ‘permanent innovation’ (Lovering, 1999), predicated on the pervasiveness and ‘naturalization’ in government and policy circles of the virtues of particular forms of neo-liberal competition, a ‘race’ for competitiveness and a constant search for transformation at the urban and regional scale. Cities and regions develop positions on technological potentials to position themselves in the global race for economic competitiveness.

This leads to a second point, that city and regional analyses need to take account of a complex interplay of relationships at various political scales. Critically, this requires ‘an appreciation of the complex geometry of power and the political and cultural struggles through which societies assume their regional shape’ (MacLeod and Jones, 2001, p. 670). A focus on the ‘endogenous’ city and region and ‘creating the conditions’ for city and regional socio-technical innovation often ignores what drives city and regional economies, and in doing so underplays the differential economic and political positions of places and the wider role of the nation-state in devolving responsibility (but not power and resources) for technology and innovation strategies to the city and regional development (Ward and Jonas, 2004). Cities and regions are differentially positioned within existing social, political and economic relations that delimit their capacity to shape technological transitions.

Finally, cities and regions are clearly constructed in an unfolding and structured set of social, political and economic relationships. Importantly, new technology and innovation is both a product of, and produces political pressures for, institutional change. Seeing the city and regional level as merely responding, as reactive, not only ignores specific relationships informing a city and regional response, but also ignores attempts to shape relationships across space with a variety of, for example, national, supranational and other city and regional government departments and agencies. This highlights the importance of seeing city and regional development in relation to technological transitions, not only through the lens of ‘endogenous’ institutional interrelationships, but also in terms of the influence of, and relationships with, the nation-state. Cities and regions actively and strategically work both internally and externally in developing the resources, networks and relationships to shape technological transitions.
There has, as we have highlighted, been much discussion of ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘competitive’ cities and regions. By contrast there has been a relative neglect of issues of environmental governance in the politics of scale and state restructuring literature (Bulkeley, 2005). This begs questions about both environmental governance and how issues of sustainability are addressed in the literature. This is particularly pertinent in view of the increasing array of environmental commitments, developed in international forums, which are ‘managed’ at sub-national levels, raising questions about how these environmental aspects are incorporated into urban governance (While, Jonas and Gibbs, 2004). The claim is made (Bulkeley, 2005, p. 889), despite some devolution downwards from the national state of environmental responsibilities, that it is questionable whether the rescaling of environmental governance can be understood ‘in terms of the same dynamic’ that underpinned the reconfigured relationships between state, economic governance and a politics of scale. Yet, issues of urban sustainability have often been conceived of locally in technocratic terms, thereby ignoring contestations involved in producing understandings of urban sustainable development across multiple scales (Evans et al., 2001; Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005). This is particularly important given the predominance of discourses of urban entrepreneurialism. The intuitive sense of the relationship between economic and environmental governance is one of a paradox. Yet there is an issue about how any tensions between the two are managed and understood and questions about how we understand urban governance relationships in respect of economy and environment.

One way of thinking about this as a ‘sustainability fix’ has been proposed, ‘which is intended to capture some of the governance dilemmas, compromises and opportunities created by the current era of state restructuring and ecological modernization’ (While et al., 2004, p. 551). In this sense, environmental issues are not seen as counter to issues of growth but as a means ‘to safeguard growth trajectories’ through the ‘selective incorporation of ecological goals in the greening of urban governance’ both as a means of managing ecological dissent or pursuing new accumulation strategies (ibid., pp. 551 and 554). An urban sustainability fix focuses attention on these tensions and issues in relation to a variety of cities.

In this respect, attributions to ‘sustainable development’ may not only be used to inform the entrepreneurial and economic re-imagination of cities but also as an attempt to ‘neutralize environmental opposition’ (ibid., 2004, p. 554). What this view of the tensions and negotiations between economic and environmental aspects of urban governance highlights is that ‘nature’ and the ‘urban’ are not divorced but ‘produced through complex processes of “glocalization” and entangled in myriad flows of capital, things and people’ (Keil, 2003, p. 729).

In summary then, pressures for, and tensions between, economic, environmental and technological changes and activity inform the re-articulation of places through a series of relationships of institutions and individuals but these are predicated on (particular readings of) history, and prior trajectories that rely on processes of adaptability and reflexivity. In this respect cities and regions’ role in transitions is linked to their capability to adapt and transform through reconfiguring and adjusting urban and regional institutions of governance to technological transitions. The key question this raises is: what are the implications of this analysis of the re-emergence of cities and regions for our understanding of technological transitions?
Sensitizing technological transitions to cities and regions

A ‘multi-level governance’ approach allows us to re-focus on three sets of issues that are currently weakly conceptualized and understood within existing TT approaches (see, for instance, the sympathetic critique by Berkhout, Smith and Sterling, 2003).

First, there is the issue of the dominance of normative visions – a key step in transition processes – and the degree of problematization that is often lacking from transitions accounts. For Berkhout et al. this highlights the univalent nature of transitions approaches, especially the overplaying of consensus and the underplaying of power relationships. The critical insight from the ‘re-emergence of cities and regions’ is the prevalence of the particular visions perhaps most powerfully embodied in the notion of the race for technological progress and economic competitiveness. This means that the processes through which visions are produced requires a focus on whose views inform such visions, and, importantly, who is excluded, underpinned by what forms of expectations and aspirations as well as resources, through what mechanisms are they negotiated, with what forms of dissent and compromise.

This, second issue, then, relates to what is often seen as a key shortcoming of transitions approaches – understanding the motivations, negotiations and unfolding relations of actors in transitions. Even amongst key transitions authors (Rotmans et al., 2001, p. 29) there is recognition that ‘Research must first be carried out into so-called systems of interaction. Attention must be paid to the social and material context of interaction, and processes of co-evolution’ (Rotmans et al., 2001, p. 15). Working through cities and regions allows us to look more critically at processes of interaction across scales in a way that can acknowledge differential positioning, power relations and varying capacities and potential for adapting local contexts. This raises the suggestion that: ‘contemporary urban regions must be conceived as pre-eminently “glocal” spaces in which multiple geographical scales intersect in potentially highly conflictual ways’ (Brenner, 1999, p. 438).

Finally, it also adds to our understanding of the role of government in ‘creating the conditions’ for transitions. Although the nation-state is still important, so also, increasingly, are various other levels and scales of governance that are related often in complex and different ways in various contexts. In particular: ‘in major urban regions throughout the EU, regionally scaled regulatory institutions are being planned, promoted and constructed as a means to secure place-specific locational advantages against’ (Brenner, 1999, p. 440). We increasingly need to acknowledge the role of city and regional scale in shaping technological transitions as part of a wider devolution of responsibility, but not necessarily powers, to reshapen the technological and economic competitiveness of places.

In summary the re-emergence of cities and regions provides a way of conceptually understanding three key insights from Berkhout and colleagues’ work, namely:

1. the negotiated and potentially conflictual nature of visions of the future through technological transitions;
2. the related limited understanding of processes of interactions in transitions; and
3. the role of government in ‘creating the conditions’ for transitions.

This relates to our starting point that the transitions approach says little about the role of place. This, we suggest, should be rectified due to the ‘re-emergence’ of the city and regional scale in purposively shaping technological transitions.
Mediating between cities/regions and technological transitions

The critical insight we have developed then is that landscape pressures do not just shape places but that places themselves attempt to shape technological transitions. Yet, who are the social interests involved in promoting city and regional transitions? And how do we understand them and the work they do? Cities and regions often develop specialist intermediaries (Marvin and Medd, 2004) who seek to shape strategically the relationships between technology and local context.

Intermediaries are deliberately (rather than neutrally) positioned to act in-between by bringing together and mediating between different interests. Intermediaries position themselves to have a particular role in literally intermediating between sets of different social interests (and technology), to produce an outcome that would not have been possible, or as effective, without their involvement. Such intermediaries we could say are defined by their function; they become ‘strategic’ intermediaries.

The role of intermediaries in shaping technological transitions has been examined by Van Lente and colleagues (2003). Within a transitions context intermediaries play key roles for three reasons. First, intermediaries play an important role as brokers by connecting, translating and facilitating flows of knowledge between different parties. They situate this within the context of a move from ‘mono-disciplinary’ to ‘multi-disciplinary’ forms of knowledge production. The latter requires multiple and varied interactions between the world of research and users, and consequently, this creates a ‘breeding ground’ for the development of strategic, intermediary functions’ (Van Lente et al., 2003, p. 65). Second, they cite a variety of organizations that function as intermediaries: knowledge-intensive business services; research and technology organizations; industry associations; chambers of commerce; innovation centres; university liaison offices. Each of these offers different types of intermediation between different actors and they distinguish between ‘hard’ functions (transfer of knowledge, provision of specific technical services) and ‘soft’ functions (management support, organizational and institutional aspects). Finally, they argue that due to the changing characteristics of innovation systems, namely a move to systemic transitions, so too the roles and functions of intermediaries are changing. More specifically they argue that there is a shift towards the emergence of ‘systemic intermediaries’. They argue that, in contrast to intermediaries that work primarily in one-to-one interactions, that is, bilaterally, these new systemic intermediaries work at the network level and offer support at the strategic level. The specific functions that these intermediaries perform will vary in different contexts, but broadly will involve ‘articulation of options and demands’, ‘alignment of actors and possibilities’, and support ‘learning processes’.

The critical issue for us is how do place-based systemic intermediaries established by cities and regions attempt to shape and manage technological transitions purposively?

Intermediaries in cities and regions: how do they work?

With the increasing responsibilities devolved to cities and regions to shape technology and innovation, specialist network intermediaries are being developed within places to shape technological transitions. These intermediaries are usually cross-sectoral in composition, network-based (rather than bilateral), with a focus on a broad technological sector (rather than a single technology) and can be characterized as transition managers within a particular local context. There are two key sets of activities that characterize their work.
The first is the work involved in developing place-based images of technological transitions. Intermediaries develop an understanding of existing city and regional contexts (either from ‘within’ or ‘outside’ the city and region) and they position themselves between technological possibilities and local contexts to re-think city and regional contexts through technological transitions. In doing this, they identify (multiple) points of intervention within existing and new systems of provision (between systems of production and consumption). In the language of transitions they develop a ‘vision’ of a transition of the city or region that takes (a particular) account and attribution of city and regional history and outlines a vision of transition. In short, intermediaries attempt to manage the (ongoing) production, transmission and reception of the vision of transition.

Visions are important media in mobilizing and shaping expectations and commitment around transitions and offer prospective views on the form, features, functions and benefits of technologies in relation to domains of application. The purpose of visions and the goals they outline provide a focus through which networks can be built, gaining commitments to participate, orientating the actions of potential participants and constituencies and in persuading potential participants of the desirability of transition (see Russell and Williams, 2002, pp. 60–61). Visions are not fixed and will change over time with the variety of social interests who become involved.

The second role is in the governance of place-based transitions. Intermediaries build social networks of actors who either position themselves favourably in relation to the debate or who are positioned by the intermediary. These actors can operate at various scales (local, national, international scales) and may be public or private, governmental or non-governmental. The potential involvement of multiple actors needs acknowledgement that they are embedded in particular institutional settings with associated institutional enablement and constraints, and views of the city or region, in pursuing their expectations (i.e., they are not ‘free agents’). This raises the possibility of a variety of expectations (see Van Lente, 1993) of city and regional technological transitions from multiple institutional positions and the ‘voices’ that dominate. In short, intermediaries ‘manage’ processes and governance of city and regional transitions.

Researching intermediaries, cities/regions and technological transitions

Our argument is that transitions take place in particular places and that places are differentially positioned in terms of their ability to inform transitions. The concept of systemic intermediaries allows us to address the extent to which particular places, here cities and regions, strategically shape technological transitions. In doing this, we suggest that understanding the early stages of transitions in particular cities and regions means we address the following:

1. outlining the vision that has been developed for a particular place-based transition;
2. but also to understand the negotiations of these visions:
   i. the social actors involved;
   ii. the expectations from different positions embodied in them, which requires a focus not only on ‘endogenous’ relationships within cities and regions but also on the ‘exogenous’ relationships with national government, private capital and so on.
The step between 1 and 2 allows us to look not only at the vision but also the extent of any ‘gap’ between the vision and issues of capacity in relation to the extent to which cities and regions may shape (and be shaped by) transitions.

Developing four transition styles

We now address these steps to develop four transition styles that characterize the ways in which and extent to which cities and regions shape technological transitions. We do this through drawing on research we have undertaken in relation to the early stages of development of city and regional hydrogen energy economies in three cities/regions of the United Kingdom (Teesside, Greater London and Wales).1

The hydrogen economy is a highly contested idea but may be broadly understood as the widespread use of hydrogen as a fuel for transport, heat and electricity generation (see Rifkin, 2002). As concerns related to widespread reliance on fossil fuels, including reducing carbon dioxide emissions, confronting air pollution and securing (national) energy supply, have increased so has interest in the idea of a hydrogen economy. The promise of the hydrogen economy in addressing these issues has captured the imagination of politicians and policymakers at the highest levels internationally, nationally and city/regionally (see Bush, 2003; Prodi, 2003; Mayor of London, 2004). Much of this enthusiasm operates at a rhetorical level, making a multiplicity of claims about the possibilities of the hydrogen economy, which despite generating much political and policy excitement, has led to few attempts to address the development of hydrogen economy initiatives in particular city/regional contexts (see Eames et al., 2006).

Visions of cities and regions through transitions

This section of the chapter emphasizes the importance of visions of technological transitions through city and regional hydrogen economy development. Visions can be seen in relation to three points in particular:

1. the issues or problems that are identified as needing to be addressed by transition and the type of emphasis on cities and regions embodied in them;
2. the perceived possibilities and expectations of the transition in addressing this problem; and
3. the relationship between cities and regions and transitions that this captures – the extent to which cities and regions are envisioned of shaping transitions or vice versa.

In Teesside (Table 14.1), for example, the dominant problem to be addressed was the decline of employment in its traditional industrial base, particularly chemicals and steel – an ‘endogenous’ problem or issue – where addressing the decline of traditional sources of industrial employment was seen as requiring the adaptation of an existing physical and social infrastructure and skills base to appropriate the perceived benefits of hydrogen economy. The relationship between the development of a hydrogen economy and Teesside took the form of one of reconfiguring, of transforming, existing socio-technical networks and arrangements in respect of the perceived possibilities of the hydrogen economy.

In London (Table 14.1) there were two sets of issues. First, this was seen as largely, though not exclusively, around an ‘endogenous’ city-regional agenda of confronting issues of air quality, social equity, carbon emissions reduction and economic competitiveness.
issues of urban governance

Table 14.1 Visions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Driver’</th>
<th>London</th>
<th>Wales</th>
<th>Teesside</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issues/Problems facing region</td>
<td>Issues of air quality, social equity, carbon emissions reduction and economic competitiveness</td>
<td>Relatively poor economic performance both on an urban and rural Wales-wide basis.</td>
<td>Decline of traditional industrial base, particularly chemicals and steel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived possibilities and expectations</td>
<td>Development and preparation – the creation of conditions favourable to a London hydrogen economy</td>
<td>Exploring possibilities of hydrogen economy through the construction of networks and visions</td>
<td>Adapt existing physical and social infrastructure and skills base to appropriate perceived benefits of hydrogen economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between hydrogen technology and region</td>
<td>‘Preparatory’ – creating a social context in the city-region</td>
<td>‘Exploratory’ – the journey to a vision and the production of manifest potentiality with and through the hydrogen economy in Wales</td>
<td>‘Adaptable’ – reconfiguring existing socio-technical networks and arrangements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
DGTREN: Directorate-General for Energy and Transport.
FC: Fuel cell.

Through the ‘preparation’ of a ‘necessary’ social context for the hydrogen economy – to the creation of social conditions favourable to a London hydrogen economy. The relationship between the development of a hydrogen economy and the London city-region was of the ‘preparatory’ creation of an endogenous social context within which the hydrogen economy could be developed.

Whilst, second, in terms of the multi-city Clean Urban Transport for Europe (CUTE) fuel cell (FC) bus demonstration project, of which London was one city involved, it was also viewed as related to the problems of managing uncertainty for multinational automobile and fuel corporations and on the focus of the European Commission for systemic transport change. Additionally, for the CUTE project the development of Europe-wide fuel cell bus demonstration projects in highly visible ‘leading’ cities, were seen as part of a ‘test-cycle’ informing multinational corporation research and development and also understanding the ‘transferability’ of technologies across different European cities. This ‘exogenous’ view of the London city-region saw it as a highly visible ‘laboratory’ or a ‘test-bed’.
In Wales (Table 14.1) the problem was one of relatively poor economic performance both on an urban and rural Wales-wide basis. More specifically it was about the retention of jobs and economic activity related to the ‘global’ automobile industry and its supply chains in South Wales. In Wales there was a move from the problem of relatively poor economic development to exploring, through a ‘journey’, the possibilities of a hydrogen economy through the construction of networks and visions in addressing this poor economic performance. The view of the relationship between the possibilities of the hydrogen economy and Wales was a more ‘exploratory’ one where there was to be an unfolding process of developing a vision.

Intermediary organizations: networks and scale

Of key importance in producing these visions were intermediary organizations but also the institution that underpinned the reasons behind their setting up. Not only this but also of importance were the ways in which the visions were developed, and who was involved in them, and the expectations of technological transitions and hence the role of cities and regions in this. This had consequences for the types of social actors that became involved in these networks, at what scales and hence the forms of knowledge produced and the extent to which this involved the variety of knowledge producers (producer interest, consumer interests, technical knowledge, local forms of knowledge, etc.) one might expect to see in city and regional technological transitions.

The key institution in addressing the Teesside (Table 14.2) hydrogen economy – an old industrial region – was a local authority, Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council. The institutional innovation was a specific strategic intervention – Renew Tees Valley – encompassing the Tees Valley Hydrogen Project underpinned by sub-regional funding (i.e., devolved regional development agency – RDA – funding). In Teesside, interrelationships were underpinned by movements from the local level up and the regional level down to ‘stitch-up’ regionally a ‘common’ understanding of the hydrogen economy starting from different perspectives (of local authority, RDA, sub-regional partnerships, etc.). Such a process involved drawing on forms of knowledge of the possibilities of economic regeneration, knowledge of the technical and market possibilities of fuel cell and hydrogen technologies, knowledge of regional economic strengths and attempts to align these strategically. The relationship between these transformative aspirations in ‘endogenous’ relationships was matched by an obduracy in terms of other scales, particularly in relationships with Whitehall, where Teesside was seen as a site for the demonstration of the hydrogen economy (having it done to it) rather than more transformatively.

In the London city-region (Table 14.2), the role of the Mayor and Greater London Authority (GLA) was key to the vision of the London hydrogen economy on the basis of a series of issues and a political agenda that saw the development of an ‘inclusive’ London Hydrogen Partnership (LHP). This saw a wide variety of interests involved in the ‘inclusive’ LHP, including public, private, national government, and so on, but with varying degrees of commitment. A view held by a number of large corporate concerns was that the LHP was a ‘talking shop’, ‘stacked with policy people’, with a lack of financial resources, where it was the ‘inclusive’ of it being a GLA initiative that was to blame. For one large corporate member this is because the hydrogen economy is a ‘big boys’ game’. This ‘inclusive’ underpinned a lengthy process through which different
understandings of the hydrogen economy, drawing on varieties of technical, environmental, business, and so on, forms of knowledge were negotiated in the production of the LHP’s Action Plan.

A further important issue was the extent to which these interrelationships connected different scales of political activity or otherwise. In London, through the GLA and the LHP there was a focus on developing a coherent city-regional agenda but in doing so there was an acknowledged importance of geographical proximity to national-level policymakers via the ‘goldfish bowl’. In this sense the political preparation of the context of the London city-region saw an interpenetration of political and policy actors but a variable degree of commitment from industrial and large corporate actors. In the words of one key

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<th>Wales</th>
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<td>Role of ‘intermediary’ organizations</td>
<td>LHP – generation of wide-ranging network to create the ‘route-map’, know-how and know-who to support a London hydrogen economy</td>
<td>H2 Wales – university-led initiative seeking to produce networks from which sub-networks can negotiate the development and embedding of demonstration projects in a variety of local contexts</td>
<td>Tees Valley Hydrogen Project – between technology providers and a series of demonstration projects in different contexts</td>
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<td>Types of interrelationships</td>
<td>Wide variety of institutions and interests in LHP – public, private, national government, etc.</td>
<td>Ongoing negotiation and ‘journey’ – circulation and negotiation of ideas – drawing on a variety of relationships and ‘stakeholders’</td>
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<td>Scales of political activity</td>
<td>Focus on developing a coherent city-regional agenda; importance of proximity to national level via ‘goldfish bowl’; relationality and comparator cities</td>
<td>Wales-wide and South-Wales specific – the confidence of a newly devolved ‘region’; looking outwards to Wales in Europe</td>
<td>Looking ‘outwards’ to DTI and attracting inward investors</td>
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Notes:
LHP: London Hydrogen Partnership.
PPP: Public–private partnership.
HV: Hydrogen Valley.
London policy actor: ‘the right people [i.e., industrialists] haven’t been in the room’ to move the hydrogen economy to beyond the preparation of a context.

Also in London, a different form of key institution can be seen in the case of the London CUTE fuel cell bus demonstration where Daimler-Chrysler, BP and the European Commission informed the production of a vision of transition through the hydrogen economy from ‘outside’ of London’. The interrelationships underpinning the CUTE project were, initially, narrower than in the LHP and reflected the fact that this was addressing a specific transport demonstration. There was a core network of multinational interests (including Daimler-Chrysler, BP) and the European Commission in a ‘public–private partnership’ (PPP), added to by more local-level interests in particular cities, here London. The resources these actors were able to leverage across the CUTE initiative informed a particular test-bed view of the region, trumpeting a technology test-cycle and learning to inform future wide-scale systemic transport change. In terms of the CUTE project there was an attempt to develop interrelationships to link the politically supranational, corporate interests and local and city-regional levels. There was also a focus on the comparative and competitive politics of ‘world’ and major cities both vying with one another and cooperating around common agendas. In this example, the claim is that city-regions were viewed as being more shaped by technologies rather than actively shaping change. This is a reflection of the social interests involved predominantly being ‘endogenous’ to the city-region with views of the city-region as a test-bed where the preparation of local and city-regional context, in many senses though not exclusively, occurred after the fuel cell technology had been ‘dropped-in’.

From the context of a Welsh university, and funded by the European Regional Development Fund, the H2 Wales (Table 14.2) intermediary organization provided an almost Wales-wide focus on the hydrogen economy and thus the assembling of a large and wide-ranging network of ‘stakeholders’ in a Stakeholder Forum, with sub-networks of Demonstration Project Working Groups, guided by a Steering Group. Additionally, in Wales, the Welsh Development Agency was a key institution in pursuing the development of a hydrogen economy in a more specific area of industrial South Wales through its Hydrogen Valley Initiative intermediary. In addressing this there were numerous similarities and indeed overlaps in terms of the network approach outlined on a Wales-wide basis by H2 Wales. In Wales the lack of clarity as to the specifics of how a hydrogen economy would address relatively poor economic performance, and the geographic scale of activities, led to a wide variety of interrelationships (for example, encapsulated by the numbers and types of interests attending vision-building events) and produced an ongoing negotiation of various forms of knowledge – a circulation and negotiation of ideas – drawing on a variety of relationships and ‘stakeholders’ on the ‘journey’ to Wales’s hydrogen economy. In Wales the scales of political activity were both Wales-wide and South Wales-specific in terms of the cultivation of networks but also with specific project group networks developed at the local level, seeking to create a vision of Wales through to transition to a hydrogen economy.

These understandings allow us to characterize four different styles of city/regional attempts to shape technological transitions. We call these: transformative obduracy; preparing context; exploration; and test-bed (see Figure 14.1).
Consequences
The focus of this chapter has been the extent to which cities/regions can shape technological transitions. In terms of consequences (Table 14.3), what the focus on different city/regional visions and their productions highlight is the differential capabilities of cities and regions to shape technological transitions. The key issue in addressing the relationships between technological transitions and city/regions, here, is understanding the relative emphasis of intermediary organizations’ activities.

Of particular importance is their emphasis in negotiating between two aspects:

1. ‘Generic’ aspects of technological transitions (the de-contextualized, possibilities, potential and forms of knowledge associated with ‘technology providers’ and their proxies and, importantly, their [non-]anticipations of contexts of ‘application’ and ‘use’).
2. The ‘over-socializing’ of city-regional transitions, where transitions become largely – though not exclusively – about ‘endogenous’ network development largely – though again not exclusively – without engagement with forms of ‘generic’ agents or forms of knowledge. If the ‘generic’ is premised on decontextualization then the ‘over-socializing’ approach overemphasizes context to the relative neglect of meaningful engagement with generic technological possibilities.

A third position bridges the gap between these two positions:
This is to focus on ‘configurational’ (see McLoughlin, 1999 and Figure 14.1) aspects of technological transitions of cities/regions (where there is an emphasis on the specifics and contexts of technological transitions, local forms of knowledge, historical practices and the shaping of each transition in ‘application’ in terms of the specific circumstances of cities/regions).

What each of our four styles of city/regional technological transitions do (Figure 14.1) is emphasize the overwhelming predominance of intermediary activities that overemphasize one of these first two aspects over the other – the transformative obduracy, preparing context and exploration, all, in differing ways, highlight the dominance of ‘over-socializing’ aspects over the ‘generic’, whilst the test-bed privileges the opposite relationship.

At this point the notion of ‘innofusion’ (adapted from Fleck’s, 1999 use) offers a means of understanding how these four existing styles of transition relations can be unlocked. Fleck’s work focused on the relationships, roles, resources and knowledges drawn upon

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Note: PPP: Public–private partnership.
by users and key social interests in the development of the Internet. He suggests that the key relationship is between those in the local context and generic technology suppliers. The more implicated in the implementation process that generic technology suppliers become the more likely that the generic technology knowledge wins out over local knowledge, as generic knowledge and innovations are fed back into subsequent technological developments. The concept of innofusion through the building up of long-term relationships between generic technology suppliers and key city and regional networks of social actors is, thus, of crucial importance in capturing and embedding local benefits.

In its movement between the city and regional and the wider context of technological suppliers and knowledge, there remain issues of how we might understand how different forms of knowledge and expertise interact. This is important in informing the ways in which cities and regions respond and adapt to not only to landscape pressures but in terms of how they ‘get transitions to work’ in context.

What this way of thinking highlights is not only the importance of bringing together both configurational and generic aspects when thinking about the ways in which cities and regions may be able to influence technological transitions, but also, importantly, a key role for intermediary organizations in doing this.

Conclusions
In this chapter we addressed the issue of whether cities and regions can shape technological transitions and, if so, to what extent? In addressing this we acknowledged the strengths but also some shortcomings of technological transitions approaches, particularly in terms of the cities and regions that are often the places where transitions take place and are actively shaped. The focus on exploring the possibilities of cities and regions shaping technological transitions we suggested is particularly important in view of the contemporary ‘re-emergence’ of cities and regions as scales of political activity in times when we are seeing a degree of ‘hollowing out’ of nation-states and a re-articulation of relationships between the national and other scales of political activities.

There are three key conclusions. First, we have developed four styles for thinking about the ways in which these relationships between technological possibilities and urban context that are embodied in visions and the types of interrelationships and forms of knowledge that intermediary organizations ‘bundle together’. Second, we have demonstrated that each style privileged either an over-socializing of the role of cities and regions in transitions or alternatively privileged generic technological understandings and forms of knowledge. Finally, we have highlighted a central role for intermediaries in bridging this divide and providing a transformational role in developing configurational understandings of city and regional technological transitions.

Notes
1. Fieldwork was based on observational work, participation in workshops and seminars and a series of semi-structured interviews with ‘key’ national, regional and local actors, which were conducted between January 2004 and January 2005 and included individuals who were very closely involved with developing city and regional hydrogen economies, from local authorities, regional agencies, industry, national and EU government officials. In addition, we engaged in analysis of documentary and promotional material. Interviewees were identified through the course of documentary analyses and in some cases through ‘snowballing’ from issues raised in previous interviews. Quotations drawn on here have been anonymized as agreed with interviewees.
2. According to one source the costs of the initiative were split with the European Commission contributing around €21 million of the €60 million total.
References


Further reading


Introduction
Cities are at the heart of Europe. Four out of five Europeans currently live in urban areas, which in turn account for around one-quarter of the European Union’s total land area. In some ways, this concentration of population may be seen as positive in that land use and energy costs per person are potentially lower, whilst there are economies of scale in the provision of basic services such as waste water treatment. However, it is equally the case that cities are the locus of environmental problems. For example, the ecological footprint of London – the ecological impact that the city has – is enormous. It is calculated that London needs twice the land area of the United Kingdom in order to support its activities. Londoners have an ecological footprint of 5.8 global hectares per person – three times what is available naturally (London ReMade, 2005) – or put another way, Londoners consume three times their ‘fair share’ of the globe’s resources.

Londoners are not unusual. Although there are significant variations between the living standards experienced in European cities, in general, European citizens have a high consumption lifestyle and as a consequence of this, high levels of consumption of energy, raw material and resources. This in turn is translated into urban environmental problems such as poor air quality, high levels of ambient noise, greenhouse gas emissions, urban sprawl, waste generation and traffic congestion. As from January 2007, there are 27 Member States comprising the European Union, with a number of countries currently negotiating for membership. There is clearly a high level of diversity in the quality of urban life experienced by the citizens of these countries and by the same token, differing levels and kinds of environmental problems, not least determined by differing climatic conditions, cultural contexts and levels of economic development. Nevertheless, as new countries have joined the European Union, the tendency has been for them to experience uplifts in economic activity, which has in turn tended to produce the urban environmental condition experienced elsewhere in Europe.

Until comparatively recently, it was widely assumed that the environmental problems of cities could be understood as the inevitable consequence of economic growth. The publication of the *Brundtland Report* in 1987 and the outputs from the 1992 Rio de Janeiro ‘Earth Summit’, notably Agenda 21, marked the beginnings of a focus upon sustainable development, and a recognition that first, unrestrained consumption of resources and attendant environmental damage cannot continue and second, that environmental questions cannot be addressed outside of their social and economic context. This renewed focus upon urban environmental problems through the lens of the ‘sustainable city’ has increasingly characterized urban policy initiatives in Europe at all levels of government.

This chapter examines the development of these initiatives in Europe, with a particular focus upon the processes of urban environmental governance. It is clear that although there will undoubtedly be further developments in our scientific knowledge, the technical
solutions to most urban environmental problems are already largely present. However, the political conditions for their implementation are often less promising. The key to securing high-quality urban environments across Europe lies in the development of effective governing relationships involving citizens and all levels of European government, and it is to this process of environmental governing that we now turn.

**Urban environmental governing and governance**

The term ‘governance’ has been utilized in a variety of ways. In general, within the sustainable development discourse there has been a tendency to conflate government and governance, sometimes using the terms interchangeably. Moreover, it is often implied that top-down ‘government’ is intrinsically undesirable, whereas more bottom-up ‘governance’ is in contrast to be encouraged and supported. However, as has been argued elsewhere (Evans et al., 2006) it is necessary to be clear that these two processes have distinct identities and attributes, and ‘good’ government is as necessary as ‘good’ governance.

Figure 15.1 illustrates these contrasting interpretations. Government may be regarded as the sphere of governmental activity, the internal organization of governmental organizations, and the legal, financial and political processes therein. Governance, on the other hand, is the sphere of public debate, partnership, interaction, dialogue and conflict entered into by local citizens and organizations and by government itself. Governing is the term that can be applied to describe the interaction between these two processes. (See Evans et al. 2005; 2006 for a further discussion.)

![Figure 15.1 Contrasting interpretation of governance](image-url)
The European Union is responsible for around 80 per cent of all environmental legislation in the 27 Member States. The European Commission issues Directives, with which the Member States are required to comply, ranging from air and water quality through to the prevention and recycling of waste. The Member States remain responsible for passing national legislation, which in turn implements these Directives. Most environmental Directives emanate from the European Commission’s Environment Directorate, including the regular Environmental Action Programmes discussed below.

In addition, the European Union (EU) has approved a range of initiatives that together constitute a policy framework that it wishes to see adopted by all Member States. The EU has adopted a ‘Strategy for Sustainable Development’ that seeks to embed the principle of sustainability into all areas of policy development and implementation: ‘All policies must have sustainable development as their core concern. In particular, forthcoming reviews of Common Policies must look at how they can contribute more positively to sustainable development’ (European Commission, 2002; 2006).

Sustainable development is clearly defined by the EU as being more than environmental sustainability, important though that is. The Presidency Conclusions of the Gothenburg Summit stated: ‘The Union’s Sustainable Development Strategy is based on the principle that the economic, social and environmental effects of all policies should be examined in a co-ordinated way and taken into account in decision making.’

This commitment to a broadly based sustainable development is closely linked to an emerging European policy on governance as presented in European Governance – A White Paper (European Commission, 2001a). In this paper, the modernization of European governance is seen as a necessary precondition for European integration through a process of decentralization, combatting the impact of globalization and a restoration of faith in the democracy through wider involvement in decision-making. The White Paper identifies five principles that underpin good governance – openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence – which should apply to all levels of government from local to global. The White Paper recognizes that the creation of the European Union and the challenges of policy in a globalized world necessitate new ways of working that are not possible within a traditional framework of top-down government.

It remains to be seen how the proposals contained in the White Paper will develop and be implemented. By implication, the proposals demand a degree of power transference both between levels of government (through the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity) and from government to civil society interest organizations. Such transfers of power, responsibility and influence have historically met with opposition from the current holders.

The emphasis on improving democratic mechanisms for decision-making is linked to calls for human equity and environmental justice, more effective environmental governance, and greater environmental democracy. Although there is often a blurring of these concepts, the underpinning rationale is clear and may be briefly summarized as follows:

- **Equity.** Moves towards greater sustainability imply a series of difficult decisions that will need to be faced, and the consequences of not taking these decisions (for example, about resource use, consumption and pollution) will seriously compromise the quality of life of both current and future generations. Those societies
that exhibit a more equal income distribution, greater civil liberties and political rights and higher literacy levels tend to have higher environmental quality (Torras and Boyce, 1998). The sharing of common futures and fates (and the difficult decisions involved in this) is more likely when there is a higher level of social, economic and political equality. This principle applies both within and between nations.

- **Justice.** Environmental problems bear down disproportionately upon the poor, although it is the rich nations and the prosperous within those nations who are the greatest consumers and consequently polluters (Agyeman, Bullard and Evans, 2003). The principles of environmental justice demand that environmental decision-making does not disproportionately disadvantage any particular social group, society or nation.

- **Governance.** The changes implied in a move towards more sustainable societies are so immense that they cannot be imposed by governments alone. This central fact was a major impetus behind the agreement to Local Agenda 21 at the 1992 Earth Summit, which recognized that change of the magnitude envisaged by Agenda 21 can only be achieved by mobilizing the energy, creativity, knowledge and support of local communities, stakeholders, interest organizations and citizens worldwide. More open, deliberative processes, which facilitate the participation of civil society in taking decisions, will be required to secure this involvement.

- **Democracy.** The right to information, to freedom of speech, association and dissent, to meaningful participation in decision-making – these and other rights underpin most conceptions of modern liberal democracy. Democracy is vital for sustainability in that it facilitates involvement, but through this it also nurtures understanding and education. Moreover, to encourage the involvement of citizens is to develop ownership and to combat the alienation and civic disengagement that must undermine the drive to more sustainable societies.

In short, the European Union recognizes that good governance is essential for sustainability – the purposeful involvement of citizens and stakeholders must be nurtured and supported. However, it should also be recognized that ‘governance’ cannot be accepted as an unquestioned ‘good’. If more ‘governance’ simply means that those who are already well represented in the processes of public decision-making have greater and more effective access, then the move towards better governance will have failed. The task is to ensure that all voices have a say, and specifically that the underrepresented – women, the young, the elderly and members of black and ethnic minority groups for instance – are encouraged to develop a higher profile in the policy process.

The final component of this emerging European policy ‘architecture’ is related to rights and citizen participation. The UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, also known simply as the Aarhus Convention, was adopted on 25 June 1998 in the Danish city of Aarhus at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in the ‘Environment for Europe’ process.

The Aarhus Convention lays down the basic rules to promote citizens’ involvement in environmental matters and enforcement of environmental law. The Aarhus Convention consists of three ‘pillars’, each of which grants different rights:
The first pillar gives the public the right of access to environmental information. The second pillar gives the public the right to participate in decision-making processes. The third pillar ensures access to justice for the public.

These three elements of European policy relating to sustainable development, to governance and to environmental rights collectively provide a Europe-wide policy framework that, it is anticipated, will eventually determine and condition the policies and practices of European national governments.

As the level of government closest to the people, European local governments will be responsible for delivering much of this tripartite agenda. Indeed, as will be discussed below, municipalities throughout Europe are already deeply involved in all aspects of this, not least through their commitment to Local Agenda 21, their involvement in the European Sustainable Cities and Towns Campaign or as individual cities that have adopted innovative and imaginative approaches to governance and sustainability in their localities. Moreover, much of this innovation by local government in Europe has been achieved with little or no support from national governments.

**The European Union’s Urban Thematic Strategy**

The Sixth Environmental Action Programme (6th EAP) was adopted by the European Parliament and Council in 2002 and runs until 2012 (European Commission, 2001b). It requires the European Commission to prepare seven ‘thematic strategies’ that cover key areas of environmental policy, which have all now been adopted by the EU. The seven thematic strategies cover the following areas:

- air pollution;
- prevention and recycling of waste;
- protection and conservation of the marine environment;
- soil;
- sustainable use of pesticides;
- sustainable use of resources;
- urban environment;

A number of these strategies impact directly upon urban areas, for example those dealing with air pollution and waste. However, the last strategy, that on the urban environment, has environmental matters in cities as its central focus. It is interesting to note that, when the European Commission submitted its first draft of the 6th EAP to the European Parliament for approval, it contained only six strategies. The Parliament took the view that the 6th EAP should also address specifically urban issues and it therefore required the Commission to add a further ‘Urban Thematic Strategy’ (UTS). The Commission responded by organizing a series of consultations with interested parties resulting in the publication in February, 2006 of the *Thematic Strategy on the Urban Environment* (European Commission, 2006).

It is fair to state that this strategy has not met with universal acclaim. Both the European Parliament and the Council have published responses to the UTS, which, although welcoming the strategy, have expressed reservations over its scope and alleged lack of ambition. In particular, the strategy has been criticized for failing to include a Directive
requiring cities over a certain size – 100,000 was proposed – to prepare an Urban Environmental Management Plan and a Sustainable Transport Plan. Such Directives were proposed in an earlier draft strategy, but were opposed by some of the Member States.

Nevertheless, the strategy represents current EU policy towards urban environmental issues and as such it is largely advisory. The strategy encourages Member States to adopt integrated approaches to environmental management at the local level, linked where appropriate to voluntary initiatives such as Local Agenda 21 and the Aalborg Commitments (see below). In addition, the strategy encourages local authorities to develop and implement sustainable urban transport plans. In both cases, the strategy states that the Commission will provide technical guidance to support these initiatives. In addition the strategy encourages support for sustainable construction, advises Member States to ensure that the other thematic strategies of the 6th EAP are implemented in urban areas and to draw upon other EU programmes such as the Cohesion Fund and Structural Funds to support urban environmental initiatives. It should be noted that the concept of sustainable development is hardly mentioned in the UTS, despite the high profile that this has in European Union policymaking. This is in large part due to the division of responsibilities within the European Commission. The UTS and the 6th EAP are the responsibility of the Environment Directorate of the Commission, and thus ‘the environment’ was perceived as the focus of these documents. Despite the EU rhetoric outlined at the beginning if this chapter, which emphasizes the need to incorporate the social and economic into environmental decision-making, the Commission has been reluctant to work outside of Directorate ‘silos’.

Overall, the UTS is a damp squib. It does not provide the direction necessary to ensure that European cities have the level of environmental quality that their citizens deserve. Moreover, despite the widespread recognition that sustainable development provides a way of working and policy guidance that can integrate policy formulation and implementation, the UTS fails to promote and practise such integrative approaches. Furthermore, the strategy ignores many current issues and problems that are central to the future of European urban areas. A key example is the question of urban sprawl. A recent report from the European Environment Agency shows that many environmental problems in Europe are caused by rapidly expanding urban areas (EEA, 2006). The report goes on to argue that urban sprawl is a European rather than simply a national or Member State issue, and that EU policy to coordinate and control planning is required. This is clearly a sensitive issue, since land use planning is considered to be a Member State responsibility rather than an EU one. Nevertheless, the rapid increases in cross-border trade and movement, increasing citizen mobility and globalization all conspire to make urban sprawl a European rather than simply a national problem.

**Sustainable cities**

In the summer of 2003, the European Sustainable Cities and Towns Campaign held its meeting to decide which cities should receive the European Sustainable Cities Award. Nearly 100 candidate cities and towns put themselves forward for consideration, and 12 shortlisted cities gave presentations to the judges, outlining their respective claims to be considered as exemplar sustainable cities with Oslo, Ferrara and Heidelberg eventually named as the winners. The award process revealed the very high level of activity and
progress towards sustainable development being made in cities and towns across Europe. Despite the lack of support by some Member States, and the limited European Union enthusiasm for such initiatives, local governments and their local government networks have been proactive in promoting and supporting local sustainability and environmental action in cities and towns across the EU and beyond.

The 1992 Rio Earth Summit was pivotal in promoting local government as a key agency in delivering sustainable development. In passing the Agenda 21 resolutions – essentially a plan for global sustainable development – it was clearly recognized that the problems facing the world are of such magnitude that they cannot be solved by governments alone. Local action and the involvement of local governments and their communities would be needed, and thus the Local Agenda 21 initiative was born:

Because so many of the problems and solutions being addressed by Agenda 21 have their roots in local activities, the participation and cooperation of local authorities will be a determining factor in fulfilling its objectives . . . As the level of governance closest to the people, they play a vital role in educating, mobilizing and responding to the public to promote sustainable development. (United Nations, 1992)

In Europe the challenge of Local Agenda 21 (LA21) was taken up by local governments with some enthusiasm and there are now well over 5000 local governments in Europe that have some kind of local sustainability process in place and in large part this has been due to the promotion of LA21 and local sustainability by the European local government networks. In particular, ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability (formerly the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives) has been extremely active in promoting LA21 globally, and through its European office, throughout Europe and the bordering countries. ICLEI is a founder member, along with other European local government networks, of the European Sustainable Cities and Towns Campaign (henceforth, ‘the campaign’). The first Campaign Conference was held in 1994 in Aalborg, Denmark, and at this meeting the local governments present agreed a set of principles for local sustainable development that became known as the Aalborg Charter. Some 3000 local governments have since signed this charter and by so doing, have committed themselves to the charter’s principles as outlined in Box 15.1.

There is no necessary causal relationship between a local authority signing the Aalborg Charter and the delivery of a more sustainable locality. However, research into local government sustainability processes and outcomes undertaken in 2000 indicated that, despite limited support from national governments, LA21 has developed and become an effective mechanism for developing local capacities for securing change. Although there was seen to be significant diversity in achievement across Europe, with the North and particularly Scandinavian countries exhibiting swift progress, it was clear that some Southern European countries, particularly Italy and Spain were catching up extremely quickly (Evans and Theobald, 2001).

This process of local governments learning from other local governments has been largely facilitated through the networks mentioned above, and by campaign activities such as the regular European Sustainable Cities Conferences and the Sustainable Cities Awards. As Bulkeley et al. have argued, local government networks are playing a critical role in promoting the importance of local governments in the area of urban sustainable development (Bulkeley et al., 2003).
BOX 15.1 THE AALBORG CHARTER

Notion and principle of sustainability
The idea of sustainable development is to achieve social justice, and sustainable economies, without overburdening nature and destroying natural capital. Our standard of living and way of life should therefore reflect this.

Local strategies towards sustainability
Sustainability will not be achieved by an ad hoc approach. It requires the incorporation of sustainability principles into all the policies and practices that affect the operation of a city or town.

Sustainability as a creative, local, balance-seeking process
The wide-ranging activities of a city constitute its overall ecosystem. The activities inter-relate and create an organic whole.

Resolving problems by negotiating outwards
The town or city should attempt to find environmentally sustainable solutions within its own boundary. However, if the town or city is unable to resolve problems or imbalances itself, it works together with other municipalities, or the wider region or nation to develop sustainable solutions.

Urban economy towards sustainability
A clean and healthy environment is a prerequisite for investment and for the future economic development of a city or town. If the natural capital of a city/town is reduced or destroyed, economic sustainability will not be guaranteed. How is the natural capital maintained or preserved in the light of new forms of economic development?

Social equity for urban sustainability
The basic social needs of citizens, such as access to water, food, housing, healthcare, education and employment are essential if sustainable forms of society are to be maintained in towns and cities.

Sustainable urban mobility patterns
The need for less congested and polluted cities is a key objective for a more sustainable city. A less congested city is a more efficient and cleaner place and also ensures a healthier living environment.

Responsibility for the global climate
Climate change is a serious concern for the future of the planet, and its causes are varied. The local level has a key role to play in ensuring that adverse climate change is decelerated and ultimately reversed.
In 2004 the campaign organized a second conference in Aalborg, this time with the explicit objective of translating the principles of the Aalborg Charter into more concrete action. The conference approved a set of commitments, inevitably named the Aalborg Commitments, which represent a series of tangible targets that local governments are invited to sign up to. These commitments are specific and clear and have been designed to encourage local governments to go beyond generalized statements of support for sustainability. The commitments resonate well with the, albeit rather bland, environmental objectives of the Urban Thematic Strategy. As the strategy itself notes, the Aalborg Commitments should be seen as having a synergy with the UTS (see Box 15.2).

The commitments are a vehicle for encouraging local governments to adopt specific commitments suited to their localities and contexts. Under each commitment there are a series of ‘sub-commitments’, which provide more detail and suggested areas for target setting. The whole process is seen as cyclical, with local governments encouraged to adopt a management and planning process or system that enables them to work from a baseline review, through participatory target setting, then implementation and review, before beginning the cycle again. This emphasis upon a sustainability integrated management system reinforces the message of the UTS outlined above.

The key message from these initiatives is that European local government and the transnational local government networks have been singularly influential in nurturing and promoting sustainable development and local environmental initiatives throughout the EU. According to Agenda 21, local government is ‘the level of governance closest to the people’ and it is therefore best placed to pursue the sustainability goal of ‘thinking globally, acting locally’ and research recently conducted into the local sustainability programmes of

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**Prevention of ecosystems toxification**
Prevention of the pollution of ecosystems and human health toxification.

**Local self-governance as a pre-condition**
The sustainable development of cities and towns is largely the responsibility of the individual city or town, therefore the necessary powers and opportunities are needed at the local level if appropriate decisions for a sustainable future are to be made.

**Citizens as key actors and the involvement of the community**
A consensus on the future sustainable development of the town or city requires that all sectors work together and recognize their individual responsibilities in delivering their local objectives for sustainable development. This also requires education, training and access to information for all sectors.

**Instruments and tools for urban management towards sustainability**
In developing strategies and actions for sustainable development it is also necessary to be able to assess their success/failure and to measure whether sustainable development is being incorporated within the overall urban management of the city or town.
BOX 15.2 THE AALBORG COMMITMENTS

1. **Governance**
   We are committed to energizing our decision-making processes through increased participatory democracy.

2. **Local management towards sustainability**
   We are committed to implementing effective management cycles, from formulation through implementation to evaluation.

3. **Natural common goods**
   We are committed to fully assuming our responsibility to protect, to preserve and to ensure equitable access to natural common goods.

4. **Responsible consumption and lifestyle choices**
   We are committed to adopting and facilitating the prudent and efficient use of resources and to encouraging sustainable consumption and production.

5. **Planning and design**
   We are committed to a strategic role for urban planning and design in addressing environmental, social, economic, health and cultural issues for the benefit of all.

6. **Better mobility, less traffic**
   We recognize the interdependence of transport, health and environment and are committed to strongly promoting sustainable mobility choices.

7. **Local action for health**
   We are committed to protecting and promoting the health and well-being of our citizens.

8. **Vibrant and sustainable local economy**
   We are committed to creating and ensuring a vibrant local economy that gives access to employment without damaging the environment.

9. **Social equity and justice**
   We are committed to securing inclusive and supportive communities.

10. **Local to global**
    We are committed to assuming our global responsibility for peace, justice, equity, sustainable development and climate protection.
40 European cities substantiates this position (Evans et al., 2005). Local governments in Europe have been remarkably proactive in their pursuit of sustainability – in many cases, in the face of national government apathy or even opposition. Certainly, on the basis of the 40 towns and cities studied, it is possible to conclude that local government has been the principle motor for change, mobilizing local agencies and resources to secure objectives. Although other local actors have also been active, little can be achieved unless local government is supportive, and in most cases, it is from here that the initiative has come.

The main point is that those local governments that show the widest range and greatest intensity of achievement are also those that have recognized their central role in promoting and taking action on sustainable development issues. These local governments are setting the agenda and acting proactively in establishing and maintaining partnerships and alliances both within the local authority itself and with external organizations. Local government may be able to achieve change on its own. However, those cases where there are high levels of achievement are also those where some level of social capacity and a relationship between local government and civil society organizations exists.

Concluding comments
Despite the remarkable achievements of local governments during the last decade, there remains much still to do. In many European countries, local government is under-resourced with limited legal and financial powers. If the rhetoric of governance and subsidiarity is to mean anything, there will need to be a rethinking of the relationship between the spheres of governance in some European countries. Linked to this, governments at all levels will need to work hard to promote the civic engagement in public life that must surely underpin the drive to a more sustainable society. During recent years most European countries have experienced an erosion of public trust in government and an associated decline in citizen engagement in public, civic and political life. The challenge for European governments at all levels is to reverse this trend through an active commitment to the principles of sustainable development and the promotion of just, equitable and sustainable local communities.

The Europe of 27 countries that has existed since January 2007, is diverse and many-faceted. The differences of culture, climate, geography, religion and history have created cities that are vastly different in their architecture, infrastructure and their particular urban environmental issues. Nevertheless, there are common problems, many of which transcend national boundaries and that may only be effectively addressed at the European level. Moreover, as European local governments have shown, the sharing of knowledge, good practice and experience between and across national boundaries can create a confidence that change is possible and that new initiatives can work. In particular, the understanding that sustainable development is a legitimate, rational and effective toolkit for creating urban quality of life is becoming increasingly the norm for guiding policy action. However, until national governments and the European Union are able to adopt effective concrete policies to promote and direct sustainable development in Europe’s cities, progress will be slow, despite the best efforts of local governments and their communities across Europe.

References


16 Policy responses at the local sphere of government: complexities and diversity

J.G. Nel

Introduction

Environmental\(^1\) policy\(^2\) at the local sphere\(^3\) of government\(^4\) is an extremely diverse and complex concept to unpack (Nel and Le Roux, 2005). Diversity, contrasts and complexities range from macro-scale substantive diversities that are typical of north–south differences in the environmental profiles of cities, to micro-level, intra-urban contrasts and inequities within cities, each with its own unique profile of environmental issues and hence policy imperatives.

Complexity of environmental policy issues at the local sphere of government is driven by a number of factors: first by contrasting and diverse definitions of key concepts, such as what are generally understood to be ‘urban’ and ‘environmental’ issues. Second, different role players with different interests may influence or even determine which policy areas are identified, how policy is developed and what the content of such polices should be.

The local authority–environmental interface is also very complex, as local authorities are required to manage their own activities, processes, products, services and facilities, manage the global common goods and ecological services, drive local economic development and social equity issues and as a sphere of government that is mandated by other spheres of government to govern specifically allocated mandates.

Other drivers of complexity in environmental policy at the local sphere of government may include amongst others: structural and functional fragmentation of local government functions that are tasked to manage matters environmental into semi-independent departments or agencies,\(^5\) fragmentation of urban environmental policy into environmental media,\(^6\) while differences in environmental mandates of the various spheres of government\(^7\) also drive intra-urban differences in environmental policy at the local sphere.

The diversity of what is globally understood to be environmental policy issues at the local sphere of government, dictates that environmental policy content will by necessity differ significantly over space and time as well as at any scale that a comparative policy analysis may be conducted.

Despite the vast global, regional and even local differences in environmental policy issues adopted by local governments, Agyemen and Evans (1994) argue that environmental policy generation processes are generally very similar to other policy processes. It is therefore impossible to generalize any perspectives on ‘urban environmental’ policy at a global scale. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to identify and explore some of the pertinent issues that may be deemed to be generic underpinning the debate on ‘urban environmental’ policy, without implying that the issues highlighted and explored are spatially and temporally valid for all cities.

The issues that are explored in this chapter include: the diversity of global urban environmental policy, the complexities of the local government and environmental interface,
characteristics of urban environmental policy, as well as urban environmental policy challenges.

**Conceptual differences and policy diversity at the global scale**

Wide-ranging differences in definitions for the terms ‘urban’ and ‘environment’ is one of the major causes of substantive diversity of environmental policy at the local sphere.

*‘Urban environmental’ or simply ‘environmental’ policy?*

The terms ‘urban’ or ‘city’ may limit a sound understanding of both the nature and extent of ‘environmental’ policy issues that may confront local governments. Local governments in, for instance, Africa also have jurisdiction over rural areas and functions that have policy issues and challenges that are very distinct from ‘urban’ issues. Environmental media and processes also transcend ‘urban’ or ‘city’ boundaries and urban or city-based environmental policies often need to be trans-boundary⁸ to be effective (Lusser, 1994).

The implication for environmental policy at the local sphere is that the scope of environmental policy often needs to transcend spatial and functional mandate boundaries. Transcending spatial boundaries implies cooperation with neighbouring local authorities, while different functional mandates between the various spheres of government require cooperation between the spheres as well.

*‘Triple bottom line’ policy issues*

There is no universal definition for the term ‘environment’ and hence also what issues environmental policy should address. The perspectives of what the environment actually entails range from just ‘green’, to combinations of ‘green’ and “brown”⁹ issues, to sustainability perspectives that also include economic and development elements.

**The ‘green’ environment**

A more limited perspective of the term ‘environment’ is that it should only include the ‘green’ agenda, that is, the biotic and abiotic elements of the earth system. The biotic¹⁰ and abiotic¹¹ ecosystem elements, including their interactions, recycling of matter through biochemical cycles¹² in a closed system¹³ in line with the law of conservation of matter,¹⁴ as well as the movement of energy through ecosystems in line with the first and second laws of thermodynamics,¹⁵ are generally understood to constitute the ‘green’ elements of the environment.

The biotic characteristics of the environment dictate that local governments should have policies or policy elements that are pro-biotic, that is, to protect threatened species and ecosystems, vulnerable habitats and biodiversity, to eradicate alien invasive species and to maintain ecosystem services¹⁶ (OECD, undated).

The abiotic elements of the environment are bounded by the characteristics of a closed system and the imperatives of the law of conservation of matter. This law requires policies that prevent pollution, either as source-directed or resource-directed measures¹⁷ or both, including arrangements to manage waste effectively¹⁸ and to rehabilitate polluted or degraded areas.

The law on conservation of matter also dictates that the physical resource base of the earth’s system is finite, while the realities of biochemical cycles dictate that some resources are recycled over such long periods of time that they may be regarded as non-renewable.
These realities require demand-side management and resource efficiency-based policy initiatives driving improvements in resource, energy and water use efficiencies.

This green definition of the term ‘environment’ requires policy direction that addresses the use and protection of green capital,\(^{19}\) global common goods\(^{20}\) (Evans et al., 2005; ICLEI, undated), such as air quality and climate protection (Agyeman and Evans, 1994), water quality and quantity management (Callway, 2005), soil protection, including protection of agriculturally productive land and demand-side management, policy strategies to reduce resource consumption (OECD, undated), protection of biodiversity, health and food security (Agyeman and Evans, 1994; Ayre and Callway, 2005) as well as the sustainable use of resources, including equitable access to such resources.

Adding ‘brown’ to the ‘green’ The antithesis to the green capital doctrine argues that human beings are an integral and indivisible part of the earth system and that ‘brown capital’ or social issues may not be separated from it. This perspective adds social issues to the environmental policy agenda, such as addressing equity imbalances manifested by inequitable access to opportunities, resources and services,\(^{21}\) and those individuals and groups\(^{22}\) challenged by poverty, disease, unemployment, crime and environmental injustice. Brown policy issues should also redress the vulnerabilities of excluded groups based on culture, gender, age, race, religion and the indigent in the event of catastrophies (ICLEI, undated). The brown elements of the environment may also include building resilient communities, including arrangements to prevent, manage and recover from disasters or setbacks.

Managing the cultural resource base is often also considered to be a subset of the ‘brown’ environment and may need to be considered when environmental policy is generated. Cultural resources may include resources that are significant form aesthetic, historic, scientific, spiritual or social value for past, present or future generations (Australia ICOMOS, 1999).

Adding ‘brown’ issues to environmental policy content recognizes the interrelatedness of the human and ‘green’ environment interface, while the identification and prioritization of policy issues are more complex to deal with. The complexities inherent in combining green and brown issues into environmental policy at the local level is exacerbated by adding economic developmental issues to the environmental policy portfolio.

Environmental policy driving sustainability Such a holistic and integrated perspective on the green, brown and development interfaces based on the triple bottom line\(^{23}\) doctrine, drives policies that are both substantively very complex and that require elegant arrangements for line functioning departments to cooperate efficiently to achieve one common objective for the local authority: to join forces to work synergistically and collectively towards a future that is more sustainable and to perform on the triple bottom line.

A sustainability perspective on environmental policy in developing areas adds local, regional, national and global development goals such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the environmental policy agenda. The sustainability debate of developed areas on the other hand focuses more on the reduction of ecological footprints\(^{24}\) of cities, dematerialization, decongestion and improvements in eco-efficiencies.\(^{25}\) For developing countries the agenda is to reduce poverty, provide access to services to more people and even to change and increase the footprint profiles of some cities.
The debate on the extent and nature of the concept environment, as it defines the nature and extent of environmental policy, amounts to much more than a semantic or academic interest. The definition adopted by local governments determines both the substantive scope and complexities of environmental policy at the local sphere and the nature and extent of cooperation that may be required from other line functioning departments of both the local authority itself and of other spheres of government. It is therefore imperative that policymakers define and agree with all stakeholders on what the substantive definition of the concept ‘environment’ should be, in order to scope the environmental policy issues before any policy is generated. Definitions that differ spatially and temporally will by necessity also result in significant differences in environmental policy content between local authorities.

One of the fundamental principles of policy development at the local sphere demands a bottom-up and participative process to ensure that issues pertinent to the local conditions are identified and adopted as policy issues.

**Complex local government–environmental policy interfaces**

The local government–environmental policy interface is illustrated in Figure 16.1. Policy outcomes at the local sphere of government are often shaped by one or any combination of the four principal environmental policy contextual dimensions: resource-based imperatives, political realities, stakeholder-based dimensions and administrative dispensations (Nel, 2003).

**Complexity and diversity as a result of different contextual dimensions**

All four policy contextual dimensions are driven by distinct interest groups, each with its own perspectives and agendas. The resource-based dimension is driven by the interest of resource providers, either private or donor-funded agencies, national or regional governments, or internal interests that have the skills and networks to drive, direct and influence policy processes and outcomes.

Political realities and agendas on the other hand, are steered by the interests of elected politicians in all spheres of government. The interests of stakeholders including civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs), as well as the agendas of appointed administrative staff, and consultants may be powerful drivers of environmental policy process and content at the local level. All these interests are framed by the opportunities and constraints of the existing administrative framework and dispensation that are also powerful parameters that may influence identification and adoption of policy issues, including the development and implementation of environmental policy.

The unique combination of the relative power of and the opportunities afforded any or all of the four interest groups to influence policy issue identification, adoption, development and implementation, combined with the adopted definition of the term ‘environment’ is a key determinant of the substantive characteristics of policy process outcomes.

Should the objective of any environmental policy process be to be holistic, inclusive, transparent, participative and relevant to local issues, care should be taken to design a policy process that will increase the chances of a more balanced and representative policy outcome.
The resource-based context  The resource-based contextual dimension refers to all the resources – that is, available funds, skills, infrastructure, equipment, time, data and information, as well as administrative processes that are conducive to policy identification, development, adoption and implementation – required to initiate and drive policy processes at the local sphere of government, and may, inter alia, include a local authority’s own resource base, funded or unfunded mandates from national or federal government and resources obtained from donor-funded programmes. The influencing role of funding agents to shape policy processes and outcomes such as international development and aid agencies, financial institutions and even private and public partners to drive externally the identification, adoption and generation of environmental policies at the local sphere of government is significant. Examples of donor aid capital that served as a catalyst to adopt specific environmental policy issues by local authorities are the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI)-sponsored campaigns and the European Healthy Cities Programme of the World Health Organization (WHO) and UN-Habitat.

Campaigns and pilot projects are often implemented in countries and cities selected by funding agencies in line with their predetermined priorities, which may very well not correspond with the priorities of the beneficiaries. Another concern of donor-driven policy initiatives is the sustainability of the campaigns once funding and donor expertise are withdrawn.

Source: Adapted from Nel (2003).

Figure 16.1 Complex local government–environmental policy interfaces
Differences in access to resources that support the identification, development, adoption and implementation of environmental policies at the local sphere of government partly explain the vast differences in environmental policy performance at global, regional, local and, in some cases, the intra-urban scales.

The political-based context The political contextual dimensions that may serve as a catalyst to drive the adoption, generation and implementation of environmental policy at the local sphere of government, range from global political trends and initiatives, to the national and also local political agendas.

A major trendsetting force driving and promoting specific agendas for the adoption and implementation of environmental policy at the local sphere of government is the sustained formulation of global or regional calls for action and commitments since the late 1970s, such as, amongst others: the Habitat I Convention in Vancouver (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 1976), the United Nations adoption of the Global Strategy for Shelter until the year 2000 (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 1988), the IULA Common Declaration of Cities (IULA, 1992a), the Curitiba Commitment (IULA, 1992b), The Earth Summit (UNCED, 1992), the World Summit for Social Development (UNDESA, 1995), the Habitat II Agenda and the Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 1996), the United Nations Millennium Summit and the adoption of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UN, 2000), the adoption of the ten Aalborg Commitments at the European Conference on Sustainable Cities and Towns (European Conference on Sustainable Cities and Towns, 1994), World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, in 2002 (UNEP, 2002) and the Local Government Millennium Declaration issued in Beijing (UCLG, 2005). These globally driven policy initiatives are promoting highly integrated policy framework agendas that address green, brown and development-based issues.

Central government or the ‘state’ with its national or federal environmental, social development and local government policies is another important actor to direct and drive environmental policy at the local sphere of government. The actual impact that the state has on environmental policy at the local sphere of government, differs from country to country and depends amongst others on good governance (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2001), the institutional framework (Callway, 2005), the capacity and resource base at the national or federal spheres to support local authorities (Webber, 1994), the political will and power at all the spheres of government, as well as the funded or unfunded mandates and other support given to local government to govern environmental issues effectively (Agyeman and Evans, 1994; Webber, 1994; United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2001; Evans et al., 2005).

The stakeholder engagement context The third contextual dimension entails stakeholder engagement through all the phases of the environmental policy process at the local sphere of government. Most of the literature on environmental policy at the local sphere of government concur that a bottom-up and participative process, involving the public and other stakeholders as partners in the process, is key to ensuring that policy issues relevant to local concerns are identified. This contextual dimension requires that any environmental policy generation process should be conducted from the bottom up in a transparent and
participative way. A participation-based approach to policy generation may be challenging as diverse interests may be represented, adding to the scope of policy issues that may be identified for adoption and consideration. It is imperative that the process be designed and facilitated to distil a win-win-win outcome with multiple benefits for as many interests as possible.

**The administrative context**  The fourth contextual dimension that may influence the efficient and effective identification, development, adoption and use of environmental policies at the local sphere of government refers to the administrative arrangements of cities that may in turn be influenced by political leadership and availability of resources. The most important administrative issues include amongst others: capacity and skills and the configuration of the institutional and administrative framework, including mandates to drive and direct development and implementation of policies that allow for a holistic, trans-media, trans-sectoral and trans-boundary (Lusser, 1994; United Nations Human Settlements Programme, undated) approach to environmental policy at the local level, as mandates are often fragmented both horizontally (that is, across various line functioning administrative units of a local authority) and vertically between the various spheres of government.

**Diversity of environmental or sustainability mandates**  Local authorities have a diverse set of mandates and challenges and hence a very complex suite of environmental issues to consider when generating environmental policy when compared with other organizations. Their complexities and challenges may be classified into the following four categories:

1. First, local authorities are governed by other organs of state and they need to manage their own activities, processes, services as well as facilities and infrastructure to be legally compliant.
2. Second, they are mandated or even expected to protect and manage the use of the global common goods and environmental services as environmental custodians.
3. Third, many local authorities are also mandated to manage and drive local economic development and social equity.
4. Fourth, local authorities, as a partner in the government system, are often also mandated to govern. This mandate requires the adoption of governing-based policy issues that support policy implementation instruments and mechanisms. Local governments may, apart from the classical command-and-control policy tools, use the so-called ‘new’ policy tools such as fiscal-based tools, agreements and civil-based policy tools (Du Plessis and Nel, 2006) (see Figures 16.1 and 16.2).

**Local authorities as governed entities**  Local authorities that have the role of a governed entity, like most other organizations, have some of their activities, processes, services and facilities governed by organs of state in other spheres of government. As a governed entity, local governments need compliance-based policy instruments to demonstrate compliance to those policies and other command-and-control requirements that apply directly to them. Examples of activities, processes, services and facilities that may be directly governed by other spheres of government may amongst others include: the lawful operation
of solid waste and waste water management and treatment facilities, use of controlled natural resources and substances such as water, energy and controlled chemicals and substances, emissions to atmosphere and discharges to water bodies and protection of natural and cultural resources.

Indirect requirements such as broad-based policy requirements to demonstrate duty of environmental care, to drive eco-efficiency and -effectiveness programmes, to prevent pollution or to identify and implement sustainability-based programmes may spawn ‘house in order’ policy initiatives at the local level such as: energy efficiency programmes of its own buildings and facilities (Fleming, 1994), promotion of renewable energy sources (Evans et al., 2005), optimization of its own fleet, green procurement, waste reduction (OECD, undated) and optimized resource consumption policies.

A third group of policies that may be deemed to be governed-based policies entails arrangements to improve supply-side delivery of services to its social and environmental constituencies. When environmental policy is generated at the local level, consideration should therefore be given to distil environmental policy issues that drive and direct compliance to both directly governed and indirectly governed requirements that may apply to them.

**Custodians of global common goods and environmental services** The various green issues that may need to be adopted in environmental policy at the local sphere of government are alluded to in the previous section dealing with defining the ‘green’ environment. This mandate or expectation requires pro-biotic policy elements that promote conservation or the sustainable use of resources that prevent pollution and degradation of the environment.

**Local economic development and social equity** The mandates of cities to manage and drive local economic development (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, undated) to provide for a vibrant local economy (Evans et al., 2005), to improve social equity and access to resources, as well as to build sustainable communities and cities, should depend according to (ICLEI, undated) on three strategies:

1. The first strategy entails establishing viable local economies to eradicate poverty (Ayre and Callway, 2005; Simms, 2005) by means of policies that create a supportive framework for investment, local entrepreneurship, economic diversity and human resource development (ICLEI, undated). This strategy also includes the adoption and implementation of pro-poor (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, undated) policies regarding provision of services such as housing, nutrition and public health services (Hams, 1994).

2. The second strategy requires policies and programmes that foster peace, as well as the prevention of conflict, crime, violence and social exclusivity and by enhancing amongst others, gender equality (Simms, 2005; ICLEI, undated; United Nations Human Settlements Programme, undated).

3. According to ICLEI (undated) and OECD (undated) the third strategy should be to empower local authorities and especially vulnerable sectors to provide for and recover from natural, industrial and/or fiscal disasters that normally affect the challenged sectors of society the most.
The ‘brown’ policy agenda may be perceived to be in conflict with the ‘green’ agenda. Progress towards a sustainable future is only possible if policy at the local sphere of government gives equal justice to the ‘green’ and ‘brown’ agendas. The challenge at the local level is therefore to generate environmental policy that successfully integrates and achieves both ‘brown’ and ‘green’ policy objectives.

**Local authorities as governor**  The fifth mandate of local authorities is to govern environmental behaviour of others in line with the mandates that they have received. This normally entails governing, amongst others, production and consumption patterns of both the public and private sectors that function in their areas of jurisdiction, as well as issues such as prevention of pollution and environmental degradation, management of waste streams, hazardous goods and substances, pathogens, transportation and protection of the biosphere (Carr, 1994; Goode, 1994; Hams, 1994; Ayre and Callway, 2005; Evans, 2005; OECD, undated).

The fact that local authorities are challenged to be both regulators of others, and being governed as well, and that they often need to drive local economic development and to act as custodians of the environmental common goods, may cause conflicts of interest that complicate environmental policy decisions. The complexity of policy issues that need to be addressed is also exacerbated by the fact that policy issues and priorities are not static, they change over time, while they also differ spatially at global, regional and local scales. Environmental policy processes should therefore be dynamic, allowing for regular reviews and revisions to address the pertinent local issues of the day and to improve environmental policy continually.

**Characteristics of environmental policy at the local sphere of government**

**Environmental policy differs from other policies**

Agyeman and Evans (1994) argue that the environmental policy area at the local level is a policy area that is substantively different from other policy areas, while the policy process remains largely similar to other policy processes. The complex substantive challenges of environmental policy at the local sphere of government also demand not only new ways of doing things, they also demand new skills and innovative strategies to align policy across vertical and horizontal mandate divides. New and innovative tools are also required to deal with these complex issues (Agyeman and Evans, 1994).

**Unique issues require policies that are different**  Environmental policies are different for mainly two reasons. The first reason refers to the fact that environmental policy is fundamentally different from other policies as a result of the complexities that have been alluded to elsewhere in this chapter. The second refers to the fact that environmental policy issues differ significantly from city to city.

The most important characteristic of environmental policy that distinguishes it from other policy areas is the fact that, to be effective, it needs to be all-embracing and holistic transmedia, trans-sectoral and trans-boundary, as a sectoral and fragmented approach to environmental policy often neglects system and area-wide as well as cumulative environmental issues, while synergistic and efficiency opportunities may also be lost along with the benefits to be achieved with the integration of environmental, social and economic elements.
Environmental policies differ between local authorities. Every local authority is confronted with a unique combination of variables that differ between local authorities and within local authorities themselves. All the variables such as differences in the natural resource base, patterns of production and consumption, mandates to govern, capacity, skills and resources, political will, as well as stakeholder requirements and partnership configurations, drive significant variations in priorities and by necessity also, differences in policy outcomes.

The need for structures that differ from the past
Agyeman and Evans (1994) also call for new organizational structures to deliver and implement environmental policy effectively at the local sphere. New structures refer amongst others to structures for policy coordination, alignment or nesting46 (Commissions of the World Humanity Action Trust, 2000) between the relevant line functions at the different spheres of government as well as integration or clustering47 amongst the environmentally mandated line functions within local authorities themselves.

One of the major challenges faced by local governments is to decide which department or combination of departments should have primary jurisdiction over matters ‘environmental’. There is clearly no single candidate line functioning department within a local authority that may claim ownership of the entire environmental policy mandate. Environmental roles, responsibilities, authorities and mandates are generally fragmented horizontally across various line functions of local government, each with its own functions and mandates as well as entrenched power bases, behaviour patterns and vested interests of bureaucrats and politicians alike. The general impact of strong, vested interests is to resist change that may affect existing power bases.

Even where a dedicated environmental function or responsibility is established within local governments, two fundamental issues need to be resolved. The first issue is to agree on the most efficient portfolio of environmental policy mandates and jurisdictions that such a dedicated environmental function should have to address the complexity of environmental policy issues and processes effectively. It is, generally speaking, also doubtful whether structural reform as a strategy to integrate and house large portfolios of environmental mandates, or even the entire environmental policy portfolio into one centralized function, will be acceptable to both politicians and officials of local governments. Formal or informal and voluntary clustering of line functioning units with complementary and mutually reinforcing environmental mandates into a matrix of cooperation and collaboration arrangements may perhaps be more readily supported by politicians and officials alike.

In line with the very low likelihood of achieving an integrated environmental function at the local sphere, residual fragmentation of urban environmental policy, with a resultant duplication and overlap of some environmental functions, is most probably unavoidable in many instances, as environmental issues cut across most administrative divides irrespective of how they may be configured. Innovative arrangements to coordinate, or to align the local environmental policy effort across fragmented mandate divides, seems therefore to be a reasonably practicable alternative to most local authorities that are challenged to adopt an aligned approach to environmental policy.
Innovative strategies to coordinate and align environmental policy

One of the most effective strategies to align environmental policy within diverse and fragmented administrative dispensations is an overarching environmental framework policy. Another may be to make arrangements for horizontal cooperation by the various line functions within a local authority as well as vertical cooperation between the various spheres of government.

Environmental framework policy

An innovative strategy to achieve both horizontal and vertical alignment across mandate divides at the national or federal level is framework environmental policy and law (Okidi, 1997; Izbal, 1999; Nel and Du Plessis, 2001). Framework environmental policy and legislation aim to define overarching and generic principles in terms of which sectoral-specific policy and legislation are embedded, as well as to enhance cooperative or joined up environmental governance amongst fragmented line functions, both within a single local government and amongst the various spheres of government. It furthermore provides generic and basic norms that may be used to introduce new environmental legislation or to amend or maintain existing legislation.

Nel and Du Plessis (2001) argue that environmental framework legislation is characterized by: (1) generic legal elements, (2) a flexible approach to address changing circumstances, (3) support by dedicated sectoral-specific legislation, as well as (4) the inclusion of broad-based environmental policy and principles. Environmental framework legislation generally also endeavours to ensure: (1) popular broad-based participation during its formulation phase, (2) cooperative or joined up governance between all spheres and sectors of government, (3) use of innovative integration of multiple environmental management tools and instruments in order to (4) benefit the environment.

The City of Cape Town’s Integrated Metropolitan Environmental Policy (IMEP) (City of Cape Town, undated) is such a framework policy. The IMEP aligns environmental policy across the divides of line functioning departments and agencies. It provides, inter alia, for an IMEP strategy that strategically integrates a vision and policy principles with a suite of policy implementation tools that may be used to align sectoral approaches. The sectoral approaches are then rolled out as detailed sectoral strategies.

Cooperation and networks

Other strategies to facilitate aligned policy, both vertically and horizontally are partnering (OECD, undated; United Nations Human Settlements Programme, undated), and networks (Golding, 1994; Hams, 1994), with all stakeholders to generate and deliver environmental policy (Commissions of the World Humanity Action Trust, 2000; OECD, undated; United Nations Human Settlements Programme, undated) as well as public involvement processes (Webber, 1994).

Cooperation networks may range from establishing informal and ad hoc relationships based on willingness to cooperate as needed, to the establishment of clustering and nesting structures, supported by formal cooperation arrangements amongst network participants and even processes and structures provided for by law (Kotze et al., 2007).

Environmental policy challenges at the local level of government

Local governments face a number of challenges to generate, adopt and implement complex environmental policies. The challenges range from capacity-based challenges to process and governing challenges.
Capacity and skills

One of the most important challenges is the absence of, amongst others, skills, knowledge and capacity, resources, data, infrastructure, as well as supporting services and, in some instances, an actual mandate to initiate and drive environmental policy processes (Agyeman and Evans, 1994; Webber, 1994; Evans et al., 2005; OECD, undated). In some cases, existing mandates are not funded by other spheres of government, which results in inadequate implementation.

Process and priority challenges

Process challenges refer on a large extent on the capacity of local authorities to function effectively within networks of multiple stakeholders, which may range from the general public, pressure groups and the private sector, to inter-city peers and even collegiate relationships of all the line functions within a specific local government. Complex environmental policy issues are often complicated even further by fundamental differences in the needs base of very diverse stakeholders. The environmental policy process may furthermore be resource-intensive, while it is also often very difficult to demonstrate measurable progress of implemented policies over the short to medium terms.

Environmental policy also often competes with numerous other urban policy areas for political attention and support. For numerous local authorities, environmental issues are not a priority at all, hence the absence of environmental policy in many cities. Environmental policy at the local sphere often needs to be repackaged as either interfaces of, or combinations with, social development or other policy initiatives that are higher on the political agenda, in order to increase the chances of its adoption and implementation.

Governing issues

Two very important prerequisites to generate, adopt and implement environmental policy successfully at the local level are first, the need for good governance (Commissions of the World Humanity Action Trust, 2000; Evans et al., 2005; OECD, undated), and second, a governing system that supports and embraces democratic principles (Evans et al., 2005).

Policy instruments

Local governments are often bombarded by a number of environmental management and governing instruments that are intended as solutions to their environmental policy challenges. Local governments often lack the knowledge to review and select the most appropriate environmental policy tool or combination of tools for the correct need (Nel, 2003).

Adoption, implementation and use of environmental management tools by local authorities are often driven by donor agencies and or consultants that are not necessarily in line with local environmental policy priorities. Such projects regularly fail to add value to local authorities over the longer term as they are often initiated and driven by outsiders, and momentum is often lost when external expertise and funding are withdrawn (Nel and Le Roux, 2005).

Environmental policy tools should also cover the plan, do, check, act and reporting phases of the Deming Cycle in order to ensure that the entire management cycle is covered. Environmental policy instruments should preferably also be a creative mix of command-and-control tools, civil-based tools, agreement-based tools and economic instruments to ensure effective implementation of policies (Figure 16.2).
Conclusion
Environmental policy at the local sphere of government is fundamentally complex. Complexity is caused by various factors alluded to in this chapter. Successful, comprehensive and sustainable environmental policies at the local level depend largely on a general understanding of the complexities discussed in this chapter and the nature of the policy generation process adopted.

It is almost impossible for any local government to consider all the variables discussed in this chapter the first time an environmental policy is generated. What is important is that local governments should accept that environmental policy is a key element of their multiple mandates and that they should commence with generating a first version of an environmental policy regardless of the challenges that they may face. In line with the principle of continual improvement, environmental policy should be reviewed and revised where practicable at regular intervals. With time, continual learning will contribute to improved environmental policies.

Notes
1. The term ‘environment’ is loosely used in this chapter to mean more than the classical ‘green’ elements of the environment such as air, land, water and biota, and also includes ‘brown’ or social issues and even issues related to economic development in line with the three cornerstones of sustainability or the triple bottom line approach.
2. This chapter is written from the perspective of environmental policy by local government itself, rather than urban, city, urbanization, or local government policy by other spheres of government.
3. The term ‘sphere’ of government is preferred to ‘level’ of government as sphere of government suggests a governing partnership that is on an equal footing with regional and national or federal spheres of government.
4. The terms ‘local sphere of government’, or ‘local authority’ are used in this chapter as synonyms rather than the terms ‘urban’ or ‘city’. Both the terms ‘urban’ and ‘city’ imply an urbanized way of life that is

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**Figure 16.2  The policy tools cycle**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Planning Tools</th>
<th>Policy Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reporting and Improving Tools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checking and Reviewing Tools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-based Tools</td>
<td>Agreement-based Tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command-and-control Tools</td>
<td>Economic Instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing and Implementing Tools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: After Nel and Le Roux (2003).*
challenged by very pertinent urban environmental issues. Narrowing the debate down to the ‘urban’ dimension of local government may limit any discourse on environmental policy at that sphere of government, as in some instances, city administrators or local authorities are confronted with and have real mandates over rural areas, functions and very distinct environmental issues.

5. Fragmentation of environmental mandates into semi-autonomous line functioning units, departments or agencies is generally referred to as horizontal fragmentation.

6. Environmental media refers to air, land, water, biota, social and economic issues.

7. Fragmentation of environmental mandates between the different spheres of government is generally referred to as vertical fragmentation.

8. Environmental problems and challenges do not correspond with administrative boundaries. One of the key challenges of effective environmental policies at any level is to make provision for an integrated, joined up or cooperative form of governance that makes provision for dealing with environmental impacts that transcend administrative boundaries.


10. Biotic elements refer to the living elements of ecosystems such as animals, humans, plants and micro-organisms.

11. The abiotic elements are the non-living elements of ecosystems such as water, land or soil, air, energy, light and so on.

12. Within closed systems matter is continually recycled. A biochemical cycle is the transportation and transformation of chemicals in ecosystems. The most important biochemical cycles include the nitrogen, phosphorous and carbon cycles.

13. A closed system is a system where energy can enter or leave the system, but matter is recycled.

14. This law dictates that in any ordinary action or reaction, matter is neither created, nor destroyed; matter may only be transformed from one form to another.

15. The first law of thermodynamics dictates that energy may neither be created, nor destroyed; it may only be transformed from one form to another. The second law of thermodynamics dictates that every time that energy is transformed, its ability to do useful work is reduced.

16. Ecosystem services are processes by which the natural environment produces resources useful to people, akin to economic services. They include: provision of clean water and air, pollination of crops, mitigation of environmental hazards, pest and disease control, cultural services such as spiritual, recreational and cultural benefits, and supporting services such as nutrient cycling that maintain conditions for life on earth.

17. Resource-directed policy measures are measures that protect natural resources, while source-directed policy measures focus on controlling sources of environmental pollution or environmental degradation.

18. Effective waste management acknowledges the need to drive the waste management hierarchy of waste avoidance, minimization, recycling and re-use and finally responsible disposal, including the principle of integrated pollution control and waste management that does not allow transfer of waste from one medium to another.

19. Green capital refers to the intrinsic value of natural resources, biodiversity and ecosystem functions and services as opposed to brown or social capital and fiscal capital. Recognition of all three forms of equity underpins the triple bottom line doctrine.

20. Global common goods that local governments may have jurisdiction over include: air, climate, water, soil, biodiversity, health and food security.

21. Access to services may include amongst others, services such as public health, nutrition, housing, education, energy, sanitation, waste services education and access to affordable transport, energy and water.

22. Groups are often differentiated by age (the youth and the aged), class (income patterns and access to resources), sex (the role of women) and the disadvantaged (based on race or minority groups).

23. Triple bottom line refers to ‘green’ environmental, social and economic development parameters. Triple bottom line performance by local authorities is closely associated with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). For more information regarding GRI reporting by the public sector in general and cities in particular visit: http://www.globalreporting.org and http://www.publicagencyreporting.org.

24. The ecological footprint of a city is the area of land needed to provide the necessary resources and absorb the wastes generated by a community: the ecological footprint of London for example, is 120 times the area of the city itself (see http://www.gdrc.org/uem/footprints/index.html).

25. Eco-efficiency refers to the delivery of competitively priced goods and services through processes and systems that continuously reduce environmental impact and resource intensity while contributing to social well-being (see http://clinton1.nara.gov/White_House/EOP/pcsd/tf-reports/eco-efficiency.html).

26. The ICLEI-sponsored campaigns are: the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) Campaign, the Water Campaign, the Local Agenda 21 (LA21) Campaign and the Sustainable Procurement Campaign (see: http://www.iclei.org).

27. The European Healthy Cities Programme works actively to influence the health policy of European cities. (see http://www.euro.who.int/healthy-cities).
28. UN-HABITAT runs a number of global programmes that involve countries from all over the world. The programmes involve a wide range of partners ranging from central government, local government to civil society and beneficiary communities. These cover: best practice and local leadership; housing rights; Local Agenda 21; safer cities; sustainable cities; urban management; water and sanitation (see http://www.unhabitat.org).

29. The Habitat I Conference in Vancouver agreed on issues related to land, water, transport and shelter – 1976. (Habitat I was withdrawn during Habitat II) (see http://www.unhabitat.org).

30. This initiative marked a major shift in UN policies related to housing – as the squatter upgrading policies were replaced with an enabling approach that focused on the market, as well as regulatory and institutional reform.

31. The following documents were adopted: Agenda 21, including Local Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Statement of Forest Principles, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity.


33. The second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements with the Habitat Agenda and the Istanbul Declaration, focused on sustainable human settlements, taking into account amongst others, linkages with the natural environment, social development and population groups at risk.

34. In 2000, the UN Member States agreed to help the world's poorest countries to make significant progress towards a better life for people by the year 2015. A framework for progress consisting of eight MDGs was derived from the adopted Millennium Declaration. The eight interlinked goals and 18 associated targets included eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, universal primary education, gender equality and empowerment of women, reduction of child mortality, improvement of maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability and development of partnerships for development.

35. The ten Aalborg Commitments include commitments on governance, urban management, natural common goods, responsible consumption, planning and design, better mobility, local action for health, sustainable local economy, social equity and justice and global reach.

36. The WSSD had three different outcomes: Type I Government Agreements, including the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI), a political declaration and a series of Type II partnership initiatives. Apart from reconfirming the MDGs, 20 new time-bound targets were agreed to.

37. Mayors from across the world reconfirmed their commitment to perform on MDGs in Beijing – 2005.

38. Holistic comes from a Greek word meaning all, entire, total. The general idea is that all the properties of a given system (biological, chemical, social, economic, etc.) cannot be determined or explained by the sum of its component parts alone. Instead, the system as a whole determines in an important way how the parts behave.


40. Across traditional policy boundaries.

41. Across spatial, administrative and mandate boundaries of different line functions.

42. Vertical alignment refers to alignment of environmental policy between the various spheres of government.

43. Horizontal alignment refers to alignment of all the disciplines of sustainability: environmental, social and economic as well as across the various line functioning units of local government.

44. Cumulative impacts refer to the combined and incremental effects of human activities on the environment.

45. Synergistic effects refers to the phenomenon in which two or more discrete influences or agents acting together create an effect greater than that predicted by knowing only the separate effects of the individual agents.

46. Nesting refers to the positioning of local authorities within the wider frameworks of environmental mandates at the regional and national or federal levels (Commissions of the World Humanity Action Trust, 2000).

47. Clusterings refer to the creation of co-operational governing structure amongst separate line functions at a particular sphere of government.

48. Alignment refers generally to the arrangements that separate line functioning units retain their independence and mandates, but that the governing effort is aligned in terms of some overarching policy or alignment approach. Alignment may be between line functioning units in the same sphere of government or between units of different spheres of government.

49. Cooperation refers generally to formal or semi-formal cooperation arrangements between two or more line functioning units. Cooperation may be between line functioning units in the same sphere of government or between units of different spheres of government.

50. The tools provide for include: LA21, cost–benefit analysis, integrated environmental management (IEM), best practicable environmental option, risk assessment and management, environmental management systems, environmental education, environmental impact assessment and environmental education.
51. The sectoral approaches provided for include: environmental governance, air, safety and security, energy, waste, economy, transport, environmental health, infrastructure, urbanization, water, fauna and flora, soil and environmental education.

52. The detailed sectoral strategies include: noise pollution, energy strategy, land management, open spaces, environmental education, biodiversity, coastal zone management and air pollution.

53. The Deming Cycle is a well-known management model based on the plan, do, check and act cycle and the principle of continual improvement.

54. Command-and-control tools refer to all the law enforcement tools and mechanisms, ranging from policy and legislation, to enforcement.

55. Civil-based tools refer to public involvement, access to information, broad-based *locus standi*, class action, community-based watchdog arrangements, NGOs, CBOs and so on.

56. Agreement-based tools may include any tools or mechanisms that facilitate cooperation between two or more parties, either formally, or structured, or informally and semi-structured, or unstructured.

57. Fiscal-based tools refer to any tools that use market-based mechanisms to modify or direct behaviour.

References


Introduction

Africa, also referred to as the ‘cradle of man’, is a continent of extremes known for its political instability, poverty and poor governance, but also for its exceptional natural beauty and abundance of resources. The riches of Africa were highlighted by the Roman Plinius who introduced the saying, ‘Ex Africa semper aliquid novi’, which translates, ‘Always something new out of Africa’. As the title suggests, the main theme of this chapter deals with ‘urban environmental policy’ in Africa. In addressing this theme three aspects need to be acknowledged and clarified up front. First, the definition of ‘urban’ differs markedly between African countries. For example, in Uganda, a settlement with a population of more than a 100 is classified as urban, compared with Nigeria where a settlement needs to include a population of more than 20,000. Second, as is the case in South Africa, administrative boundaries and legislative functions also complicate urban boundaries, where the jurisdiction of local authorities covers both cities and large tracts of peri-urban and rural land. Third, ‘environmental policy’ is widely defined to include a range of different policy-level processes and interventions implemented within diverse institutional, legal and decision-making contexts. This makes ‘environmental policy’ an ambiguous term and generalizations around the topic virtually impossible due to differences in application.

The main aim of this chapter is to introduce the theme of urban environmental policy in Africa and in particular to introduce the relevant literature. This refers specifically to literature on the theoretical understandings of policy formulation as well as the key policy documents at international, regional and local levels. Although the scope of the chapter will take account of the African continent, specific case examples from South Africa will also be presented to illustrate what we regard as the ‘real story’ behind policy-making within the urban context. It is not argued here that the South African experience could or should be generalized for the entire continent. However, as will be shown, South Africa has been a leading developing country in attempts to integrate environmental and sustainability issues into urban policy and decision-making, experiences that could hold value for the continent as a whole.

The following section starts by introducing the methodology applied in exploring the development of urban environmental policy in Africa and specifically South Africa. This is followed in Section 3 by a description of international literature on policy formulation and analysis. To set the scene and provide the policy context, a discussion on urban environmental policy agendas in Africa is included in Section 4. Policy formulation is explored in more detail in Section 5 through the description of the urban environmental policy processes for three selected case studies in South Africa against specific themes and lines of enquiry. Finally, conclusions are drawn and broad characteristics of urban environmental policy formulation distilled.
Methodology
The methods applied to explore the main theme of this chapter relied mostly on literature reviews as well as limited empirical data-gathering through semi-structured interviews. In order to deal with the particular theme and overall aim of the chapter the methodology had to address the following three questions:

1. What is the main literature relating to the theory on ‘urban environmental policy’ in Africa?
2. What are the key policy documents relating to ‘urban environmental policy’ in Africa at international, regional and local levels?
3. How does ‘urban environmental policy’ get generated within the African context?

Since theory on ‘urban environmental policy processes in Africa’ has not yet been developed, the literature review had to consider broader theory dealing with policy formulation and analysis in general. It is evident that these perspectives provide a sound theoretical basis against which to identify certain themes and lines of enquiry that might be applicable to urban environmental policy formulation within the African context. To answer the second question the literature review had to deal with an overwhelming abundance of literature to select what was considered key international, regional and local urban environmental policy documents. The methodological approach towards the third research question could be described as deductive, flexible and qualitative. Clearly it would not have been realistic to answer the question for the entire continent due to the time and resources required for such research. Rather, a more focused case study approach was followed. Three case studies were selected within the South African context. The themes and lines of enquiry identified as part of research question 1 was explored through semi-structured interviews with key selected role players responsible for formulation and implementation of urban environmental policy. However, the possible wider application and testing of the particular themes and lines of enquiry in a different context in relation to a broader sample of case studies holds promising potential for expanded future research.

Theoretical framework – urban environmental policy
To define policy has proved particularly difficult, as one British civil servant commented, ‘Policy is rather like the elephant – you know it when you see it but you cannot easily define it’ (Cunningham, 1963, cited in Keeley and Scoones, 2003). To explore how perceived knowledge finds its way into public policy and to deal with the proverbial black box of policy-making it is useful to reflect on its theoretical underpinnings. This section aims to introduce briefly the theoretical understanding of policy in order to provide a theoretical framework for the overall theme. It further aims to highlight some of the work that has been done specifically to explore the dynamics of policy formulation in developing country contexts that has been increasingly criticized for being predicated on highly questionable assumptions (Keeley and Scoones, 1999).

Because policy processes tend to be complex and chaotic, there is a need to impose some conceptual order to comprehend and describe it. To begin with, it is widely accepted that a single accepted theory of policy and policy-making does not exist (Dunn, 1994; Parsons, 1995; John, 1998; Cahill, 2002; Colebatch, 2002). Theories have been classified in different ways by different authors. For example, Nhamo (2005) distinguished between theories for
‘decision-making’, ‘policy formulation’, ‘policy implementation’, ‘policy regulation’ as well as ‘policy evaluation’. Examples of theories referred to by De Coning and Cloete (2000), place particular emphasis on the policy-making process. They distinguish several strands: ‘classical theory’ (institutional theory) promotes the separation of powers of government into legislative, executive and judicial; ‘liberal democratic theory’ highlights the position of the political party as the primary policy-maker, representing individual voters; ‘elite theory’ assumes that elite groups drive policy; and finally, ‘systems theory’ focuses on the inter-relationships in terms of inputs, outputs and feedback in the policy process.

Some argue that a distinction should be made between theories and models (Dunn, 1994; Bartlett and Kurian, 1999; De Coning and Cloete, 2000). Although the distinction at times seems tenuous, theorists conceptualize policy models to simplify the vast array of decisions and forms of behaviour that characterize contemporary public decision-making. If models tried to include the role of all the political actors who have some say in decision-making and tried to account for the many disjuncture and contingencies, they might not be able to do any more than describe the complexity. Models try to introduce some clarity and elegance into the process of explanation. Table 17.1 provides a summary of some of the mainstream models illustrating the multiple dimensions of decision-making in policy, the interactions of actors in policy formulation and the functional stages in the policy process.

Policy formulation within the African context has not been widely researched (Keeley and Scoones, 1999; Carter, 2001; Makumbe, 2001; Mariga, 2002; Keeley and Scoones, 2003). It has been argued that to understand policy processes one should consider the linkages connecting knowledge, power and politics – exploring how policies are framed, who are the role players involved and excluded (Scharpf, 1997), whose interests are dominant and how policy changes over time (Davies, 2002). The remarkable consistency of policy on the African environment from colonial times to the present has been highlighted as a particular feature for the region (Leach and Mearns, 1996). The role of perceptions of risk and crises has also been particularly prominent (Adam, Beck and Van Loon, 2000; Beck, 2000) and consistently seems to silence the rather more important policy questions such as whether the particular perceptions are well-founded in the first place.

Policy analysis within the African context also highlights some of the key debates in social science by asking (Keeley and Scoones, 1999):

- Why is reality framed and dealt with in certain ways?
- How important is political conflict over distribution of power and resources?
- What is the role of individual actors in policy change?

These questions could be explored against three contrasting explanations, namely: policy reflects political interests; policy change reflects the actions of actor networks; or policy is the result of discourse (Keeley and Scoones, 1999; 2003). Nhamo (2005) analysed a particular policy process related to waste management within the South African context through the application of the actor/actant network theory. Based on the literature, a conceptual framework with related lines of enquiry was applied to three selected case studies within the South African context as a first stab towards unpacking the considerable complexities associated with policy formulation. As shown in Table 17.2 the framework explores three themes in the urban environmental policy processes, namely, the actors and networks involved, the knowledge and science underlying the policy and finally the
### Table 17.1 Summary of models describing policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model type</th>
<th>Model definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Models for describing effectiveness and comprehensiveness in the policy decision-making process</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational comprehensive model</td>
<td>Variously called the linear, mainstream or rational model. This model outlines policy-making as a problem-solving process, which is rational, balanced, objective and analytical. In the model, decisions are made in a series of sequential phases, starting with the identification of a problem or issue and ending with a set of activities to solve or deal with it. This model assumes that policy-makers approach the issues rationally, through each logical stage of the process and carefully consider all relevant information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounded rationality</td>
<td>Bounded rationality is a rational decision-making process, which takes place entirely within the boundaries of the limited capability of human beings. The decision-maker comes to a decision, which is good enough, based on a limited range of known alternatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental model</td>
<td>Policies tend to be marginally different from those that have gone before. Policy-makers do not consider options that would lead to radical change. This is because what is feasible politically is only incrementally or marginally different from existing policies. If there is a change in policy stance, it occurs by a series of small steps rather than one radical change. There is no optimal policy decision – a good policy is one that all participants agree on rather than what is best to solve the problem. The policy process is also described as disjointed incrementalism or muddling through. Policy is regarded as a continuation of existing government with the potential for small incremental changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed scanning model</td>
<td>This model covers the middle ground between the rational and incremental model. It essentially divides decisions into a macro (fundamental) and micro (small) classification. It involves the policy-maker taking a broad view of the field of possible options and only looking further into those that require a more in-depth examination. In making decisions, the decision-maker will systematically assess alternatives within the political context of the goals and limitations of the organization and their own values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garbage can model</td>
<td>Decision-makers delay decisions until circumstances force them into a position where there are no real alternatives. This amounts to a decision taken by default.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B. Models for describing decision-makers in the policy process</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elitist model</td>
<td>Proponents of the elitist model focus on the structure of decision-making. They note that power is concentrated in the hands of a few. Political elites wield authority over a multitude lacking ready access to the corridors of power. The power structure resembles a pyramid, with power flowing from top to bottom. Policy decisions are made by the elite and executed by the bureaucracy. The model illustrates a policy-making and policy-executing elite, who impose decisions upon the masses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-governmental model</td>
<td>The sub-governmental model is closely linked to the elitist model. The model describes an iron triangle of political elites at the apex and at the base who dominate agenda-setting (i.e., administrative elites/the bureaucracy and special interest groups). This rigid model assumes a stable coalition of players in the policy-making process.</td>
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</table>
 eventual influence or effects (direct and indirect) resulting from the policy application and implementation.

**Urban environmental policy agenda in Africa**

This section describes the urban environmental policy agendas in Africa by first providing a brief historical overview followed by the status quo in relation to the international, regional and local policy contexts. It concludes by looking towards the future of urban areas and related environmental policy on the continent.

**Setting the scene – brief historical overview**

Africa has a long pre-colonial history, during which time very little local environmental policy was generated. The history of environmental policy in Africa can roughly be divided into three phases starting with the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, which laid the foundation for action on the environment. Since ‘urban environmental policy’ has never been part of an explicit policy agenda until recently this section focuses more on the general environmental policy events. Some milestones in this process are summarized in Table 17.3.
Table 17.2  Themes and lines of enquiry for brief policy overview description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Lines of enquiry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor networks – power and politics</td>
<td>1. Why was the policy developed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Who were the actors involved in the policy formulation process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Who funded the policy initiative?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Where does the policy fit within the broader policy context?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. What are the institutional and financial resources allocated for implementation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge and science</td>
<td>6. What knowledge underlies/frames the policy content?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application and implementation</td>
<td>7. What contributions/effects (direct or indirect) have the policy achieved?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17.3  Selected policy development events for Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>African governments signed the Algiers Convention on the conservation of nature and natural resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Efforts to use and manage natural resources in a sustainable manner escalated after the United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), an extraordinary summit of African heads of state and governments led to the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action – Africa’s blueprint for economic development, which helped to highlight the challenges facing the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>African countries established the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) to provide region-wide leadership, awareness-raising and consensus-building on global and regional environmental issues, and in enhancing the skills necessary for African governments to manage their environment and participate in global environmental negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>During the 55th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (September 2000), African governments endorsed the six fundamental values that should underpin international relations in the 21st century, namely: freedom, the equality of nations, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>African heads of state agreed to transform the OAU into the African Union. They also agreed on the New African Initiative, a plan of recovery forming part of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). This was a milestone in the quest for a new path to sustainable development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNEP (2002b).
The first phase during the 1970s was referred to by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson as the ‘winds of change’ during which time Africa experienced decolonization and independence, although in many instances independence was accompanied by instability. The main environmental policy events with specific relevance to Africa were the Algiers Convention and Stockholm Conference. During this time the international Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973) as well as the Convention Concerning the Protection of Cultural World Heritage (1973) were also ratified by 12 and 29 African countries respectively. During this period, policy related to the environment was largely viewed as conservation- or protection-related, with limited thought of integration between environment and development. Decision-making was also largely elitist because it largely involved high-ranking government officials but failed to consider the views of local communities.

The main policy events during the 1980s were the Lagos Action Plan and the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN). However, the 1980s is described as a period of stagnation, during which time many African countries went through so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), today blamed for exacerbating poverty. One of the main reasons for sluggish and declining economic performance during this period was the dependence on external aid and subsequent external debt. It has been categorically stated by the UN that the negative impacts of the SAPs were heaviest on the urban poor who rely most on employment, consumer subsidies and public services (UNEP, 2002b). However, during the 1990s, a collective will emerged to address environmental and related issues, and institutions were created to translate that will into concrete results, such as the African Union (AU). The following section highlights the main policy agendas during this period to the present.

The status quo – urban environmental agendas for the new millennium
Although Africa has the least urbanized population globally at around 38 per cent, it has the highest urbanization rate at 3.5 per cent per annum (UNEP, 2002a; 2002b; UNDESA, 2004; UNDP, 2006). It has been emphasized that rapid urbanization across the continent is a key issue dominating Africa’s environmental problems, which places excessive pressure on the urban infrastructure and accompanied deterioration of the environment (UNDP, 2003a). Urbanization is generally not discouraged because the majority of these problems are considered predictable and inevitable consequences of rapid urbanization, which could and should be addressed through effective urban planning and management. Until recently it was generally assumed that urban populations are healthier, more literate and experience a higher quality of life than rural populations. However, the UN-Habitat’s State of the world’s cities report 2006/07 shows that communities living in informal settlements and urban slums in developing countries are as badly off and in some cases worse off than rural communities (UN, 2006). The urban poor in developing countries suffer from what is referred to as a so-called ‘urban penalty’ – overcrowding, poor services, failing infrastructure, unhealthy environments, and so on.

As can be expected there are major regional variances in terms of the environmental status of urban settlements in Africa. Northern Africa is the most urbanized sub-region at 64 per cent, with Libya the most urbanized country at 87.6 per cent. Although Eastern Africa is the least urbanized at 26 per cent, it is also the sub-region with the highest
urbanization rate at 4.5 per cent per year. The main areas of environmental concern for urban areas highlighted by the *African environment outlook* report are (UNEP, 2002b):

- Inadequate financial resources to fund the much-needed infrastructure development and upgrading.
- Lack of planning skills and capacity. A need exists to curtail urban sprawl, promote recycling initiatives, improve energy efficiency and develop effective transport infrastructure.
- Rapid growth in demand for shelter and housing.
- High demand for urban infrastructure and services. This is especially significant from an environmental and health perspective related to insufficient sanitation and waste removal facilities.

However, it is also evident that a direct link exists between rural and urban poverty, which should not be overlooked. Prosperity and/or poverty in rural areas directly affect urban areas and vice versa. Thus, the broader environmental issues for Africa such as desertification, access to clean water, soil erosion, food insecurity, and so on which are easily considered as non-urban issues, are also directly relevant to urban areas. Thus, a holistic perspective is required acknowledging the rural–urban interface and interdependence. The link between sustainable development, poverty alleviation and sustainable urban settlements has been captured and highlighted in international agreements and policy debates related to Africa, examples of which are included in Table 17.4.

**International policy context**

The Rio Earth Summit could be described as a benchmark event in the facilitation of formal environmental and or sustainability action plans and policy by governments. The concept of sustainable development was squarely placed on the world agenda as articulated years before at the World Conference on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987). The global action plan for the implementation of the outcomes of the Rio Summit was termed Agenda 21 (UNCED, 1992). Chapter 7 of Agenda 21 specifically deals with the promotion of sustainable human settlement development, with a particular emphasis on developing countries. The objectives listed are to provide adequate shelter; improving human settlement management; promoting sustainable land use planning and management; promoting the integrated provision of environmental infrastructure such as water, sanitation and waste; promoting sustainable energy and transport systems. It is also evident that sustainable human settlements is a cross-cutting theme linking to Chapter 8 dealing with integrating environment and development in decision-making, as well as Chapter 28 focusing on local authority initiatives in support of Agenda 21.

Since then, most African countries are party to many international environmental conventions such as the Basel Convention, Ramsar Conventions, World Heritage Convention, Convention on Biological Diversity, and so on (UNEP, 2003). However, the focus of these so-called ‘environmental conventions’ seems to exclude the interface and interdependence with the urban context. The environment agenda in Africa is normally considered with the rural context in mind. The downward spiral of the poverty–environment nexus throughout Africa is thus not (as yet) strongly linked or considered within the urban context by international environmental conventions.
In 2000, another key declaration was ratified by 189 nations, namely the United National Development Declaration (UNDP, 2003a). From the declaration, the so-called Millennium Development Goals were derived. Goal number 7 deals with environmental sustainability, with a specific target to ‘achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020’. The most recent review of the progress towards achieving these goals shows that in relation to Africa, only North Africa has shown an improvement, where the number of city dwellers living in slums has decreased by 0.15 per cent annually (UNDP, 2006). Internationally, in all other regions urban life is deteriorating, with cities and their slums in sub-Saharan Africa growing most rapidly.

The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg South Africa was considered a ten-year follow up to the Rio Summit. The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, which emerged from the agreements reached at WSSD and ratified by most African countries, dedicates a full chapter to ‘sustainable development for Africa’ (UN, 2002). The very last section in this chapter (Section 71) focuses on sustainable urbanization and human settlements and the need to strengthen national and local

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agenda 21 (UNCED, 1992)</td>
<td>Chapter 7: Promoting sustainable human settlement development. The objective is to ensure sustainable management of all urban settlements, particularly in developing countries, in order to enhance their ability to improve the living conditions of residents, especially the marginalized and disenfranchised, thereby contributing to the achievement of national economic development goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 2003a)</td>
<td>Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability. • Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources. • Achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (UN, 2002)</td>
<td>Chapter 8: Sustainable development for Africa. Section 71: Support African countries in their efforts to implement the Habitat Agenda and the Istanbul Declaration through initiatives to strengthen national and local institutional capacities in the areas of sustainable urbanization and human settlements, provide support for adequate shelter and basic services and the provision of efficient and effective governance systems in cities and other human settlements and strengthen inter alia, the joint programme on managing water for African cities of the UN Human Settlements Programme and UN Environment Programme.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2000, another key declaration was ratified by 189 nations, namely the United National Development Declaration (UNDP, 2003a). From the declaration, the so-called Millennium Development Goals were derived. Goal number 7 deals with environmental sustainability, with a specific target to ‘achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020’. The most recent review of the progress towards achieving these goals shows that in relation to Africa, only North Africa has shown an improvement, where the number of city dwellers living in slums has decreased by 0.15 per cent annually (UNDP, 2006). Internationally, in all other regions urban life is deteriorating, with cities and their slums in sub-Saharan Africa growing most rapidly.

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institutional capacities to achieve this. In line with the Rio outcomes it also highlights the need to provide support for adequate shelter and basic services and the provision of efficient and effective governance systems in cities and other human settlements. The main international initiatives underpinning this section are the UN-Habitat Agenda and Istanbul Declaration as well as the programme of UN-Habitat and UNEP on managing water for African cities.

The regional and sub-regional policy contexts

Within the African region many regional environmental conventions have been ratified by the majority of African countries. One of the first was the Algiers Convention in 1968 dealing with conservation and natural resources. Since then the Organization of African Unity has been replaced by the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). To deal with sustainable development within the NEPAD, the so-called ‘NEPAD Action Plan for the Environment Initiative’ (NEPAD, 2002b; see also NEPAD, 2002a) was launched (UNEP, 2003). It is significant that the initiative has not strongly articulated the environmental implications of deteriorating urban areas – and is silent about the need to address environmental issues in urban areas. Rather, the main programme focus areas include combating land degradation, desertification, wetlands, invasive species, marine and coastal resources, transboundary conservation and climate change. The urban context is not even integrated within the so-called cross-cutting issues mentioned in the report. It is evident that these issues seem very generic, reflecting international agendas and lacking a distinct local flavour or identity. Within the African context the trends in urbanization and sustainable settlements should surely have made the list of key considerations impacting on the environment. Some have also made calls to integrate environmental assessment as a tool to ensure sustainability within NEPAD (Weaver et al., 2003).

A number of sub-regional and regional bodies also exist, which have developed environmental policies and programmes and integrated sustainability into their developmental agendas. Such bodies include, Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Commission of Western African States (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC), the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). With particular reference to the SADC region the environment is dealt with in two documents, namely, the SADC policy and strategy for environment and sustainable development (SADC, 1996) and the Regional indicative strategic development plan (RISDP) (SADC, 2003). SADC’s policy for the environment has been described as notably enlightened (Brownlie, Walmsley and Tarr, 2006) although review suggests that the urban context has received little focus, especially if one considers the 12 priority intervention areas highlighted in the RISDP (SADC, 2003). The text refers to poor sanitation in urban areas and the impact that has on quality of life, rendering the urban poor victims as well as agents of environmental impacts. It is however, safe to conclude that although the environment and sustainable development are included under one of the 12 areas, the link with the urban environment remains elusive and vaguely implied at best.

The local environmental policy context

Where urban environmental policy initiatives exist in Africa they are in many instances linked to local action towards implementation of internationally agreed goals and targets contained in, for example, Agenda 21, the Rio Conventions, the Habitat Agenda, the
Millennium Development Goals and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. Such initiatives are also usually reliant on international funding from development agencies such as UN-Habitat, the World Health Organization, United Nations Children’s Fund, Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Danish Development Agency (DANIDA), Department for International Development (DFID) and bodies such as the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) and the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). Very little literature exists on the dynamics required to facilitate ‘home-grown’ environmental policy. The lack of ownership and ‘importation’ of policy agendas has already been raised in previous sections as an issue of concern. The influence of external funding and agendas on shaping policy formulation in Africa has also been researched and debated (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).

One initiative on local level that has shown great success has been Local Agenda 21. A survey conducted by ICLEI (2002) found that globally, the involvement of local government in Local Agenda 21 (LA21) increased from 1812 initiatives from 64 countries in 1997, to 6416 initiatives in 118 countries by 2001. As illustrated in Table 17.5 the African region contributed a small but significant portion of this total with 107 LA21 initiatives from 20 countries in the low-income category and 44 LA21 initiatives from eight middle-income countries.

The report also highlights that the two main obstacles identified for the implementation of LA21 in low-income countries were lack of financial resources and lack of national government support. Interestingly, it was found that local authorities did not feel that they had a strong possibility of effecting change in policy areas, although they did indicate that environmental policy would be the most likely, and financial policy the least likely, areas of influence.

Looking towards the future

‘Cities – magnets of hope’ was the theme for the fourth UN-Habitat Africities Summit held in 2006. The main message was that sustainable settlements are directly linked to the vision of attaining the MDGs and that local government and key stakeholders should take the challenge of urbanization in Africa more seriously. Rapid urbanization has been highlighted as a main driving force causing stress in many African economies (UNEP, 2002b), a trend that is expected to increase. When considering the future it is worthwhile reflecting on the predicted trends in urbanization against the trends in policy responses. As shown in Table 17.6, the reality for Africa is that urbanization is expected to increase rapidly from 38.7 per cent in 2003 to 53.5 per cent in 2030 (UNDESA, 2004). It has further been suggested that:

Developing countries are also more likely to have adopted policies to ameliorate spatial distribution. For example, almost three-quarters of developing countries have enacted policies to reduce the flow of persons moving to metropolitan areas, but only 12 per cent of developed countries have done so. (UNDESA, 2004, p. 8)

However, it seems as if the existing regional and sub-regional environmental policy context does not explicitly reflect the sustainable urban settlement agenda linking environment with urbanization. In contrast, international- and local-level (where it exists) policy agendas do explicitly reflect the need to link environment and urban settlements. Many African governments also need to be applauded for their progressive thinking in terms of environmental
legislation. However, the implementation and application of these provisions remain problematic and, unless implemented, they remain mere intentions (UNEP, 2002b).

It will not be disputed that poverty reduction will be on the top of the African agenda for the foreseeable future. The main pathways towards addressing poverty have been identified as accelerated industrial development, advocacy for better terms of trade and, importantly, improvement in infrastructure and sustainable human settlement patterns in Africa (UNDP, 2002b). Different scenarios have been proposed in the literature that could broadly be described as ‘markets first’ versus ‘sustainability first’ (UNEP, 2002a). Policy rhetoric would support the ‘sustainability first’ scenario but in practice the ‘markets first’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of LA21s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low-income countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo.Dem.Rep.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty countries</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle-income countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight countries</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

scenario linked to the drive for economic growth seems to dominate. Interestingly, a recent report on the ecological footprint of Africa showed that only four countries in Africa exceed their ecological limits compared with almost all developed countries (GFN, 2006). However, as urbanization increases, accompanied by increases in consumption levels, this picture will most probably change towards more unsustainable patterns. It is also worth noting that on a more theoretical level, the future of the concept of sustainability is under discussion (Smith, 2003; Adams, 2006). The concept of 'sustainability' and 'sustainable development' has been described as 'over-worked' and 'tired', in desperate need of re-thinking. As Smith (2003, p. 112) states: ‘The notion of sustainable development no longer provides an alternative perspective of the environmental, social and economic excesses that face us, it has become an internalized justification.’

Dealing with the future of urban settlements in Africa might also require critical debate on the viability and effectiveness of the concept of sustainability (and/or sustainable development) in facilitating change and effectively influencing decision-making. A strong case could be made for a more practical and less theoretical/philosophical policy approaches and conceptualizations of the challenges facing urban areas on the continent.

**Urban environmental policy – experiences of South Africa**

As the third most biologically diverse country in the world (WCMC, 2002), South Africa is renowned for its riches in biodiversity and natural beauty. However, the country is also in a process of addressing its turbulent political past, marred by social injustice. Over the last decade South Africa has emerged as a leading African country in the development of environmental policy and legislation and has published a national environmental policy (RSA, 1998) as well as a national strategic framework for sustainable development (DEAT, 2006). Following the democratic elections in 1994, environmental concerns were placed more prominently on the agenda and increasingly incorporated into broad frameworks, sectoral policies and laws. Underlying these policies are the principles of equity, social and environmental justice, participation, ecological limits, stewardship and good governance (Hauck and Sowman, 2003). A review of selected environmental policy instruments conducted by Rossouw and Wiseman (2004) indeed revealed that a shift took place from highly centralized, technocratic, rules-based, mechanistic approaches synonymous with

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**Table 17.6 Percentage urban and rate of urbanization by major area, selected periods, 1950–2030**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>74.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNDESA (2004).*

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Issues of urban governance
the previous political dispensation, to a decentralized, participative cooperative governance framework. However, the review also highlighted a lack of implementation linked to monitoring and review mechanisms that hamper the effectiveness of policy implementation. The latter seems a common problem for African countries (UNEP, 2002b).

The development of urban environmental policy is directly linked to the so-called Integrated Development Planning (IDP) process, which is the principal strategic planning instrument that informs and guides planning and budgeting for local authorities over five-year terms. As the principal vehicle for the introduction of environmental policy into local-level decision-making and urban planning, much effort has gone into finding ways of integrating sustainability into the IDP process (Sowman, 2002; DEAT, 2003; CSIR, 2004). The existing policy and legislation undoubtedly do provide the mandate for a strong commitment towards the environment and sustainability and a clear convergence between legal and policy requirements for planning and environmental management has occurred. However, translating these intentions into integrative processes, documents and outcomes within IDPs are proving exceedingly difficult. Sowman and Brown (2006) expressed this view based on the assessments of IDPs conducted to date. Examples where formal environmental policy has been developed in relation to the IDP process are admittedly still limited, although some progress has undoubtedly been made, especially for larger authorities such as Durban Metropolitan Council (1999), City of Cape Town (2002), City of Tswane (2002) and Mangaung Local Authority (2005).

Urbanization trends have historically been influenced by racially based control measures such as influx control. Recent data show that three of the four so-called ‘main population groups’ namely, ‘whites’, ‘Indians’ and ‘coloureds’ all experience tapering off in terms of urbanization rates, while the ‘black’ population in cities has been showing signs of rapid increase in urbanization (SSA, 2006). Boraine et al. (2006) argue that the urban question lies at the heart of achieving the national vision of a productive, democratic and non-racial society based on sustainable human settlements. In this regard the State of cities report, 2006 highlighted ten main challenges for South African cities (SACN, 2006). Challenge number 7, specifically, introduces the concept of sustainability and is entitled ‘Taking sustainability seriously’. Overall, it concludes that the trends show that cities have become less sustainable and that the success in translating sustainability strategies into practice has been variable. To raise the profile of sustainability issues, cities will have to:

- improve their information base and introduce clear performance targets and indicators;
- prioritize and take ownership of sustainability programmes especially those that are externally funded;
- investigate alternative service delivery approaches and technology;
- improve cooperative governance.

The following sections describe environmental policy development for three case examples within the South African context to illustrate some of the main policy formulation issues already alluded to in previous sections. The discussion is structured around the themes and lines of enquiry provided in Table 17.2. The three cases represent urban areas of different sizes, namely a small town (Potchefstroom), medium-sized city (uMhlathuze) and a large city (Mangaung). Table 17.7 provides a summary description of the outcomes for the different cases.
The actor networks highlighted by the case studies included international funding agencies, local councils (political mandate), consultants, research and training institutions and officials in the public sector. The networks highlighted two main models broadly described as internally and externally driven actor networks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Potchefstroom</th>
<th>uMhlathuze</th>
<th>Mangaung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Why was the policy developed?</td>
<td>As part of a broader greener governance initiative</td>
<td>To deal with environmental issues impacting on development authorizations in a sensitive environment</td>
<td>To integrate environmental issues with development planning process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Who were the actors involved in the policy formulation process?</td>
<td>Local council; NW University; ICLEI</td>
<td>Environmental Manager at the local council</td>
<td>Environmental Manager at the local council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Who funded the policy initiative?</td>
<td>International funding from ICLEI</td>
<td>In-house funding</td>
<td>In-house funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Where does the policy fit within the broader policy context?</td>
<td>Located with sub-directorate Environmental Health Department</td>
<td>Located with the environmental management department</td>
<td>Located with the environmental management department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What are the institutional and financial resources allocated for implementation?</td>
<td>Limited budget linked to the Environmental Health Department</td>
<td>Linked to departmental budget (heavily underfunded)</td>
<td>Linked to departmental budget (heavily underfunded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. What knowledge underlies/frames the policy content?</td>
<td>International agendas on climate change as well as university inputs</td>
<td>Existing knowledge from diverse sources</td>
<td>Existing knowledge from diverse sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. What contributions/effects (direct or indirect) has the policy achieved?</td>
<td>Linked to broader policy framework contained in IDP process – although very limited implementation to date</td>
<td>Integration of policy into broader policy framework – limited actual implementation</td>
<td>Policy integrated as part of an EMS for the local council – varying levels of implementation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The externally driven actor network example refers to the Potchefstroom case study. The main external role players were the funding body (ICLEI) and the local university, providing necessary expertise. The environmental agenda and ultimately the environmental policy was initiated through the availability of funding for an ICLEI ‘Cities for Climate Change’ (CCP) pilot project. The funding became available through personal networks between the (then) mayor and the local ICLEI official responsible for allocating pilot cases. However, the network between the university and the city council, or more specifically, the mayor and the director of the Centre for Environmental Management at the university, proved critical to provide the expertise catalyst necessary to deliver the CCP project. Once the project was secured, a wave of environmental initiatives ensued, of which the environmental policy was one. Potchefstroom was even identified as a CCP showcase city at WSSD in 2002. However, the departure of the mayor following local elections resulted in a change in agenda for the local council, which saw the environment take a back seat to other development priorities. The networks that existed before between the funding agency, local council and the university withered and the environmental policy lacked the necessary network ingredients for implementation, such as funding, expertise and political will.

The next two case studies showed similar networks but different reasons for developing environmental policy. In both cases individual officials from the local council drove the drafting of the environmental policy internally. These individuals were responsible for the environmental management function at the local authority. Both were well trained and experienced environmental managers. The main challenge for these functions was the integration of environmental considerations with development decisions, essentially driven by political agendas. The justification for the environmental policy was based more on the need to streamline environmental and development authorization processes than on the need to make environmentally informed decisions. The ingredients for the formulation of environmental policy internally seems to be a specific environmental management function with sufficient access and influence to guide budgeting decisions. Although the drafting of the policies has been completed, implementation remains a challenge primarily because of the trade-offs required between social and environmental issues.

Knowledge and science

The knowledge underlying the need for the environmental policies could also be defined as external and internal knowledge. The first case presents a classical example where global policy agendas (climate change) get imported on the back of available funding. The community of Potchefstroom could rightly question if climate change should be the main environmental focus of the local council. There are many more significant local environmental issues to be addressed but which do not fit the funding requirements. Externally funded initiatives, although well-intended, could easily divert attention and energy from the more important local issues. On the other hand, the remaining two case studies both relied on existing information from diverse sources to justify and provide the basis for the environmental policy. Again, the lack of resources to focus knowledge and information on the most significant issues had to make way for existing information generated through different agendas and by different sources. It seems that until enough resources and expertise can be accessed to draft environmental policy independent of external sources of information and knowledge, environmental policy runs the risk of being shaped by external agendas and priorities.
Application and implementation

For environmental policy to be implemented it needs to be aligned and integrated with the relevant policy framework. This was attempted in all three cases although in slightly different ways. The least effective seems to have been the Potchefstroom case where the environmental policy was merely located as the mandate of the Environmental Health Department. This implied that implementation would be subject to the human resources and funding available from that department and also that in order to influence policy on, for example, housing, cross-departmental influence would be required. The uMhlathuze case linked the environmental policy with the broader IDP framework as a so-called cross-cutting policy. This implies that it had to be considered by all line departments. The Mangaung case study had the most ambitious approach by linking the environmental policy to an environmental management system (EMS) for the local council. However, the practical integration of the EMS with the local IDP is in process but initial signs are promising.

Conclusion

Africa experiences the highest urbanization rate in the world and the standard of living in urban settlements is decreasing, especially in the sub-Saharan region. This chapter aimed to highlight the main literature relating to the theory behind ‘urban environmental policy’ as well as key policy documents. Furthermore, the question of how ‘urban environmental policy’ gets generated within the African context was explored. In this regard the following two main conclusions can be drawn:

1. To understand policy formulation in developing countries requires an understanding of knowledge, power and politics. Policy in developing countries is increasingly criticized for importing agendas and supporting highly questionable assumptions. A distinct lack of home-grown ‘urban environmental policy’ exists.
2. The sustainable cities/settlements agenda is reflected in international policy as well as local-level policy (where it exists). However, at an in-between level (i.e., regional and sub-regional level) the urban agenda does not seem to be integrated with the environmental agenda. The contents of environmental policy seems preoccupied with themes relating more to the rural context, such as desertification, protection of wetlands, food security, sustainable agriculture, and so on, ignoring the vital link that exists between urban and rural livelihoods. Finally, it is feared that policy initiatives in Africa might fail because of a lack of implementation and application.

A need exists to explore the applicability and viability of ‘urban environmental policy’ within the African context. Ideally such research should focus on particular national contexts until sufficient knowledge exists to allow for comparative studies. Ultimately, a holistic view is required acknowledging the interaction between life support systems for urban and rural communities, as DANIDA (2006, p. 1) puts it: ‘Every city draws on environmental resources and services, continuously remaking the built environment, working around nature, obliterating it, transforming it – and yet in a more fundamental sense remaining very much a part of it.’
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PART FIVE

FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
Introduction

Attempting to look into the future is a brave, even a foolish, endeavour. But that is what I have been asked to do. The problem with forecasting is that something always turns up that is not expected. In the past it was often war or pestilence, today it is more likely to be technological change. Sometimes we know that something is going to happen but we do not know when or how seriously it will affect us. Urbanization and global warming are the two most obvious examples here. Sometimes we fear something is going to happen and then it doesn’t – the Millennium Bug was going to stop all computers at midnight 2000 but, mysteriously nothing happened; no planes fell out of the sky even in Brazil and Italy where they had taken virtually no precautions. Given the dangers with futurology I am going to take a careful line. I am going to avoid science fiction, stick mainly with current trends and venture nothing much beyond a generation ahead, say 2020.

My references to the literature will be relatively sparse and hopelessly partial. My defence is simply that academic writing, indeed all writing, is out of control. In every country where I work, more journals, books and chapters are emerging on every conceivable subject than ever before. As such, it is impossible to keep up with the writing in any of the theme areas that I am required to cover. If, therefore, no reference is made to your paper, simply blame the volume of publications as well as the way my bibliography has been heavily influenced by my own interests and prejudices, both thematic and geographical.

Generalization is a risky exercise and in the conclusion to Chapter 7, Fielding warns that some research turns ‘migration’ into a ‘chaotic concept’, ‘that is to say, a term that means so many things to so many people that it has come to mean nothing to anyone’. If that is a danger with discussion of migration, then how much more dangerous is it in an attempt to confront urbanization, especially now that half the world’s population lives in towns and cities? In an attempt to overcome this difficulty, I have tried to back up as many of my assertions as possible with reference to those cities I know best: London, where I live, Bogotá, Colombia, which I have visited frequently for years, and less confidently, Cape Town, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago and Paris. If this is by no means a balanced selection of cities, at least it is drawn from both the North and the South. It may not include any of the world’s most chaotic and fastest-growing cities but at least each has been through a period of relative chaos and it is possible to judge whether it has managed to adjust or fail to adjust to the challenges.

As requested I will make frequent reference to the chapters in this book. But there is a problem insofar as I am unsure that these chapters cover most of our hopes and fears about the future. Like any collection, the contents are heavily biased by selection. First, a quick glance at the contributors shows that all but two of the 24 authors are male and that all but four are over 50. We may or may not be grumpy but we are relatively old men! Second, most of the writing is about the North, a term I hate but will use because of its only virtue – it is shorter than equivalent terms like ‘more economically developed
countries’. There is the odd reference to the South in this volume, but given most of the world’s problematic and fastest-growing cities lie there, it is remarkably short on the real urban world. In this respect the volume accurately reflects the bias of most of the urban literature towards the North, something that I and others have bemoaned for years without any real shift in emphasis having become apparent (Gilbert, 1987; Potter, 2001). Third, the chapters in the book appear to be rather light on what I consider to be very real problems – inequality, poverty, poor services and decent employment. My editor assures me that forthcoming volumes will rectify some of those gaps.

I am going to disappoint many readers by predicting neither a glowing future nor a major disaster. Insofar as there is a theme to my chapter it is that urbanization over the years has been relatively successful and has generally helped people improve their lives. I therefore go against a long line of famous novelists who have always tended to portray urbanization as a social ill. At the same time, it is clear that urban planning has failed to produce the kinds of utopian cities that many of us were educated to believe lay just over the horizon. Indeed, while technology and economic growth have permitted both rapid urban growth and a general improvement in living standards in most parts of the world, a combination of population growth, inequality and less than decisive decision-making has produced highly defective cities. With our technology, wealth and know-how, we should have done better. Will we improve on our past performance in the next few years? Here my pessimistic side shows through. We will cope but we will not do much more than that because those with economic and political power will not concede many of their existing advantages. And, where substantial political shifts take place, I fear that they may well not make much real difference.

Urban growth patterns
The broad outlines of urbanization in 2020 are clear. A majority of the world’s population will live in towns or cities, even in many of the world’s poorest countries (Table 18.1). Most of Latin America and parts of Africa and Asia will be urban, including China. And, if we take the warning of Champion in Chapter 3 that urbanization has infiltrated much of the world’s countryside, then 2020 will be indisputably urban.

If we only count real towns and cities, the urban population will continue to grow both absolutely and relatively but its pace will be slower than in most previous decades, even in

Table 18.1 Urban population, 1960 to 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Percentage urban</th>
<th>Hundred million people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed world</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least developed regions</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: UNDESA Population Division (2005, Tables A2 and A3).
the poorest countries. People will continue to move to the cities, particularly in China, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and in such areas the numbers of city dwellers will grow enormously. In most of the world, however, the chief cause of urban growth will be natural increase. The absolute numbers of rural people will continue to grow in the least developed countries but will be virtually static in most of the South; the rural fuel for rapid urbanization will be running out.

Given that the urban population is likely to increase by some 1.3 billion people between 2000 and 2020, it is not surprising that the number of million cities will have increased dramatically (see Chapters 5 and 7). Most of these million cities will be found in the South and most will have grown dramatically in size. In 1950, the average population of the largest 30 cities was 3.9 million and today it is 12.5 million; by 2020 perhaps it will be 15 million. However, the fastest urban growth will be found among smaller cities, particularly in the less developed areas.

**The key issues**

I have identified 11 broad issues as worthy of discussion, omitting at least an equal number of deserving causes for inclusion in the future volumes.

**Controlling urban growth**

For decades, governments have complained that too many people are moving to the cities and that urban growth is out of control. Too many are arriving and few are the right kind of people; too many migrants are unskilled, uneducated and too often lack the appropriate local language skills. This was as true of the English government during the Industrial Revolution, of the reaction to the waves of immigration into New York, as it was to governmental concern at the peak of urban expansion in Latin America during the 1960s. It is still true of reaction in the fast urbanizing countries of Africa and Asia. However, with very few exceptions (for example, Cambodia, China and Cuba), governments have rarely done much to stem the flow of migrants (Lipton, 1977; Gilbert and Gugler, 1992). As a result, urban growth has continued unabated and, despite the fears, the cities have generally managed to cope with the influx.

Similar fears have long been expressed about the growth of the largest cities. Their populations have been increasing too quickly and they have grown excessively. It seems that Aristotle believed that in a healthy democracy every citizen should know every other and that Plato ‘set the number of citizens in his ideal city at 5,040’ (Max-Neef, 1992). Many social observers since, and certainly most politicians, have come out with similar nonsense about city size. Queen Elizabeth I wanted to stop London’s ‘excessive’ growth when it contained around 100,000 people, and the proliferation of new cities from Brasilia and Dodoma to Milton Keynes suggests that the attitude of modern politicians has not been very different (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992).

Again, however, policy has seldom been able to control the growth of mega-cities and the number of such cities has continued to grow. Governments have been as unwilling to slow expansion of their most dynamic cities as they have to control urban growth generally. The establishment of new towns and regional development policies have rarely been effective given the ‘large city bias’ that has characterized most national economic policies (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992). Today, many governments recognize that, in a competitive world, very large cities have certain advantages with respect to economic performance and
service provision. Current policy in China and India suggests that the case for large city
growth has generally been conceded (see Chapter 5). Government pragmatism is sup-
ported by the research that has shown that it is difficult to determine when a city might
have grown too large (Richardson, 1973; 1993) and, in any case, it would be difficult to do
anything to control its growth. In my ideal world, big cities would grow less rapidly, but
we live in anything but an ideal world.

Of course, various chapters in this volume argue that we should stop thinking about the
problems and management of ‘cities’ and think more in terms of city-regions. Today, it is
the city-regions that compete with one another both within national borders and increas-
ingly beyond. Some authors in this book have suggested that for this reason governments
should represent and administer urban and rural areas because the concept of the stand-
alone city is no longer meaningful. In addition, Cohen (2004, pp. 48–9) argues that:

There has also been a general convergence in lifestyles between urban and rural areas as distance
and time have collapsed. Consequently, the traditional distinction between urban and rural areas
has become insufficient for many purposes and an enormous challenge for the social sciences is
to come up with a classification system that adequately represents present day realities.

I have no particular objection to that call beyond lamenting that it will make generaliza-
tion about urban life even more difficult than it is now.

Economic growth, work and living standards

Dynamic economies have always welcomed the arrival of cheap labour. This was true of
the burgeoning industrial cities of Northern England and the docklands and sweatshops
of Dickensian London (Stedman-Jones, 1971). It is equally true of the post-industrial
cities of Los Angeles or London where cheap labour is required to build homes and offices
and to clean, feed and look after those who work in higher paid jobs (Sassen, 1991).
Throughout history, the rich have demanded servants and the poor have arrived, legally
and illegally, to provide them with cheap and cheerful labour.

The work open to migrants has rarely been safe or secure and has always been relatively
badly paid. In recent times, something has been done in many developed countries to
reduce penury, but child workers and exploitative labour practices continue to exist in
most countries, phenomena guaranteed by persistent rural and urban poverty. Generally,
however, it is clear that urban labour is more remunerative than that in the countryside.
And, while the arrival of poor people generally causes angst among the local population,
there is a broad correlation across the globe between urbanization and rising indicators
of well-being. Across the world, there are few examples where people in urban areas do
not live longer than their country cousins, where more children die in infancy or child-
hood, and where fewer can read. That is precisely why most people move to the cities. They
know that they can improve their lives (Cornelius, 1975; Butterworth and Chance, 1981;
Gilbert and Gugler, 1992). While there are important exceptions (see below) most
migrants are self-selected for their skills, youth and initiative and manage to cope with
urban life. The oldest, poorest and least-educated generally do not move to the cities, they
stay in the countryside. It is only when war, famine or pestilence breaks out that migra-
tion breaks the golden rule of movement and ceases to be selective (see Chapter 7).

Urbanization, at least since 1900, has rarely led to declining living standards and then
the reasons have had little to do with urban growth. In Russia, falling life expectancy
among men, due to disease and alcoholism, has been stimulated by economic transformation and regime change; in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, plummeting life expectancy among both men and women has been the result of HIV/AIDS. Surely the broad correlation between rising welfare and urbanization suggests that urbanization is not inherently bad for us?

Today, the number of voices criticizing urban growth has declined. Urban growth is necessary for competitiveness. Most competitive economies are based around dynamic economic clusters found in urban areas, admittedly often with a supportive rural hinterland (e.g., Santiago, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Bogotá). Our main concern currently is linked to the recognition that increasing numbers of urban ‘slum’ dwellers are living in conditions that are actually worse than in the countryside (UN-Habitat, 2003a; 2003b; 2006; Davis, 2006).

The urbanization of poverty

The world has changed in recent decades. In 1950, most poor people lived in rural areas and by 2020 poverty will have become a predominantly urban phenomenon. This is a natural outcome of the trends shown in Table 18.1. With urbanization growing faster in the South, the numbers of poor urbanites will continue to grow. Pressure on the land, changing agricultural circumstances and more opportunities in the cities will encourage people to move in increasing numbers. Most will have moved through some kind of choice, particularly those who have kin in the city. Unfortunately, some will have moved because of displacement; they will have had little option but to move, often rather suddenly. Over the last couple of decades, war has forced millions in countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Sudan and Zimbabwe to move to safer areas, often to the cities and sometimes even to foreign cities. In Colombia, the violence of drug barons, paramilitaries and the army has forced well over two million people from their rural homes. No doubt, this kind of distressing experience will find its parallel in other lands in the future.

As a result, we can no longer assume that all urban people are healthier, more literate and more prosperous than rural people. While in general, the chances of being poor are likely to be higher in the countryside than in the city, UN-Habitat (2006) is broadly correct in noting that ‘slum dwellers in developing countries are as badly off if not worse off than their rural relatives’. Of course, this is hardly a new finding, for this was true of Victorian cities in Britain (Stedman-Jones, 1971). It was also seemingly true of Lima in the late 1980s:

> a large part of the population, particularly the children and young people, lives in poverty. These are the children of chaos, of poverty, and of urban violence . . .a city like Lima produces an immense population with distinctive traits: people who know only despair; young people who live alongside criminals, and drug addicts, who may at any moment fall into prostitution; people who carry in their lungs a concentration of smog. (Sánchez-León, 1992, pp. 201–2)

What the latter omitted to point out was that most rural folk were no better off.

That many of the people living in desperately poor cities are impoverished is hardly surprising. What is more remarkable is just how many poor people are living in cities in the so-called developed world (Table 18.2). While the severity of that poverty is hardly comparable with that in most parts of the South, 51 per cent of children in Inner London are currently living in poor households (London, 2006). The problems manifest in so many
American ghettos and the catastrophe wrought by Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans underlines the chronic urban poverty to be found in the United States (O’Connor, Tilly and Bobo, 2003). And, as Fidel Castro is fond of reminding his rich Northern neighbour, the infant mortality rate in Washington DC is twice as high as that in Cuba!

I don’t think that much of the urbanization of poverty can be blamed on urban growth per se. The underlying cause of urban poverty is that there are too many poor people in the world and as the total population expands, this poverty increasingly spills over into urban areas. According to Chuhan (2006, p. 31):

Over three-quarters of a billion people, many of them children, are malnourished. Each year nearly 11 million children die from malnutrition or disease before reaching their fifth birthday...[and] over half a million women die every year in childbirth from lack of appropriate health care, malnourishment, or disease.

If these people increasingly live in urban areas rather than rural areas, the only important question is whether poverty can be handled better in the former than in the latter. The lesson of history is that there is little alternative to urban expansion. As such, 2020 will be a world of urban poverty and the authorities will be forced to deal with the consequences of that fact.

Inequality
Recent World Bank work suggests that both global poverty and global inequality is in decline largely because of rapid economic growth in populous China and South Asia (UNDP, 2005; World Bank, 2005). Less positively, inequality is increasing in virtually every country and city around the world (Milanovic, 2003; Wade, 2004; Gilbert, 2007). That is a worry because inequality blocks other people’s paths to a decent life. It also offends the long-established notion of fairness that is the foundation stone for constructing a worthwhile democracy. Inequality is also dangerous insofar as it can, although it usually does not, stimulate violence.

During most of the twentieth century, and particularly after the Second World War, most social scientists assumed that societies would become more equal. Admittedly
Kuznets (1955) issued a warning that industrialization would first widen personal inequalities in agricultural economies before continued economic development would again reduce them. But, in the North, government intervention, the construction of some kind of welfare state, the growth of education and health services and progressive taxation, had gradually cut poverty and reduced inequality between 1850 and 1950 (Kuznets, 1960). While Kuznets’ famous curve never held true and was, as he admitted, based more on supposition than hard fact, he had no doubt that advanced countries would become more equal as they continued to develop. The assumption was always that the South would eventually follow.

Perhaps it is the effect of globalization in its varied forms, or more likely neo-liberalism, but today few believe in that recipe. To most people’s surprise, ‘over the past decade . . . inequality has increased in most rich countries’ (Dollar, 2005, p. 160). Inequality has risen over the past three decades in Germany and in the United Kingdom (Economist, 2006b; 2006d). In the United States ‘the share of aggregate income going to the highest-earning 1 per cent of Americans has doubled from 8 per cent in 1980 to over 16 per cent in 2004. That going to the top tenth of 1 per cent has tripled from 2 per cent in 1980 to 7 per cent today’ (Economist, 2006a). Something similar has been happening in many poorer countries too (Stewart and Berry, 1999, p. 150). Few economists now accept that there is a positive correlation between per capita income and equality (Fields, 1980; Randolph and Lott, 1993; Kanbur, 2001; Jha, 1996; World Bank, 2005, p. 44).

Bidwai (2006, p. 35) argues that ‘global economic apartheid’ has created fault-lines ‘between different classes and social groups in both parts of the world. There is a South within many countries of the North . . . a North within the South’. The US-based Institute for Policy Studies notes that chief executives made 142 times more than the average worker in 1994 – and 431 times more in 2004. A similar tendency is apparent in the UK where in cities like London, the super rich co-exist with large numbers of poor families. And, I have already noted the number of children who live in poverty in London.

The geographical and sociological literature is now replete with research on the dangers of ‘gated communities’, a worrying but hardly the most significant aspect of the problems of modern urban life (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Lang and Danielsen, 1997; Marcuse and van Kempen, 2000; Lemanski, 2004; Salcedo and Torres, 2004). Much more troubling is the emergence of social ghettos, which makes upward mobility so difficult for the very poor, particularly those whose faces are the wrong colour. Getting out of the ghettos of urban France, Britain or the United States is highly problematic. Clark’s Chapter 6 points out that ‘global migration has highlighted, what has always been pushed under the rug – global inequality’.

Today, few social scientists doubt that inequality is a major cause of social and economic problems across the globe. A World Bank study of Latin America has admitted that: ‘High inequality has major costs. It increases poverty and reduces the impact of economic development on poverty reduction. It is probably bad for aggregate economic growth, especially when associated with unequal access to credit and education, and with social tensions’ (De Ferranti et al., 2004, p. 1). Seemingly, economic theory now demonstrates that inequality can be damaging to economic growth. The Human development report of 2005, for example, declares that: ‘economics itself provides strong arguments for redistribution’ (UNDP, 2005, p. 53).

In developed countries, research is increasing, showing how inequality creates welfare problems (Martin, 2001; Hutton, 2002; Dorling and Rees, 2004). Wilkinson (2005),
for example, has recently argued that if Britain changed from being one of the most unequal of European countries to being among the most equal, the result would be radical. Average life expectancy would increase, homicide rates and levels of violence would fall, people would trust each other more, and community life would be revitalized. As such, the benefits of greater equality would be seen across all sectors of society.

I suspect that most countries in the world will be even less equal in 2020 than they are today and that the most blatant signs of inequality will be manifest, as always, in the cities. I hope that the high point of neo-liberal orthodoxy has already passed and that more generous economic and social policies will be instituted in the near future. However, I am not optimistic, and confronting inequality is one of the key urban challenges for the future.

Shelter and services
I read constantly that the world is suffering from a shelter crisis. The United Nations and the World Bank frequently remind us that one billion people live in slums and that urban growth ‘will become virtually synonymous with slum formation in some regions’ (UN-Habitat, 2006). Anyone who visits Nairobi’s rental shanty towns in Kibera or the Mathare Valley will be appalled by the thought that such overcrowding, lack of services and poor living conditions might become more widespread.

No one can deny that the lack of decent accommodation is a huge problem insofar as it harms people’s health and their general welfare. Unfortunately, over the years, governments have been less than successful in providing poor people with decent accommodation and even those in developed countries have failed to solve their housing ‘crises’ (e.g., Van Kempen and Musterd, 1991; Noin and White, 1997; Power, 1999). In the South, the lesson seems to be that governments should not attempt to build houses because they are often not very good at it, can never build enough and too often allocate those houses to the less than poor (Gilbert, 2001; Stokes, 1962; Turner, 1967). Rather greater efforts should be made to install infrastructure and to help reduce poverty. Self-help housing, providing it is not built in dangerous places and is constructed in ways that make future servicing possible, is the only sensible approach in a world where just too many people live in poverty.

Fortunately, the development industry appears to have taken that lesson on board (World Bank, 1993; World Bank/UNCHS, 2000; Imparato and Ruster, 2003; Buckley and Kalarickal, 2005), although I have serious doubts that the current conventional wisdom of the development banks will be effective in improving the quality of self-help housing. Heavily influenced by the thinking of Hernando de Soto and by total belief in the virtues of owner-occupation and access to credit, the current idea is that the widespread delivery of legal titles will attract bankers into the shanty towns and lead to a rapid process of housing improvement and economic development (de Soto, 2000; Fernandez, 2002; Gilbert, 2002; Bromley, 2004; Home and Lim, 2004). My own research, in the consolidated self-help areas of Bogotá, suggests that such thinking is hopelessly optimistic. Most banks are less than interested in lending to the poor and the latter worry about the millstone that a long-term mortgage represents. In addition, one plank in the logic of financing housing is that people can eventually sell their homes. Unfortunately, evidence of a market for the purchase and sale of consolidated self-help homes is scarce (Gilbert, 1999). It is also necessary to point out that ownership of property is not the only form of tenure that can provide decent housing (UN-Habitat, 2003c). After all, most households in
Switzerland and Germany rent, and neither country suffers from much in the way of a housing problem. Unfortunately, the holy grail of ownership seems to be deeply grained in the minds of most governments (Krueckeberg, 1999).

In a world with so many poor families, there can be no solution to the shelter crisis, only the rediscovery of ways to reduce its severity. Past experience tells us what needs to be done. It is to provide basic services and infrastructure to as many people as possible. Governments should not try to build homes, not even to subsidize them, because there are too many people without homes (Gilbert, 2004). Over the years, people in many poor cities have shown themselves to be thoroughly capable of building adequate shelter for themselves without receiving much in the way of government help. As Turner and others pointed out years ago, what is needed is the infrastructure to make that shelter habitable and the environment healthier (Turner, 1967; 1976). More needs to be done too to prevent self-help housing being built in areas that are dangerous and in zones where earthquakes or floods will lead to disaster. This is not rocket science, it is basic common sense. Unfortunately, implementing such an approach appears to be beyond the competence of far too many urban governments.

Basic common sense also appears to be lacking in the developed world. According to the media, the United Kingdom is facing a ‘housing crisis’ because the number of households is growing faster than the supply of affordable housing. At the same time, the financial pages celebrate the fact that house prices are continuing to rise spectacularly and their only fear is that the housing market might crash (Economist, 2003; Elliot, 2004). Those who own homes celebrate by counting the profit they are making as house prices rise and many cash in part of their gain to pay for holidays or to buy a new car. Meanwhile those without homes are being priced out of the housing market; the homes that were once affordable to young families are no longer within their reach. The banks offer to ‘help’ by offering new schemes by which the young can help fuel the speculation by indebting themselves beyond their life times and by borrowing up to six times the joint salaries of the household. The government devises fatuous schemes that will accentuate urban sprawl even in areas without water.

However difficult life may appear to aspirant home owners, the current situation does not constitute a crisis. At most it is social and economic mismanagement, one based on an ideology of greed and self-interest. It is not a crisis because fewer people are homeless than in years past and most people in British rich cities live in accommodation that is much better serviced, in terms of central heating, plumbing and space, than ever before. The problem, as opposed to the crisis, is that, as ever, we neglect the needs of the poor and bow to the wishes of those with means. We could solve our housing ‘crisis’ with better designed taxation systems, particularly on second homes, luxurious houses and even on land, thereby reducing the profitability of home-ownership, urban sprawl and the proliferation of holiday homes.

**Mobility and ethnic mix**

The general maxim that has long explained migration is that people move to improve their lives. Admittedly, they sometimes flee from misery, violence and despair, but more often they make a positive choice to migrate to places where they expect life to be better. If we need proof that migration is not caused mainly by ‘push’ factors, it is that migration is nearly always highly selective (Cornelius, 1975; Butterworth and Chance, 1981;
Gilbert, 1998). It is not those in most need who move. As Fielding puts it in Chapter 7: ‘there is an inverse relationship between the need to migrate and the actual migration rate’. Migration streams are dominated by those people who are able to cope in the eventual destination. Because it is mainly people who can cope who move to the cities, we have seen so few urban conflagrations or social revolutions over the centuries.

Typically, migration has been local and that is still true today; most Chinese, Indian and African migrants do not move abroad. But as transport links have improved and globalization has become more dominant, migration has occurred over longer distances. Of course, international migration is hardly new and it is important to recall that towards the end of the nineteenth century, millions moved from Europe across the Atlantic or to even more distant colonies like Australia (Held and McGrew, 2002).

The recent change in many parts of North is that many of the new urbanites are coming from abroad. In 2002, an estimated 175 million people were living in a country other than where they were born, some 3 per cent of the world’s population (UNPD, 2002). The number of migrants has more than doubled since 1975 and two-thirds live in the more developed regions. Almost one in ten people living in developed countries is now a migrant. This has added a distinctive ethnic mix to many previously ‘European’ cities and some ‘world cities’ have become distinctly cosmopolitan. Despite rising barriers, huge numbers of Latin Americans have moved to North America; Africans, Indians and Turks to Western Europe; Indians to parts of the Middle East and so on (Salt, 1989; Durand and Massey, 1992; Cornelius et al., 1994; Crush and James, 1995; Massey et al., 1998; Stalker, 2000; IOM, 2003; Cohen, 2006). Some have arrived legally with work permits or as asylum-seekers but vast numbers have arrived illegally, opposed officially but encouraged surreptitiously by some employers and state governments. Their movement has been permitted by the cumbersome state apparatuses of developed countries that are relatively easily circumvented by the desperate, the intrepid and the dishonest. Clark notes that almost one in 20 workers in the United States in 2005 was an unauthorized migrant, mainly Hispanic, young and poorly educated.

The migration of unskilled workers has contributed to worsening inequality in the developed world. The arrival of Mexicans to work in the service sector of Los Angeles or of Puerto Ricans and Colombians to find jobs in New York City has created large pockets of low-paid workers. Some of these will return home, some will eventually achieve a measure of prosperity, but some will remain among the ranks of the poor. In Chapter 6, Clark warns of the possibility of ‘quasi-slave’ conditions in a ‘two-tiered’ labour market and in the following chapter, Fielding notes the problems facing sex-workers from the Philippines in Japan.

In places, ethnic diversity has generated social problems. Locals tend to be suspicious of migrants, particularly when they come from ‘exotic’ places. Both locals and earlier generations of migrants worry that the newcomers will take their jobs and homes. Occasionally, violence may break out between ethnic groups; disturbances in ethnically mixed Oldham, Bradford and Burnley in 2001 led the UK Commissioner for Racial Equality to warn the government of the ‘risk of race riots’ in nine areas: Rochdale, Preston, Bolton, Huddersfield, Tower Hamlets in East London, Ilford/Barking, Camden in North London, Nottingham and Leeds (Travis, 2006).

But while noting the potential problems that may arise from ethnic mixing, let us not blame immigration for urban problems. Many ethnic groups adapt extremely successfully
to the new environment. In the United Kingdom, many children from the Chinese and Indian communities are now attending the best universities and taking well-paid professional jobs. Of course, second-generation West Indians and Bangladeshi in the United Kingdom have been far less upwardly mobile but the evidence from Table 6.4 in Chapter 6 surely points to the overall success of the migration process. The top five countries in the list with the highest share of foreign-born people are: Switzerland, Latvia, Austria, Ireland and Sweden. If I were to identify countries in the world with a high quality of life and the fewest urban problems, most of these countries would be included. Clearly, immigration in itself does not cause problems.

Arguably, too, immigration and cityward migration generally produce real benefits for people back home. Despite the complications caused by the brain drain, there is now increasing evidence of the huge amount of money that the migrants send back home. In many countries, remittances have become big business and a major source of funds for local investment. The World Bank estimates that workers will have sent some US$199 billion to their homes in the South in 2006 (Economist, 2006e). Often, this money makes a huge difference; more than a quarter of the GDP of Jordan, Lesotho, Nicaragua, Haiti and Tonga, for example, is made up of remittances (Economist, 2004a, p. 70). It is said that many households in Cuba survive on the basis of the dollars they receive from kin living in the United States. And, of course, many migrants eventually return home (see Chapter 6).

Urbanization and politics

Urbanization has more often than not been portrayed as a social ill. Novelists of the nineteenth century such as Dickens, Hardy and Zola described the ghastly living conditions in the cities and many twentieth-century novelists from the South, such as Ngugi and Paton, have done the same. No doubt there are exceptions but I can't think of many. Social scientists have often echoed this negative attitude towards urbanization, particularly when referring to the Third World city (Hoselitz, 1957; Lerner, 1967). The assumption among many has been that sooner or later protest will break out.

Of course, relatively few social scientists share that view any longer. Innumerable studies have demonstrated that few cityward migrants suffer from social anomie and mental dislocation. While some no doubt go off the rails, the majority get work, establish themselves in self-help communities and manage to make the best of an unpromising situation. There is little sign of ‘marginality’, ‘irrationality’, ‘despair’ or of a ‘culture of poverty’ (Lewis, 1966; Mangin, 1970; Portes, 1972; Perlman, 1976; Roberts, 1978). As Castells (1983, p. 175) once put it, ‘contrary to the expectations of those who believe in the myth of marginality and in spite of the fears of the world’s establishment, social organization seems to be stronger than social deviance in these communities’. Most of the newcomers have proved themselves to be politically conservative.

Of course, a few cities in the South have experienced major protests over the years. But the frequency of protest is low because most poor people are extremely busy earning their living and building their own self-help homes. They have also recognized that protesting can be dangerous; many governments are less than gentle in their handling of dissent, particularly in societies under authoritarian rule. Frequently, too, political patronage is used to dampen protest; politicians of every hue are very adept at making promises and offering jobs and services in return for obedience (Mainwaring, 1989; Gay, 1990; Gilbert, 1998). Where violence has broken out it has usually been aimed against
specific actions or policies, few among the migrant poor seem to have been interested in structural change. They have been outraged about the quality of public services or about the introduction of wage freezes or about the rise in bus fares. Most have simply wanted to get on with improving their own homes and neighbourhoods and have not been very interested in building up alliances with other neighbourhoods or with the labour movement (Evers, 1985).

Some observers have sometimes been excited by the discovery of ‘social movements’, ‘made up of young people, women, residential associations, church-sponsored “grass-roots” communities, and similar groups’ (Portes, 1989, p. 36). The poor were prepared to throw off their shackles as reflected in the community-based protests supported by the Church in Brazil, the collectives established in Chilean campamentos, and in the urban coalitions being built across Mexican cities (Kowarick, 1988; Boran, 1989; Coulomb and Duhau, 1989; Kusnetzoff, 1990, p. 62). The ‘austerity’ or ‘IMF’ riots that broke out during the 1980s as a result of debt crisis were seemingly another example (Walton, 1989; Seddon and Walton, 1993, p. 39). Some saw in these movements signs of a more turbulent future (Gizewski and Homer-Dixon, 1995, p. 17).

Political violence is possible in the future and is perhaps made more likely by growing inequality and ethnic differentiation. However, nothing is less predictable than the political future: ‘a week is a long time in politics’ as Prime Minister Harold Wilson once put it. As such, I make no guesses about the political future at all beyond the general statement that most cities will be peaceful. Protest will occasionally break out and may sometimes be violent but urban politics across the globe will be extremely diverse and largely determined by local factors.

Crime and violence

‘It is held as a matter of common sense that the main cause of violence in society is urban development and the growth of huge cities. This conviction has deep roots that go back to the wave of urbanization that started in the twelfth century and the resulting polarization between town and country’ (Pinheiro, 1993). Hasan (1993, p. 1) claims that, ‘from Los Angeles to New Delhi, urban crime statistics reveal that not only is the incidence of violence becoming more frequent but the nature of those crimes more heinous’. Geyer and Portnov make a similar claim in Chapter 9: ‘While urban statistics of homicides, assault, rape, and abuse in the developed world fluctuate over time, some showing short-term downward, others upward trends, violent crime in urban areas seems to be worldwide a steadily growing phenomenon.’

I am suspicious of many of these claims of growing criminality. Besides anecdotal evidence, the data that support that claim are generally scanty. Most crime figures, apart from those for murder, are feeble, and sensationalist news stories nearly always publicize the worst crimes and the ‘many’ places where crime has increased. By contrast, the ‘few’ places where crime has declined only occasionally figure as headline news (e.g., New York under Mayor Giuliani). My own biased sample of cities, London and Bogotá, offers little to support the idea that crime is out of control. In Bogotá, the murder rate declined from 68 per 100 000 inhabitants in 1994 to 18 in 2006. In London, the homicide rate has risen but only from 2.1 homicides per 100 000 people in the middle 1990s to 2.6 in the middle 2000s (BBC, 1998; Coleman and Cotton, 2006). By world standards London is still a very safe city (Economist, 2004b).
Whether or not urban violence, and crime generally, is increasing, we can safely say that there is no consistent relationship between crime and urbanization. Within every country there are major differences between rates of crime in urban and rural areas. Similarly, some cities are much safer than others. Like most of the other supposed linkages discussed in this chapter, crime is the outcome of a range of social factors and ‘urbanization’ is only a secondary explicator. This is clear if we look at variations in crime rates across urbanized countries. While most cities in the Middle East areas are largely free of crime, urban areas in Latin America, the United States and South Africa are often major centres of crime. The level of urbanization is a poor guide to criminality and so is size of city. While Los Angeles, New York and Rio de Janeiro are giant cities with depressingly high crime rates, other mega-cities such as Tokyo and Cairo suffer little from crime. In the United States, Chapter 10 demonstrates that homicide is more common in some kinds of cities than in others, those in the South and those with large African-American populations are more prone to violence. Homicide is particularly common in cities with high rates of gun ownership, alcohol and drug use, inequality, low education and male unemployment (Renner, 2001; Safford and Palacios, 2002).

Even in cities with high crime rates, crime is not ubiquitous. In Bogotá, the homicide rate in the city centre in 2003 was almost 100 per 100 000 inhabitants compared with less than 20 in most suburbs of the city (Veeduría Distrital, 2004, p. 11–12). In London, most cases of homicide occur in specific areas, particularly those associated with drug trafficking, or in what the PMSU (2007) has recently called ‘striving areas’, where deprivation is common.

Insofar as violent crime is increasing, it has little to do with urbanization. In London, a recent rise in the use of guns is linked to the arrival of international crime gangs and their involvement in the drug trade (Povey and Kaiza, 2006). Rio de Janeiro’s crime wave is similarly linked to the growth of the drug business. The rise in the rate of violent death in recent years to 149 per 100 000 inhabitants in Medellín in 2003 and 141 in Cali coincided with competition for control over the drug trade (Safford and Palacios, 2002; Veeduría Distrital, 2004). The much lower rates of violent death in Bogotá are no doubt explained by the Colombian capital’s limited involvement with drugs. The drug business encourages turf wars between suppliers and it forces those addicted to drugs to engage in petty crime to feed their habit. It is addiction that is at the root of the problem, not urbanization, and the parallels with crime in Chicago during the prohibition era are so close that they should be embarrassing US policy-makers.

Similarly, access to guns is clearly linked to the incidence of violent crime. Colombia, South Africa and the United States have higher levels of violent crime than most of Europe, in large part because it is so easy to obtain a firearm. In London, people rarely shoot their wives or neighbours, largely because they don’t own a gun; for the same reason, while road rage is increasing it rarely ends in death. Londoners are not inherently more tolerant of others; we just don’t have the means to be lethal (Renner, 2003)!

If crime, and particularly violent crime, is determined by variables other than urbanization or urban size, it suggests that levels of crime in the cities of 2020 will be determined by local circumstances. Good policing helps, although in the United Kingdom increased police numbers and expenditure over the past decade have failed to improve detection rates (PMSU, 2007). If crime is falling it is usually because society is changing. In Bogotá, better policing has helped but other factors are possibly more important in explaining the
decline in violent crime: a campaign against guns, earlier closing times for drinking spots, and more community participation in campaigns against crime (Martin and Ceballos, 2004). The amount of crime in 2020 will be determined by the quality of urban governance and by simple demographics – how many young men there are. In Bogotá, a 20–29-year-old man is 15 times more likely to be murdered than a woman of the same age (Garcés, 2006) (see Figure 18.1). In New York and London, the incidence of crime in the 1990s declined with the proportion of young men in the population.

In places, violence is generated by ethnic, political and religious differences. I do not know whether more cities will suffer from the kind of situation that has been manifest over the years in Beirut and Belfast, and is currently devastating Baghdad, but such violence, and indeed terrorism, has virtually nothing to do with urbanization. The causes of ethnic and religious conflict lie elsewhere and, as Darfur or Sri Lanka show, the violence may not even take place principally in urban areas. In Colombia, most political deaths occur in rural areas and small towns, which is why between 2 and 3.6 million people have fled to comparative safety in the cities (Rojas et al., 2001; Safford and Palacios, 2002; Moloney, 2006). In any event, the chances of any of us in cities in developed countries being killed by urban terrorists are tiny. We are in far more danger from the cars on our roads (see below).

Is crime linked to inequality? Many people believe this to be the case, although the evidence is less than clear (Caldeira, 2000; Renner, 2001; Thorbecke and Charumilind, 2002; Cardia, Adorno and Poleto, 2003). For while it is true that violent cities like Johannesburg and Rio de Janeiro are hugely unequal, so is Bogotá. In the latter, although the richest 10 per cent of the population receive 49 times the income of the poorest 10 per cent, violent crime has plummeted over the last 15 years. In London, crime rose in the 1980s as the city became more unequal and then fell in the 1990s as the city continued to become more unequal.
Perhaps the greatest concern about urban crime in the future should be our fear of it. Whatever the trends in crime, public concern seems to grow incessantly (Rorker, 2002; Lemanski, 2004). In London, if you are a female, do not deal in drugs and rarely go to nightclubs, your chances of living a long life are extremely good. If you are aged under 16 or over 50, you are incredibly safe, especially if you keep clear of your family who are among the most likely people to kill you! Urban violence is mainly committed by young men against other young men or their nearest and dearest – it has relatively little to do with urbanization. Nonetheless, people worry constantly about their children being attacked by strangers!

Fear of crime is undoubtedly fanned by media scares (see Bamber, 2002) and, I suspect, by the growth of private security firms. Is our paranoia not linked to the hugely profitable expansion of private security services? ‘In Canada and Australia, the private security workforce outnumbers the police by 2 to 1, in South Africa by 3 to 1 and in the US by 8 to 1’ (PMSU, 2007). Is it paranoid of me to suspect that the builders of gated communities and the sellers of burglar alarms have a vested interest in exaggerating our risk from crime? Parallels with the Millennium Bug and computer viruses spring to mind; to what extent is the threat of crime and violence real and to what extent is it invented?

Crime is clearly a sin of society and the nature of each society influences the form and frequency with which crime occurs. Of course, this makes it an ‘urban’ phenomenon insofar as most of the world is becoming increasingly urban. But, if we attribute rising levels of crime to urbanization we are falling again into the trap of confusing causation with correlation. The incidence of crime in 2020 will depend in part on how we manage our cities, how we deal with drugs and alcohol and how we socialize our youth. It also depends on us keeping a careful eye on the security industry.

Environmental damage
Suddenly, the environment is on the global agenda and belatedly many policy-makers are recognizing that human action has contributed to global warming. Now that even the White House has accepted that the polar bear is in danger, there is a faint chance that something will be done to slow the pace of environmental damage. But, by 2020, rising air and sea temperatures are likely to have increased the severity and incidence of storms and floods, although there is still a major debate over that issue (Maslin, 2004; Economist, 2006c, p. 12). Currently, sea levels are estimated to be rising at between 3 and 4 millimetres per annum and, even if different oceans are rising at different rates, many cities lying close to the sea or to major rivers and lakes will be more susceptible to flooding (Economist, 2006c, p. 10). How much damage will occur is uncertain although, as the impact of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans showed, it will be the poorest who ‘will suffer earliest and most’ (Stern, 2006, p. vii). By 2020, rising sea levels may well have affected very low-lying cities, particularly those lying in monsoon areas, although if current trends continue, the real danger will come after 2050. Of course, ‘natural’ disasters in the form of hurricanes and earthquakes will continue to threaten cities across the globe. And, although great economic damage will be caused in some Northern cities, the greatest number of deaths will occur in the South (Sanderson, 2000; Pelling, 2003).

An increasing danger by 2020 will be air and water pollution. Although the Kuznets environmental curve suggests that this is not entirely correct, some kinds of emissions increase with economic growth while others decline (UNEP, 1992; World Bank, 2002,
pp. 111–13), growing pollution is a real danger – particularly for the poor. Clearly, economic growth is needed to address poverty and the associated environmental risks that are linked to it. Unfortunately, most current forms of economic growth seem to damage the environment. In China, rapid economic expansion is helping to create some of the most polluted cities on earth. A recent World Bank survey reports that ‘China is home to 16 of the world’s 20 cities with the worst air pollution’ and research by the Chinese Academy on Environmental Planning reveals that ‘100 million people live in cities where the pollution reaches “very dangerous” levels’ (Watts, 2006).

One of the great dangers both to people’s health and to their quality of life in most cities in the world is the growth of car ownership (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999; Gorham, 2002; World Bank, 2002; Whitelegg and Haq, 2003). The car adds to the air pollution that so afflicts cities like Los Angeles, Mexico City, Santiago and an increasing number of Far Eastern cities. The increasing incidence of asthma is almost certainly linked to fuel emissions. Congestion is an even more widely felt problem and in Britain costs ‘an estimated £20bn a year in wasted time and resources and lost business’ (Jowit, 2006). In most countries urban sprawl is advancing apace, adding to many people’s feeling that they are dependent on the car (Jenks and Burgess, 2000; Angel, Sheppard and Civco, 2005). Unless sprawl and car dependency are reversed, the pace of global warming is likely to increase.

Equally serious is that some 1.2 million people die in road accidents every year and, by 2020, road accidents will be the third-biggest cause of death and injury, after heart disease and serious depression. Today 2.1 per cent of all deaths in the world are due to traffic fatalities (Peden et al., 2004, Table A3) and even on the comparatively safe roads of the United Kingdom, ‘between 1951 and 2005, 305,972 people were killed and 17 million persons were injured in accidents’ (Department for Transport, 2006, p. 1). For purposes of comparison, The Guardian newspaper calculates that a mere 14 600 people were killed in terror attacks in 2005 (8300 in Iraq and the rest elsewhere) (Guardian, 2006). Similarly, between 1990 and 2004, 52 000 people died every year as the result of the combined effect of earthquakes and volcanoes, floods and droughts, storms, fires and landslides. Compared with our road deaths, crime and terrorism constitute comparatively insignificant dangers (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/3666474.stm).

Of all of our environmental dangers controlling use of the car ought to be easy. After all, we possess the technology to provide people with alternative forms of transportation. Unfortunately, the wish to own a car, together with the automobile industry’s alleged contribution to economic growth, has made politicians reluctant to confront the issue. Few cities across the globe have been prepared to take significant action against the car and, even in London and Bogotá where serious policies have been introduced, it has so far proved impossible to control the growth in either car ownership or car use.

Car ownership and the threat it brings to urban life and the environment seem to be almost totally out of control. In 1900, there were virtually no cars; ‘Today there are 620 million private cars worldwide, to say nothing of buses, vans and lorries. On current growth trends, that number is expected to double to a staggering 1.2 billion cars worldwide by 2020’ (Jowit, 2006). According to A.C. Nielsen’s 2004 survey of intentions to buy in 28 countries, demand was likely to rise by 60 per cent in seven countries, by 30–60 per cent in 11 and between 0 and 30 per cent in nine (Matsuoka, 2005). In no country surveyed was ownership likely to decline. Unfortunately, those countries with the highest aspiration index included three of the world’s most populous nations, China, India and
Indonesia. Even in countries where population growth has slowed, the changing structure of the family, smaller household size and the increasing demand for ‘mobility’ make it certain that ownership will continue to rise. This is something that must be confronted urgently.

The ideal city, urban policy and informalization

There have long been idealists who have created visions of the perfect city. Unfortunately, visionaries like Ebenezer Howard, Le Corbusier, Patrick Geddes and Oscar Niemeyer are no longer relevant because every attempt to produce a utopian city has failed the test of confronting reality. In the United Kingdom, ‘new cities’ have rarely produced the wonderful living conditions that were promised and, while by world standards, Milton Keynes is a fairly desirable place in which to live, there is absolutely no chance that thousands of Milton Keynes can be produced across the globe. Where wonderful new capitals have been built, they have either been overwhelmed by migrants as in Greater Brasilia, or succumbed to wider social problems as in Washington DC (Wright and Turkienicz, 1988; Gilbert, 1989; Holston, 1989). Even the most successful new capitals, such as Canberra and Ottawa, are in no way appropriate models for other countries because of the expense of building them.

While architects and planners may dream of the ideal, most of the urban world is not even properly regulated. Most people live much of their lives in some kind of informality. They work in unregulated employment, they lack access to social security or a pension, they drive without insurance or even a licence, they live in housing that lacks planning or building permission, their children do not go to school. Increasingly, even the so-called nanny British state is being forced to admit that it does not even know how many people live in the United Kingdom or to explain where the missing Britons are. The ‘black’ economy, while much smaller than that in say Italy, let alone that in the South, is extremely large; a goodly proportion of the people working in construction, agriculture, hotels and restaurants and cleaning have dubious documentation. Compared with the situation in the 1960s, London today exhibits many signs of informality. In the United States, Clark reminds us in Chapter 6 that some 11.5 million immigrants lack documentation and almost one in 20 workers is an unauthorized migrant. An implicit assumption in the planning of utopian cities was that everyone living there would be well-sheltered, educated and provided for. Today, in the great metropolitan cities of the developed world, we don’t even know who lives there! If that is the case in the North, little need be said about the cities of the South, where liberalization and urban growth are together leading to a vast expansion in informality.

All that we can hope for in 2020 is that, despite the mounting problems, most cities will be doing a better job at governing themselves than has been the case in the past. Here, at least, I can identify a number of cities where better governance has allowed living conditions to improve in recent years. Despite formidable barriers, Latin American cities like Bogotá, Curitiba, Porto Alegre and Guayaquil have transformed their administrative competence. In South Africa, Johannesburg shows signs of real improvement, and in Asia, cities like Bangalore appear to be relative models of efficiency.

Some attribute the rising quality of urban governance to growing decentralization (Rodríguez, 1997; Heller, 2001; Campbell, 2003; Oxhorn, Tulchin and Selec, 2004) and while some larger cities have undoubtedly benefited from greater freedom from central
control, decentralization is hardly a panacea. In Brazil, for example, most of the country’s 5500 municipalities lack the finance and personnel to perform the most rudimentary of urban functions and in Colombia the mayors of 300 of its 1100 municipalities have fled in fear of their lives. Even where urban administration has improved, urban overspill means that an increasing proportion of the population of competent cities like Bogotá now live in less organized, even chaotic, neighbouring municipalities (Gilbert and Dávila, 2002; Mesa, 2005; Rueda and Rueda, 2005; Gilbert, 2006).

Despite the efforts of the Cities Alliance and the vast amount of collaboration between urban governments that now takes place, we cannot assume that most people in 2020 will live in competently run and decently financed cities. As such, huge numbers of poor people will continue to lack basic services like water and sewerage. I strongly doubt that we will achieve the laudable Millennium Development Goals and I will only be happy if we can achieve gradual improvement and reduce the absolute numbers of people living in poverty.

**Belief and urban cultures**

Many cities in developed countries are worried about the growing numbers of ethnic minorities living in their midst. This has given rise to great debates about multiculturalism, integration and national identity (see Chapters 6 and 8). In countries like Australia, the United States and even Denmark, increasing efforts have been made to keep immigrants out; elsewhere, as in Canada and much of Western Europe, migrants are still welcome despite increasing signs of public concern. Debates about the veil, the growth of ethnic ghettos, the low standards of education, the decline of national culture and so on reflect the cleavages that the arrival of large numbers of poor and especially poor foreigners are perceived to generate.

There is some danger that ethnic diversity when allied with inequality may accentuate urban problems. The arrival of millions of immigrants to New York and the eastern US seaboard from the middle of the nineteenth century was not unproblematic and the often violent affiliation of ethnic or religious groups with particular football teams is a constant reminder of the antipathy that exists between newcomers and more recent arrivals. Recent clashes between ethnic groups in Sydney, the antipathy between Hispanics and Afro-Americans in the United States, and anti-Moslem feeling in generally tolerant Denmark, France and the Netherlands are worrying signs of the difficulties brought by mass migration. The danger of violence apart, the arrival of large numbers of people from poor countries is reintroducing diseases like tuberculosis into cities like London (Gandy et al., 2003; HPA, 2005). Similarly, the massive arrival of people who struggle with the local language, clearly causes problems for the education system. In London, schools are attempting to educate children who are brought up in homes with at least 300 languages (Baker and Eversley, 2000; Lamb, 2001). In Germany, the second generation of immigrants apparently have an awful educational record (Loewenberg, 2006). Without a decent education, much of the urban citizenry of the future will be condemned to poverty and worse. At the very least, this is not the kind of society that we want to live in.

Whether this will cause generalized violence is unlikely and I do not fear the kind of future hinted at by authors such as Davis (2006) with his forecasts of the poor peripheries of developing cities becoming the permanent battlefields of the twenty-first century. Religious fundamentalism, whether in the form of Islam, evangelical Protestantism or
the neocons in the United States, is worrying even if provides a vivid antidote to the growing materialism of Western society that so many lament! Some violence will no doubt break out in one city or another but the number of people who will be killed or harmed by such violence will be infinitesimal when measured against the damage inflicted by road vehicles.

Perhaps the great social safety net will be provided by our access to modern communication and technology in the home. The rise of the home computer, the Internet, and satellite and cable TV may be encouraging obesity among our children but it is allowing them to live out their fantasies – in sport, music, dance and whatever else – in the comparative safety of their homes. If they increasingly support the global giants rather than their local sports teams and do not even kick a football in the park, nor are they likely to participate actively in social unrest or violence. In 2020, urban societies are more likely to be divided into millions of different sub-cultures than to be radicalized by some great religious wave. Some of those tiny sub-cultures will be dangerous for the rest of us but society at large will be much safer as a result. We will create our own ideal worlds around us and cut ourselves off from the rest of the fearful, chaotic city. I am not sure I like that vision but then I don’t much like many elements of urban culture today!

Conclusion

A key lesson that I draw from my reading and thinking over the years is that few of the grand generalizations that have ever been made about urbanization are universally applicable. The urban world has always been highly complex and, as our numbers increase, migration becomes more common, knowledge becomes more ubiquitous and more selective, culture becomes both more international and localized, little is described accurately by grand ‘laws’. The best we can manage is probabilistic statements of likelihood.

First, unless global warming really takes hold, although 2020 is too soon for its full effect to be manifest, there will be no great urban environmental disaster. Of course, earthquakes, tsunamis, wars and epidemics will strike particular places and sometimes thousands will be killed. But such disasters have relatively little to do with urbanization and in relation to the world’s urban population the number of deaths will be miniscule. Global warming must be addressed immediately but it is not going to have a dramatic effect on urban life by 2020. Perhaps more should be done to discourage people from moving to potentially dangerous places, but I doubt that it will be.

Second, even though poverty will increasingly be an urban phenomenon, over the years cities have generally proved superior to rural areas in allowing people to improve their lives. If the numbers of urban poor increase, that merely means that there will be fewer poor people living elsewhere. Our only concern should be to try to cope better with the arrival of those people and to provide them with public services and employment.

Third, I hope that by 2020 governments and society at large will be more prepared to use existing technology to improve most people’s lives. Today, we do not use our abundant knowledge to best effect. We provide too few poor people with health care. We do too little to confront global warming. We fail to provide land on which people can build their ‘self-help’ shelter safely. Unless we change our ways, too many people will continue to die unnecessarily and to live dismal lives.

Fourth, we clearly need better urban governance. A key problem today is that too few cities, let alone city-regions, have much in the way of coherent government. Many US
cities suffer from the way that more prosperous groups and the better jobs have moved out of ‘problematic’ municipalities, leaving local governments to struggle with a reduced tax base and substantial social problems. To my mind it is essential to develop supra-municipal institutions to prevent excessive government fragmentation and to maintain a general level of competence. Unfortunately, this view is not often shared by the affluent as they move outwards into cheap tax zones.

Fifth, there is the big question of whether ‘globalization’ is reducing our ability to control local and even national issues. The tax base is to some extent being eroded by offshore and on-shore tax havens. Capital movements are rendering national macroeconomic policy redundant. Arguably, the city is increasingly powerless. Most governments lack autonomy and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{11} London’s government can do something about buses and can tax cars entering into the city centre but does not control much else. People constantly complain how the UK government intervenes in too many issues. Unfortunately, attempts at intervention do not constitute effectiveness and one sometimes wonders whether UK government is at the point of breakdown. It is poor at regulating private utility companies, it cannot keep illegal migrants from entering the country, it loses huge amounts of taxation through evasion, its commissioning of public computer contracts is a recurrent disgrace and its to-ing and fro-ing on education, health and security policy has become distinctly embarrassing. If this is the state of the United Kingdom, traditionally one of the better organized societies, what hope is there for the rest of the world?

Sixth, before 2020 we will have to address society’s insatiable demand for the unsustainble. Every Briton, let alone the world at large cannot expect to live in a £300 000 home with a garden, remote from work, amenities and the existing infrastructure. We need more environmentally friendly architecture and urban design. We need to control the private car and to provide better public transport. If we fail to do that then global warming will destroy some cities by 2050 and life will be intolerable in most of the rest. If China continues to copy the West, it will be a disaster foretold.

I have said that most generalizations are unhelpful. However, I will repeat two that I made earlier. By 2020 urban life will not have become intolerable and no city will have been washed away by floods or depopulated by disease. On the other hand, despite continued economic growth urban problems like pollution, inequality and poverty are likely to have risen to such an extent that they will threaten our future. By 2020, the great tragedy will be that millions of people will continue to live in poverty when more determined leadership and more sensible use of our technology and resources could have mitigated the worst of their suffering. Too much of urban life is premised on selfishness. Unless we take action to change that premise, whoever writes the equivalent to my conclusion in 2020 is likely to conclude with more cataclysmic forecasts than my own.

Notes
\begin{enumerate}
\item A rather amusing UK television series in which minor male celebrities were invited to pontificate about the things they disliked in modern life. ‘Who is this hitherto unidentified group of Grumpy Old Men? We’re the ones who were encouraged to dare to dream. The only trouble is that somewhere, over the rainbow, the dreams we dared to dream really did not come true’ (Prebble, 2004, p. 34).
\item Although recently authors like Robinson (2005) have bemoaned the same fact, albeit without apparently being aware that this complaint has something of a history!
\item In 1950, 19 among the 30 largest cities in the world were located in the North compared with only eight in 2005. Industrial cities like Birmingham and Milan have been displaced by Southern cities like Bogotá, Seoul, Tehran and Shenzhen.
\end{enumerate}
4. For example, the UK government’s plans to build thousands of new homes in water-scarce Southeast England.

5. As the Governor of the Bank of England admitted in November 2006, the UK government has no idea how many migrants there are in the country. The incoming UK Home Secretary also claimed that in May 2006 that the immigration section of his new department was ‘not fit for purpose’ and had no real control over the numbers of people who were arriving.

6. Even in the United Kingdom there is constant discussion whether police records are reliable and now doubt is even being cast on the bi-annual household crime survey, mainly because it fails to interview children.

7. Stern (2006, p. vii) claims that one-fifth of Bangladesh will be under water if the sea level were to rise by 1 metre.


9. Over the years many have criticized the attempts of British planners to export new towns to poor countries.

10. In 348 of inner London’s 695 primaries, at least half of pupils do not have English as a mother tongue. http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23370136-details/English%27a/foreign+language+in+London%27s+schools%27/article.do.

11. I cannot think of many cities in the world that have genuine influence over the lives of their people beyond the issue of transport and infrastructure. Which cities in the world work well? Two names spring to mind: Singapore and Zurich. One reason is that both have control. The Singapore government because it is autocratic and takes action on social issues that most other governments will not touch (e.g., electronic taxation of vehicles and banning of chewing gum). Zurich, currently ranked ‘the best city’ in the world to live in, is no doubt helped by the traditional obedience of the Swiss, their high per capita income, effective transport policy and perhaps by the Swiss federal structure and belief in referenda.

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